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Dissertation Abstract 
The text sets out to consider the aspects of the spectral, 
as proposed by Derrida in Spectres of Marx. As an alteric 
revenant refuting the historical/chronological 
determination of ratio and universality, it haunts the 
architectonics of the metaphysical edifice. This spectral 
'operation' is also an activity of encryption which 
involves a discussion speculating on the virtual by 
proposing the transgressive rift as an introjective 
interruption that is realised through the abysmal 
(dis)order of fenestration. It uncovers a thematic of 
topological (dis)location via a series of 'meridial threads' 
which the dissertation seeks to explore through a scrutiny 
of aesthetics and specific creative activities. 
The first chapter explores this 'relation' with 
specific attention given to the alteric rift as an operation 
of diff6rance as indicated by Derrida and seeks to 
critique this juxtaposition with particular reference and 
attention to Kant's aesthetics. Chapter two identifies Paul 
Celan's poem 'Todtnauberg' as a topos for a discussion 
on anticipation and silence in the complex historical 
relationship between the poet and the philosopher Martin 
Heidegger, as 'reported' in the poem. It identifies the 
topology of 'meridial haunting' at Heidegger's Black 
Forest mountain retreat. 'The Unheimlich Manoeuvre' 
(chapter three) deals with two key works by the 
architectural interventionist Gordon Matta-Clark, through 
a discussion on the uncanny (Unheimlich) and its relation 
to the homely (Heimlich), taking into account the encystic 
operation of mourning. The Final chapter continues this 
theme of the architecturally 'interruptive' by considering 
orientation with specific attention to the labyrinthine and 
the temporality of the crystal-image as cited by Deleuze 
in his writings on cinema and the spectral. It looks 
specifically at two films by Tarkovsky; Solaris and Stalker 
and Mark Z. Danelewski's novel House of Leaves (a 
complex fictitious account of a nonexistent documentary 
film which recounts the exploration of a labyrinth which 
appears in an ordinary suburban house). 
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Introduction 
'Well! ' thought Alice to herself. 'After such a fall as this, I shall 
think nothing of tumbling down-stairs! How brave they'll all think 
me at home! Why, I couldn't say anything about it, even if I fell 
off the top of the house! ' (which was very likely true). ' 
Emptiness is held to be a failure to till up a cavity or gap. Yet 
presumably the emptiness is closely allied to the special 
character of place. And therefore no failure but a bringing-forth. 
What began as an opportunity to consider spatiality and 
proximity in the artwork -a speculation on near-ness and 
dis-tance, prompted by Heidegger's essay 'Art and Space' 
(1968), took a tumble into a conundrum of labyrinthine 
passageways where the only hope would be the uncovering 
of a new lingual thread. In considering the juxtaposition of 
aesthetics and hauntology I uncovered a means of exploring 
the possibilities and limitations of the terms 'relation' and 
'dialectic'. Appropriating the Derridian term hauntology 
identifies a means of articulating alterity as an essentially 
spectral imperative that, not only motivates all discourse, 
but also 'functions' (a 'functor') as the 'topological tool' of 
variation. 
1 Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventure in Wonderland, p. 10. 2 Martin Heidegger, 'Art and Space' (published in Pethinking 
Architecture: A F? eader in cultural Theory [ed. N. Leach]), p. 123. 
V 
There were already clues as to how one might begin to 
stake out the trajectory of this journey in the opening 
remarks of 'Art and Space'. Here as a sculptor and 
therefore arguably, a manipulator of the spatial, I sought 
out, recognised and took a certain comfort in the language 
of volume and closure, and which Heidegger provisionally 
cites as the demarcation of inside and outside and the 
surety of enclosure and the familiarity of an ongoing 
technicity. However, as the text unfolds, so too is 
unravelled the scientific and volumetric arbitration of space 
and which leads Heidegger to tread what he terms 'an 
emergency path 3 through language to release the 
particularity of the placial through the operation of clearing 
(Lichtung). Similarly, I found in Derricla the Wegmarken 4 of 
the lingual disruption of difference through the revelation of 
the silent phonetic arbiter of diffdrance. As noted, 
Heidegger's engagement with the artwork specifically 
through the sculpted form in 'Art and Space' and more 
generally in 'The Origin of the Work of Art', infers that the 
historical definition of aesthetics as a kind of scientific 
arbitration of 'truth' and 'beauty' identifies and 
'essentialises' a notion of 'pure form'. Here persists the 
continuing imperative toward an 'idealisation' or 'pre- 
emptive organisation' of intuition which follows and merely 
'adapts', the metaphysical tradition. The domination of this 
tradition of 'making sense' argues that 'order' and 'ordering' 
not only 'give shape', but also identify that which cannot be 
ordered as that which refutes 'order'. 
3 lbid, . p. 122. 
This route is also described as 'a narrow and 
4 
precarious one'. 
Translates as pathmark. 
VI 
In the 'continuous' drive toward 'clarity' as the 
affirmation of an 'universal illumination' (at shadows, 
deferral); of that which organises while simultaneously and 
perhaps more militantly, suggesting a 'suppressive violence' 
of that which can never 'conform' to any recognised pre- 
determined definition of 'organisation'. This is better 
articulated through the 'complication' of an abysmal 
6 outside' introjected; and encrypted in all such 
terminologies as the encYst-ence of what will be called a 
rif t. 
If thus an abyss stretching out of sight (unijbersehbare Kluft) is 
established between the domain of nature, that is, the sensible, 
and the domain of the concept of freedom, that is the 
suprasensible, such that no passage (Obergang) is possible from 
one to the other (by means, therefore of the theoretical use of 
reason), as between two worlds so different that the first can 
have no influence (Einfluss) on the second, the second must (soll 
doch) yet have an influence on the former( ... ). Consequently it 
must be (muss es) that there is a foundation of unity (Grund der 
5 
Einheit)... . 
In seeking to consider pertinent exemplars of the encystic 
collusion of aesthetics and hauntology, I came upon Pierre 
Joris' translation of Paul Celan's poetic inscription of his 
5 Quote taken from Jacques Derrida's text The Truth in Painting (pp. 
35-36) and abbreviated from Kant's treatise, The Critique of 
Judgement. 
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meeting with the questionably politically and morally 
compromised philosopher Heidegger at the latter's Black 
Forest retreat in July 1967. This provides the overarching 
thematic for a discussion that navigates the terrain of the 
lingual (as both vocal and written word) in relation to 
silence. I propose a critique of Celan's 'demand' for a 
'word' (what Joris terms, 'his great expectations Y6) of 
acknowledgement and contrition from Heidegger for his 
political 'dalliances' during the National Socialist era. I 
speculate on how one (Celan) who found in the evolution of 
their own 'poetic voice' a failing of 'vocality' and a 
'stuttering into silence' (disfluency) could either expect or 
anticipate the clarity and eloquence of an apologetic 
assertion from another? The relationship between 'the 
thinking poet' (Celan) and 'the poetic thinker' (Heidegger) 
will also draw attention to the possibility of a locale 
resonating with a plurality of meridial hauntings along the 
holzweg7. 
The line inscribed in the poem, "whose name did it record 
before mine? " identifies Celan's own speculative 
anticipation of proximity to evidence of previous visitations 
to the hillside retreat from arguably more contentious 
individuals and groups. In any 'foci' or temporal 'locale' (in 
this instance, a 'double' operation - the poem, 
'Todtnauberg' 'locates' the place Todtnauberg and is itself 
'located) there is anticipated all other possible historical 
'locales', which exceed and recede the specificity of any 
one. This 'archaeological' encryption that the aesthetic of 
6 Pierre Joris, Introduction to his translation of Celan's collection of 
7 
poems, Lightduress, p. 15. 
Holzweg translates as logging path or wood way. It is used here and 
throughout this text to connote variant pathways and possible routes. 
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poetic language 'illuminates', postulates the meridian as the 
topological tool for an appropriate navigation of the trace as 
that which vocalises all that remains essentially unvocal 
while resisting any determination toward the continuity of 
mere substitution. The image of the pharmakos ('the 
scapegoat') introduces a discussion on ambiguity manifest 
in the complication of the remedial: that is, the intrinsic 
differential relation between the curative and poisonous. 
As a result, an aesthetic procedure where both toxicity and 
remedy (co)operated was sought to further explore 
spectrality. 
Speculation on the remedial as an operation of introjection 
draws attention to the architectonics of The Heimlich 
Manoeuvre. This First - Aid operation determines a need for 
a permanent expulsion of an alien body as a remedial 
restoration of corporeal order. Armed with this definition of 
ejection, a provisional 'inversion'; defined as The 
Unheimlich Manoeuvre, is proposed. This is understood as 
the retention of the 'alien' as an 'essential' operation of 
encryption. The 'architectural interventions' of the artist 
Gordon Matta-Clark provide a specific creative oeuvre by 
which this operation of encyst-ence can be explored. 'The 
cut' of Matta-Clark's visceral operations, demands the 
continual 'insistence' and integrity of an 'architectonics of 
ix 
stability' to give a 'lingual potency' to the variations of a 
fenestrative 'manoeuvre', however, the overarching theme 
of encryption identifies an ambiguity at the heart of any 
structural 'continuity' -a ructure. As already stated, the rift 
is identified as the 'locale' of encryption -a 'non-place' or 
'no-where' bearing the poignancy of a spatiality that refutes 
incorporation and questions the 'logic' of spatio and 
extensio. This determines the crypt as the 'abysmal 
foundation' - the non-ument as the 'site' of mourning and 
the locale of the spectre. 
I argue that mourning as the 'event' of encryption 
remains fundamental to the work of Matta-Clark 
emphasising their conceptual 'grounding' as that which are 
termed non-uments. It also indicates that visceration is the 
realisation of that which remains intrinsically and 
exclusively invisible in the framing of any edifice. The rift 
as ructure 'locates' invisibility as the 'operation' of the 
spectral arbiter refusing absorption by and into the 
corporeal through the disruptive encyst-ence of 
discontinuity and alterity. As Paul Virilio recognises in his 
text Bunker Archaeology that the variation by which space 
is articulated is no longer understood by mere calculation 
but haunted by the introjection of the temporal. 
The space I was charting with surveys and measurements of 
different types of casements was the space of a different 
historical time than that of the moment of my trip; the conflict I 
perceived between the summer of seaside bathing and the 
summer of combat world would never again cease. For me the 
organisation of space would now go hand in hand with 
manifestations of time. 8 
8 Paul Virilio, preface to Bunker Archaeology, p. 14. 
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23 Janiuere, 1610 
Ftaires! We haue found ftaires! 9 
* 
The aesthetic of the cinematic event interpreted as the 
implication/explication of a kind of Leibnizian folding, 
identifies duration as a 'form of time' that resists the 
continuity of what we might define as a succession of 
moments that constitute permanence. Deleuze, via Bergson 
understood such duration as an open whole of constant 
differentiation, which rather than specify fragmentation as 
mere dissipation, offered the complexity of incompletion as 
an operation of pre-individuation (disorientation). Here the 
convolution of the labyrinth enunciates temporality as the 
crystal-image. It considers the concept of 'open' narrative 
where duration takes precedence and forms the intrinsic 
'temporal structure' of two films by Andrei Tarkovsky: 
9 Mark Z. Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 414 (footnote reads; 
Jamestown Colony Papers: The Tiggs, Verm &/ Diary [Lacuna Diary 
Library founded by The National Heritage Society] v. xxiii. IN 139, 
January 1610, p. 18-25) 
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Solaris, and Stalker. As Deleuze argued, Tarkovsky opted 
for the 'classical' (movement-image) concept of shot but 
also indicated that he referred to "the pressure of time in 
the shot"10 animating the 'stasis of movement'. 
Mark L. Danielewski's novel House of Leaves also 
'folds, unfolds and refolds' through a series of interrelated 
narratives in an ever shifting operation of 
implicate/explicate and construes a topological thread 
through a series of transcribed events which surround the 
discovery and exploration of a labyrinth which appears in an 
ordinary suburban American house. The chapter explores 
via Tarkovsky's two films, specifically, the phi-creature in 
Solaris and the 'zone' in Stalker and the crystalline concept 
of the time-image and the spectral variation of the 
introjected phantom which haunts both Tarkovsky's films 
and Danielewski's novel. It draws comparisons with the 
fragmentary 'structure' of Danielewski's novel (itself a story 
about the making of a film) to extrapolate on encryption and 
the significance of the rift/ructure discussed in the previous 
chapters via the aesthetic 'experimentation' of film and 
novel. This is indicative of the orientating 'operation' of 
spectrality through the interruptive inconsistency of encyst- 
ence in the labyrinthine while also considering that which 
de-centres/haunts the labyrinth. 
10 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 42. 
xii 
Down, down, down. Would the fall never come to an end? 'I 
wonder how many miles I've fallen by this time? ' she said 
aloud. 'I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the 
earth. Let me see that would be four thousand miles down, I 
think-"' 
11 Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, p. 10. 
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Chapter 1 
An Aesthetics' of Hauntology 
A traditional scholar does not believe in ghosts - nor in 
all that could be called the virtual space of spectrality. 
There has never been a scholar who, as such, does not 
believe in the sharp distinction between the real and the 
unreal, the actual and the inactual, the living and the 
2 
non-living, being and non-being . 
This chapter will develop a discourse on what Derrida 
has called the virtual space of spectrality as the 
alteric locale of a certain kind of aesthetic 
differentiation. In so doing, it will resist subsumption 
into any binary opposition by identifying the 
transgressive ri ft3 (the between) as the active topos of 
the apparition. 
The Greek root 'aesthesis' denotes the capacity for sense perception, 
the wide realm of the beautiful, and the science of sensation or 
feeling. The Latinate aesthetica (in German, Asthetik) was first used 
by A. G. Baumgarten (1714-62) in his texts Metaphysica (1739) and 
Aesthetica (1750) and was derived from the Greek aisthanesthai, 'to 
perceive', aisth6sis, 'perception' and aisth6tikos, 'capable of 
perception'. Baumgarten defines it as the 'science of sensory 
knowledge', but later restricts it to the 'science of sensory beauty'. 
The term covers the beauty of nature as well as the beauty of art. I 
am mindful here of Derrida's use of the term cryptology (see Chapter 
3, 'The Unheimlich Manoeuvre') as the scientific study of secret 
writing and the deciphering of secret codes. 
2 Derrida, Spectres of Marx, p. 11. 
31 wish to consider the term rift with all the resonance of the German 
word Riss. Heidegger uses this term in his essay 'The Origin of the 
Work of Art' (Basic Writings, pp. 139-203) to, not only indicate a rift, 
split or tear as an indication of separation, but also to 
simultaneously connote a holding together (in the case of the 
artwork, of the revelation of world and the obduration of earth). It is 
further defined by Heidegger as a plan (as in architectural drawing or 
ground plan) and this will impact later in this and further chapters. 
Levinas, writing on transcendence, defines it as that which cannot be 
conceptualised, theorised, objectified or universalised as in the 
history of epistemology/reason. It is as a rupture: an opening up to 
the other that resists reduction to sameness (Western thinking's 
drive to objectify and universalise). 
1 
The necessity which places two such specific 
terms (aesthetics and hauntology) in a kind of coeval 
proximity to each other must provisionally recognise 
and explore the dialectical complexity of what might be 
considered their seemingly fundamental oppositional 
nature. However, what this also suggests is that the 
operation by which the initial identification of the 
former (aesthetics) as the 'science' of beauty and 
4 
perceptions, and the latter (hauntology) as other5 to 
that science (what we might tentatively and advisedly 
refer to as a science 6 of the spectral), offers the 
potential for further scrutiny with regard to some 
observations on spectrality - what might be interpreted 
as a condition of encryption. 
The context of the encounter between aesthetics and 
hauntology will be set up by the confrontation that takes 
place between the key thinkers of aesthetics (Kant, in The 
Critique of Judgement) and hauntology (Derrida, in Spectres 
of Marx) and given a locale in Derrida's critical project on 
aesthetics, The Truth in Painting. 
4 Derrida quotes Kant from The Critique of Judgement (§ 44, 'On the 
Fine Arts'), when he notes in The Truth in Painting, 'There is no 
science of the beautiful, only a critique of the beautiful', p. 89. 
5 The concept of the other will expanded on in some detail later in the 
text and will make specific reference to Levinas and alterity. 
6 An indication of the significance of using the word science in this 
context has already been alluded to in footnote 1 and will be 
expanded on further. 
2 
This will not only attempt to identify the alterity of the 
other as that from which the emergence of any binary is 
manifest, but also to explore a terrain, which is more, 
haunted by what is encrypted 7 within it. This text will seek 
to confront these seemingly oppositional characteristics and 
explore the possibility of the variance of the spectral as 
that, which calls into question certainty and conclusivity 
(the 'closure') of the universal as thinking's framework. 
It will also seek to question pure pragmatic integrity 
as a means of countering classical reason 8 and to explore 
spectrality as the site of the alteric, 9 but also as a 
complication of variation from which the conception of any 
scientific postulation might emerge through a critique of 
adherence and inherence. 10 Amidst such provisional insights 
and speculation, the question emerges as to where we 
7 With the use of the term encryption I will seek to indicate an active 
immanence of otherness that undermines and unsettles oppositional 
dialectics. It may be worth bearing in mind at this point Derrida's 
contention that diffdrance is not a concept but the 'possibility of 
conceptuality' -a 'play', an 'undecided between' that is outside the 
concept of signifier and signified and therefore between passive and 
active. The historical context for passive and active is found not only 
in Kant, but also in the fundamental binary opposition of presence 
and absence. Derrida notes that the question, 'What is the origin of 
the work of art? ' implies a unity of word, concept and thing as well as 
an originary meaning, an etymon. As the unity of such a truth, the 
work of art: 'It implies first of all that "art" can be reached following 
the three ways of word, concept and thing, or again signifier, 
signified, and referent or even by some opposition between presence 
and absence. ' The Truth in Painting, p. 20. 
8 In Positions, Derrida argues: 'In effect, we must avoid having the 
indispensable critique of a certain naive relationship to the signified 
or the referent, to sense or meaning, remain fixed in a suspension 
that is, a pure and simple suppression, of meaning or reference', p. 
74. 
9 Alteric or Alterity from the German Alter translated as other or to 
make a thing different. The other common definition refers to alterity 
as the state or quality of being other, a being otherwise; 'For outness 
is but the feeling of otherness [alterity] rendered intuitive, or alterity 
visually represented' (Samuel Taylor Coleridge; added emphasis). 
10 Derrida notes in The Truth in Painting that: 'Absolute nonadherence 
should certainly have no contact, no common frontier, no exchange 
with adherence: no adherence is possible between adherence and 
nonadherence. And yet this break of contact, this very separation 
constitutes a limit, a blank, the thickness of a blank -a frame if you 
like', p. 100. 
3 
might begin to find such a locale of differentiation 
(assuming, at this stage, that a topographical language of 
mapping and location is still in some way appropriate to 
such an endeavour). The locale remains essentially 'without 
place' (arguably, that which haunts") while simultaneously 
exercising a profound influence on what we might call the 
post priori principles of the placial. 
* 
In the introduction to The Truth in Painting, Derrida argues 
for the institution of what he calls a trai t12 and which he 
defines as: 
Between the outside and the inside, between the external and 
the internal edge-line, the framer and the framed, the figure 
and the ground, form and content, signifier and signified, and 
so on for any two-faced opposition. The trait thus divides in 
this place where it takes place. 13 
11 1 am mindful here that to consider a 'that which' runs the immediate 
risk of subjugating the spectral to a possible a priori subject/object 
relation, but for the moment, I leave this in place on the 
understanding that further critique will contextualise such a 
motivation. 
12 Trait: a distinguishing feature or characteristic from the Latin tractus 
meaning act of drawing and which is also the etymological root for 
tract meaning; a region or area of indefinite (especially) large extent; 
in corporeal terms an area of an organ or system or in temporal 
terms, a period of time. 
13 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. xii. Earlier in the same 
introduction, Derrida says of the 'trait' that: 'It situates between the 
visible edging and the phantom at the centre, from which we 
fascinate', ibid., p. xii (added emphasis). 
4 
The connotation of such an attribution calls into question 
the prerogative of any simplistic binary in favour of a more 
complex interpretation of 'locale', which finds in a certain 
kind of predetermination an abysmal status that articulates 
(com)prehension through the relation of a between. 
However, it is pertinent to remember here that any 
confrontation requires the engagement of a language that is 
arguably already steeped in logocentric bias, and as such, 
requires us to be both cautious and attentive to the 
condition of play at work in the possibility of the written text 
as a location for speculation on or about the spectral. 
Likewise, historical terminologies will be used advisedly 
and attentively on the understanding that they may still 
resonate with the 'vibration of a metaphysical weight' that 
determines the direction of enquiry. Therefore, whenever 
possible, an attempt will be made to contextualise their use 
and proffer appropriate criticism. 
Derrida comments in The Truth in Painting that: 
The imagination is afraid of losing itself in this abyss. The 
abyss - the concept of which, like that of the bridge, organised 
the architectonic considerations - would be the privileged 
presentation of the sublime. 14 
Any observations made must be scrutinised in relation to 
reveal any historical determination to perpetuate a relation 
based in such historical binary opposition (presence and 
absence, being and non-being, affirmation and negation, 
etc. ) but also recognise its import as a context for the 
foundation of our argument on the understanding that the 
14 Ibid., p. 129 (added emphasis). 
5 
following discussion does not merely invert affirmation and 
negation, but explores the complexity of both encryption 
and the spectral and their pertinence to the demands of 
structural integrity. 15 
* 
It might appear provisionally that we seek some kind of 
middle ground (what Derrida in The Truth in Painting takes 
from Kant as that which is between reason and knowledge; 
Mittelglied) -a place that is neither theoretical nor 
practical, or which is as Derrida indicates, both theoretical 
and practical, where art (in general) or the beautiful take 
place; 16 what is other to both reason and knowledge 
(practical and theoretical). In Kantian discourse, the abyss 
over which judgement constructs a bridge between the 
above is arguably such a non-locatable locale. 17 However, 
15 Derrida notes in The Truth in Painting: 'One would be seeking a one- 
and-naked meaning [un sens un et nu] which would inform from the 
inside, like a content, while distinguishing itself from the forms which 
it informs', p. 22. He argues that in order to 'think art', one does so 
through a series of oppositions (meaning/form, inside/outside, 
content/container, etc. ) which, he argues, 'precisely structure the 
traditional interpretation of works of art ... One makes of art in 
general an object in which one claims to distinguish an inner 
meaning, the invariant, and a multiplicity of external variations 
through which, as through many veils, one would try to see or restore 
the true, full, originary meaning' (ibid., as above). 
16 'Lrl]f it takes place, is inscribed here. But this here is announced as a 
place deprived of a place. It runs the risk in taking place, of not 
having its own proper domain. But this does not deprive it, for all 
that, of jurisdiction and foundation: what has no domain [Babiet] or 
field [Feld] of its own, no "field of objects" defining its "domain", can 
have a "territory" and a "ground" [Boden] possessing a "proper 
legality". ' Ibid., p. 38 (added emphasis). 
17 Note here Heidegger's use of the image of the bridge in 'Building 
Dwelling Thinking' as the locale for the gathering of the fourfold: 'the 
stay of mortals on the earth' in dwelling. He determines the 
belonging of the fourfold as mortals who are affiliated to earth ('on 
the earth'), sky ('under the sky') and divinities ('remaining before 
divinities') and argues that such a belonging as a gathering 'or 
assembly, by an ancient word of our language is called a "thing"', p. 
153 (added emphasis). The specifics of the thingliness of the bridge 
are determined by the realisation of such a gathering. 
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such rational topography belies more complex articulations, 
which this text will seek to explore. 
Firstly, as indicated in the opening comment, it may 
seem paradoxical to propose hauntology as a science, 18 
however, this is done with the specific intention of 
proposing that the spectral is already at work, encrypted 
even, in the predetermined logic of science and technology. 
We may consider here momentarily that Heidegger hints at 
an alteric operation in his essay, 'The Question Concerning 
Technology', when he postulates that 'the essence of 
technology is nothing technological'. 19 
This notion of precomprehension is not necessarily 
confined to the scientific/technological trope, as Derrida 
points out in The Truth in Painting. He states: 
If therefore, one were to broach lessons on art or aesthetics 
by a question of this type ('What is artT 'What is the origin of 
art or of works of artT 'What is the meaning of artT 'What 
does art meanT etc. ) the form of the question would already 
provide the answer. Art would be predetermined or 
precomprehended in it. 20 
As can be noted here, Derrida finds in his various questions 
of and on 'art' an a priori condition that precedes any 
enquiry and demands consideration in advance of aesthetic 
specificity. The question that follows this preliminary 
proposal might well be one of the nature of such encryption 
as something essentially outside binary determination, and 
as such, whether it has an essential function in all logical 
18 The term science may indeed reference an empirical imperative 
structured by logic that has remained essentially a priori in thought 
and if this text attempts anything, it is to consider what I will call the 
event of spectrality in terms of empiricism and vice versa. 
19 Martin Heidegger's essay, 'The Question Concerning Technology', is 
found in a collection of essays under the same title, pp. 3-35. 
20 Added emphasis. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 21. 
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determinations. It is hoped that this alteric condition 
identifies an operation of spectrality whereby the haunting 
of all that is understood as reasonableness in the logic of 
thinking is found in the ambiguity of the location of the 
event of spectrality, no longer understood as mere 
exclusion, and this will be credited and developed as the 
text unfolds. 
The key term that will function as the overarching 
thematic of this discussion will be the rift. This will operate 
as a topological pun CtUM21 -a kind of singularity of 
othernesslalterity and which arguably, operates as a kind of 
invariant which maps the speculative field and addresses 
the notion of the spectre in the realisation of a realm of 
discontinuity not necessarily instigated by the a priori of 
continuity - what we might begin to think of as the 
visualisation of invisibi I ity. 22 As has already been noted, 
Heidegger addresses the term rift at some length in his 
essay, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' as that which 
distinguishes the obdurate materiality inherent in the 
concealment of earth from the revealing unconcealment of 
world. 
21 The term puncturn is used here in the sense of an elevation or a 
depression on a surface and has strong resonances with Deleuzian 
notions of the 'determining' of a continuous surface and in particular, 
his work on the Leibnizian singularity, the monad in The Fold Leibniz 
and the Baroque. In topological terms the singular point or foci 
operates as that which maintains the continuous through any 
transformation or discontinuity - it maps a surface (via its own 
continuity) while remaining unaffected by any transformation of that 
surface. 
22 In The Truth in Painting, Derrida comments: 'If the phrase "the truth 
in painting" has the force of "truth" and its play opens onto the 
abyss, then perhaps what is at stake in painting is truth, and in truth 
what is at stake (that idiom) is the abyss', p. vii (added emphasis) of 
introduction entitled 'Passe-Partout'. 
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What is initially proposed is to sketch out an overview 
that explores what has been already indicated, as the 
provisional consideration of not only the oppositional 
distinction, but also the commonality between terminologies 
(aesthetics and hauntology) and therefore what imperative 
brings them together - their root, as it were. 23 
* 
The rigour of this discussion will bring some clarity towards 
our motivation for maintaining them in what might be 
understood as provisionally, a proximal relation and which, 
while indicating a perceived historical dialectical continuity, 
questions the nature of such a coeval unity through the 
specificity of such proximity. This will also take into 
consideration the nature of such a proximal relation in more 
general terms and its relation to the specificity of 
difference. 
At the same time, an attempt will be made to 
illuminate this so-called dependency and question the 
historical motivation towards duality, similitude and 
precedence. This text will both follow and anticipate a 
conceptual trail ('a thread'), which will not necessitate a 
determination towards what we might term a chronological 
23 1 am conscious here of the provisional retention of a terminology of 
metaphysical enquiry and logical structure. 'Root' indicates a 
'ground' that conforms to the posture of stasis and reason, which 
organises the historical progress of philosophical thought. This text 
will seek to question that genesis but through the language of its 
conception; hence the provisional maintenance of its language. Both 
Derricla and Heidegger argue for the understanding of the abyss or 
abysmal as the foundation for the metaphysical edifice and which in 
turn, violently represses its origin through constructive abuse. See 
Mark Wigley's text, The Architecture of Deconstruction - Derrida's 
Haunt, pp. 1-33. Also note the significance of the abyss in Derrida's 
The Truth in Painting as that which comes between (as described 
earlier as judgement) knowledge and reason and finds its place in the 
disinterested pleasure of a subjective aesthetic - that which Kant 
attempts to bridge via judgement. 
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exploration, but will look towards the interruptive aspects of 
what will later be considered as the crystallisation of 
tempora litY24 in an attempt to traverse a thematic course. 
This course will seek evidence of the spectral through a 
range of thought always and already haunted, as it were, by 
alterity. It will maintain what will be understood as the 
overarching alteric thematic, identifying and locating the 
other . 
25 1t is no longer conceived as merely the prosaic 
condition of absence, but that, which motivates through a 
precedent towards invisibility as that which maintains any 
notion of discontinuity/continuity. 
In a sense, it is a priori to the historical drive towards 
a universality and continuity based on similitude, which 
may, in effect, be seen as the post priori condition of any 
reasonableness and logic. 
It is essential to keep in mind that any notion of 
continuity which may appear to unfold on this journey 
(which might be conceived as the alteric thought of the 
thinkers, Derrida, Levinas and Deleuze) must first be noted 
and second resisted, as it obviates the spirit of the 
observation and maintenance of the status of alterity in its 
otherness. With this in mind, it is worth remembering what 
Derrida expresses in his text 'Diffbrance' on the status of 
the alteric: to capitalise diff6rance would be to provide it 
with a kind of ontological status that undermines its alteric 
condition, and he reminds us that: 
24 The crystal-image as cited by Deleuze in his writings on film 
(Cinemas 1 and 2) as the expression of a distinctively different 
interpretation of temporality in post-war European cinema will be 
considered in greater detail in Chapter 4, 'The Orientation of the 
Labyrinthine'. 
25 These terms are used advisedly at this stage, bearing in mind the 
context of the textual thematic as a critique of dialectical structure 
and its intrinsic role in the history of logic and reason. 
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It commands nothing, rules over nothing, and nowhere does it 
exercise any authority. It is not marked by a capital letter. Not 
only is there no realm of diff6rance, but diff6rance is even the 
subversion of every realm. This is obviously what makes it 
threatening and necessarily dreaded by everything in us that 
desires a realm, the past or future presence of a realm. 
And it is always in the name of a realm that, believing one 
sees it ascend to the capital letter, one can reproach it for 
wanting to rule. 26 
The precedence of this term (diff6rance) as neither a word 
nor a concept indicates what he refers to as a middle voice 
-a juncture, interval or assemblage that, he proposes, 
does not recount the steps of history, but refers to a 
27 
general system of all these schemata' . 
This indicates that 
the spectral complicates any surety in what we might call 'a 
chronological temporal continuity' and through a kind of 
spatial intervention impacting from outside of any 
recognised systemisation as a transgressor of the clarity of 
distinction and beyond the control of individuation. 
26 Derrida, taken from the text 'Diff6rance', and published in The 
Continental Philosophy Reader (ed. R. Kearney and M. Rainwater), p. 
458. 
27 Ibid., p. 442. He also comments on the 'dual' in his text, Memoirs of 
the Blind: 'Creative memory, schernatization, the time and the 
schema of Kant's transcendental imagination with its "synthesis" and 
11 ghosts". ' And later in the same text suggest that the 'dual' takes 
place: 'the visionary vision of the seer who sees beyond the visible 
present, the overseeing, sur-view, or survival of sight. And the 
draftsman who trusts in sight, in present sight, who fears the 
suspension of visual perception, who does not want to be done with 
mourning it, who does not want to let it go, this draftsman begins to 
go blind simply through the fear of losing his sight. ' pp. 47-8 (added 
emphasis). We might also consider for a moment here the link 
between sight and voice with regard to Celan in Chapter 2, 
'Todtnauberg and the Meridian'. Does the poet fear becoming 
disfluentlsilent through the fear of losing the ability to speak? 
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As Derrida proposes, 'a spectre is always a revenan t. 213 
One cannot control its comings and goings because it 
begins by coming back. 29 It remains crucial to the 
development of our argument that the consistency of this 
proximal relation we are making between aesthetics and 
hauntology is not found only in similarity, although 
sameness will play a pivotal role in the topological terrain 
covered. 
In the discussion that follows, what is essentially not 
similarity or a manifestation of sameness will be seen as 
the consistent factor (the functor) that haunts the fabric of 
the text and also that the alterity of any interpretation of 
spectrality will be perhaps the strongest (though not 
necessarily the clearest) manifestation of the overarching 
thematic. 30 
Here I begin by suggesting that sameness, as the 
condition of similitude, is perhaps provisionally (and 
arguably controversially) rather a condition of alterity. This 
resists the insistence towards merely inverting the binary of 
metaphysical logic and just presenting absence as a priori 
in presence's stead. Spectrality not only calls into question 
this historical precedent, but also refuses to recognise or 
28 Translates as ghost, but can also refer to the verb to return. Derrida 
exploits this variant possibility of its meaning in Spectres of Marx. 
Also note here Derrida's question on 'return' (revenant) and the 
reciprocity of the 'circle' in the section entitled 'Lemmata' of The 
Truth in Painting. 'Why a circle? Here is the schema of the argument: 
to look for the origin of a thing is to look for that from which it starts 
out... to look for its essential provenance, which is not its empirical 
origin. The work of art stems from the artist so they say. But what is 
an artist? The one who produces works of art. The origin of the artist 
is the work of art, the origin of the work of art is the artist, "neither 
is without the other". ' pp. 29-30. 
29 Derrida, Spectres of Marx, p. 11. 
30 The manifestation (the 'visibility') of invisibility as the condition by 
which the spectral haunts is crucial to our argument against the logic 
of presence as the affirmation that precedes the negation of absence. 
12 
condone the possibility of a mere inversion as any solution 
to such an historical precedent. 
What remains important to this operation is how it 
might be understood that the two terms (aesthetics and 
hauntology) are drawn together outside any dialectical 
determination based in the consistency of a historical 
binary opposition. I have already postulated a provisional 
definition of aesthetics as the science of beauty, but what 
of its counterpart? How might we articulate the term 
hauntology? There is implied in the structuring of the title, 
An Aesthetics of Hauntology, what might be seen as the 
judgemental imposition of the so-called science of beauty 
over the science of spectrality. 
The inclusion of the preposition of could be seen as 
validating such a hierarchical interpretation. The implication 
is that aesthetics imposes a form of Judgemen t 31 overthe 
other and it may well be that we might have to consider 
their inversion to be the provisional solution to that obvious 
call for any speculation on a priori status. 
This literal inversion (what could be seen as A 
Hauntology of Aesthetics) might certainly begin to articulate 
the significance and relevance of haunting as pertinent to 
any future aesthetical postulation, but the reversal of 
terminologies remains just that, and does not yet address 
31 The term Judgement is used advisedly and with specific reference to 
Kant's third critique: The Critique of Judgement. The capitalisation of 
Judgement is intentional and refers to the comment made by S. 
K6rner in his text Kant (p. 175) that the capital 'indicates the power 
of the faculty of judging'. As K6rner points out, Kant states that 
'Judgement in general' is 'the faculty of thinking the particular as 
being contained in the universal' (p. 176, Critique of Judgement, 
Introduction, Part IV, 179) (added emphasis). As already noted, 
Derrida subverts this lingual empowerment through capitalisation, by 
proposing that diff6rance should not conform to such hierarchies and 
therefore to maintain its alteric status by the refusal of 
capitalisation. 
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the more fundamental issue of the necessity of their 
proximity and relation. 32 
In Spectres of Marx, Derrida proposes hauntology as 
that which is altogether other, the event of the 'staging for 
the end of history' as both first and last time (retention and 
protention). The ghost is understood as the manifestation of 
any insubstantiality that operates between corporeality and 
its facsimile as simulacrum. It is a repetition (and as such, 
has a kind of temporality) that engenders the spectral 
through the return to a kind of abstracted corporeal 
possibi I it Y. 33 An additional difficulty that Derrida discloses 
as manifest in the spectral is that any apparition is not 
merely the incarnation of spirit. The tradition that locates 
spirit as the transcendental at the heart of the corporeal is 
motivated by the persistence of an onto-theological 
imperative that orders through the determination to find a 
place for the transcendent within the carnal as that which in 
some way, supersedes it. The spectre is neither 'pure' spirit 
nor 'mere' body, but functions as an intervention which 
relies on the corporeal to render 'the non-sensuous 
sensuous'. 34 
32 In Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Heidegger points 
out what he refers to as 'the dialectical game' seemingly 'at work' in 
the phrase; 'The truth of be-ing is the be-ing of truth'. He argues 
that: 'Said in this way, sounds like an artificial and forced reversal 
and - taken to the extreme - like a seduction to a dialectical game', 
p. 66 (added emphasis). However, he proceeds by indicating that that 
this is just a 'fleeting' and 'external' sign of a turn in be-ing and 
which indicates a more fundamental interpretation based in decision. 
33 Derrida's argument for the apparitional is based in incarnation. He 
states: 'There is no ghost, there is never any becoming-spectre of 
the spirit without at least the appearance of flesh in a space of 
invisible visibility, like the dis-appearing of an apparition. For there 
to be ghost, there must be a return to body, but to a body that is 
more abstract than ever. ' Spectres of Marx, p. 126. 
34 Ibid., p. 151. Derrida also refers here to transcendence as the super- 
, the step beyond. 
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With this in mind, the understanding of the spectral as 
6merely' a simulacra or facsimile of the specificity of 
carnality is called into question, and articulates the 
contention that similarity and sameness are not necessarily 
this unifying factor. 35 What brings them into relation may be 
provisionally perceived as sameness, but this is on the 
understanding that similitude remains the action of reason 
and logic. This relegates difference to merely the negation 
of that sameness and therefore subordinate to it. If 
scrutinised more carefully, it will appear more appropriate 
that we consider difference as essentially more involved in 
the instigation of relation and therefore fundamentally 
preceding any grasp of similitude. With this in mind, the 
thinking of difference will supply the essential tools to begin 
this journey, but with clear provisos based on the range of 
distinctly different thought that is involved in the thinking of 
difference. 
What has already been indicated with regard to the 
historical precedence of sameness may still remain 
somewhat inarticulate in any critiquing of the universal, and 
therefore inarticulate in the determining of an exploration of 
the spectral and its location as the rift. Consequently it will 
be productive to look to Derrida and provisionally further 
35 In his text on Levinas, Emmanuel Levinas, The Genealogy of Ethics, 
John Llewelyn articulates the distinction that Levinas makes between 
totality and infinity through production. He states: 'The idea of 
production will enable Levinas to distinguish the idea of the infinite 
from the idea of totality. Although totality is not the same as 
neutrality and distinction is not the same as separation, the thin end 
of the wedge that will accomplish this distinction between totality and 
the infinite is inserted when analysis of concrete manifestations of 
the concretion of existence and the existent begins to separate 
these. ' p. 32. The wedge not only holds to pieces tightly together, 
but also can split them apart. I would also comment here that the 
distinction/complication between spectre and simulacra is looked at 
in some detail in Chapter 4, 'The Orientation of the Labyrinthine', 
with regard to the visitorslphi-creatures in Lem's novel and 
Tarkovsky's film, Solaris. 
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appropriate diff6rance 36 at the beginning of this enquiry as 
the key term by which to grasp and critique this relation. 
The relevance of this provisional consideration of 
Derridian differenceldiff6rance remains pertinent, given the 
appropriation from Derrida of the term hauntology as the 
science of 'not to be', as not merely the negation of an 
ontological precedent, but as the derangement of such 
antecedence. The prodromic thought exploited by Derrida 
through the notion of phonetic similarity (hauntology and 
ontology) in Spectres of Marx may provisionally be 
understood as the identification of difference through 
sameness. As he indicates with the 'sciences' of to be 
(ontology) and not to be (hauntology), the distinction 
between difference and diff6rance is also 'not heard'. 
The "a" of diffdrance, therefore, is not heard: it remains silent. 
Secret, and discreet, like a tomb. 37 
It can only be expressed and ordered through the 
significance and disorder of the impure written text in the 
context of what he calls the vocalic notation. The difference 
between a and e expresses through what is written and 
what is read, but not what is heard. 38 
36 This term is drawn specifically from Derrida's text 'Diffbrance' (pp. 
441 -464) and published in the anthology, The Continental Philosophy 
Reader (ed. R. Kearney and M. Rainwater). 
37 Added emphasis. Derrida, 'Diff6rance', ibid., p. 443. 
38 He also states that phonetic writing can only function through the 
incorporation of what he calls 'non-phonetic signs' (punctuation, 
spacing, etc. ) so that what is inaudible allows the phonemes to be 
heard. 
16 
Diff6rance may be distinguished fundamentally from 
difference through the latter's continual dependency on the 
universality of sameness in reasonableness to give it 
shape. Derrida argues that to differ carries both the 
difference of a distinction or an inequality whilst also 
indicating the interposition of a delay or an interval. The 
latter definition is described as 'a putting off till later what 
is presently denied' or the possible that is presently 
impossible and which implies both a spacious and a 
temporal quality. 
For Derrida, these movements of non-identity and 
sameness must have a common root that relates the two 
movements of differing to each other. Diff6rance articulates 
a different kind of sameness that is not identical (the silent 
a referring to 'differing' as both spacing and temporalising 
and the movement that structures every dissociation). 
However, the violence of what might be defined as the 
dialectic continuity of difference through similitude, 
essentially predicates the same. As such, it diminishes the 
power of difference by maintaining it as an appendage to 
the logic of reasonableness and therefore merely awaiting 
its inevitable recuperation through the event of sameness 
and universality. 
If difference is seen in these terms, it is clear that its 
possibility remains only the inevitability of such 
incorporation into what is essentially universal. This event 
of negation might provisionally be seen as indicating the 
force of the other but at the same time it persists through 
the diminishing of the power of difference while 
simultaneously allowing it to fall into mere reflection. 
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Derrida's project is to distinguish diff6rance from mere 
difference in this context, because as neither word nor 
concept, it exists as a juncture or assemblage (in the 
Heideggerian sense of a 'bringing-together'), that operates 
as a 'between' which not only indicates a bringing together 
as an interlacing or web of distinct threads which bind, but 
also lines of sense or force which also allow for 
separation. 
39 
Now understood as outside the dialectical order of the 
founding oppositions of reasonableness (for example, 
sensibility and intelligence 40) , diffdrance belongs neither to 
speech nor writing; it is: 
between speech and writing and beyond the tranquil familiarity 
that binds us to one and to the other, reassuring us sometimes 
in the illusion that they are two separate things. 41 
What is important to remember here is that although Derrida 
proposes the vocalic notation of the a in diffdrance as 
inaudible and therefore not present, it does allow for the 
presentation of being possible but not through its own 
presentation. 
* 
However, it is not concealed in any sense of what he 
describes as a zone of non-knowing, 42 because this would 
suggest that it is exposed to a notion of disappearance, and 
39 The thread as a literal means of navigation is intrinsic to the 
traversal of, both the Minoan Labyrinth and the 'zone' in Tarkovsky's 
film, Stalker. See Chapter 4, 'The Orientation of the Labyrinthine'. 
40 This will be looked at in more detail in relation to Kant's work on 
intuition and knowledge in the Critiques. 
41 Derrida, 'Diff6rance', p. 444. 
42 Note here Kant's reference to the irreducible 'unknowable' between 
intuition and knowledge. 
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therefore runs the risk of falling into the dialectical 
possibility of appearance. " 
Derrida questions the need for what he describes as a 
de jure commencement, and attempts to articulate a new 
strategy that resists any determination towards finality by 
proposing that the play at work in diff6rance is beyond any 
binary opposition and precedes what is contingent in the 
dialectic of difference. Difference cannot refer to differing 
as temporal isation, because it operates as an 
eschatologica 144 demand, which maintains rather than 
suspends accomplishment/finality. Diff6rance compensates 
for the complex of meanings by designating a process of 
scission and division by which the -ance of diff6rance, 
expresses the undecided as what is between active and 
passive. 45 In this way, it is no longer a concept but the 
possibility of conceptuality - what Derrida defines as a 
conceptual system of the play of reference in a conceptual 
system. 
Diff6rance produces differences, but crucially not in 
the sense that it precedes the plurality of differences as a 
simple and in itself unmodified and indifferent present'. " it 
is the non-full, non-simple origin of what Derrida refers to 
as the structured and differing origin of differences, on the 
understanding that differences are, as such, produced, but 
not by a presence. 
43 It is not a 'being-present' (on) in an ontological sense but remains 
irreducible to ontological, theological and onto-theological re- 
appropriation. It encompasses and surpasses such distinctions but 
also resists any fall into oppositional dialectic because it sustains 
that dialectic from outside. 
44 Eschatology, the branch of theology dealing with last things; death, 
divine judgement and life after death. 
45 In this sense, it is 'outside' the concept of signifier and signified as 
determined the concept of presence. 
46 Derrida, 'Diff6rance', p. 449. 
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Diff6rance is what makes the movement of signification 
possible only if each element that is said to be 'present', 
appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something 
other than itself but retains the mark of a past element and 
already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to 
a future elemen t. 47 
In Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze makes clear 
his intention in confronting difference is not to perpetuate 
the continuation of a dialectical precedent by investing in 
the continuation of the binary model of essence and 
appearance, but in seeking to extract what might be 
understood as the marginalised category of the simulacrum 
as the subverter of any dialectical model. This differs from 
Derrida's spectre as it relies on the grasp of the simulacra 
as a facsimile undermining the continuity of the universal. 
48 
This is also a key issue for Levinas as an important thinker 
of alterity, who understands and acknowledges that the 
other (as essentially other) can never be recuperated into 
sameness and, as such, is not just an addendum to the 
logic of historical empiricism and therefore contingent on 
the form of the dialectic. The history of logic would propose 
the same as reason's highest aspiration, through the drive 
to universality and therefore relegate the other, through the 
particularity of difference, to the role of that which is 
merely what is not the same. 
This suggests that the other could remain trapped in a 
dialectical model from which its essential possibility is 
merely awaiting assimilation into the same, and, as such, it 
is robbed of any and all of its essential alteric power. The 
47 Added emphasis. Ibid., p. 450. 
48 As already indicated, Derrida's spectre is neither a facsimile of spirit 
or body - it is between. 
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important shift from a difference determined and predicated 
by sameness to a deferral, is through the recognition of the 
contribution of the rift as an essential factor in the forging 
of a concept of this kind of relation. 
The rift will provide the specific conceptual form by 
which hauntology, and its relation to the aesthetic, will be 
explored, and through which it will also seek to articulate 
the contention that the imposition of the alteric through this 
understanding of the rift undermines the existing order of 
predication and binary opposition in Western thinking. 
However, it is vital to keep in mind that the rift is also the 
operative manifestation of the event of encryption and must 
not be conceived as a mere afterthought to reason but 
essentially encrypted within it - what haunts it. The rift is 
what forms the notion of relation 49 and is what essentially 
holds apart. It is the between of the rift that will initiate the 
articulation of hauntology and its status as a critique of the 
persistent drive of logic to universality and reasonableness. 
The contention that the phenomenological project's 
aim was to reduce the gap between thought and 
embodiment - being and existence - demands closer 
scrutiny of the manoeuvre that draws together knowledge 
and sense and exposes them through their difference. What 
persists in this dialectic underlines the predication of 
continuity - sameness and universality as the driving force 
for logical stasis. 
As already indicated, when Derrida articulates a 
phonetic rift in his text Spectres of Marx, he indicates the 
similarity between the spoken terms hauntology and 
49 Husserl identifies 'relation' as the key proposal of the 'science' of 
ph en omen ology. 
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ontology (in French, the terms sound almost identical when 
spoken). 5' 
This logocentric play of phonetic similarity disguises a 
more fundamental concern which recognises this distinction 
as an encryption that resists the status of a mere insertion 
or addendum to continuity by conferring on the encryption a 
condition of otherness, which does not resort to a resolution 
through similitude. 
When he refers to the former (hauntology) as the 
science/logic of 'not to be', and the latter (ontology) as the 
science/logic of 'to be', 51 he articulates this between as the 
juncture of a difference. This is seen provisionally as that 
which holds together the lingual identity being and non- 
being in a relation exposing the phantasm of otherness 
encrypted into the presence of being. 
Language as the site of both identity and difference 
must be negotiated further through the contention of what 
has already been noted as the deferral of difference. The 
complication cited by Derrida as provisionally phonetic, and 
therefore critiquing any logocentric bias, has far reaching 
implications in the development of my argument for the 
intrinsic phantasm at work undermining the structure and 
constraints of the linearity and polarity of the historicity of 
logiC. 52 The rift as a non-site 53 -a fenestration in the 
50 It is also worth remembering here what we have already said about 
the phonetic issue of silence at work between difference and 
diffdrance. 
51 1 will later draw attention to the distinction between Derrida's 
science/logic of 'to be' and 'not to be' and Levinas's writing about il 
ya- 'there is', with its implicit alterity. 
52 Logic understood as the place for establishing and exploring the 
essential requirements of genuine knowledge and science -a 
discovering of norms. 
53 A non-site as the active possibility of encryption has a strong link 
with the work of Gordon Matta-Clark and the term non-ument and will 
be explored in more detail in Chapter 3, 'The Unheimlich Manoeuvre'. 
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architectonics of thought - exposes the possibility of 
encryption as the active participant in the structuring of any 
corporality. For example, the architectural interventions of 
the artist Gordon Matta-Clark not only rely on architectural 
structure to give them shape, but expose that edifice to an 
intensive dissective scrutiny (a fenestration) through an act 
of visceration. 
It is important to remember, however, that Matta-Clark 
is not merely dissecting the body of the building, but 
articulating its language through the complication of, on one 
level, blurring the borders between inside and out and all 
that might imply, as well as drawing attention to the 
pertinence of the event of mourning (encyst-ence)" 
resonating in the visceral act -a commemoration through 
annihilation. 
With this in mind, it must be remembered that its 
active role remains outside the recognised continuity of 
active and passive as understood by Kant with regard to 
intuition and knowledge in the Critiques. As a kind of 
hermene Uti C55 intervention, it disrupts linearity and indicates 
that there is a potential for discontinuity in any generating 
of continuity, inverting the Cartesian model of a 
separateness, which contends that continuity generates and 
structures discontinuity. 
As already suggested, Derrida argues that diffdrance 
is an assemblage, and through the event of 'bringing 
together' it allows for different threads and lines of sense 
and force to interlace. But what remains contingent in this 
54 Derrida refers to the act of mourning in Spectres of Marx as the 
attempt to ontologise 'remains' - to make present, as it were, that 
which can never essentially be present. 
55 Hermeneutic understood as the science of interpretation. 
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manoeuvre is that what binds also has the potential to 
separate, with the possibility for continuity and discontinuity 
at the juncture. However, what must remain at the forefront 
of our thought when considering this disruption of continuity 
is that we do not fall into the trap of indicating merely a 
dialectic inversion through the predication of the 
discontinuous. 
As will be argued, this will only persist in maintaining 
the status of universality and sameness as that which 
attempts to recuperate otherness, and therefore the event 
of mere inversion can only be described and contained 
within the same binary framework of any epistemological 
enquiry. 
Deleuze, however proposes the tactic of the 
disjunctive use of faculties, whereby the unconscious 
condition of each faculty is revealed, replacing a philosophy 
of identity and representation with one of difference. He 
differs from Derrida in that he critiques the pertinence of 
difference as deferral by suggesting that a stable intrinsic 
meaning can never be found there as a perpetual regress of 
one word defined by yet another therefore prevents the 
discovery of a linguistic ground. Difference operates as a 
paradoxical element - it is never where it is sought and 
always where it cannot be found. This discloses a sensible 
realm of intensities, and an ideal realm of problems - what 
is indicated by Deleuze as a physics and metaphysics of the 
simulacrum. 
Where Platonic ideality provisionally proposed the 
model (the 'ideal') and the copy (its representation), it also 
distinguished between 'good' (eikon) and 'bad' 
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(phantasme 56) copy. The former operates as the 'true' inner 
resemblance while the latter is the 'false' external illusion. 
The phantasme remains fearful to Plato because it has no 
fixed identity; it is unlimited and illogical becoming, which 
reveals in the copy that the domination of the ideal as 
model is undermined by its proximity to its copy as 
representation. For Deleuze, to overturn Platonic ideality is 
to revel in the simulacra (the so-called bad copy) as the 
denial of the primacy of the ideal - the model over the 
image - and to glorify the simulacra and the reflection. 57 
The proper activity of thought for Deleuze is not to 
immerse oneself in the realm of the essence, but to seek 
the impingement of the simulacrum through the critical 
examination of mental experiences, which he refers to as 
transcendental empiricis M. 58 Transcendentalism is relevant 
for Deleuze with regard to empirical principles because, as 
he states, they always 'leave outside of themselves the 
59 
elements of their own foundation'. 
The ruling opposition of ideal and sensible is 
undermined by the Deleuzian terminology of the virtual and 
actual, which indicate a more fundamental distinction 
between the aconceptual and the conceptual. The sub- 
representative/unconscious (aconceptual) of illogical 
56 Phantasme and its epistemological root to the spectral. 
57 In Spectres of Marx, Derrida distinguishes the spectre from Platonic 
phantasma and simulacrum by describing it as the 'tangible 
intangibility of a proper body without flesh, but still the body of 
someone as someone other', p. 7. This has a strong resonance with 
the manifestation of the phi-creatureslvisitors in Lem's novel and 
Tarkovsky's film, Solaris, and will be discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 4, 'The Orientation of the Labyrinthine'. 
58 This is distinguished from Kantian transcendental idealism, which 
presupposes 'good' sense and 'common' sense - 'real' experience is 
for Deleuze, sub-representative. Deleuze's method is empirical 
because its object is experience not the possible experience of 
Kantian thought through meaning 'capable of representation'. 
59 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 328. 
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intensities and the representative/conscious (conceptual) 
logic of common sense - whereby the problem occupies the 
paradoxical space between existence and non-existence 60 
is the rift. The transcendental can now be understood as 
the realm of the problem and is paradoxical because it 
resists incorporation into empirical principles - in a sense, 
it is a problem without a solution. 
It is important to remind ourselves here that to 
comprehend this rift we must grasp it as not just a holding 
apart in the sense of what we might provisionally consider 
as a difference of separation contingent on the priority of 
similitude. 
* 
What is essentially different between hauntology and 
ontology is also the irreducible transcendence of alterity, 
understood as that which holds them together 61 and 
therefore is resistant to the collapse into a duality of 
sameness. 
60 'Ideas', for Deleuze, are not Platonic simple essences but rather 
Kantian problems without solutions. Deleuze also prefers to exploit 
the terms subsistence and insistence rather than existence. 
61 In his text 'Edmond Jalb6s and the Question of the Book', Derrida 
states: 
'A first encounter, an encounter above all unique because it was a 
separation, ( ). Encounter is separation. Such a proposition, which 
contradicts "logic" breaks the unity of Being - which resides in the 
fragile link of the "is" - by welcoming the other and difference into 
the source of meaning. ' Writing and Difference, p. 74. 
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Derrida's use of the term hantise 62 at the beginning of 
Spectres of Marx evokes not only a spectrality but also 
indicates a further meaning rooted in common sense, which 
can also be translated as an obsession, a constant fear, a 
fixed idea or nagging memory. " 
In the text he indicates that historically the so-called 
spectre of Communism preceded its realisation in the 
revolution of 1917, which inaugurated the Soviet Union - 
and which was, in a sense, the pre-emptive 'secret' that Old 
Europe, demanding continuity and stability, hoped would 
remain thus (as 'a secret') but, for which, and by which, it 
was fearful of (a labour movement that transgressed the 
security and stability of the existing geopolitical 
landscape). 64 
In 'Diff6rance', Derrida proposes the temporality of the 
trace (the spur) as that which relates to what is called both 
future and past through the constitution of a present by 
relation to what it is not. In order for the trace 'to be' an 
interval from what it is not, it must intervene and, as such a 
division, that constitutes it in the presen t. 65 
The spectre here is conceived as a transgressor of 
boundaries but what is important to keep in mind is that the 
62 This translates into English as haunting. 
63 Derrida's observation that the first noun in The Communist Manifesto 
is 'spectre' is the basis for his attempt to recuperate Marx. For 
Derrida, Marx was a scholar 'capable of thinking the possibility of the 
spectre' and this distinguished him from the 'traditional' scholar who 
could only conceive distinctions in binary oppositions - real and 
unreal, actual and in-actual, living and un-living, being and non- 
being ('to be or not to be'). 
64 Note here Derrida's suggestion in 'Violence and Metaphysics' that 
the security of the Greco-European tradition is undermined. 
Knowledge is neither 'habitual nor comfortable but permits us to 
experience torment or distress in general', p. 82. 
65 Derrida goes further by saying that this division, which constitutes in 
the present, must also divide that present and therefore everything 
conceived on the basis of presence; for example, being, substance 
and subject. 
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complication that Derrida wishes to invoke in the spectral is 
in its location as encrypted within the 'historical 
phenomenon' of Europe, old and new. He states: 'At bottom, 
the spectre is the future, it is always to come, and it 
presents itself only as that which could come or come back; 
in the future'. 66 
For Derrida, our inheritance is no longer the 'end of 
history' but rather the end of a certain concept of history 
whereby an injunction should not be seen and understood 
as a restrictive ordering, but a reaffirming by choosing in 
the division on the injunctive: 'The present appears neither 
as the rupture or effect of a past, but as the retention of a 
present past. 67 
The plurality of 'one must' in dealing with an 
inheritance as injunction is to filter, criticise or sort out 
several different possibilities that inhabit that injunction. 
The naturally transparent univocal is without interpretation 
and has nothing to inherit from - there is no inheritance in 
infinity, memory is a condition of the specificity of finitude. 
The finitude of consciousness preserves significations, 
values and past acts as habitualities and sedimentations 
and is where the other becomes the sedentary spectre. 
Derricla argues that it is possible to recuperate Marx 
as the revolutionary transgressor now, in a predominantly 
66 Derrida cites the 'plagues' of the 'new world order', of which number 
7 is defined as 'inter-ethnic wars'. He describes these as driven by 
an archaic phantasm, a primitive conceptual phantasm of community, 
the nation-state, sovereignty, borders, native soil and blood. He 
terms ontopology as the axiomatic event whereby the topos of 
territory (native soil, city and the corporeal - body) is rooted in an 
anxiety of displacement. Communism is both a 'future spectre' and 
now, a 'spectre of the past' and as such, temporal linearity is 
undermined - displaced. 
67 Added emphasis. Spectres of Marx, p. 57. Retention and Protention 
form the active elements in an adumbration, where the transience of 
history and immanence (possibility) invoke variety rather than 
sameness. David Bell identifies this in Husserl's thought. 
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post-communist world where the disjuncture of thought and 
action on such a thought can be rectified. Spectropoeti CS68 
becomes the examination of the ways in which Marx still 
haunts and influences through the methodology of poetics. 
This is understood as the uncovering of layers of meaning 
in events and texts by pursuing such literary devices as 
analogy, metaphor and allusion and therefore outside the 
conceived rational ordering of a science. 
If we understand history as essentially a linear 
temporal movement (chronology) - that historical/political 
events follow each other in ordered succession - Derrida's 
conception of inheritance has no place. 69 Inheritance 
interrupts this infinity of history by proposing memory as a 
condition of finitude -a plurivocality that exposes the 
possibility of choice in the order of the injunctive. As 
Derrida argues, the univocal in its natural transparency has 
no finitude, cannot be interpreted and has nothing to inherit 
from the internal untranslatability in Marx. Its lack of 
system is not a sign of weakness, but an opening up where 
injunction and promise could not be without such a 
disj . unction. This latter term, disjunction, perhaps requires a 
clearer definition - it describes a sharp cleavage, a 
disunion or separation and expresses an alternative or 
opposition between the meanings of connected words -a 
rift. 
68 Is this the archaeology of encryption? 
69 Derrida's use of Hamlet is instructive here. Hamlet's Father's ghost 
is a spectral manifestation of Hamlet's inheritance, disrupting the 
continuity of the social order by encouraging revenge, and instigating 
the unfolding of the tragedy that is the form of the play. As an 
apparition, its 'form' is both and neither a carnal representation of 
Hamlet's Father, and also a 'spirit' - outside rational/order but 
intrinsic to the play's unfolding narrative. Banquo's ghost performs a 
similar literary function in Macbeth. 
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As a compositional tool in language, it indicates a rift 
that performs a conjoining (as in a compound sentence in 
logic) yet does not lose that which brings together in this 
event of conjunction; it maintains its status in 
separateness. It is intrinsic to, yet also exclusive to any 
composition. As already indicated, Derrida distinguishes 
diff6rance from difference by virtue of the former's 
irreducible status as a juncture of proximity and separation. 
The spectre as a phenomenal/carnal form of the spirit 
transgresses the boundary of phenomenon as flesh and 
spirit as invisibility. In becoming a 'thing', it remains 
difficult to name as it is neither body nor spirit, yet it is 
both one and the other - it becomes the embodiment of 
invisibility and, as such, the event of transgression. 
Phenomenality bestows apparitional status on the spectre 
through the simulation of the corporeal. In not knowing what 
it 'is' (as a spectral entity), one does not not know out of 
ignorance 
'70 
but rather because, as non-object, non-present 
present, there is a being there of a someone/something 
absent or departed which no longer belongs to knowledge 
(logic/science and the rational). It is the invisibility of the 
visible or the visibility of that which hitherto has been 
invisible. 71 
70 It is important to remember here that the spectres in both Hamlet and 
Macbeth are not immediately recognised by the leading characters, 
but it is perhaps the instability of conscience that reveals who they 
represent. De-stabilisation becomes the function of the spectre. 
71 'The animated work becomes that thing, the thing that, like an 
elusive spectre, engineers [s'ing6niel a habitation without proper 
inhabiting, call it a haunting, of both memory and translation. ' 
Derrida, Spectres of Marx, p. 18. 
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The transcendent nature of such apparitions are 
prefixed, 'given form to', as it were, by carnal ity, 72 and in 
this way might be understood as following the model of the 
event of transcendental reduction as laid out by Husserl. 
Embodiment gives form to the spectral but the 
ambiguity arises in a contention towards any condition of a 
priori in this manoeuvre. 73 
Spectres of Marx makes clear that dis(place)ment as 
an event of spacing is the precursor of the stability of any 
sedenterisation and as such, the memory of displacement 
roots such historical conceptions as nationality so that any 
grasp of archaism is already based in a kind of 
dislocation. 74 The root is itself a phantasm of the 
inconsistency of plurivocality - its retention and protention, 
and apparitional otherness. Equally, temporality is active in 
this event of spacing as interval. Haunting is historical, but 
not encumbered by the specificity of dating; it is not without 
time but is untime /Y. 75 
72 Derrida states, 'the spectre is a paradoxical incorporation, the 
becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit' 
(p. 6, Spectres of Marx). As becoming-body the spectre is neither 
spirit nor form. 
73 Phenomenological enquiry refocuses the reduction as an act of 
change that is highlighted in the ambiguity between the everyday 
(materiality) and the transcendental. 
74 We may wish to think here of Lyotard writing about the displaced 
other in his text Heidegger and the 'jews': the memory of 
displacement manifest in the 'Jewish nation' undermining the fiction 
of Germanic rootedness. The phantasm of nation-state is itself 
haunted by the intolerable physical manifestation of dislocation -a 
nomadic parasite at the heart of German cultural life. As is later 
remarked, Derrida finds in Kant and Hegel a 'Semitic' relation to the 
sublime irruption between finite and infinite (see The Truth in 
Painting, p. 134). 
75 'Untimely, it does not come to, it does not happen to, it does not 
befall', Spectres of Marx, p. 5. 
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The term conjuration is introduced to indicate a causal 
imperative in the form of a calling forth, 76 which in itself 
certifies nothing yet provokes something to happen while at 
the same time linguistically implying a conspiracy, the 
swearing of an oath in a struggle against a superior 
power. 77 The complicity of an absence in the shaping of a 
'something' is not without precedent in both Derrida and 
Heidegger's thinking. Significantly, in Deleuze's work on 
difference can also be found the structure of what he refers 
to as the virtual idea, which bares no relation to its actual 
embodiment. 
Gilbert Simondon's influence on Deleuze's thinking 
can be seen through the example of individuation in his 
studies of the process of crystallisation . 
73 This process is a 
movement from what is known as a metastablelamorphous 
to a stablelcrystalline via the introduction of a seed crystal 
which communicates structure to a molecule of the 
metastable substance and which is then passed on to others 
in what is called a process of individuation. What is crucial 
here is that the process of individuation precedes the 
individual and for Deleuze, the metastable is difference in 
itself. The implicate spatium of groundless space precedes 
the explicate extensio of representable space where 
76 The disembodied voice of conscience in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit 
speaks through the spacing of silence. In his later text, Contributions 
to Philosophy (From Enowning), Heidegger introduces the term echo 
and emphasises the appropriateness of silence as the proto-locale of 
thought. 
77 This is defined as both a conjuring trick and the practice of oath 
swearing. 
78 It is worth noting here what will later be discussed in Chapter 4, 'The 
Orientation of The Labyrinthine' - the crystal-image, which Deleuze 
discusses specifically in his text Cinema 2 as the fragmentary 
consideration of the temporal as the key conception of post-war 
European cinema. 
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intensity as difference - the state of pre-individuation - 
haunts the explication of the individual. 
In scientific terms, crystalline structures are formed by 
an exterior factor/element that resists inclusion/absorption 
through the initiation of the event, but its presencing traces 
an encrypted signature -a memory of what formed it, on 
what is formed . 
79The event of encryption is located in 
dislocation - an active between that shapes and gives form 
while remaining shapeless itself. 80 
For Kant, sensibility and theretore perceptions were 
primarily a passive faculty shaped by the a priori forms of 
space and time. The complication in Kantian thought is 
understood in the resistance to categorisation of space and 
time conceptually and Kantian thought insists on 
79 Celan makes reference to the crystalline in two poems, 'Crystal' 
(1952), about which John Felstiner comments in his text, Paul Celan: 
Poet, Survivor, Jew that the title 'speaks for pattern and solidness in 
poetry and spurs a memory of Nazi "Kristallnacht, " the rupture of the 
poem', p. 60. It reads: 
Not on my lips look for your mouth, 
not in front of the gate for the stranger, 
not in the eye for the tear. 
Seven nights higher red makes for red, 
seven hearts deeper the hand knocks on the gate, 
seven roses later plashes the fountain. 
(Translation by Michael Hamburger, from Selected Poems, p. 69. ) 1 
note here Celan's reference to the mouth with regard to later remarks 
on the dysfluency of 'latemouth' and the 'mouth as wound' in Chapter 
2, 'Todtnauberg and the Meridian'. Also note the last stanza of 
'Bitten away' (1963): 
Deep 
In the time-crevasse, 
by the honeycomb-ice 
there waits, a breathcrystal, 
your unannullable 
witness. 
(Translation from John Felstiner's text, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, 
Jew, p. 219. ) 
80 As already stated, the architectonics of encryption will be explored 
further in Chapter 3, 'The Unheimlich Manoeuvre'. 
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maintaining their intuitive status. If aesthetic is defined by 
Kant as a derivation from the Greek for sensation in 'The 
Transcendental Aesthetic', space and time are not 
conceptions applied to intuitions, but fundamental forms of 
intuitions themselves. 
Kant's argument states that all sensation must 
intrinsically have the imprint of temporality and the spatial 
conferred by the organisational status of both space and 
time. 
Derrida argues in 'Diff6rance' that the term diff6rance 
operates as an interval which, in order to function ('to be 
what it is not'), must intervene and become a division that 
constitutes it in the present where it must divide that 
present and consequently everything conceived on the basis 
of presence . 
8' As an interval, it indicates a spacing whereby 
we can understand a deferral through becoming that 
undermines the notion of presence through the interval as 
not only time's becoming spatial but also space's becoming 
temporal. Derrida's introduction of a complication through 
the derivation of the term diff6rance as an indication of 
what he refers to as primordial difference, questions the 
binary imperative of presence and its a priori status. He 
states: 
And it is this constitution of the present as a primordial and 
irreducibly nonsimple, and, therefore, in the strict sense 
nonprimordial, synthesis of traces, retentions and protentions 
... That I propose to call protowritin g' 
82 prototrace, or 
diffdrance. The latter (is) (both) spacing (and) temporalising. 83 
81 Here Derrida is referring to all that belongs to the revelation of 
presence; 'being' - substance and subject. 
82 Protowriting is understood as an inscription prior to writing -a trace. 
83 Added emphasis. Derrida, 'Diff6rance', p. 451. 
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This notion of the precedence of the trace (spur), indicated 
through the interval of diff6rance, bears clear comparison 
with Kant's view of the alteric condition of the spatio- 
temporal imprint on the sensory. 
Kant's argument is developed through an 
understanding of the inner sense of time grasped through 
the organisation of our experience and that no mental state 
can exist outside time. Likewise, the outer sense of space 
qualifies an independent status for all that is objectified in 
the world through exteriority and therefore, as outside, it is 
deported in a spatial relation to oneself. In denying space 
and time a priori status, Kant accepts that they are not 
conceptual, in that they do not define a plurality of 
instances and therefore are not latterly applied to any 
sensation. However, one must bear in mind that Kant's view 
of both space and time is understood through what he 
believed to be the necessity for there to by only one space 
and one time, from which all specific spaces and all times 
are derived. 
As already stated, Deleuze's methodology for 
critiquing Kant's understanding of the faculty of the 
sensible is both empirical (because its object is real 
experience) and transcendental, because such empirical 
principles 'leave outside themselves the element of their 
own foundation'. 84 Deleuze replaces the designation of a 
supposed opposition between the historical dualism of 
essential/ideal and accidental/sensible, with new 
conceptions of the virtual and the actual. These new terms 
84 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 328. John Rajchman 
notes in The Deleuze Connections, that '... in Deleuze's serniotics, 
there is no 'double articulation' - no prior or necessary bi-univocal 
link between word and images or saying and seeing; there is no 
'schematism' as in Kant that would link intuition and concept. ' P. 68. 
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not only confer a different condition for the recognised 
forms of dialectic that form the metaphysical opposition of 
both Kantian faculties and Platonic ideals. They offer what 
Deleuze considers to be a more fundamental opposition that 
indicates the sub-representative as the realm of the 
unconscious, conceptual ideas and intensities, with the 
conscious realm of the conceptual representations of 
gcommon sense'. 
The idea, in the Platonic sense of simple essences, is 
now replaced by the problem without solution in the Kantian 
sense, and indicates that problems are the immanent within, 
yet irreducible to, their solutions. The problem for Deleuze 
is implicit in the creation of a realm in which solutions might 
take place, but essentially they remain outside that realm 
and transcendental to it. This event of encryption 
(dis)embodies a kind of transcendental through locating it, 
but refuses any notion of absorption or incorporation in 
preference to a kind of introjection and, as already 
indicated, the intensity of metastability as implicate 
precedes the specificity of any explication. 
What is implicate for Deleuze is spatium or the 
groundless space of pre-individuation, and this 
communicates form from which the specificity of explicate, 
extensio or representable space appears. 85 Deleuze 
conceives the points or foci that remain fixed, in a 
85 Note here that Kant, writing on aesthetics, makes this distinction 
between the beautiful and the sublime. He writes: 'The beautiful in 
nature relates to the form of an object which consists in limitation: 
the sublime on the contrary is found in an object devoid of form in so 
far as it immediately involves.... a representation of limitlessness yet 
with a super-added thought of its totality. Accordingly the beautiful 
seems to be regarded as the representation of an indeterminate 
concept of understanding, the sublime as the representation of the 
indeterminate concept of reason. ' The Critique of Judgement, §23. 
245, pp. 90-91. 
36 
topological sense, during the process of a transformation as 
the form of pre-individuation that mediates for individuation. 
Although they are implicit in the structuring of any 
domain/realm of possible solutions, they are explicit in the 
actuality of any preconceived notion of structure, and as 
virtual rather than actual, they determine a paradoxical 
place that is neither existence nor non-existence. 86 
What is important to remember here is that the virtual 
is involved in the event of embodiment while remaining 
without body itself (arguably, the invisible topos). This does 
not mean that it is an amorphous, undifferentiated mass, 
but rather an event of distribution mapped by singularities 
without the specificity or particularity of an identity, but 
which provide the genetic code for the generation of a 
specificity through difference -a haunting! 
The differential relation between these singular points 
(foci) indicates the potential for various forms of 
embodiment in a zone where possible actualisations are 
continually forming and un-forming (protentions and 
retentions). To locate a problem, it can only be realised 
through the conglomeration of all possible actualisations 
and embodiments. For Deleuze, problems occupy a 
paradoxical space between existence and non-existence, 
and the structure of the virtual idea bares no relation to its 
embodiment. 
In his study on Husserl, David Bell discusses a 
process of cross-referencing, understood as an adumbration 
86 It is worth noting here the subsistence of the virtual as a structuring 
for the actual while bearing no resemblance to what is actualised. 
Also consider the concept of enframing posited by Heidegger in 'The 
Question Concerning Technology' (Part 1, pp. 3-35) where the 
framework (what Heidegger refers to as 'enframing') for technology 
and machination is essentially nothing technological. 
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or event/point of various perspectival aspects: 'Every 
adumbration ... contains within it a structure of "retentions" 
and "protentions" that are a function of memory, 
imagination, expectation and habit. 87 Each adumbration is 
surrounded by a horizon of other possible adumbrations - 
essentially an event of the spectral via the haunting of one 
possibility with other possibilities. Not only mapped 
externally via this horizon, they are also structured 
internally by a multiplicity of what are termed retentions and 
protentions. This forms what we might call reciprocity of 
contractive and expansive possibilities within the variety of 
perspectival aspects. 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas proposes that: 
[Slince Husserl the whole of phenomenology is the promotion 
of the idea of horizon which for it plays a role equivalent to 
that of a concept in Classical Idealism; an existent arises upon 
a ground that extends beyond it, as an individual arises from a 
conce pt. 88 
The existent becomes the silhouette on the horizon of being 
and as such, being becomes the guarantor of that existent's 
independence. Derrida notes in Spectres of Marx that '[i]n 
the movement of protention, the present is retained and 
gone beyond as past present in order to constitute another 
primordial and original Absolute, another living present. 89 
Derrida's play with what I will call a 'phonetic deferral 
of sameness' (similitude) undermines the terminology of 
similarity while exploiting the very structure of such a 
87 David Bell, Husserl, p. 190. 
88 Added emphasis. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 45. 
89 Derrida, Spectres of Marx, p. 58. 
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conceptualisation in the epistemological canon of 
metaphysical enquiry. The operation of similitude in this 
context is crucially and essentially spectral, and is haunted 
by what always remains other (alteric) to it. Derrida's 
phonetic play emphasises that alterity through its invisibility 
in the universalisation of logic. Motivated by the immanence 
of such conceptual isati on of a logic of alterity; I use all 
these terms advisedly, and it would be worth considering 
the historical context for otherness/spectrality in modern 
thinking with a view to reconfiguring the imperative towards 
objective similarity from within the framework of 
epistemology. 
Perhaps an appropriate point of departure for this 
exploration of the spectral, given the proposal of this text to 
consider a so-called aesthetics of hauntology, would be to 
return to Kant's transcendental aesthetic. 90 Kant, in The 
Critique of Pure Reason writing about the transcendental 
aesthetic, distinguishes between the cognitive powers that 
relate to objects and how they are composed, as intuition 
and conceptual. What is distinctive about the former is its 
base in the phenomenology of the immediate and the 
cognitive power of sensibility and the specificity of an 
object. The latter is based in the cognitive power of 
understanding, and indicates a kind of mediation between 
the features that several things/objects have in common. In 
this provisional distinction, Kant proposes that the 
particularity of the singular representation (intuition) 
precedes the generality of objects (conceptual) where the 
90 The topic of Kant's aesthetic is to analyse the form of experience by 
isolating sensibility from understanding and separating off from it 
everything that belongs to sensation. Kant's imperative towards a 
transcendent ideality for aesthetics is found in the presupposition of 
the existence of experience. 
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application of the concept belongs to a kind of which there 
could be other instances. 
What is crucial here is that, for Kant, our intuition is 
'sensible' and not intellectual, and that what he calls 
'sensible representations' are formed through receptivity 
and passivity - through being affected. Intuitions (on their 
own) do not amount to cognition of objects, they merely 
'give' and can only relate to an object under the condition 
of being brought 'under a concept'. 
Understanding is the producer of concepts and then the 
applier of those concepts to objects and is both active and 
spontaneous. 91 
It indicates a generality that distinguishes it from the 
particularity of singular representations, which remain 
essentially intuitive. The sensibility of the intuitive through 
the power of the cognitive assumes an essentially passive 
and receptive clemeanour that distinguishes it from 
understanding, which Kant indicates to be both active and 
spontaneous. 
However, the mutually irreducible functions of intuition 
and understanding/thinking remain heterogeneous. This 
double movement implies something crucial through this 
divisive event of cognition. For Kant, intuitions cannot 
amount to the cognition of any object as they only 'give' 
and relation to an object requires that such an object be 
91 We need to consider here the proposal by Deleuze and Guattari in 
the text What Is Philosophy? This suggests that philosophy is the 
creation of concepts and where the insistence is not on the 
philosophical event as contemplative or reflective, but always 
essentially immanent. The implication here is not that the 
philosophical process is 'in addition' to the intuitive in the sense that 
Kant suggests understanding making sense of the immediate, and 
therefore a posteriori. When Kant proposes understanding as both 
active and spontaneous, he implies a creative event that may be 
concomitant with Deleuze and Guattari's immanence. 
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conditioned by being 'brought under a concept'. Equally, if 
all thought is removed from experience, no knowledge of 
any object remains, as concepts on their own lack objects; 
therefore Kant proposes that the knowledge of an object 
requires the conjunction of concept and intuition. He stated 
that: 
Without sensibility, no object would be given to us, without 
understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without 
context are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, 
therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, 
that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make 
intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. 
Those two powers or capacities cannot exchange their 
functions. The understanding can intuit nothing; the senses 
can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge 
arise. 92 
Why is it relevant to consider in such detail this 
fundamental proposition of Kantian epistemology with 
regard to a discussion around the concepts of aesthetics 
and hauntology? It is perhaps an obvious perception of a 
kind of alterity in the divisive event of cognition that Kant 
refers to as knowledge. We may therefore initially propose 
to sketch out the idea that that intuition haunts 
understanding in an equality that may be inverted to 
presume that understanding may also haunt all that is 
intuitive. 93 The proposal that intuition and understanding are 
irreducible indicates an essential difference fundamental to 
such an epistemological relationship. This distinguishes 
92 Added emphasis. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason § 51 , p. 93. 
93 It is important to remember here our earlier contention that we were 
not fall into the trap of mere inversion as a means of uncovering the 
rift. I refer back to our earlier consideration with regard to aesthetics 
and hauntology - 'mere inversion' dismisses the complexity of the 
intervention of the rift. 
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actuality from possibility through what insists (encysts) in 
the sensibility of intuition, and the discursiveness of 
understanding, there is also what Kant describes as a 
common root that remains unknowable. 94 
The question that arises is one that we may think of as 
a kind of temporality with regard to precedence in the 
relationship between intuition and understanding. 
Precedence implies temporality by indicating a before or 
perhaps an a priori, and what becomes clear in Kantian 
epistemology is that such privileged status is given to 
space and time. 95 As already stated, Kant's view of space 
and time as a priori intuitions meant for him that they did 
not derive from experience and as intuitions, and were both 
immediate and non-conceptual. 96 
A question now arises: how can there be something 
that is a priori in intuition, in contradiction to the natural 
conception of sense experience as entirely a posteriori? 
Kant proposes what he terms the synthetic judgements 
as a priori and as such, are made true by objects and not 
concepts. Intuitions are the representations whereby 
objects are given a priori judgements and require a priori 
grounds. Synthetic a priori judgement is made possible if 
there is a priori intuition on which it may be grounded. In 
94 Is the implication for Kant's 'unknowable' in a sense subjective and 
is this subject some kind of divinity - 'God'? 
95 The Background to Kant's understanding of space and time is found 
in the Absolutist thinking of Newton and the Relational thinking of 
Leibniz. Newton states that space is an absolutely real self- 
subsistent container which would exist with no physical objects 
contained within it -a self-sufficient substance. Time is the same. 
For Leibniz, space is a logical construction out of the relations 
between objects and any statement about space is therefore reduced 
to one about objects and their interactions. 
96 They are both irreducible (contra Leibniz) and not real in the 
absolute sense (contra Newton). 
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the Third Critique Kant distinguishes Judgement' S97 a priori 
principle in relation to that of feeling, as distinctive to 
understanding's relation to knowledge/empirical fact and 
the relation of practical reason to desire. As such, this 
mediation allows us to see the empirical world conforming 
to the ends of practical reason, and thus practical reason 
as adapted to our knowledge of the empirical world. 
This faculty of Judgement, then, mediates (bridges, as 
Derrida extrapolates in The Truth in Painting) between the 
faculties of understanding (the First Critique) and practical 
reason (the Second Critique). The fundamental problem for 
aesthetics as a judgement, however, is through the 
incompatibility of aesthetics, understood as the expression 
of subjective experience and judgement as a claim of 
universal assent. It is crucial to our understanding and 
proposed use of the Derridian term hauntology in the 
context of this text that we clarify the need to explore in 
such detail this Kantian epistemology of synthetic 
judgement. We must look here to Kantian appearance as a 
means of navigation towards the spectral. 
Appearance is not, for Kant, a manifold of sensations 
in a posteriori sense, but presupposes that sensations are 
in some way ordered or have form. 
Experience, in this sense, cannot be all content: it must 
have form, as to be without form would be buzzing 
confusion. 
The spectrality of such form is significant to the 
understanding of appearance in relation to sensations. 
97 As stated earlier, the capitalisation of Judgement is indicative of 
Kant's prioritising of the term. 
43 
To be conscious of its experience as 'something', a subject 
must understand that 'something' as ordered in some way. 
In this way, form is the unifying factor that allows the 
content of experience to show itself as a structure of 
relation's a priori supplied by our power of intuition. What is 
clear from this is that what gives order to sensation cannot 
derive from that sensation and is essentially outside that 
98 
sensation. 
The form of appearance is a relational structure 
through the power of intuition, but its form cannot derive 
from either intuition or thought; it is located between 
sensation and thought and is prior to the application of any 
concept and, like thought, does not derive from sensation. 
It is evident from this that Kant proposed a kind of intuition 
that is independent of sensation and which he defined as 
'pure' intuition, which is distinguished from 'empirical' 
intuition. 99 We may momentarily recall here an earlier 
comment that defined a common root between the actual 
and the possible (intuition and understanding) as something 
that Kant defined as 'not knowable'. I would suggest here 
that the heart of Kantian epistemology, with its root in the 
98 It may be worth reiterating here earlier remarks that Heidegger in 
'The Question Concerning Technology' made regarding enframing, 
that the essence of technology is nothing technological -a 
suggestion that the abysmal encryption of alterity is that which gives 
order. It is also worth reminding ourselves here of the natural 
formation of crystalline structures by the seed crystal; they are 
formed by an alteric factor that is not essentially crystalline 
(genetic? ) - it is other to the formation of the crystal yet the crystal 
is dependent on it for its formation. I also introduce here, as a 
precursor to later remarks in Chapter 4, 'The Orientation of the 
Labyrinthine', the notion of the seed crystal with reference to the 
crystal-image and temporality in Deleuze's writings on cinema, 
particularly in his text Cinema 2. 
99 Kant now defines two kinds of intuition - 'pure', containing nothing 
belonging to sensation, the form of appearances; and 'empirical', 
understood as the specificity of sensations and objects in the world. 
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context of intuition and thought, pure and empirical 
intuition, is essentially alteric. 
Kant's aesthetic indicates two forms of beauty: 
dependent and pure. The former relies on the understanding 
of the object being 'brought under a concept', for example, 
painting as an expression of content, or a building as the 
performance of a function, which, as such, is less 'pure'. 
The latter allows for the relaxation of scientific and 
practical thought and the entry into a free play of what he 
describes as purposiveness without purpose. 100 
This is an indication of the ground of aesthetic beauty, 
which abounds in nature and not in art. 101 The unity of free 
beauty is purified of all interest and therefore is of no 
definite purpose (what Kant terms disinterested), but 
reflects back at us an order of origin within ourselves as 
purposive beings. What is important here is that free 
beauty's capacity to indicate origin is not through its 
involvement in the specificity of purpose, but in what Kant 
defines as the 'indeterminate mark of purpose'. The unity 
100 This is understood as a beauty purified of all interests and therefore 
as having no definite purpose. It reflects back at us an order of 
origin within ourselves as purposive beings and bears the 
unspecified/indeterminate marks of purpose, yet it is without specific 
purpose itself. The perception of purposiveness is not understood as 
a 'what is' in an ontological sense, but as an 'as if'. This does not 
conform to a sense of infinite possibility but rather the inescapability 
of a 'we must', which ties us to the act of seeing the world in a 
certain way so as to discover our 'proper' place within it. 
101 This is indicated as the sublime. Derrida notes in The Truth in 
Painting that the sublime is essentially a violent experience of 
indirection and superabundance, which is preceded in man by 
inhibition, arrest and suspension. He argues that this conjunction of 
pleasure/attraction with repulsion indicates that the trait of attraction 
has the double meaning of affirmation and negation - 'What the 
"pleasing-oneself-in" of the sublime "contains" is less a "positive 
pleasure" than respect or admiration. That's why it "deserves to be 
called a negative pleasure". ' He also comments: 'It appears to do 
violence to the imagination. And it is all the more sublime for that. 
The measure of the sublime has the measure of this unmeasured, of 
violent incommensurability', p. 129. 
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previously described displays purposiveness without 
purpose. 
However, the perception of this purposiveness is not 
of a 'what is' but rather an 'as if', which, unlike what has 
already been speculated on in the discussion of difference, 
does not conform to an infinite possibility, but the 
inescapability of a 'we must', which demands the viewing of 
the world in a certain way through which we can ascertain 
our proper place within it. 
Aesthetic judgement frees us from the rigour of both 
theoretical insight and moral endeavour and, as an idea of 
transcendental design, is supersensible. 102 
* 
As an aesthetic idea, it imprints on the senses an intimation 
of the transcendental realm, transcending any natural 
example to make us aware of something beyond description 
from which any natural example can only be seen as just a 
pale reflection. The aesthetic experience involves the 
perpetual striving to pass beyond the limitations and 
specificity of any particular point of view to attempt to 
embody what cannot be thought. 
The philosophy of beauty moves through Kant's 
attempt to free the limitations and particularity of a specific 
perspective based in the inevitable necessity of our own 
self-conscious condition, towards an aesthetic experience 
where we view ourselves in relation to the transcendental - 
102 Kant likens aesthetic judgement to the idea of reason and the 
concept of purposiveness as 'beyond' the pragmatics of 'mere 
sensibility'. Derrida argues that: 'The sublime cannot inhabit any 
sensible form. There are natural objects that are beautiful, but there 
cannot be a natural object that is sublime. The true sublime, the 
sublime proper and properly speaking [Das eigentliche Erhabene] 
relates only to the idea of reason. ' The Truth in Painting, p. 131. 
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a reality beyond the realm of thought. Kant's distinction 
between beauty and the sublime finds the former 
harmonising between nature and our own faculties and 
infusing this relation with purposiveness and understanding 
of all that surrounds us. Kant makes the distinction between 
aesthetics and Judgement by claiming that the former is an 
expression of subjective experience and therefore directly 
related to that experience, whereas the latter claims 
universal assent. 
This suggests that the Judgement of taste cannot be 
based on a conceptual framework, as that would lay it open 
to dispute, hence the need to distinguish dependent and 
pure. Kant's philosophy of beauty demands a relation 
between our own perspective based in what he describes as 
the 'necessary condition of our own self-consciousness', 
while simultaneously addressing the sublime as the 
overcoming of purposiveness and the renouncement of any 
attempt to understand or control the infinite greatness of 
the world. As such, the mind is 'incited to abandon 
sensibility'. 103 To judge the sublime, we demand a universal 
recognition of the immanence of the supersensible realm 
and, as such, it recognises the intimation of a 
transcendental origin from which no reasoned argument can 
be drawn. 104 Purposiveness (in beauty) offers a sense of 
harmony between nature and our faculties that is not bound 
to the specificity or particularity of a pragmatic purpose, 
103 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, p. 92. 
104 For Kant, all morality stems from the transcendental point of view. 
The awesomeness and solemnity of natural phenomenon make man 
aware of the sense of his own limitations and allows Kant to extend 
from the sublime a context for the faith in a Supreme Being. We may 
wish to reflect back to earlier comments regarding the context for 
teleology and unknowing with reference to intuition and knowledge in 
the First Critique. 
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and therefore offers an 'as if' as the indeterminate condition 
for aesthetical transcendence that is still inescapable from 
and conditional for any worldly praxis. However, the realm 
of the transcendent that Kant advocates as the pre- 
conceptual aesthetic experience still conforms to the 
sensibilities of purity and impurity, and it predicates 
affirmation over negation and as yet indicates, but does not 
explore, the possibility of a transcendent terrain of interval 
and between. However, as Derrida notes in The Truth in 
Painting: 'The "pleasing-oneself-in" of the sublime is purely 
or merely negative [nur negativ] to the extent that it 
suspends play and elevates seriousness. 5105 
This constitutes an act of violence through what 
Derrida defines as an occupation that is related to moral 
law, whereby violence is done not by the imposition of 
reason on the senses, but by the imagination itself. This 
turning of violence against itself by imagination constitutes 
a self -sacrificial operation that subsumes the legality which 
calls it to order - what Derrida refers to as 'the law of the 
sublime as much as the sublimity of the law'. 106 
John Rajchman points out that Deleuze critiques an 
aesthetics based in the Kantian notion of a transcendent 
manifold as the sublimation of sensation to what he refers 
to as aesthetic pieties. He argues that Kantian 
disinterestedness in the idealisation of art is merely recast 
in Heideggerian Gelassenheit and Freudian sublimation. 
Deleuzian sensation pushes beyond any such aesthetics of 
transcendence and the belief in the precedence of another 
105 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 130. 
106 Ibid., p. 131 . Unlike that of the beautiful, the principle of the sublime 
must, as Derrida points out, 'be sought in ourselves who project 
[hineinbringen] the sublime into nature, ourselves as rational beings', 
p. 132 (added emphasis). 
48 
world, in favour of a new logic of paradox and the 
nonsensical, which proffers the commitment to the 
possibilities of this one: 'The category of sense replaces 
that of truth when true and false describe the problem and 
not the propositions that respond to it. ' 107 
For Levinas, any criticism is the basic capacity for 
human dwelling and indicates a primordial relation with 
alterity. 108 This spectral other as the ordering/unifying factor 
for experience may be more closely linked with terms 
employed by Levinas in his work around his alteric term, the 
il y a. 109 Levinas exploits this notion of the il ya in all the 
ambiguity of its indeterminateness as an impersonal 
'isness' -a precursor that precedes any recognised 
epistemological enquiry of the isolated subject. It is before 
revaluation or any conceptual framework that can order it. 
There are distinct parallels to be drawn here with Deleuze's 
thinking on the process of individuation in Difference and 
Repetition, as indicated earlier. 110 
Levinas argues that ontological enquiry persists in the 
determinant specificity of a being through 'isness' and 
therefore in the subjectivity of identity - an 'it is'. 
107 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 145. 
108 This is distinct from the Heideggerian notion of dwelling as 
essentially a poetic experience. 
109 The il ya translates as 'there is' and is imbued with horror as it is 
neither interior or exterior -a 'between' that is the impersonal sheer 
fact of being. We may also need to consider here lekton - one of the 
four Stoical categories of incorporeals, understood as what is 
expressible -a 'between' as 'extra-being'. 
110 This refers to Deleuze's conception of a pre-individuation as apriori 
to the specificity of individuation in Difference and Repetition. 
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The epistemological quest for accurate knowledge of the 
world perceived marginalises any other discourse that 
resists sublimation into the tradition of the isolated 
subject. "' The de-personalising of being' 12 creates a trauma 
of consciousness and the impossibility for symbolic 
process, but what is significant is that the a priori nature of 
'there is', is not a negation of rationality in the sense of 
irrationality -a mere inversion - but a positive force that 
refuses avoidance and exclusion via possibility. 
By proposing 'there is' as a critique of the ontological 
'it is', Levinas does not procure a new lingual form to do 
away with being, but finds in ontology the tools to 
reconsider what Husserl refers to as ontological 
commitment. It may also be worth remembering that the 
concept of the transcendental, crucial to Husserl and 
Levinas, is founded upon the manoeuvre of bringing the 
outside inside while retaining its essential exteriority - an 
event of encryption that is not incorporation. 
Consciousness is implicitly subjective and therefore, 
in a sense, already torn away from the 'there is'. To be 
conscious is already to be 'outside of' and as such 
compelled to construct consciousness into a subjectivity 
formed of a certain framework of rationality and logic. The 
so-called darkness of the unconscious is suffused with the 
light of consciousness, but Levinas's notion of exteriority 
111 For Levinas, Phenomenology comes closest to encountering what he 
refers to as an 'ethical responsibility' that critiques the tradition of 
epistemology, which places knowledge and perception via an isolated 
subject at the centre of any discourse. However, the shift that 
Levinas proposes is from Husserl's transcendental ego whose activity 
is directed towards objects in the field of first-hand experience, 
towards an ethical reflection of human concern for others extended 
through the work of Heidegger and Sartre. 
112 The impersonalness of being considered by Levinas in concomitant 
with Heidegger's interpretation as expressed particularly in 
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). 
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extends beyond the traditional recognised dichotomy of the 
historical discourse of thinking/philosophy. 113 There is (il y 
a) is neither transcendent nor based in the ego nor any 
form of the personally symbolic and '[i]t insinuates itself in 
the night as an undetermined menace of space itself 
disengaged from its function as a receptacle for objects, as 
a means of access to beings'. 114 
It is the particular that eludes/haunts the universal - 
the horror/shadow of being that is exposed as impersonal 
neutrality, and relocates any enquiry from the clarity of 
ontological and epistemological discourse, to the nudity of 
115 alteric otherness. 
* 
The historical understanding of the transcendent as that 
which can be conceptualised, theorised, visualised, 
objectified and therefore universalised is in contrast to 
Levinas's use of the term. He understands it as a rupture, 
an opening up to the other as resisting any reduction to 
sameness (Western philosophy's historical drive to objectify 
and universalise) where similitude's dominance makes the 
universal the goal of thought. 116 
Phenomenology's aim was to reduce the gap between 
thought and embodiment - being and existence and to 
113 This is understood as the discourse of interior/exterior, 
presence/absence and sense/nonsense. 
114 The Levinas Reader, p. 31. 
115 1 am reminded here in Levinas's and Blanchot's critique of 
Heidegger's Being of the existent as impersonal neutrality, of post- 
war criticism of Heidegger as 'non-humanistic' with reference to his 
silence about the Holocaust/Shoah. 
116 The universal is defined as independent of any given set of concrete 
circumstances and is therefore disembodied and idealist. 
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advocate relation as the new motivation. 117 Whereas, in 
attributing a primacy to alterity, is Levinas setting the other 
up as the universal in the formlessness of a waiting to be 
conceptualised or universalised and therefore just a formal 
other of negation and not a true alterity? The distinction is 
important here: otherness as just another version of 
sameness (its negation), or an irreducible other that is 
foreign to the 'order of the same'? 118 The other for Levinas 
arises in the relation to others rather than in relation to the 
universality of laws and is therefore a relation of ethical 
responsibility. 119 
Such responsibility towards the other engages with its 
foreignness of irreducibility that is at once transcendent, in 
that it is not just the negation of sameness and therefore an 
a posteriori corruption of universality and its drive to 
conceptualise. It is essentially outside and persists as an 
overarching alterity that maintains difference as the 
framework of indeterminacy - deferral as the motivation 
against ontological order that both Husserl and Heidegger 
advocate in their thinking. The event of presencing only 
operates as such if as an occasion, we comprehend and 
117 It is worth remembering here the provisional discussion on relation at 
the opening of this chapter: the significance of between and the 
integrity of the rift. 
118 The distinction is important in relation to Phenomenology, as 
Husserl's attempt to reinvigorate the transcendental via a new 
relationship with existence is undermined by Levinas, who wishes to 
expose what is essentially alien in transcendental otherness and 
therefore unable to conform to the phenomenological persistence in a 
formal dichotomy. 
119 Ethics is understood here as the practical relation of one to another 
that is prior to ontology. Husserl's project is to locate signification in 
existence; Levinas's is in responsibility for the other. The 
communication, which must be established in order to enter into a 
relation with the other means that the relation is no longer ontology, 
but rather religion -a place where knowledge cannot take 
precedence over sociality. This is relevant to what will be later 
discussed in Chapter 2, 'Todtnauberg and the Meridian', with regard 
to the relationship between Heidegger and Celan and manifest in 
Celan's poem, 'Todtnauberg'. 
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maintain the metaphysical binary of presence and 
absence. 120 The former (presence), as illumination, can only 
be understood via a simultaneous grasp of its counterpart 
shadow - however, the full glare of the always entirely 
present can only banish shadow to an ever-diminishing role 
that can only be maintained in proximity to the privileged 
ideality. 121 
In 'Reality and its Shadow', Levinas proposes that the 
artwork is 'an event of obscuring', in that the consciousness 
of representation is in the knowledge that the object 
represented is essentially not there. 
The perceived elements of any artwork do not serve as 
symbols in the absence of the object - they do not force its 
presence, as it were, but by their very presence insist on its 
absence. 122 
120 Even as an active process, presencing is haunted in its motivation by 
absence. As an active verb, to presence must embrace absencing as 
its hidden imperative - the shadow to any illumination. 
121 It may be pertinent to remember our earlier remarks on 
consciousness and the unconscious in Levinas with regard to 
illumination and shadow. 
122 Hegel states in his lectures on aesthetics, 'For the beauty of art is 
the beauty that is born - born again, that is - of the mind. ' In 
Bosanquet's translation, Geist can mean both mind and 'spirit' and an 
allusion to a biblical source can be detected: 'born of water and of 
the Spirit' (John 3: 5) refers to spiritual rebirth. Natural objects, 
materials, etc., are 'transformed' by spirit (in this context, the human 
mind) and are reborn as works of art. This relation activates 
aesthetics and specifically determines the sublime. 
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For Hegel, the mind/spirit (Geist) is the contributory 
factor that elevates what is natural to art. What 
distinguishes between them is not conceived in terms of 
hierarchical quantitative judgements, but by saying that the 
unique contribution of Geist to artistic beauty is that 'mind 
and mind only, is capable of truth'. 123 Natural beauty cannot 
be systemised as it is too vague and destitute of a criterion, 
but Hegel introduces the term utility in an attempt to 
compile the natural as product into a 'science of use'. 124 
In the forms of art we seek repose and animation in place of 
the austerity of the reign of law and the sombre self- 
concentration of thought: we would exchange the shadowland 
of the idea for cheerful vigorous reality. 125 
The transcendent spirit in Hegel's aesthetic transforms 
materiality through elevation via the conduit (thread) of a 
transcendent Geist and conceives ideality and its law as 
imparting restrictions, against the 'caprice and lawlessness 
of the mind'. 
123 This combines two ideas 
i The mind discerns the truth about other things, e. g., discovers 
the laws governing the solar system and focuses on and accesses 
the beauty of sunsets, etc. 
ii The mind is independent and self-contained, having such 
qualities as beauty underivatively. The beauty of nature is a 
reflection of the beauty that belongs to the mind. It is an 
imperfect and incomplete mode of being. 
124 He also uses the term curative, which has implications for the work in 
Chapter 2, 'Todtnauberg and the Meridian', particularly with 
reference to comments on the pharmakos. Beauty and art 'form the 
bright adornment of all our surroundings', 'soothing the sadness of 
our condition', and 'keeping evil at a distance'. Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Chapter 1 (part 
vi), P. 5. 
125 Ibid., p. 7, Chapter 1 (part vii) (added emphasis). 
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In this way ideality becomes the spectral transformer of the 
sensual via transcendence. 126 
* 
Death for Heidegger is impossibility - the possibility of 
impossibility, but for Levinas mortality is beyond the 
capacity of what he refers to as the 'I can'; the impersonal 
otherness of the 'there is' allows for the possibility of taking 
life as it were, but not the capacity for 'taking death'; it is 
rather the impossibility of possibility. 127 We may conclude 
that, historically, the 'wholly present' and 'wholly absent' 
correlate in their dialectic with illumination and shadow as a 
clear manifestation of the metaphysically persistent binary. 
However, the movement of becoming indicates a more 
complex articulation, which ruptures this opposition and its 
hierarchy by creating a fissure between the clear paradigm 
of epistemological presence and absence -a 'between' or 
interval or rift. Mindful of this, to propose becoming as a 
more appropriate operation of the event by which any 
dialectic can be undermined and reconfigured, must take 
into account that the very binary it seeks to rethink still 
determines it within the hierarchies of being and non-being, 
126 This differs from Derrida in that the directional nature of the impact 
of Geist as transcendent still conforms to a Platonic ideality of 
imposition. Derrida's spectre undermines that chronology by 
insinuating itself via encryption and discontinuity. Levinas speaks of 
the material ity/component/element as old garments occupying a place 
to make a removal as though the represented objects died, were 
degraded, and were disincarnated in its own reflection. ' (added 
emphasis). Levinas, 'Reality and its Shadow', p. 136. Later in the 
same text, he states, '[tlhe artist moves in a universe that precedes 
... the world of creation, a universe 
that the artist has already gone 
beyond by his thought and his everyday actions. ' Also note here 
remarks made by Derrida on predetermination in The Truth in 
Painting, p. 21. 
127 This is understood as a 'coming toward' rather than a 'that which I 
am toward'; 'isness' is depersonalised in the other. 
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truth and non-truth, sense and non-sense, understood 
through ratio. 
Derrida's suggestion (quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter) that the traditional scholar can only think in 
binaries, does not suggest that such oppositional 
hierarchies should be done away with, but rather that closer 
scrutiny must uncover that exteriority which is encrypted as 
a spatio-temporal event. To suggest a literal relation for 
shadow with any binary counter-part is to fall, if not 
cautious, into the persistence of a distinction between 
affirmation and negation as the contingency by which 
shadow might be proposed and exploited. 128 Levinas 
described a doubling of reality with its image as indicated 
by the idea of shadow or reflection. He argued that '[t]he 
whole of reality bears on its face its own allegory, outside 
of its own revelation and its truth'. 129 
* 
The work of art/artistic event is then the obscuring of being 
in images and therefore the arresting of that being in a 
temporal 'between' -a meanwhile. In citing two 
contemporary possibilities for being, Levinas seeks to 
rethink disclosure and its function in the artwork outside 
revelatory predisposition commonly a ttributed to it 
historically. The simultaneity of idea and soul - being and 
its disclosure - is superseded by the simultaneity of being 
and its reflection, where the absolute reveals itself to 
reason and also lends itself to a kind of erosion outside 
128 1 am thinking here of the cinematic - the object of the film occurs in 
the temporal flux between illumination and shadow - other to 
illumination and other to shadow. Also note here Deleuze on the 
object as present image in Cinema 1. 
129 Levinas, 'Reality and its Shadow', p. 136 . 
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causality: 'Non-truth is not an obscure residue of being, but 
is its sensible character itself, by which there is 
resemblance and images in the world. ý 130 
For Levinas all art depends on rhythm (and is 
ultimately musical) and produces a state of intoxication 
where distinctions between subject and object are blurred 
and dissolve into impersonality and anonymity. Its time is 
not that of the real world but of the dream -a between time 
where any future is replaced by fatality. 
As a shadow of reality, it can only be engaged through 
criticism (questions of technique and influence 'wake' art 
from its 'dream') . 
131 Husserl's definition of the image as 'the 
real object minus its being posited as really present 
anywhere' is critiqued by Levinas, who proposes that 
consciousness of the absence of the object should be 
understood as an alteration of the being of the object. The 
phenomenology of the picture in clarifying the 
phenomenology of the image destines the virtue of the 
image in its own right so that it is no longer merely the 
medium through which something else might be reached. 
Unlike a sign or a symbol, 132 the image and therefore 
representation are reversals or allegories - the shadows 
that reality casts before it. 
130 Ibid., p. 136. 
131 In the introduction to House of Leaves, the character Johnny Truant 
states, 'Old shelters-television, magazines, movies-won't protect you 
anymore. You might try scribbling in a journal, on a napkin, maybe 
even in the margins of this book. That's when you'll discover you no 
longer trust the very walls you always took for granted. Even the 
hallways you've walked a hundred times will feel longer, much 
longer, and the shadows, any shadow at all, will suddenly seem 
deeper, much, much, deeper', p. xiii (added emphasis). 
132 Signs and symbols understood here as that which is tied to that 
which are signified through them. 
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The world of the artistic imagination and of imagination in 
general is not merely a reflection or re-presentation of reality, 
but a double of reality presenting its sensible truth. 133 
In 'The Transcendence of Words', Levinas states, '[n]on- 
sense is the most evenly distributed thing in the world'. 134 
Understanding sense outside the remit of the 
negation/affirmation dichotomy allows us to grasp a 
conception that no longer relies on the privileging of reason 
as the essential component to understanding. What is 'not' 
sense in the order of reasonableness remains other to it - 
its shadow, and as such, a bifurcation. In his introduction to 
'The Transcendence of Words', Sedn Hand comments: 
An original bifurcation means that any static identity or 
representation overflows from the beginning. The primary 
space which this creates is one filled with anxiety for Levinas, 
unless it includes a relation with someone that is the necessity 
of critique. This necessary communication means that there is 
no pure sound prior to the word: sound or words produce a 
transcendence by breaking the world of self-sufficiency. 
Speech situates the self in relation to the other in a way that 
shows us how being for the other is the first fact of 
existence. 
135 
When Levinas states that thought is originally erasure, he 
refers to a network of associations in which what is key is 
not that ideas displace one another, but the assurance of 
the presence of one idea in another. 136 
133 Added emphasis. The Genealogy of Ethics, 'Tropes', p. 195. 
134 Levinas, 'The Transcendence of Words', from The Levinas Reader, p. 
145. 
135 Levinas, Introduction to 'The Transcendence of Words', p. 144. 
136 '[T]he thought at the moment of its erasure still influences through 
its erased meaning; its different meanings participate with one 
another. ' 'The Transcendence of Words', p. 146. 
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The association of ideas understood through this level of 
erasure takes thought beyond the classical categories of 
representation and identity. 137 Space is no longer conceived 
as the accommodator of things, but rather as that which is 
delineated through their erasure. This line of ambiguity is 
where the skeletal function of the linear is shed in the 
framing of the pictorially spatial in favour of an infinity of 
possible connections where the modern work of art 
proposes a state of incompletion and possibility through the 
simultaneity and ambiguity of erasure. 
* 
137 Such an overflowing has a close affinity with Bergsonian duration, 
but Bergson's concept represents this negation of identity as a 
process of evolution against the primordial status of Levinas's notion 
of erasure which 'affirms the simultaneity of multiplicity and the 
irreducibly ambiguous nature of consciousness'. (Levinas, 'The 
Transcendence of Words', p. 146) Deleuze's appropriation of 
Bergsonian duration is particularly evident in the texts Cinema 1 and 
Cinema 2. This will be explored in more detail in a later chapter, but 
it suffices here to mention that duration incorporates both temporality 
and spacing, and where the precedent is no longer to consider time 
as the mere diminutive of space but to propose durde as the relation 
of time-space. Levinas argues that overflowing lies beyond the 
classical categorisation of representation and identity and looks 
towards Bergsonian duration noting that Bergson's conception 
represents the negation of identity as a process of evolution. 
Duration here is not explicit, as such variation is both simultaneous 
and spatial and therefore there is no etudic process towards 
completion. 
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Derrida says of Levinas that he respects the zone or layer 
of traditional truth, but his thought makes us tremble 
through dislocation and move towards a prophetic speech 
that is no longer the site or home for a god. 138 
The bifurcation of the other as an event of difference 
promotes the status of ambiguity, so that intrinsic meaning 
is deferred in an attempt to liberate thought from the 
samelbeing and the onelphenomenon through the interval of 
deferral. This may be provisionally conceived as a 
difference between what is and what is not, when perhaps it 
is more appropriate to think of it in terms of a complication 
of similitude -a diff6rance. 139 
In the preface to Derrida's 'An Introduction to the 
Origin of Geometry', in a footnote, he attempts to define 
diff6rance via language: 
Here in the usage of our language we must consider that the 
ending -ance is undecided between active and passive. And 
we shall see why what is designated by 'difference' is neither 
simply active nor simply passive, that it announces or rather 
recalls something like a middle voice, that it speaks of an 
operation, which cannot be thought of either as a passion or 
as an action of a subject upon an object, as starting from an 
138 In the text 'Edmond Jabbs and the Question of the Book', Derrida 
speaks of the coincidence of 'right to speech' and 'duty to 
interrogate'. He says, 'But if this right is absolute, it is because it 
does not depend upon some accident within history. The breaking of 
the Tables (tablets? ) articulates, first of all, a rupture within God as 
the origin of history. () God separated himself for himself in order to 
let us speak, in order to astonish and to interrogate us. He did so not 
by speaking but by keeping still, by letting silence interrupt his voice 
and his signs, by letting the Tables be broken, ' p. 67 (added 
emphasis). Derrida remarks in The Truth in Painting that, '[a] piece 
of wasteland [terrain vague] has no fixed limit. Without edge, without 
any border marking property ... Vague [i. e., wanders, roams -Trans] 
is a movement without its goal, not a movement without goal but 
without its goal', pp. 92-3. 
139 Christopher Norris, writing on Husserl, describes the transcendental 
reduction an oscillation that disables materiality, perhaps the 
intervention of interval - the vibration of unclecidability. 
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agent or from a patient, or on the basis of, or in view of any of 
these terms. 140 
As already stated, the essential alterity of diff6rance is not 
to be defined exclusively by the operation of the 'not' of 
difference, the complications of identity and the universality 
of sameness. It continues to specify a locale of a 'between', 
which is perhaps still organised and essentially defined by 
the dialectic of presence and absence and within which the 
pre-existent a priori is maintained . 
141 The trauma of the 
'there is', as understood by Levinas, is formed by the 
indeterminate ambiguity of its 'isness'. It comes to thought 
before either personal revelation or the rigorous necessity 
of any concept that can order it. 142 
The distinction employed between difference and 
diff6rance is significant to the understanding of the 
spectral, and in as far as difference retains some proximity 
to the universality of sameness, diff6rance articulates a 
trauma of more complex irreducible unclecidability. 143 
Derrida articulates two questions with regard to 
Husserl's The Origin of Geometry in his introduction. The 
first concerns the status of what he describes as the 'ideal 
140 Preface to 'An Introduction to the Origin of Geometry' by Derrida, p. 
4, footnote 12.1 also draw attention here to earlier comments on 
active and passive with regard to Kant writing on intuition and 
knowledge. 
141 1 am thinking here of the primacy of alterity defined by Levinas as 
not a negation in the sense of the irrational, a void, but as a positive 
force, essentially particular and eluding the universal. It is important 
to remember here that the other, in the sense of difference, may still 
be defined in terms of 'waiting to be conceptualised and 
universalised' - the other of Western thought as just another version 
of the same. Levinas is looking for an other that is irreducible to the 
universality of difference and foreign to the order of the same. 
142 As neither transcendent nor based in the specificity of the ego nor 
personally symbolic, it is truly nowhere. 
143 '[T]he crisis of the text is not brought about by polysemy or the 
overabundance of meaning but rather by the very inability to decide 
meaning', 'An Introduction to the Origin of Geometry', Preface, p. 5. 
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objects of science' 144 (geometry being one example) and 
their production by identifying acts as sameness and the 
constitution of exactitude through idealisation . 
14 '5 The 
second considers the interrelated and concrete conditions 
for the possibility of these ideal objects through language 
and intersubjectivity - the world as the unity of ground and 
horizon. 
For Derrida, The Origin of Geometry unites organically 
the two denunciations of historicism and objectivism to 
create a new conjunction: the historicity of ideal 
objectivities, which obeys different rules and is neither the 
factual interconnections of empirical history nor an ideal 
and ahistoric 'adding on'. 146 He proposes an occultation 
through the event of objectivism in science whereby the 
founding subjectivity of science, and therefore its basis in 
what Husserl defines as the Lebenswelt, 147 are alienated 
and rendered strange. 148 
To free science from its subjective origins is to be 
involved in what Derrida, via Husserl, describes as a 
'necessary act' of objectivisation and conquest, but which is 
also an act of irresponsibility by rendering the world (via 
144 1 refer back to earlier comments on science. Derrida's use of 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry gives status to science/geometry as a 
means of navigating towards its origin. 
145 For Kant there is one geometry: the Euclidean, which is viewed as a 
body of synthetic a priori propositions about the structure of 
perceptual space, for example, the proposition that space has only 
three dimensions. 
146 This conjunction is crucial because it is quite clearly, for Derrida, 
neitherfactual nor ideal. This new unity of different rules is perhaps 
most strongly linked to the Heideggerian originary event of the 
essence of technology. The term objectivities indicates a close link 
to event status in as far as the exactitude of objectivity is 
undermined by immanence. 
147 Translated as 'life world'. 
148 The situating of imagination as the scission between sensibility and 
knowledge highlights the rift as the erudition of the unfamiliar (the 
Unheimlich) in the midst of what is comprehended (the finitude of 
comprehension) as familial. 
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the sense of science and logic/reason) unintelligible. 149 In 
this way, the responsibility of sense and objectification, 
through what might be defined as 'the logic of clarity', 
imposes an obscuring structure on subjective origin. 150 
Derrida defines this 'forgetfulness of origins' thus: 
Undoubtedly, Husserl's production also involves a stratum of 
receptive intuition (as in Kantian 'revaluation'). But what 
matters here is that this Husserlian intuition, as it concerns 
the ideal objects of mathematics, 
151 is absolute, constitutive 
and creative: the objects or objectivities that it intends did not 
exist before it: and this before of the ideal objectivity marks 
more than the chronological eve of fact: it marks a 
transcendental prehistory. 152 
149 It may be worth thinking here of Deleuze writing on sense, pre-sense 
and nonsense in his The Logic of Sense. If we understand pre-sense 
and nonsense in terms of discontinuity, they interrupt the smoothness 
of any continuity and give the continuous shape. 
150 Husserl's consideration of pre-sense critiques Galilean blindness to 
origin via the accomplishment of idealisation and its lack of enquiry 
into origin via the pre-geometrical, sensible world and practical acts. 
151 In The Truth in Painting, Derricla speculates on scale and the 
differentiation between mathematical and aesthetic evaluation. 'The 
mathematical evaluation of size never reaches its maximum. The 
aesthetic evaluation, the primary and fundamental one, does reach it; 
and this subjective maximum constitutes the absolute reference 
which arouses the feeling of the sublime; no mathematical evaluation 
or comparativity is capable of this, unless ... the fundamental 
aesthetic measure remains alive, is kept alive [lebendig erhalten 
wird] in the imagination which presents the mathematical numbers. ' 
pp. 139-40. 
152 Derrida, 'An Introduction to Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry', p. 
40. 
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In Kantian revaluation, the first geometer merely becomes 
conscious that it suffices for any mathematical activity to 
remain within a concept that it already possesses, and 
therefore a construction that is the explication of an already 
existing concept is the non-creative act teaching the sense 
of a ready-made geometry. 153 As such, it remains the history 
of an operation, and not the act of being instituted -a 
founding. 154 Derrida's argument that deconstruction is a 
rigorous attempt to think the limits of the principle of reason 
remains pertinent to this institution, as it inherits the active 
demand of Heidegger to re-think origin (in this instance, the 
origin of reason, but the same application may be made to a 
more general sense of origin as in Husserl's geometry). 
What is implicit to Derrida's project is the imperative to go 
beyond the tradition of oppositional terminology of praxis 
and theory, however, the activity of deconstruction remains 
inconceivable outside the tradition of enlightened rational 
critique, whose classic formulations are found in Kant. In 
demanding a reason for reasonableness, Derrida maintains 
that rationality understood as the likes of technology, 
science, geometry, etc., remains a highly specific historical 
153 Derricla notes in The Truth in Painting that: 'The nonconceptual 
resembles the conceptual. A very strange resemblance, a singular 
proximity of affinity [Ahnlichkeit] which, somewhere draws out of 
mim6sis an interpretation of the beautiful which firmly rejects 
imitation', p. 76. He argues that the place of the gathering of 
'without-concept' and 'concept', universality 'with' and 'without' 
concept, legitimates what he refers to as the 'violent occupation' of 
the nonconceptual field by the grid of conceptual force. 
154 In the sense that Heidegger proposes the essence of technology as 
nothing technological, is Derrida proposing that the essence of 
geometry is not geometric? I pose the following two questions: Is the 
origin/essence inside geometry through the temporality of historicity? 
And if so, as such a component does it remain alien to the 
architectonics of geometry -a viral contamination encrypted at the 
source of ideality? Derrida notes on the intermediary of imagination 
recognised in aesthetic evaluation, between sensibility and 
understanding in The Truth in Painting, that 'for aesthetic evaluation 
to give rise to a mathematical measure, the intervention of the 
imagination is indispensable', p. 140. 
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formation that cannot be appealed to as a kind of ultimate 
ground. 155 He argues in The Truth in Painting that: 
An inadequate presentation of the infinite presents its own 
inadequation, an inadequation is presented as such in its own 
yawning gap, it is determined in its contour, it cises and 
incises itself as incommensurable with the without-cise. 156 
Where he differs from Heidegger is in his insistence that 
there is no possibility of thinking back beyond the origin of 
a false enlightenment to a primordial state of being where 
language touched the ultimate truths of experience. This 
remains too logocentric in its assumptions about speech as 
self-presence and is still trapped in the empirical framework 
of conceptual oppositions. The active re-thinking of 
reason's origin through what is described as an immanent 
critique implies a Kantian dialectic of passive and active, 
and perhaps suggests that such an activity can only take 
place within the principality of reason in the Western 
tradition. 
Derrida's notion of 'beyond reason', as already stated, 
differs from Heidegger's notion of 'beyond' in as far as the 
primordial linguistic origin the latter considers remains still 
concerned with the patterns of logocentric ordering while 
aspiring to be distinctly other. 
155 In this way he continues Heidegger's critique of instrumental reason 
as the 'essential task of any authentic "modern" philosophy'. 
156 Added emphasis. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 132. Derrida's 
excavation of the word cise from incision is significant because it 
draws attention to the contention that sublimity exceeds the order of 
what Kant calls 'productions of art', as they are concomitant with the 
scale of man: 'the sublime, if there is any sublime, exists only by 
overspilling: it exceeds cise and good measure, it is no longer 
proportioned according to man and his determinations', ibid., p. 122. 
This superabundance opens an abyss - an in[ciselion within 
ourselves where magnitude as absolutely large 'is no longer of the 
order or at orders of largeness as dimension. It is larger than 
largeness, neither large nor largeness, but absolutely large. ' Ibid., 
pp. 135-6 (added emphasis). 
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* 
This more paras it iC 157 activity acknowledges its encrypted 
blurring of the internal/external ordering of metaphysical 
logic, and emphasises Heidegger's origin as still essentially 
a metaphysical one, in that being haunts beings in a way 
that it (being) persists in the form of a primordial ideality. 
He critiques Husserl's attempt to define the universal 
knowledge of geometry as the combination of present 
intuition and past discovery, through what he perceives as 
the essential role of the lingual as an event of emancipation 
from the intuition of actuality. Derrida plays with the 
Husserlian interplay between present and past in intuition 
and discovery as a circulatory source of illumination from 
which consciousness discovers a path. 
Derridian ideality, in what we might refer to as 'the 
lingual permanence of language', sources the a priori truth 
not as the geometric form as a universal knowledge, but 
confers the source of such ideality in the language in which 
that form is expressed. 158 
* 
Phenomenology, as defined by Husserl, is the philosophy of 
essences - objective, intangible and a priori - but is also 
the philosophy of experiences, the temporal flux of what is 
157 In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl contextualises logic by 
saying that: '[This] theory of pure forms is the intrinsically first 
discipline of formal logic, implanted as a germ in the old analytics 
but not yet developed', p. 50 (added emphasis). 
158 It is worth noting here that if we understand writing, as Derrida 
proposes, as an endlessly productive signifying practice, irreducible 
to some ultimate, self-evident truth, the conception of writing is 
already a deferral of meaning, and therefore the assurance of an 
objectivity of pure presence in the written form is already 
undermined. Husserl's reliance on the lingual form to express the 
geometric places deferral at the heart of any 'origin'. 
66 
lived. The path of such thinking is defined, as Christopher 
Norris states, by an oscillation between genesis/intuitive 
(the temporal), and structure/ideality (permanence). In his 
introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry, Derrida 
states, '[h]istorical incarnation sets free the transcendental, 
instead of binding it'. 159 For him, the 'speaking subject' (the 
fall back into the lingual, as it were) constitutes the ideal 
object and therefore objectivity, and raises the question of 
the disassociation of the ideal object from all subjectivity 
and empirical language, both of which may confuse the 
transparency of the univocal and objective significations of 
a pure logic. According to him, the reductive process of 
phenomenology by which Husserl parenthesises constituted 
language, operates to let the originality of constitutive 
language come to light. As such, the reductive process must 
inhibit any objective positing produced in unreflective 
consciousness (perceived, remembered, judged, etc. ), so 
that the world is not understood absolutely but via 
consciousness - the experience 'of', as it were. 
160 
In the preparatory considerations of his text Formal 
and Transcendental Logic, Husserl argues: 
As a theory of science concerned with principles, logic intends 
to bring out pure universalities, a priori universalities. As 
already said in the introduction, it does not intend to 
investigate empirically the so-called sciences that are given 
beforehand - the cultural formations going by that name, which 
have in fact come into existence - and abstract their empirical 
types, on the contrary, free from every restriction to the 
factual (which supplies it only with points of departure for a 
159 Derrida, 'An Introduction to Edmund Husserl's The Origin of 
Geometry', p. 77. 
160 'Of' as the 'via' of consciousness, may give a context for the 
preposition 'of' that operates between aesthetics and hauntology. 
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criticism of examples), it intends to make completely clear the 
final ideas that hover dimly before us whenever we are 
actuated by a purely theoretical interest. 161 
Husserl's investigations belong, not within a deductive 
logic, but in what might be considered as a second-order 
discipline now understood as the philosophy of I ogiC. 162 The 
determination towards a systematic coherence of knowing in 
Husserl's thought makes a clear distinction between the 
pure logic of Kantian judgements: 'finding ground for one's 
knowing, and suitably combining and ordering the sequence 
163 of such groundings' . 
The essence of science is no longer merely the 
accumulation of various isolated pieces of knowledge, but 
the unity of a whole system of grounded validations. Logic, 
for Husserl, becomes the theory of theories and is a priori 
in that, as David Bell states in his study of the philosopher: 
'It is the science that studies the possible forms of any 
systematic, rational knowledge whatsoever, regardless of 
the material content of that knowledge. 7 164 
* 
161 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 28. 
162 It is worth remembering here that, logic, as a 'pure' science, is 
understood as the investigation and codification of relations of 
deductive consequence, holding between sentences or thoughts and 
propositions and what they express. Kant's objective cleductio was a 
positive attempt to establish the content of a priori knowledge by 
asking the question, What are the presuppositions of experience? 
The truth follows not from the particularity of this or that experience, 
but from the fact that we have experience at all. For Kant, the 
particularity of experience cannot verify this truth, only the 
universality of reason is capable of defining what will be true in 
every 'world' where sceptical questions are asked. 
163 'Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields 
us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from 
the understanding arise concepts. ' Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
§33, p. 65. 
164 David Bell, Husserl, p. 90. 
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The objectivity of pure logic can only be proved outside its 
own system and requires epistemological self-evidence (the 
reflection and critique that, as far as Husserl is concerned, 
only a philosopher can supply), and all syntactic, semantic, 
logical and metalogical laws and principles, 165 that together 
comprise the formality of the objective, requires a 
complementary investigation into the subjective and 
material aspects of rational thought - philosophical logic. 
This materiality is a key to any understanding of the 
temporal flux of phenomenological thinking, and introduces 
a Hegelian/historical dimension as a ground for knowledge 
and as a reaction against a priori truth as a grand 
synthesis. 
For Derrida, the power of logocentric thinking is to 
absorb all differences by viewing the event of difference as 
merely a signPOsting towards this synthesis. Therefore 
dialectical reason becomes an attempt to comprehend all 
via terms that the philosophical lays down in advance. 166 
In this sense, Husserl's proposal to render a 
philosophical logic through means of subjectivity and 
materiality can be seen to indicate, through the distinctions 
manifest in the application of the aforementioned terms, 
difference as the core of rational thought. What haunts the 
objective in its drive towards the application of principles is 
another logic grounded in distinctiveness and diversity. 
165 Husserl describes these as: 'the merely negative conditions of the 
possibility of truth'. From 'Experience and Judgement (§3)', and 
quoted in David Bell's text Husserl, p. 91 . 
166 Derrida critiques Husserl's conception of structure via writing as 
permanence, suggesting that this origin relies on what he refers to as 
'mortal script'. In his introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry, he 
asserts that the imperative to define geometry, via writing, traps 
Husserl's thinking in a continual logocentric bias, which is contrary 
to writing's irreducibility to any self-evident truth. 
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Derrida alludes to this in his critique of The Origin of 
Geometry expressed through 'mortal script'. 
However, the particularities of what Husserl describes 
as emancipated sciences cannot realise their true potential 
- their full being-sense, without relinquishing their 
provincial particularities, their exclusivity of method and 
specificity. 
The combinations of their research potential must lead 
to 'the universality of being and its fundamental essential 
unity'. 167 Any impetus to blame pure or formal logic for the 
creation of exclusive scientific principalities is contingent 
on the suggestion that the logic of universality has 
relinquished its capacity for overseeing and has resorted to 
the role of a special science. Implicit in this historical 
manoeuvre is a shift in significance from the transcendental 
to the merely formal. 
The procedure 168 of phenomenological reduction that 
Husserl advocates is a method by which one can reduce to 
zero ontological commitments based in what he describes 
as the natural attitude . 
169 The principle of reduction 
addresses the naivety of ontological commitment on the 
premise that ontology is understood here as the existence 
of physical objects, properties, and facts in the form of an 
objective causal nexus. The transcendental reduction is a 
167 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 4. 
168 Phenomenological Reduction is for Husserl, a procedure and not a 
theory that can be applied. It is an expression of imperatives rather 
than a declaration of 'truth' - an activity rather than a belief that 
induces a particular state of mind of which no adequate conception 
can be formed or understood by others who have not already 
successfully performed the reduction. 
169 Natural Attitude denotes a complex system of interlocking beliefs 
permeating our everyday understanding of things. It is generally a 
shared system of commitments that are linked to the pursuit of 
objective truth by the natural and human sciences, and which, for 
Husserl, are essentially philosophically naive, in that they remain 
uncritical and largely unconscious. 
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method for neutralising these ontological components 
without excluding them or obliterating them and this is 
crucial to any understanding of the complexities of the shift 
from natural attitude to neutralised attitude. 
* 
In Ideas, Husserl indicates the process thus: 
[A]lthough it remains what it is in itself, we put it 'out of 
action', we 'exclude it', and we 'bracket it'. It is still there, like 
the bracketed matter inside a pair of parentheses ... but we 
make no use of it. We put out of action the entire ontological 
commitment (General thesis) that belongs to the essence of 
the natural attitude, we place it in brackets whatever it 
includes with respect to being. 170 
The oscillation that Christopher Norris refers to between the 
intuitive/temporal and structural/permanence is indicated by 
the parenthetic event of transcendental reduction, which 
essentially disables any materiality/objectivity. If pure or 
formal logic is understood as the place for establishing and 
exploring the essential requirements of a genuine 
knowledge, the discovery of such norms, and therefore the 
new sense of science in a metaphysical sense, arises in the 
Platonic establishment of a formal logic. The ambiguity of 
Husserl's reductive process mediates for a different 
interpretation of the transcendental that resists the 
metaphysical imperative to impose universality on 
temporality. The complication of this manoeuvre 
provisionally shifts the emphasis of what is essentially 
transcendent from a priori to post priori. However, this 
170 Edmund Husserl, Ideas §32, p. 111 - 
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procedure is not merely an inversion of the common 
understanding of the historical metaphysical dichotomy. 
What Husserl alludes to, and Norris amplifies, is a 
more complex affiliation between the intuitive and the 
structural, whereby the emphasis is no longer on exclusivity 
and separateness in the sense of diminishing, but rather an 
ex-endence. 171 In the introduction to Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, Husserl proposes a reversal of the 
historical relationship between logic and science by stating: 
Instead of seeking out the pure essential norms of science in 
all its essential formations, to give the sciences fundamental 
guidance thereby and to make possible for them genuineness 
in shaping their methods and in rendering an account of every 
step logic has been pleased to let itself be guided by the cle 
facto sciences, particularly the much-admired natural sciences 
in conceiving its ideal of science and in setting its own 
problems. 172 
The contradiction in transcendental reduction remains in the 
worldliness implicit in ontological commitment that Husserl 
provisionally insists must be done away with. The external, 
once neutralised, allows for the transcendental residuum of 
consciousness (which has its own absolute essence) to 
come to the fore as it is unaffected by the reductive 
process. Thus the dichotomy of internal/external is retained 
by Husserl's phenomenology as the spectre of 
consciousness. This operates as a transcendental 
residuum, which haunts ontological commitment. Husserl's 
attempts to resolve the contradiction of this dichotomy by 
171 Ex-endence is understood as a departure from being and the 
categories that define it. In making this departure, what remains 
crucial is the contribution of the embarkation point for the journey. 
172 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic - 'Introduction', 
p. 3. 
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proposing the reductive act as one of change, but what is 
highlighted is an ambiguity between the everyday and the 
transcendental - the legitimacy of truth and its 
acknowledgement. 
The scientific imperative that Husserl adopts in his 
transcendental ontology fails to provide it with a genuine 
explanatory power, because it persists in assigning 
scientific functions to both transcendental and natural 
sciences. 173 Derrida's contention in 'Violence and 
Metaphysics' is that: 
[T]he consciousness of crisis is for Husserl but the 
provisional, almost necessary covering up of a transcendental 
motif which in Descartes and in Kant was already beginning to 
accomplish the Greek aim: philosophy as science. 174 
The complication of legitimising a new provision for the 
transcendental is most acutely felt in Husserl's 
determination to configure it within the context of the 
Greco-European tradition. It alludes to a security that 
undermines its potential and radicality. 175 However, as 
previously stated, Derrida in 'Violence and Metaphysics' 
also suggests that knowledge within the aforementioned 
tradition 'is neither habitual nor comfortable but, on the 
contrary, permits us to experience torment or distress in 
general'. 176 The reductive process performs as an inhibitor 
of objective positing produced in unreflective consciousness 
(perceived, remembered, judged, etc. ) and by placing the 
173 Derrida's contention that Husserl's reliance on mortal script to define 
scientif ic/geometric ideality may be pertinent to remember here. 
174 Derrida, 'Violence and Metaphysics', p. 82. 
175 David Bell in his study on Husserl, suggests that phenomenology is 
an inherently conservative philosophy. 
176 Derrida, 'Violence and Metaphysics', p. 82. 
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'world' in brackets, it is no longer understood absolutely but 
obscured via consciousness - the experience 'of'. 
The transcendental, then, appears to be absolute and 
not hindered by specificity and through the process of 
phenomenological reduction it is the revision of the shutting 
out of universal consciousness in favour of the pure 
phenomenon - the purely psychical. 
* 
Perception of a body as a concordant multiplicity of 
perceptions of one and the same body becomes unthinkable 
as factually occurring perceptions or expectations. It 
becomes the presentation of invariant structural systems 
better understood as essential forms or eidos. Kant, in 'The 
Dreams of a Spirit Seer', states: 
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The initiate is already accustomed to heighten his intellectual 
powers and thus transcends the crude world of the five senses 
by help of reason and abstract concepts: thus he has learnt to 
discern spiritual shapes, devoid of material particles, in the 
twilight where the dim glow of metaphysics renders to him the 
realm of shadows. 177 
Kant's theory indicates an intermediary link for the concept 
of the organism. It is not dead/inert matter; neither is it the 
immaterial substance or pure pneumati C 178 understood as a 
reciprocity not hindered by the laws of any material inertia. 
This 'neither' is further articulated and understood, as 
previously stated, by Christopher Norris as the oscillation 
between intuition and structure as the motivation for 
phenomenological discourse. 
Where this movement, or perhaps it might better be 
defined as a vibration, provisionally differs from the Kantian 
concept is in the latter's imposition of the spiritual as an 
event of animation on the dead matter of the material 
177 Added emphasis. Kant, 'Dreams of a Spirit Seer', Chapter 2, p. 44. In 
Derrida's text Memoirs of the Blind, he comments: 'the operation of 
drawing would have something to do with blindness, would in some 
way regard blindness [aveuglement]. ' Later in the same paragraph he 
extrapolates: 'the blind man can be a seer, and he sometimes has the 
vocation of a visionary', p. 2. Mark Z. Danielewski's character, 
Zampan6 in House of Leaves: the keeper and original commentator of 
The Navidson Record, wrote constantly about seeing: 'What we see, 
how we see and what in turn we can't see', p. xxi, while proposing 
that the fictitious documentary film, The Navidson Record, was an 
attempt to 'somehow capture the most difficult subject of all: the 
sight of darkness itself', ibid., p. xii. Significantly it is noted by the 
character Johnny Truant that: 'He was blind as a bat. ' ('Almost half 
the books he owned were in Braille. Lude and Flaze both confirmed 
that over the years the old guy had had numerous readers visiting 
him during the day. ' It is noted that Zampan6's readers were mostly 
women: 'those soothing tones cradled in a woman's words'. ) Ibid., 
pp. xxi-xxii. Deleuze remarks in Cinema 2 that: 'the visionary, the 
seer, is the one who sees in the crystal, and what is seen is the 
gushing forth of time as doubling, as scission', 109: 81 (added 
emphasis). 
178 'Pneumatic' was the current word for the spiritual in Kant's day. 
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world. 179 Knowledge and intuition remaining outside 
materiality, yet still impose criteria on matter. 
David Bell suggests that the phenomenological 
reductive bracketing of materiality acts as a form of 
indexing, but uncovers the contradiction implicit in 
Husserl's understanding of the reductive event, which, while 
proposing the radicality of a transformation, insists on 
6 everything being left as it is'. The problem becomes one of 
a change that is fundamental yet essentially a 
transformation that has no impact on materiality as 
materiality. 180 Kant, writing about Swedenborg in 'Dreams of 
a Spirit Seer', stated that: 
All knowledge of material objects takes on a double 
significance: one meaning is being obtained through the 
external relations of matter, and the other is obtained from the 
way (material things) reflect the forces from the spiritual world 
for these are the causes of (material things). "3' 
179 1 note here one of the corporeal operations of the cyst as a 
receptacle for 'morbid matter' - see Chapter 3, 'The Unheimlich 
Manoeuvre'. 
180 Bell's proposition that 'the sense of', described by the Fregian model 
of '7-' as a pre-fix to any assorteric statement. The semantic shift 
towards 7- as a bracketing of any proposition indicates the 
transcendental as a pre-fix of the sensual. Also for Foucault's 
remarks on the use of parenthesis in Roussel's writing, see Chapter 
4, 'The Orientation of the Labyrinthine'. 
181 Kant, 'Dreams of a Spirit Seer', p. 88. 
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The question of correlation between spiritual and material is 
brought into sharp focus by the bracketing that Kant 
employs here but the distinction between this, Husserlian 
phenomenology and transformation is key to any 
interpretation of mere inversion. 182 The ambiguity of the 
bracketing complicates the tendency towards the 
oppositional by shifting the assured historical composure of 
the internal and external dialectic of logic towards an alteric 
encryption of the spectral. In semantic terms, the physical 
punctum of the bracket encloses materiality - framing it as 
it were, and in this sense, is contingent to a 'giving sense 
to' as articulated by the Fregian model cited by David Bell 
in his text Husserl and detailed in footnote 180. However, 
for the framing to have a sense, it must in some way, enter 
into a relationship with the material that maintains, as part 
of that engagement, its status outside materiality - 
transcendent to it. With this in mind, the complexity of what 
we might define as the imposition of the transcendental on 
materiality does not constitute an event of displacement, 
but the implicit spectral relation of hauntology. 
* 
182 Bracketing may also have a correlation with sous rature. Both 
Heidegger and Derricla employ this process to undermine/draw 
attention to the discrepancies in the metaphysical project -a 
deletion can only be a deletion if the evidence of what is prior to the 
event of deletion (what is to be deleted) is retained. Likewise, 
Husserl's reductive process relies on the preservation of materiality 
- the imposition must acknowledge that on which it imposes. 
Husserl's contention, however, reverses the imposition so that 
matte r/materiality invokes the transcendental. Levinas states that 
'thought is originally erasure' and he refers to a network of 
associations towards which what is key is not that ideas displace 
each other, but the assurance of the presence of one idea in another: 
'the thought at the moment of its erasure still influences through its 
erased meaning; its different meanings participate with one another', 
Levinas, 'The Transcendence of Words', p. 146. It is also worthy of 
note that Foucault considers the parenthetical aspect of the bracket 
in his text on Roussel, Death and the Labyrinth (see Chapter 4, 'The 
Orientation of the Labyrinthine'). 
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Derrida says of Levinas: 
Levinas respects the zone or layer of traditional truth; and the 
philosophies whose presuppositions he describes are neither 
refuted nor criticized. Here, for example, it is a question 
simply of revealing beneath this truth, as that which founds it 
and is dissimulated within it, 'a situation which precedes the 
division of Being into an inside and an outside'. However, it is 
also a question of inaugurating, in a way that is to be new, 
quite new, a metaphysics of radical separation and exteriority. 
One anticipates that this metaphysics will have some difficulty 
finding its language in the medium of traditional logos entirely 
governed by the structure of 'inside-outside', 'interior- 
exterior'. 183 
Being for Levinas is a kind of suffering that invokes an 
enchainment or imprisonment (incarceration), and so what 
becomes implicit in being and therefore in ontology, what is 
encrypted within it, is the invitation to escape. 184 Escape 
then becomes the consequence of being whereby 
restlessness - the unquiet of existence, manifest in 
dissatisfaction - is conceived as a more pronounced 
imperative than Heidegger's concept of anxiety in Sein und 
Zeit or distress in Contributions to Philosophy (From 
Enowning). Derrida sees in Levinas no longer the thought of 
being (Heidegger) or phenomenality (Husserl), but rather a 
process of dismantling and dispossession. 
* 
183 Added emphasis. Derrida, 'Violence and Metaphysics', p. 88. 
184 Two possibilities occur here: firstly, the Labyrinth as a mechanism 
for incarceration (the prison of the Minotaur and the concealment of 
a secret - see Chapter 4, 'The Orientation of the Labyrinthine') and 
the encryption of the 'bunker' as both locale of escape and ultimate 
imprisonment (see Albert Speer's comments on Hitler's bunker, also 
noted in Chapter 4). 
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The impersonal fact of being is understood as indeterminate 
and ambiguous and comes to thought before revaluation or 
the imposition of a conceptual framework. It is neither 
transcendent nor ego-based nor construed in any form of 
the personally symbolic. It resists inclusion into any binary 
opposition and is therefore irreducible to recognised forms 
that might order it. However, as an alteric phantasm it 
cannot operate as pure exclusivity without some relation to 
historical thought. 185 As already indicated, the spectre that 
Derrida proposes must be involved in some kind of 
specificity via relation to a someone. The particularity of 
the haunting of both Hamlet and Macbeth (Hamlet's father 
and Macbeth's friend Banquo) in Shakespeare is intrinsic to 
the event through recognition as a certain kind of relation. 
Exclusivity would suggest concomitance with a kind of 
transcendental ideality already outlined in the metaphysical 
project - an overarching aspiration, which refutes Derrida's 
more complex articulation of an encrypted intervention of 
spectrality. As already proposed, to haunt is an exclusive 
event of interiority which exploits the carnal imperative of 
phenomenality and the impact of a transcendent alterity on 
such corporeality while resisting the determination to 
comprehend incorporation as merely absorption. 
* 
185 Levinas proposes religion as the site of communication for the 
established order to enter into relation with the 'being of the other', 
whereby this relation is no longer ontological, but spiritual -a place 
where knowledge does not take precedence over sociality. Ethics is 
grasped as the practical relation of one to another -a relation prior 
to ontology. 
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The ghost or spectre 186 as the manifestation, or more 
specifically, the visualisation of that which remains 
essentially invisible, operates as an insistence (what I will 
later call an encyst-ence) through this complication of an 
interpretation of it as an encryptive event. This designates 
a deferral maintained as a kind of difference designated by 
Derridian diff6rance rather than the incarnation of 'mere' 
absorption, which implies the continuity of similitude. 
Implicit in that encryption as an interval or rift is a notion of 
temporality that is identified by the immanence of 
discontinuity as the form by which time is made manifest 
spatially. As Derrida remarks, the spectre is always a return 
and never an emanation, and Jt is from this event of 
spectrality that the continuity of chronological time is 
undermined and the clarity between spatio and extensio is 
blurred. 
As hauntology is named as the so-called science of 
the spectre, it identifies anomalies in the progression and 
stability of any ontological speculation, so close scrutiny of 
aesthetics as the science of beauty uncovers comparable 
discontinuities. As we have tried to explore, the possibility 
for hauntology, as a mechanism for questioning the stability 
of the metaphysical terrain, finds in the encryptive spatio- 
temporal interval of the rift the location of an anomaly, 
which erupts and disrupts the continuity of logical 
chronology. To infer that discontinuity is the predicate of 
any reasonable notion of continuity must go further than 
186 In Of Spirit Heidegger and the Question, Derrida argues: 'a spirit, or 
in other words, in French (and English) as in German, a phantom, 
always returns, I mean in the sense of a revenant (ghost), and geist 
is the most fatal figure of this revenance (returning, haunting) of the 
double which can never be separated from the single', p. 40 (added 
emphasis). 
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rely on this as an opportunity to invert a binary as a means 
of radical reconf igu ration. The necessary wound of the rift 
demands a more complex articulation of it as a locale for 
the emergence of a transcendental imperative that does not 
conform to any previous clarifications of what 
transcendence might 'be' (or not 'be'). 
In as much as this transcendental place is 'not', its 
visibility or lack of visibility sets it apart as distinctive from 
shadow, simulacra or facsimile - it is not more than or less 
than any of these, but essentially other to them, as it is 
other to illumination and ideality. Also it is not merely an 
exteriority/explicate that operates as the negation of an 
interiority/implicate, but occupies the 'between' that differs 
via deferral. 
Diff6rance as the indeterminate event of deferral is 
distinguished from the notion of any ontological difference 
by which difference is understood as the anomaly between 
the specificity of a being and the transcendence of being. 
Not only is diff6rance otherto ontological difference, it is 
other to the forgetting of ontological difference and, as 
such, it subsists as a trace. Its radical alterity is removed 
from every possible mode of presence and presencing and 
is characterised by irreducible after-effects, delayed effects 
and unconscious traces (there are no conscious ones). It 
remains a trace because it highlights the inadequacy of 
metaphysical and phenomenological speech through the 
interruption of that speech - not as an external addendum 
to be latterly applied, but as the interval already encrypted 
into its labyrinthine architectonics, parasitic in its spectral 
rupturing (a ructure! ). It identifies difference through its 
own invisibility as interruptive event and its spectrality 
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adopts the facsimile of the corporeal while remaining 
essentially other to any semblance of that carnality. 
The trace (spur) is not a presence but rather is the simulacrurn 
of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond 
itself. The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for 
effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace. 187 
As we have seen, the phantasm of the trace insinuates 
itself into the very fabric of reasonableness and can be 
observed as the very predicate of all that is logical. It is the 
question that articulates aesthetics and judgement and the 
substance of difference. It is the haunting that motivates 
and predetermines enquiry and yet undermines resolution to 
any such enquiry by disrupting visibility, not with the 
obscuring determination of a presence which resolutely 
enforces alterity as diminutive to its absolution and 
universality, but with the disconcerting irreducibility of the 
absolute other manifest only in the effacement of 
invisibility. 
The phantom exceeds through such undermining of 
visualisation. It resists any predilection to locate it as 
either facsimile or mimetic entity in its capacity to be 
grasped as a mere replication or semblance with all the 
incumbent diminutions of representation. Neither is it 
recognised as spirit, equally encumbered by the 
transcendental and its urge towards ideality and meta- 
language. Both these possibilities appear as addenclums to 
the historical imperative, which organises thought through 
rationality and logic as the ongoing mechanism for 
definition and determination. 
187 Derrida, 'Diff6rance', p. 461 - 
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The operation of spectrality finds its functionary locale in 
all the placial coordinates, which refute dialectic assurance 
and binary oppositions, and insists and subsists through its 
inherent capacity to resist sublimation and objectification by 
always locating itself outside the places where it can never 
be found. 
This nomadic status determines transgression via 
encryption as its active modus operandi and, in so doing, 
finds in continuity all that is discontinuous, not as 
afterthought but as integral to its very formation. Where 
language breaks down and disfluency becomes the 
determining agency of communication, so the spectre as 
silent interrogator introjects, not through force of speech or 
by exceeding the topos of the spoken, but through the 
arrest of silence as that which precedes all that is said. 
When Heidegger seeks and demands a locale for 
silence in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 
which endows an a priori spatial anomaly where an echo 
(the silent voice of be-ing) can be heard emanating from the 
pre-Socratic past whilst simultaneously heralding a new god 
to come -a cyclical determination which engages 
temporality without ever falling into linearity. To be haunted 
is to find one-self steeped in the anxiety of the sensation of 
feeling not-at-home with all that is familial, where 
proportion suddenly determines the unfamiliar and 
calculation can no longer afford assurance of where one is. 
Heidegger's indication that the eventuation of be-ing and 
enthinking as a creative engagement (rather than wilful 
imposition of a new form) of responsiveness has, as 
Richard Polt notes in his essay 'The Event of Enthinking the 
Event', a parallel with the activity of landscape drawing as 
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in-vention. As such, the drawing (as genuine work of art) 
not only represents a place but also brings meaning (a facet 
of its being) to our attention. This meaning was never 
simply 'there' prior to the execution of the drawing, but was 
what Polt refers to as latent and vague and can only 
become fully alive when appropriated by the drawing. In- 
vention is then understood as a coming upon as opposed to 
any planning or willing and is a venture-some openness of 
experience towards which the artist is him/herself 
appropriated and, in a sense, transformed. 
In-vention undercuts the opposition between creativity and 
truth. It is neither the discovery of a previously formed object 
nor the creation ex nihilo of a new form but the attentive 
cultivation of meaning. In-vention allows the meaning to 
flourish - and allows the finder of the meaning to flourish as 
well. '88 
Here I draw a parallel with the locale of a certain kind of 
poem (transcribed by a certain kind of poet) as also an in- 
vention of a certain kind of topos no longer restricted to the 
mere observation and representation of the topography of 
landscape - its flora and fauna. In language it finds in what 
is spoken, the silence of the spectral event, a 
transformation which flourishes through pervasion, 
transgression - the place of both, anticipation and 
disappointment, in-vention and anxiety, toxin and remedy. 
188 Added emphasis. Richard Polt, 'The Event of Enthinking the Event 
(Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy), p. 92. 
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Chapter 2 
Todtnauberq and the Meridian 
Todtnauberg 
Arnica, eyebright, the 
draft from the well with the 
star-die on top, 
In the 
hOtte, 
written in the book 
- whose name did it record 
before mine -? 
In this book 
the line about 
a hope; today, 
for a thinker's 
word 
to come, 
in the heart, 
forest sward, unleveled, 
orchis and orchis, singly, 
crudeness, later, while driving, 
clearly, 
he who drives us, the man, 
he who also hears it, 
the half- 
trod log- 
trails on the highmoor, 
hu mid ity, 
much. ' 
Translation of Todtnauberg by Pierre Joris and published in his 
essay, 'Celan/Heidegger: Translation at the Mountain of Death' and 
found on website: 
httID: //winqs. buffalo. edu/epc/authors/ oris/todtnauberq htmI. Also 
published in Joris's translation of Celan's collection, Lightduress, 
pp. 62-5. 
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It is language that speaks as an open even when its language 
is the language of mediation, that is, even when it is the 
bearer of love and grace. 2 
In the hut-book, looking at the well-star, with a hope for a 
3 
coming word in the heart. On 25 July 1967 Paul Celan . 
I would like to begin by proposing a question that will lead 
to a series of speculations which emerge from the above 
comment written by the poet Paul Celan in the guest book 
provided by Martin Heidegger, on the occasion of the 
Celan's visit to the philosopher's Black Forest HOtte at 
Todtnauberg in the summer of 1967. 
2 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, p. 1 14. 'The mouth 
as wound' is also indicated by Derrida in his essay 'Shibboleth for 
Paul Celan'. Also worthy of note here is Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok's essay 'Introjection-Incorporation' (from the book 
Psychoanalysis in France, ed. S. Lebovici and D. Widl6cher), in 
which they indicate that the beginnings of intro-jection are found in 
the experience of what they refer to as empty mouth doubled with 
the mother's presence. 'The transition from breast-filled mouth to 
word-filled mouth is achieved through the experiences of "empty 
mouth". ' p. 5. They argue that learning to fill the void of mouth with 
words constitutes an early paradigm of introjection through the 
continual presence of the mother as the possessor of language and 
such constancy guarantees the meaning of words. It is also worthy 
of note here that Jacob Bachofen in his text 'Mother Right' saw the 
matriarchalltellurian as arguably the origin of the written form - the 
letter written at the hearth. 
3 From Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew, by John Felstiner, p. 244. 
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In keeping with the locale of Heidegger's mountain retreat, 
I will negotiate a plethora of Holzweg in order to develop a 
discourse which questions the topos of Todtnauberg as an 
aesthetic experiment in language and a place haunted by 
the trace of mericlial threads. 
* 
Provisionally, it will be perhaps considered a question of 
anticipation and also forgiveness, but largely one of 
disappointment as indicated by the comment noted in the 
guest book by Celan, variously recognised as the writer, 
translator, poet and Jew. It will be borne out of what might 
be still be interpreted as a pervading and embracing 
silence that not only preceded the writing of the poem; its 
inscribing, but through the continual provocation of its 
determination towards a certain kind of absenting, which 
was insisted by the poem's inscription and latterly by its 
translation and re-inscription. 
This silence 'spoke' and continues to 'speak' 
remaining voluble in the various translations that have 
been proffered for publication since its initial inscribing in 
the immediate aftermath of that encounter between 
Heidegger, the 'poetic thinker' (the German Denker) and 
Celan, the 'thinking poet' (the Jewish Dichter). 
It alluded to, and perhaps, continues to invoke, what I 
might venture to call a meridial haunting that resists the 
univocal permanence of stasis and any static point of view 
in favour of a concentration of possibilities (or significance 
of temporality and spacing concomitant to the virtuality and 
immanence of dates and dating! ). 
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In his text 'Shibboleth for Paul Celan', Derrida speaks 
of the 'date' as a kind of visceral intervention in the 
corporeality of the poem. The readability of dates marks 
the possibility of the enunciation of a spectral recurrence 
that is distinct from what he calls the 'absolute recurrence' 
of that which 'cannot return'. 
The spectral return is understood as of that which is 
unique, in that its occurrence will never return. Derrida's 
preliminary comments in his discussion on Celan propose 
that: 
We will be concerned then with the date as a cut or incision 
which the poem bears in its body like a memory, like, at times, 
several memories in one, the mark of provenances of a place 
and of a me. To speak of an incision or cut is to say that the 
poem is entered into, that it begins in the wounding of its 
4 date 
. 
Concealed within the date is the 'stigma' of singularity, 
which sustains and prolongs its dating through the 
temporality of lasting, which is understood as that which is 
the poem. 
4 Added emphasis. Essay published in Word Traces, Readings of Paul 
Celan (ed. Aris Fjoretos, pub. Johns Hopkins University Press), 
P. 19. 
88 
Derrida argues that for the date to function in the poem, it 
must retain, though concealment, the specificity of the 
singular (a 'specific' date) to assure its own longevity as 
5 
that which 'lasts longer' than that which it commemorates . 
In the essay 'Catastrophe', Philip Lacoue-Labarthe states: 
The place of poetry, the place where poetry takes place, every 
time is the place without place of the intimate gaping - 
something that must certainly be thought as the pure spacing 
which places (do not) suppose and which upholds them with no 
6 hold . 
The topology of the meridian manifest in the continuity of 
folding, unfolding and refoldin g7 indicates, to employ a 
description used by Celan in his 'Meridian Speech' of 
October 1960, an animation of 'tremors and hints' that are 
both inclusive and exclusive to the 'poetic event'. 8 As 
Derrida argues in 'Shibboleth for Paul Celan', they are the 
temporal/spatial anomalies that are written into the text 
and which, through concealment and effacement, 
transgress its textural body. 
5 Derrida later argues that: 'This is the only chance of assuring its 
spectral return. Effacement or concealment, this annulment in the 
annulations of return belongs to the movement of dating. And so 
what must be commemorated, at once gathered together and 
repeated, is, at the same time, the date's annihilation, a kind of 
nothing, or ash. ' Ibid., p. 22. 
6 Added emphasis. Ibid., p. 140. 
7 These terms are borrowed from Deleuze and used specifically in his 
text, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. 
8 'The Meridian' speech was delivered by Celan on the occasion of 
receiving The Georg BOchner Prize, Darmstadt, 22 October 1960. 
Published in Paul Celan, Collected Prose, trans. Rosemarie 
Waldrop, and published by Carcanet Press, pp. 37-55. 
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They are the tracings of 'what is', 'what has been' and 
'what will be' - the variance of protentions and retentions 
that mark the visibility of invisibility and the immanence of 
the virtual 'transcribed' as the meridial interval or the 
movement of 'dating' of the poem. 
This commemoration through annihilation articulates a 
negation through the double movement of gathering and 
repetition that annuls the date, reducing it to a kind of 
nothing. 9 Silence prescribes this condition of negation in 
the encryption of the poem by commemorating that which 
subsists as that which is unvocalised rather than 
exclusively absent. 10 This poses the question as to the 
nature of annihilation? Is it to be understood by Derrida in 
relation to Celan's poetic articulations that the trace is 
manifest as the visualisation (vocalisation) of that which 
remains essentially invisible (unvocal), and is this merely a 
substitution? 
If silence is not the merely the anticipation of any 
substitution - the 'not yet' of a representation, how does it 
activate the topological transformation of the poem? 
9 Commemoration through annihilation has a strong resonance with 
the events of the Holocaust/Shoah and is something that haunts the 
fabric of Celan's poem. I would also note here a reference to 
Gordon Matta-Clark's two works discussed in the later chapter, 'The 
Unheimlich Manoeuvre': Time WellICherry Tree and Descending 
Steps for Batan, as possible examples of this commemoration by 
annihilation. 
10 In Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson argued against the possibility 
of a total annihilation by stating that: 'The idea of an absolute 
nothing, in the sense of the annihilation of everything, is a self- 
destructive idea, a pseudo-idea, a mere word. If suppressing a thing 
consists in replacing it by another, if thinking the absence of one 
thing is only possible by the more or less explicit representation of 
the presence of some other thing, if in short, annihilation signifies 
before anything else substitution, the idea of an annihilation of 
everything is as absurd as that of a square circle. ' pp. 285-286 
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Dennis J. Schmidt in his essay on Celan entitled, 'Black 
Milk and Blue', states: 
To think the poetic place means remembering that the silence 
making that place has its own contours; it also means knowing 
that such silence is not to be confused with mere quiet; but 
needs to be heard as the unvocalised voice of the poem. " 
Any provisional consideration of what is traced in Celan's 
poem may perhaps look towards Heidegger's much 
publicised (and much commented upon) 'conspicuous' 
silence in the years following the collapse of the Third 
Reich in 1945 until his death in 1976. Such speculation 
must be in light of his contentious involvement with the 
National Socialist movement from its coming to power in 
the early 1930s. 12 This could well be seen as the 
overarching spectre that prompted the 'writing of' 
'Todtnauberg', and pervaded the anticipatory note, not only 
in Celan's poem but also in the comment inscribed in the 
visitor's book at Todtnauberg. I would suggest that such a 
consideration, though valid, is perhaps just one of several 
historical events - traces, as it were, which singularly 
anticipate but perhaps do not fully address the complexity 
of the many unvocalised possibilities that haunt its lingual 
prosody. What is more compelling is the more complex 
double dispossession of language at work in oeuvre of 
Celan's poetry. 
* 
11 Added emphasis. Word Traces, Readings of Paul Celan (ed. Aris 
Fioretos), p. 110. 
12 It is worth noting here that Heidegger recorded an interview for Der 
Speigel magazine in 1967 where he touched on his involvement with 
the Third Reich, but with express instructions that it would not be 
published until after his death. 
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The High-German that was Celan's poetic mother-tongue 
was steeped in the Germanic tradition of Hellenic 
Romanticism, 13 which pervaded the poetry of H61derlin, 
Rilke and Trakl. As such, predating the events that led to 
the Holocaust/Shoah '14 
it was no longer 'at home' in the 
post-Auschwitz world (this is a reference here to Adorno's 
comment in 1955: 'After Auschwitz, to write a lyric poem is 
15 barbaric'). 
13 This term is used to describe the Germanic literary and artistic 
tradition with a strong affiliation and interest in Hellenistic culture, 
at its peak in the era of Hblderlin. I also wish to note here that 
Jacob Bachofen distinguished Hellenistic culture as specifically 
Apollonic (what he terms 'the Apollonic age'). It was the patriarchal 
era of the Uranian Solar Hero where the spiritual principle rose 
above the corporeal - the dawn as the foundation of transcendent 
hopes. Derrida comments in The Truth in Painting on Kant's 
recourse in The Critique of Judgement to a 'dead language' (Latin) 
in parenthesis when describing 'pure' beauty (in this instance Kant 
puts forward the example of the tulip - this botanical reference 
remains pertinent to later discussion in our text), which gives rise to 
pure aesthetic judgement, that: 'in "speaking arts" at least, the 
models should be written "in a dead and scholarly language". For 
two reasons, one lexical and the other grammatical. So that these 
models should be spared the transformations suffered by living 
languages and which have to do first with the vocabulary: 
vulgarization of noble terms: then with the grammar: the language 
which fixes the model of taste must have a Grammatik which would 
not be subject to "the capricious changes of fashion" and which 
would be held in "unalterable rules". ' p. 92. 
14 Holocaust/Shoah - the proximity of these two terms throughout the 
text is intended to articulate both meanings. Holocaust is the most 
recognised term, and refers to a 'great destruction resulting in 
extensive loss of life, especially by fire. It is most commonly used 
in reference to the genocide of European Jewry by the Nazis during 
the Second World War and its epistemological root is in the Greek 
holokauston, which translates as a burnt offering in the sense of a 
sacrificial offering, but its historical application did not become 
established until the late 1950s. However, shoah (the English 
derivation of the Hebrew sh6'a) translates as 'catastrophe', but its 
biblical sources also suggest that 'a wasteland or desert' or 
'personal ruin or devastation' were first used to refer to the Nazi 
slaughter of Jews during the Second World War. It may be pertinent 
to keep the Greek meaning in mind with regard to later comments 
made about the chthonic Dionysian cult of dead heroes and the 
pharmakos. The acknowledgement of both meanings will be 
recognised throughout the text. 
15 Adorno, Prisms, from the chapter 'Cultural Criticism and Society', 
p. 3 4. 
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Yet its very alterity is found in the invocation of certain 
kind of literary status of lingual historicity that pervasively 
haunts and remains intrinsic to the very circumstances by 
which the solution of the Holocaust/Shoah was made 
manifest. 
Such a condition of alteric homelessness found in the 
surety of a familial terrain of what was both written and 
spoken may be crucial to our understanding of Celan's 
personal history and its impact on his poetry. It is where an 
otherness that is perhaps more complex than the strangely 
familiar of the unheimlich, 16 not only haunts the 'poetic 
event', but predicates the very language which inaugurates 
that event. Lacoue-Labarthe in his text 'Two Poems by Paul 
Celan states': 
'Todtnauberg' is really barely a poem; a single nominal 
phrase, choppy, distended and elliptical, unwilling to take 
shape, it is not the outline but the remainder - the residue - 
17 of an abortive narrative . 
16 Unheimlich translates literally from the German as unhornely and 
from this is derived the more spectral definition of uncanny. See 
Freud's essay published by Penguin in the volume of his collected 
works entitled Art and Literature (Number 14). The significance of 
the uncanny is, as Freud points out, its very familiarity. 
17 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience (pub. Stanford 
University Press, 1999), p. 35. Stephen Pruslin in the liner notes for 
the recording of Pulse Shadows (1996, released by Teledec in 2001) 
says of the composer Harrison Birtwistle's settings of Celan's 
poems for soprano, string ensemble and string quartet that: 'one 
can understand his affinity with Celan's poetry: its concision and 
concentration; the aphoristic quality that allows even a carefully 
structured poem to suggest a "fragment": above all the verbal 
implosions that only leave an imprint', p. 5. 
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2 
I will begin by proposing that, in speculating around the 
questions that pervade the inscribing of the poem 
'Todtnauberg', the evolution of Celan's late poetic voice 18 
tends towards a truncation and dislocation that does 
violence to language. Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that this 
is comparable to H61derlin's later efforts before the onset 
of his insanity, and quotes Adorno, who refers to them as 
'condensation and juxtaposition, a strangling of language'. 
In the poem 'TObingen, January', 19 Celan speculated on the 
religious man's attempts to speak of the age or time 
(today) as H61derlin did in his time, but he was condemned 
to a kind of aphasia: 'stuttering on the edge of silence'. I 
would like to suggest that the difficulty of Celan's later 
18 In the Celan poem, 'The Vintagers/Die Winzer' of 1953, he uses the 
term 'latemouth' to describe this poetic voice. In the poem, he uses 
the metaphor of an Autumnal harvest and in particular emphasises 
the last gleaning of grapes before they rot on the vine as the crop 
that produces the richest wine. In HbIderlin's poem, 'Germania' (5th 
stanza) the metaphor of the flower is explored in terms of a 'mode 
of mouth'. 
And secretly, while you dreamed, at noon, 
Departing I left a token of friendship, 
The flower of the mouth behind, and lonely you spoke. 
Yet you, the greatly blessed, with the rivers too 
Dispatched a wealth of golden words and they well unceasing 
Into all regions now. 
(Added emphasis. Selected Poems and Fragments, p. 192. ) 
19 Paul Celan, Selected Poems and Prose (ed. J. Felstiner), p. 159. 
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work is steeped in the concentration of an anxiety that 
persists in confounding a poetic eloquence where even the 
poetic event as 'poetic' is called into question. 
I would like to propose a term that might indicate the 
complexities of such a lingual encounter in Celan's later 
poems that is poetic in background, but psychological in 
utterance -a form of 'disfluency'. There is a crucial 
question that it now seems appropriate to ask with regard 
to Celan's comment in the visitor's book at Todtnauberg. 
In his text Aesthetic Theory, Adorno acknowledges 
the pressure inherent in Celan's poetry, claiming that: 
Celan's poems articulate unsPeakable horror by being silent, 
thus turning their truth content into a negative quality. They 
emulate a language below the helpless prattle of human 
beings - even below the level of organic life as such. It is a 
language of dead matter, of stones and stars ... Celan writes 
poetry without an aura. 20 
This question is perhaps not meant to be directed towards 
Heidegger's silence, but how a poet with such a 
pronounced and progressively more difficult ability to 
speak, a profound disfluency, can not only interrogate 
20 Added emphasis. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (trans. C. Lenhardt, pub. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 444. It is worth noting here that Adorno 
refers to the language of dead matter as that of stones and stars. Is 
this making reference to Todtnauberg and, specifically, the line 'the 
draft from the well with the star die on top'? With regard to Adorno's 
oft-cited quote on the demise of so-called lyric poetry, Derrida 
notes in his essay 'To Forgive' (published in the anthology, 
Questioning God) that: 'Forgiveness died in the death camps', p. 34. 
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Heidegger's thought but in confrontation with the thinker, 
demand a fluency and a conciseness -a word of contrition, 
a remedial pardon from Heidegger to end his silence ? 21 
3 
COMPLETION AND POSSIBILITY 
Celan, in his acceptance speech of 1960 entitled 'The 
Meridian', stated: 
Whenever we speak with things in this way we also dwell on 
the question of their where-from and where-to, an 'open' 
question 'without resolution', a question which points towards 
open, empty, free spaces - we have ventured far out. 
22 The poem also searches for this place . What is evident 
from this statement is the affinity that Celan proposes 
between the thinker who questions and the writer/poet who 
seeks. The nature of how the question might now be asked 
has perhaps changed, so that its proximity to the poetic of 
that which is sought is most significant in the proximal. 
21 The issue of end as completion will be discussed later in the 
chapter but suffice to say here that Celan's hope for a conclusive 
end to Heidegger's silence contradicts his own thoughts particularly 
in the 'Meridian' speech. 
22 Celan, 'The Meridian' (published in Collected Prose), p. 50. 
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Its internal logic is usurped by the externalising of a kind 
of questioning that reaches back to a primordial ontology, 
where the distinction between the assurance of the 
interiority of the present and the exteriority of absence is 
undermined by the operation of 'a seeking of the same 
place' that is found in silence. This potential alliance 
between poet and thinker - this seeking of the same place 
- would suggest that Celan's topology of silence is common 
to both. Yet he remained unmoved and insistent in his 
determination to 'demand a word' from Heidegger, to break 
that silence in a way that, rather than propose a question 
that might point to openness and a way forward, is directed 
towards completion and closure. 23 
Maurice Blanchot, in his text The Writing of the 
Disaster, indicates that silence is already dislocated from 
the lingual and, as other to it, places language 'at risk'. He 
argues that 'the silence of silence which by no means has 
any relation to language for it does not come from 
language but has already departed from it, . 
24 
The suggestion is that this departure is from that 
which maintains the availability for silence, in that it does 
not 'lead away' from the poem, but rather belongs to 
language itself 'in' the poem -a departure in language 
marks the place of the poem. It is the pause (for Celan the 
'turn of breath') as the site of an ambiguously infinite 
compression and extension -a breathing space where the 
23 In this regard, Derrida states in 'To Forgive' that: 'Nothing can be 
more unjust than clemency' (from the anthology, Questioning God), 
p. 33. 
24 Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, p. 57. 
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dependent possibilities of inhalation and exhalation 
operate in a lingual collusion. 
For the poet speaking, the other in language is the 
kinship of language through the medium of the poem with 
that which always places that language at risk - silence. 
4 
In seeking the 'place of silence', Celan understood it as 
common to both thinker and writer and so the question still 
remains, why was it that he could not grant the privilege of 
such a silence to Heidegger? 
it may be that Celan, the poet, 'stuttering on the edge 
of silence' was in no way comparable with Heidegger, the 
thinker, who, it may be argued with reference to his lack of 
comment, his silence on the Shoah/Holocaust, was merely 
I stuttering at the edge of speech'. Therefore, the 
distinction between he who questions and he who seeks 
remains unbridgeable. What is problematic is what Celan 
introduced by suggesting that the topological ground where 
such a questioning and seeking takes place is essentially 
the locale of a kind of sameness. 
What is pertinent in the consideration of this locale, 
where both a seeking and questioning take place, is that it 
not only draws attention to the distinction between the 
activities of the poet and the thinker as understood by 
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Celan, but complicates any disparity by finding a common 
locale of similitude -a placial sameness. As such, 
similitude as a common ground for questioning and seeking 
must be understood, not in the equivocality of any 
historical conception of identity, understood as a locale for 
the equanimity of the same (a kind of placial univocality), 
but rather as a 'topological' anomaly whereby the equivocal 
and univocal should perhaps be reconsidered through 
similitude, as the difference of univocal and unvocal. Why 
is it pertinent to make this distinction relevant to an issue 
of sameness and locality where both questioning and 
seeking might well appropriate this place in a kind of 
equanimity? 
In observing this disparity (I use this term cautiously 
and advisedly), I am mindful that Heidegger himself had 
addressed the issue of identity at some length in a series 
of texts published under the heading Identity and 
Difference . 
25 It is worth digressing momentarily to consider 
how this may inform Celan's understanding of sameness in 
light of 'The Meridian' speech, and given Celan's own 
commitment to Heidegger's thought. 
25 1 refer here to the 1969 edition of Identity and Difference (trans. 
Joan Stanbaugh; pub. Harper Row). 
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5 
'The Principle of Identity' 26 addresses the issue of identity 
as provisionally a formulaic structure based on a kind of 
equality (Heidegger uses the 'tautology' of the 
mathematical formula A=A, defining it as an unnecessary 
equality) that proposes sameness without indicating firstly, 
where that equality is 'rooted', and secondly, how such an 
equality might be redefined in relation to its source. 
Via Plato, Heidegger reformulates this customary 
formulation of the principle of identity (A = A) by the 
introduction of sameness, so that not every A is itself the 
same, but is itself the same with itself. The key here is not 
sameness as the source of the principle as it stands, but 
the mediation of this preposition, the 'with' as a connective 
synthesis or relation. 
It is intrinsic to Heidegger's ontology of identity that 
the connective 'with' (provisionally reformulated as A is A), 
identifies the keynote to the formulation as the preposition; 
and the 'is' indicates the Being of beings, articulated by 
Heidegger as the ontological difference that indicates the 
principle's true conception that every being is itself the 
26 This is the first essay in the above-mentioned publication, Identity 
and Difference (pp. 23-41). 
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same with itself. 27 What is essential to sameness in this 
context is the intrinsic and fundamental difference between 
Being and beings that is the ontological difference that 
Heidegger places at the heart of the 'Principle of Identity'. 
Heidegger proposes an event of appropriation between 
Being and beings that is the essential difference between 
them: 
The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within 
itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their 
own nature, achieve their active nature by losing those 
28 
qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them . 
For Heidegger, this event is also where thinkinglman 
receives the tools by which it1he might be most 
appropriately active as part of the togetherness of this 
event through the 'most delicate and susceptible vibration 
holding all within this structure' - language. 
At this point I wish to refer back to Celan's comment 
in 'The Meridian' speech that indicates a unity or sameness 
of placial locality for thought/questioning and 
writing/seeking. This unity, as sameness, is the locale 
(place) that both the thinker and the poet are involved in 
locating (through the questioning of thought and the 
seeking of the poem) and therefore, the relationship 
between the thinker and poet is structured in the realm of 
language. Finding in Heidegger a comparable conception of 
27 Heidegger considers sameness with reference to the Parmenicles 
quote: 'for thinking and Being are the same. ' See his essay, 'Moira 
(Parmenides V111,34-41)' in Early Greek Thinking p. 79. 
28 From 'The Principle of Identity' and published in the collection of 
essays, Identity and Difference, p. 37. 
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identification through the provisional notion of locale, for 
the more complex and active nature of the event where 
man as thinker dwells and as such, is given over to 
language, indicates that appropriation as an essential 
togetherness proposes sameness as difference. 
Although for Celan, the thinker and poet seek the 
same place, the structure of the place is essentially 
difference, 29 the question then arises: How can similitude 
and difference enter into a fruitful correspondence? 
The search for the sameness of this place is 
contingent on the understanding that its essence is a 
differential that precedes any certainty of a unity prior to 
belonging. For Heidegger, the ontological difference is 
essential to a conception of identity. 30 In the 'merely 
identical' (as understood by the preliminary formulation A 
A), difference disappears, whereas in the same, its 
appearance is essential and notan addition or contribution 
to Being or beings. I would suggest that Celan too is 
concerned with difference, and the sameness of place 
sought by thinking and poetic writing is indicated by the 
differential between thought and poetic speech/writing. 
I am now forced to reappraise my provisional thought 
that Celan could have had the ethical presumption to hope 
or demand that Heidegger discontinue his most pronounced 
silence at a specific time/date (one might well alternate the 
term 'time/date' with 'encounter') and a specific location, 
given his own tending towards silence. In the term ending 
29 As already discussed in Chapter 1, 'An Aesthetics of Hauntology', 
Derricla too essentialises difference in speech and writing as the 
primordial event of metaphysics. 
30 He states: 'The essence of identity is a property of the event of 
appropriation' ('The Principle of Identity'), p. 39. 
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we might well look to a kind of completion, a conciseness 
of closure, that is largely at odds with Heidegger's own 
thought, and which is certainly unfamiliar and to some 
extent 'inappropriate' to Celan's writings. Having indicated 
this, with reference to the specificity of this encounter 
between Heidegger and Celan at Todtnauberg, I will not yet 
dismiss it without finding it of some further use. 
I would like to extend my attempts to contextualise 
Celan's 'demand' of Heidegger by citing the latter's 
influence on the poet as not only intrinsic to Celan's need 
for penitence from the thinker, but also in a wider context 
that locates Heidegger in a zonal historicity that might well 
be conceived as 'meridial' . 
31 Heidegger's influence on 
Celan is well documented, and Lacoue-Labarthe goes so 
far as to suggest that 'TObingen, January' could not have 
been written without reference to Heidegger's lectures on 
H61derlin of the 1940s. 
This would suggest that Heidegger's legacy, his 
process of thinking and how that was imparted in written or 
spoken form, was intrinsic to the development of Celan's 
poetry. We must remain conscious that Celan's hope for a 
'coming word' does not intrinsically insist that the 
expectation of an appropriate penitent remark would suffice 
31 By 'meridial', I refer to the active temporal nature of a locale that is 
not restricted to a finitude without possibility. 
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to reassure him of Heidegger's contrition and draw to a 
close Celan's anxie tY32 in a mood of absolution and 
arguable forgl'veness on that Black Forest hillside outside 
33 the HOtte. 
It is further complicated by the manoeuvre whereby 
Celan seemingly moved continually towards silence as the 
formal aspects of his poetry 'broke down' into disjuncture 
and disfluen Cy. 34 (1 refer back to the earlier quote from 
Lacoue-Labarthe regarding the structure of 'Todtnauberg') 
His hope was for Heidegger to take the opportunity of their 
meeting to resist the evasive tenure of his post-war 
writings and speak candidly. This demanded of Heidegger a 
move towards the 'most vocal' - an inversion of his own 
lingual trajectory . 
35 The conspicuousness of Heidegger's 
silence is perhaps 'most amplified' (if this is indeed not a 
contradiction), by the scant references he makes in his 
32 1 am also reminded here that anxiety as defined by Heidegger in 
Sein und Zeit is an authentic experience of being-in-the-world - 
integral to Dasein's inmost possibility. 
33 In discussing the frame as border (the Parergon) in The Truth in 
Painting, Derrida articulates an etymology of 'border' (au bord), in 
which is heard 'on the border' (l/ est d'abord 1'. ý-bord). He plays with 
the term, ii-bord in which he refers to the Middle High German, Bort 
(meaning table, plank or deck of a vessel) and finds here an 
etymology in 'deck of vessel' (a construction of planks), which 
articulates another kind of border that limits and encloses. The 
rhetorical figure of the boat has in this instance the same 
etymological root as 'brothel' (bordel) and which Derrida refers to 
as 'an easy one, at first a little hut made of wood', p. 54 (added 
emphasis). 
34 Disfluency -a break in fluent speech. Stuttering has more 
disfluencies than is considered average. The different types of 
disfluency include sound or syllable repetitions, silent blocks and 
prolongations (unnatural stretching out of sound), and are often 
accompanied by facial grimaces or tics. 
35 We may want to think here of Heidegger's contention (in the 
Nietzsche lectures) that Nietzsche did not escape the metaphysical 
- he merely inverted its values. 
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post-war writin gS36 to the specificity of the Holocaust/Shoah 
and its 'impossible possibility'. 
What is certainly contentious in Heidegger's overview 
of the history of productionist metaphysics is an inability to 
distinguish between the technological transformation that 
is manifest in both the hydroelectric dam and the 
crematoria (I am mindful here of Heidegger's technological 
dilemma manifest in the term techn6, that can understand 
The Rhine as both a technological resource and the subject 
of H61derlin's poem). 
If there is an issue to be made of his post-war 
silence, it is perhaps in this very distinction that 
approaches the issue of the technological as the 
'transformation of things' (or the reduction of 'things', 
human or otherwise, to 'stand i ng-rese rve' -a resource) to 
the neglect of all social institutions and practices. 
It is worth reflecting here momentarily on the specific 
incident where the 'infamy' of Heidegger's post-war 
considerations on technology with reference to the Final 
Solution 37 remains sharply focused by later commentators 
on what is now known as the 'agricultural remark' taken 
from a 1949 lecture on technology: 
Agriculture is now a mechanised food industry. As for its 
essence, it is the same thing as the manufacture of corpses in 
the gas chambers and in the death camps, the same thing as 
36 There are further references to the 'technological production' of 
humans as standing-reserve in his collection of essays on the perils 
of technology in 'The Question Concerning Technology'. 
37 Inaugurated at the Wannesee Conference in the winter (January) of 
1942 as the mechanised and wholesale extermination of Jewish 
culture from mainland Europe. It is perhaps where the ambiguity of 
definition was steeped in a certain kind of encryption and where the 
word evacuation actually stood for annihilation. 
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the blockades and reduction of countries to famine, the same 
38 
thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs . 
In this sense, humanity is a commodity like all others in the 
drive for the purity of technological empowerment and 
machination. To anticipate that Heidegger might distinguish 
between the relative 'thingliness' of these resources is to 
imply that moral or ethical considerations might be brought 
into play. The nihilistic tendency of contemporary history 
as Heidegger understood it (in what might be considered to 
be the slow decline of metaphysical enquiry from its 
inception in the thinking of Plato and Aristotle to an 
understanding of 'productionism' as the primary force of 
modern life) fuels his grasp of the institution of technology 
and its essence. 
In his essay 'The Cries of Others and Heidegger's 
Ear: Remarks on the Agricultural Remark', Robert John 
Sheffler Manning proposes to critique a consensus of 
informed opinion that suggests that the remark is a clear 
example of the lack of an ethical status within not only the 
specificity of this particular statement, but across the 
breadth of Heidegger's thought. He cites John Caputo's 
comments in his essay 'Heidegger's Scandal: Thinking and 
the Essence of the Victim', as perhaps the clearest 
example of the taking a moral stance against what Caputo 
describes as Heidegger's 'ethical deficiencies'. 
38 This is Thomas Sheehan's translation taken from his text Heidegger 
and the Nazis, published in The New York Review of Books, 16 June 
1988, pp. 41-3. 
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For Caputo, Heidegger was 'deafened' by the 'call of 
Being' to the point where the suffering of individual or 
39 
collective beings is obliterated - was silenced . 
The contention of both Caputo and Levinas is that the 
silencing of the victim brings forward a question of not only 
muteness, but also invisibility in Heidegger's post-war 
thought. The individuation of Dasein's authenticity that is 
explored in Sein und Zeit is sacrificed in favour of the 
bigger picture of Being's 'self-showing'. 
Manning disputes this contention and suggests that 
this convenient closure of such an argument (that which 
separates Heidegger's lack of ethics, via his concern only 
with the history of Being, from the security of a morality 
that is assured in the reaffirmation of such a separateness, 
as proposed by both Caputo and Levinas) fails to address 
the question that is perhaps more pressing: Why does this 
separation need to take place at all and, more importantly, 
what does this say about the commentator? 
Manning argues that there is compelling evidence that 
Heidegger does not exclude the individual from his 
philosophical discourse, and, in fact, in Sein und Zeit the 
notion of being-with is distinctive from his other grasp of 
the collective negation of individuation - the They (Das 
Man), which is understood as equiprimordial with Being-in- 
the World. The authenticity of being-with is not in the 
distinction of 'others' over and against whom the 'I' stands 
out, but rather those from whom the 'I' does not distinguish 
39 Perhaps the clearest example of this inability to hear can be seen in 
the so-called turn (Kehre) Heidegger makes from the individuation 
of Dasein, to the concern for Being (beyng-historical-thought) in his 
later thought. 
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itself - those with whom the T is not separated, but is one 
too. " 
An understanding of the continuity of this solicitude in 
Heidegger's thinking is the crucial point of Manning's 
argument against both Caputo's and Levinas's contention 
that the 'agricultural remark' reflects a general lack of 
humanity in a Heidegger that prefers the consideration of a 
metaphysical transcendent conception of Being rather than 
any ethical or moral preoccupation with beings. 
He proposes that the superficiality of such a reading 
at Heidegger's expense serves to underline a moral and 
ethical superiority taken by commentators to differentiate 
themselves and those in accord with them, from 
Heidegger's compromised stance, illustrated by the 
'agricultural remark'. 
Manning attempts further persuasion by drawing on 
examples from the post Sein und Zeit era, using written 
evidence of Heidegger's solicitude . 
4' The first, from the 
period of the now infamous Rectorate year at Freiburg, 
takes the form of a speech calling for a bridge to be 
40 The distinction between the collectives of the They (Das Man) and 
being-with, as cited by Manning is crucial, but it may be worth 
considering how such distinctive collectives square with Heidegger's 
understanding of nationhood and the Volk in the years after the 
publication of Sein und Zeit. 
41 For example, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) compiled 
in the late 1 930s and seen by some as a companion work to Sein 
und Zeit. The first of the six fugues (entitled Echo [Anklang]) deals 
specifically and explicitly with silence. In her essay 'Poietic Saying' 
(published in Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to 
Philosophy), Daniela Vallega-Neu comments: 'The experience of a 
lack of words and the experience of the necessity of words that say 
beyng's* occurrence go hand in hand. It is precisely the lack that 
compels thinking; it is in the lack that beyng's silent call resounds. ' 
pp. 70-1 . 
The spelling connotes an archaic rendering, which Heidegger 
hoped would infer a more essential interpretation outside the pre- 
existing ontological etymology. 
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formed to celebrate the unity between scholars and manual 
workers. In the speech (given on the arrival of 600 formerly 
unemployed workers, now given employment by the Nazi 
administration of the city and sent to the University to 
begin their National Socialist education in February 1934), 
Heidegger attempts to bind and unite the people through 
knowledge, basing this understanding on the premise that 
'the production of the miner is not fundamentally less 
42 
spiritual than the action of the scholar' . The contention, 
by Manning, that this is a clear example of Heidegger's 
humanism in drawing together the manual and the 
intellectual in a common cause seems to underplay the 
cause with which Heidegger was associating himself at this 
point. 
It may be reasonable to assume that Heidegger's 
appropriation of the National Socialist ideal in the period of 
the Rectorate remains, at this stage, essentially a form of 
political naivety, as has been suggested by a number of 
later commentators. The consensus of opinion favours the 
view that Heidegger considered his position at this stage 
as an intellectual arbiter for the new order, able to 
influence and (within the confines of the university) 
institute policy. 
The institution of the so-called FOhrer Principle in the 
academic system, and the militarisation of the student body 
43 
as laid out in the Rectoral Address , seem to be equally as 
important in any understanding of Heidegger's humanism, 
42 Taken from German Existentialism (trans. D. Runes, pub. New York 
Philosophical Library, 1965), pp. 37-42. 
43 The full text of the Rectoral Address, titled 'The Self-Assertion of 
the German University' appears in The Heidegger Controversy: A 
Critical Reader edited by Richard Wolin (MIT Press, 1993). 
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and the restrictions imposed by such a systernising of the 
academic environment certainly seem to look towards a 
kind of Volk humanism. 
However, the treatment of Husserl over the 
contentious issue of access to the University librarie S44 and 
a more general disassociation with his former mentor in 
this period, lends currency to the issue of Heidegger's 
45 
ethical behaviour . 
What is perhaps more pertinent in any case against 
Heidegger's humanism in this era is the so-called 
Baumgarten Affair. Heidegger's damning report to the 
League of National Socialist University Lecturers in 
December 1933 used Baumgarten's 'Jewish affiliations' as 
an argument against him becoming Heidegger's assistant at 
Freiburg, and as such, he made what Hugo Ott describes 
as 'a verbal obeisance to anti-Sem itism, . 
46 
The unity that permeates Heidegger's attempts to 
affiliate the labour of the worker with the intellectual labour 
of the academic institution in both the Rectoral Address 
and the later speech to the newly employed workers, can 
also be heard in the second text that Manning cites in his 
case for Heidegger's ethical humanism. 'Why Do I Stay in 
44 In Hugo Ott's book Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, he refutes this 
charge by saying: 'Let us be clear about one thing: as rector and 
head of department Heidegger did not issue a ban of any kind on the 
use of the university library or the departmental library. This oft- 
repeated charge is without foundation. ' p. 174. 
45 The suggestion is often made that Heidegger's treatment of Husserl 
in this period was directly responsible for his untimely death in 
1938. It is also worth mentioning here that Heidegger retained the 
dedication to Husserl in Sein und Zeit in the fourth edition 
published in 1935, but dropped it from the fifth, published in 1941 . 
The dedication read: 'Dedicated to Edmund Husserl in respect of 
friendship. Todtnauberg, in the Black Forest, 8 April 1926. ' 
46 From Ott's text, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, p. 191. 
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the Provinces? '47 written in the period directly after 
Heidegger resigned the Rectorate in 1934, was a clear 
attempt to identify his place of thought in the heart of the 
Volk community of the Black Forest region where the Hijtte 
had been built in the early 1920s. 
As ROdiger Safranski states in his book, Martin 
Heidegger: Between Good and Evil: 
The places of his thinking can be quite accurately determined: 
an imaginary and a real place - ancient Greece of his 
philosophy and his province, more accurately Todtnauberg. 48 
6 
Heidegger shared with his contemporary Alfred Baeumler 
the view that any critique of modern nihilism would require 
its' understanding as a radical problematic, which in some 
way preceded their respective involvements with National 
Socialism. 
In this sense, they were both philosophical radicals, 
whose common ground was the critique of idealism and the 
resulting principles of materialism associated latterly with 
Marxist principles. They looked to Nietzsche as the 
47 The whole of this text is translated and published in Thomas 
Sheehan's book, Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker (pp. 27-30). 
48 Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, p. 277. 
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spiritual/conceptual father of a radicalism, which pointed 
eventually to the holistic, folkish doctrine of National 
49 
Socialism . 
For both, this meant the redefining of spirit or Dasein 
within the context of historical being and time, through the 
'recuperating' of H61derlin (and his Greek view) and the 
i new' interpretation of Greek tragedy as an attempt to 
uncover a new sense of history based on the exegesis of 
mythic symb OIS50 and reconstructing the appropriate 
conditions for the possibility of the transformation of the 
historical existence of a people. 51 
As Frank H. W. Elder states, in the second part of 
Sein und Zeit, Heidegger had always intended to include a 
dismantling of the Western philosophical tradition in an 
attempt to uncover a more originary understanding of 
Being. 
This cleconstruction would deal with the explication of 
mythic and scientific Dasein as two fundamental 
possibilities of being-in-the-world, and from which could be 
retrieved a more originary relationship between mythos and 
49 Safranski comments that: 'The anti-political mood would no longer 
reconcile itself to the fact of the plurality of human beings; instead 
it was looking for the great singular - the German Volksgenosse, 
the labourer of hand and head, the spirit. ' Ibid., p. 230. 
50 Baeumler wanted to give ontological and epistemological priority to 
symbols (understood as the middle term between instinct and form). 
He argued for two languages - Word, as the conscious articulation 
of concepts used in discussion and indicative of itself and the 
object, and Symbol, the silent language of inner conscious and 
instinct, and for which there is no interpretation without primary and 
primitive comprehension; it is outside understanding. 
51 For Baeumler, this meant an interpretation of Greek tragedy based 
on chthonic Dionysus and the cult of dead heroes. 
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logos, which would anticipate and create the conditions for 
such a radical transformation. 52 
Both Heidegger and Baeumler agreed that logic and 
reason had become groundless and that the revolutionary 
project of the 'new man', the 'new university' and the 'new 
state' would be involved in the process of grounding ratio 
in a more originary origin. The key to this radical 
manoeuvre was to liberate Greek antiquity from the 
domination of Roman and Judeo-Christian interpretation, 
through the recuperation of both H61clerlin and Nietzsche in 
the 1920s by those who have recently been referred to as 
the radical conservatives of German academia and to which 
Heidegger and Baeumler serve as polar examples. For 
example, Norbert von Hellingrath was responsible for 
bringing to light H61clerlin's translations of Pinclar into 
German and coined the phrase das geheime Deutschland 
(the secret Germany) as the spirit of the state that did not 
yet exist but was 'poetised' in H61derlin's poetry. 53 
* 
Nietzsche's new interpretation of Greek religion and art as 
essentially Dionysian (emphasising the darker, orgiastic 
and horrifying side) also resurfaced in this post-Great War 
52 Heidegger perhaps followed through this notion of a transformation 
of thought most distinctly in his text Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enowning), written between 1936-8. The significance of this 
text as a radical rethinking of thinking in a more poetic manner is 
reflected not only in the style of the language but also in the 
insistence that the so-called grounders of the abyss are the 
ahistoric poetic voice personified by H61derlin. 
53 1 note here Derrida's text Of Spirit-Heidegger and the Question, 
where Derrida seeks to find a notion of spirit in Heidegger's work 
amidst the seemingly continual refusal by Heidegger to address the 
term specifically. Derrida argues for its spectrality in Heidegger's 
writings. 
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era, countering the 'classical' philology (the rational or 
scientific view) of ancient Greek culture that had 
dominated the academic field since the 1880s. For both 
Heidegger and Baeumler, the significance of their 
interpretation of H61clerlin as the historical precursor of a 
German revolution highlighted the significance of the poet 
as not merely the writer of verse but as a seer who saw 
beyond the aesthetics of beauty and art to the alterity of a 
religious-mythic dimension. Edler states: 
Baeumler saw the mystery of the living sense of myth because 
the mythic was beyond the grasp of all previous categorical 
54 
conceptions used to understand world history . 
The contextualisation of history resting on myth 
undermined all previous measures of historical time and, 
for Baeumler, was the symbolic expression 'of the 
development of man's essential nature'. 55 
54 Added emphasis. Frank H. W. Edler, 'Alfred Baeumler on H61derlin 
and the Greeks: Reflections on the Heidegger-Baeumler 
Relationship', p. 4. 
55 Ibid., p. 4. 
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The hidden source of world history was the essentially 
alteric mythic dimension of human nature, which 
complicated any perceived clarity of interiority against 
exteriority and wrested control of chronological history' 
from rational logoS. 56 In the two addresses entitled 'The 
Meaning of the Great War I and 11', given in 1929 and 
1930, Baeumler reminded his audience that the dead of the 
Great War were now powerless, and it was entrusted to the 
living, in what was more of a 'religious' than a 'moral' 
responsibility, to allow their thoughts and deeds to 'reach 
the light of day'. 57 For Baeumler, the creation of 'tragic 
drama' in ancient Greece had great historical 
consequences as a turning point in the history of the West. 
It also had a strong resonance with the 'reassertion of the 
heroic' in post-1918 Germany, whereby a 'genuine', 'real' 
Germany (a 'secret' Germany), lost in the depths of history, 
56 Johan Jacob Bachofen (1815-87) was a key figure in the 
development of an anthropology of myth in nineteenth-century 
Germany. His most noteworthy text, 'Mother Right', argued for the 
precedent of a historical matriarchal period that preceded the 
Hellenic/Roman (patriarchal) era and was bound up with the 
development of the chthonic. His two methodological axioms were: 
(i) Phenomena are governed by discoverable natural laws. 
(ii) These laws are continuously operative and uninterrupted by 
miraculous intervention. 
He said of myth: 'It has been said of myth, like quicksand, can 
never provide a firm foothold. This reproach applies not to myth 
itself, but only to the ways in which it has been handled. Multiform 
and shifting its outward manifestation, myth nevertheless follows 
fixed laws and can provide as definite and secure results as any 
other source of historical knowledge. Product of a cultural period in 
which life has not yet broken away from the harmony of nature, it 
shares with nature that unconscious lawfulness which is always 
lacking in the works of free reflection. Everywhere there is a 
system, everywhere cohesion; in every detail the expression of a 
great fundamental law whose abundant manifestations demonstrate 
its inner truth and natural necessity. ' 'Mother Right', p. 76. 
57 'Not the pangs of conscience but fear and trembling, not reproach 
but misfortune befalls us if we do not comply with the social 
command of Pietas in German fidelity. ' Ibid., p. 5. 
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would rediscover itself through heroism as the natural 
disposition of the German Volk. 58 
He looked for a new language in the silent symbolism 
of the Nazis, which challenged the old language of 
intellectualism as no longer appropriate, because it was 
disconnected from the spiritual and instinctual depths of 
the Volk. He is quoted by Edler: 
Only in what people themselves cannot express, in what is 
done and protected without word, without reflection in worship 
and custom, does the depth of reality disclose itse If. 59 
Baeumler argued that the only person capable of 
interpreting the living sense of life is someone who 
understands the silent language of symbols into which life 
flows, and Hitler, as the living symbol of National 
Socialism, was to function for the Germans as the heroic 
dithyrambicltragic drama had functioned for the Greeks. 
58 The implication of a racial imperative in Baeumler's rhetoric is 
strong here. His argument that heroism is the natural disposition of 
the Volk is founded in the hereditary biology of a martial 
Germanicness. Baeumler's H61derlin is perceived as a youthful 
Germanic fighter, whose ancestors stretch back to the 'racial 
paradigm' of Siegfried (the German counterpart of Achilles). 
59 From Edler's essay 'Alfred Baeumler on Hblderlin and the Greeks 
(Part 1)', p. 9 (www. janushead. org/JHspg99/edler. cfm). 
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The chthon jC60 articulates the heroic dithyramb 
6' 
as 
associated with the Dionysian cult of the souls of dead 
heroes rather than the bacchic ekstasis of hedonistic 
Dionysian enthusiasm and draws attention to the distinction 
between the mystical suffering of Dionysus and the 'real' 
suffering and deeds of heroic figures. 62 
It is in relation to death that the chthonic hero is 
63 
distinguished from the epic hero of Homeric verse . 
60 Chthonic: tragic. 
61 Dithyramb: the dramatic chorus integral to the structure of Greek 
tragedy. The song of the chorus (the dithyramb) was sung by faithful 
worshippers in religious ceremonies and preceded the sacrifice of 
an animal on the grave of the hero, its blood pouring into the earth 
to honour him. The 'spell' of the dithyramb called the hero from his 
grave and created a daernonic being (Geist). The fear of such a 
prospect terrified the chorus to such an extent that they made the 
leader of the group into a 'stand-in' hero and this visualising of 
what was darkly felt was the catharsis of fear and trembling. 
62 Baeumler argued that the true hero must incorporate what he called 
the 'fear and trembling ... that the religious man senses 
in the face 
of a daemonic being who is capable of affecting things even from 
beyond the grave' (Das Mythische Weltalter: Bachofens Romantische 
Deutung des Altertums; abbreviated English translation: The Mythic 
Age). From Edler's essay, 'Alfred Baeumler on H61derlin and the 
Greeks', p. 5 (www. 'anushead. orq/JHspq99/edler. cfm). 
63 Baeumler wanted to avoid the mistake he perceived the Greeks had 
made, by escaping the use of Homeric language to express the 
chthonic hero. His connection with Bachofen is significant here as 
the chthonic hero was essentially tellurian (of the earth) and 
therefore linked to the Demetrian mother principle, whereby 
matriarchal peoples searched for consolation in the phenomena of 
natural life and sought solace in what Bachofen referred to as 'the 
generative womb, to conceiving, sheltering, nurturing mother love', 
'Mother Right', p. 92. 
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The latter have no relation to death and remove the 
underworld to a safe distance, whereas the former through 
poetising the tragic, invoke the dead and transform the 
soul from the realm of flattening shadow through the 
primordial phenomenon of the tragic act, into an acting and 
speaking 'being'. 64 
The manifestation of the hidden unspeakable depths 
in the image of the tragic actor 'living' as the dead hero 
were contingent on the spoken language which, in the 
Homeric epic, was controlled by the intellectual and 
excluded the instinctual drives. As such, it was complicit in 
the de-potentiation of the chthonic depths, so the 
unchanging light of being as identified in the Homeric gods 
triumphed over the claemonic existence of the chthonic 
hero. Bachofen critiqued the modern historical presumption 
that m atri arch al/chthon ic mysteries were merely a later 
degeneration of HelleniclClassicism as manifest in the 
Homeric epic, by stating: 
[T]he maternal mystery is the old element, and the classic age 
represents a late stage of religious development; the later age 
and not the mystery, may be regarded as a degeneration, as a 
religious levelling that sacrificed transcendence to immanence 
and the mysterious obscurity of higher hope to the clarity of 
65 form 
. 
64 These heroes are no longer pale insubstantial shadings on the 
margins of the Homeric epic, but indicate 'the truth of the dramatic 
form is the making present of something past'. From Alfred 
Baeumler, The Mythic Age, p. 73, and quoted in Edler's essay, 
'Alfred Baeumler on H61derlin and the Greeks', p. 6 
(www. ianushead. orq/JHspc199/edler. cfm). 
65 Bachofen, 'Mother Right', pp. 88-9. 
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For Heidegger (as for Baeumler), the Great War broke the 
materialistic and bourgeois world that had instituted it, and 
both H61derlin and Nietzsche symbolised the potential re- 
emergence of a Greek-Germanic essence unfettered by the 
trappings of the historical precedence of the Roman/Judeo- 
Christian tradition. 66 H61derlin's slumbering youth was 
transformed by Baeumler into the embodiment of latent 
Germanic instinct and enthusiasm, which identified its 
creator, and latterly Nietzsche too, as outsiders alienated 
from the modern world. Significantly, where Baeumler 
differed from Heidegger was in the precedent the latter 
gave to the special affinity between the Greek and German 
languages. 
For Baeumler, the bond was created through what he 
described as youthful enthusiasm, as the expression of 
race and as such, it is clear to see a more direct 
connection with the more extreme policies of National 
Socialism than Heidegger's literary synthesis. 67 
It is evident then, that their respective desires to 
ground ratio were founded in a general heroic mood 
66 Nietzsche and Bachofen (historical contemporaries) clearly defined 
this later cultural period as essentially the Apollonian age (see 
Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy), in which patriarchy as the 
spiritual principle, rising above and breaking the bonds of 
maternal/tellurism, created the Uranian Solar hero to oppose the 
earlier Chthonic Mother goddess. Derrida notes in Memoirs of the 
Blind that: 'Between Apollo and Dionysus a "fraternal bond" is 
certainly possible, if we are to believe Nietzsche', p. 122. 
67 In Baeumler's inaugural address at the University of Berlin in 1933, 
he spoke of a 'new unity of the people' not rooted in the one-sided 
goal of the educated individual, but in the community of the polis 
where the 'new type' would be one of many political soldiers. 
Baeumler saw the bond between Greek and German based in heroic 
enthusiasm and race as essentially a deeper bond than Heidegger's 
originary lingual imperative of Greek origin. 
www. anushead. orq/JHspq99/edler. efm, p. 6. 
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(Stimmung) of attunement, whereby the spiritual mission of 
the university was grounded in the essence of science but 
the evolution and establishment of such a grounding would 
be distinctly different. 
* 
Baeumler's scientific approach looked to the active and 
political of youthful enthusiasm as the spiri t68 of this world- 
changing new science, while distinguishing it from what he 
defined as the passivity and 'contemplation of a theoretical 
ma n'. 69 Change and living enquiry could not 'be carried out 
in the idyllic nooks of monks' and therefore, Baeumler's 
critique of Heidegger centred around the latter's seeming 
desire for a cloistered aestheticism. 
68 Spirit (Geist) was not identified with either consciousness or 
intellect, but for Baeumler was the origin of science. 
69 Baeumler distinguished between the passivity and disinterest of a 
'theoretical man', and the pragmatic, participatory aspect of a 
'political man' through active or passive involvement in change. It is 
worth noting that Heidegger conformed to the latter type, 
particularly after his retreat from the political life of the Rectorate 
in 1933 and with his vision of a, however 'secular' academic 
community in Berlin which would draw on the particularity of his 
volkish view gleaned at Todtnauberg. As Baeumler stated: 'the 
scientific-scholarly subject is supposed to withdraw completely from 
the world like a monk of the Middle Ages who leaves the world 
behind in order to dedicate himself completely to the via 
contemplativa. The theoretical man as the secular monk: distant 
from the world in absolute safety, he leads a life of asceticism, 
which is clearly always in danger of transforming into an idyllic life. ' 
From Baeumler's The Mythic Age, and taken from Frank W. Edler's 
essay, 'Alfred Baeumler on Hblderlin and the Greeks (Part 11)', p. 5 
(www. janushead. org/2-2/fedler. cfm). 
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Edler confirms this view: 
Anyone who knew Heidegger would know of his retreats to his 
Hatte in Todtnauberg and to Benedictine monasteries and 
70 
could easily see Heidegger precisely as a secular monk . 
Equally, Heidegger critiqued Baeumler by indicating that he 
did not go far enough into the essence as a questioning 
71 
process in the privileging of activity over consciousness . 
For Heidegger, science arises out of the event of 
Greek philosophy as Aufbruch -a 'rupture' or 'breaking 
open, of a re vea ling-concea ling, clearing where science 
can emerge, made possible by language. 72 
70 Frank W. Edler, 'Alfred Baeumler on Hblderlin and the Greeks (Part 
11)', p. 7. Herman M6rchen commented on visiting Heidegger at 
Todtnauberg during a break in the Plato semester (1931-2) that: 'He 
doesn't seem to concern himself with political details. If a man lives 
up here, he has a different yardstick for everything. ' From 
Mbrchen's text Aufzeichnungen, and found in FlOcliger Safranski's, 
Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, p. 227. 
71 Baeumler distinguished between (but failed to explain) scientific 
activity originating in the spirit of bold and daring enthusiasm 
characteristic of the Germanic people, whereas the passive 
scholarly and contemplative life of the intellect was more 
characteristic of the Jewish people. 
72 As already stated, Heidegger does not concur with Baeumler's racial 
theory of the essence of science, however, he was not against 
Baeumler's theory of the chthonic as it was concomitant with his 
conception of conceal i ng-reveali ng as a jointure not overcome by 
the defiance of knowing. The chthonic was important for Heidegger 
as the event of origination in Greek philosophy and thus referenced 
to Bachofen's work on the chthonic hero. Bachofen stated: 'Thus the 
hero, who expects to achieve immortality, sees himself and his race 
succumb to the law of earthly matter. ' And later in the same text: 
'He belongs to the world of endless becoming, not to the world of 
being. Everything that material energy brings forth is doomed to 
death. ' 'Mother Right', p. 125. 
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He highlighted Baeumler's rubric of 'theoretical man' as 
non-compliant with the Greek conception of theoria given 
that it was not understood as 'pure contemplation' pursued 
73 for its own sake . 
Aufbruch - the rift, as the originary event - was for 
Heidegger the condition under which the German language 
must place itself so that once immersed in its retrieved 
Greek origin, a more radical understanding of language and 
74 
a more fundamental science of language would emerge 
The route to language that Heidegger mapped out had 
strong parallels with his own retreat from politics after his 
resignation from the Rectorate in 1933. It is evident from 
the shift in his concerns that the emergence of 'language' 
and its relation to logic, however radical, were perhaps, 
through his work on HbIderlin, evidence of a lack of a 
75 
specific moral and ethical posture . 
It is perhaps his greatest failing, and the location 
from which his conspicuous silence emanates, that 
Heidegger refused to acknowledge that such moral and 
ethical considerations were no more than just the 
continuing restrictive vestiges of metaphysical valuation 
that had no place in the possibility of a 'new' world and the 
73 The Greeks struggled to conceive and enact contemplative 
questioning as the highest mode of energeia - of man's 'being-at- 
work'. Theory is then understood as the highest realisation of 
genuine practice and therefore Baeumler's 'modern' distinction is 
collapsed when thought back to the originary event (the same place 
from which science emerges). 
74 It is worth noting here that Bachofen indicated that the origin of 
letter writing was credited to Atossa (the mother of Xerxes) and the 
evolution of this written form of language was expressly due to the 
confinement of the 'Asiatic queens' (Bachofen's term) to the interior 
of palaces; the written word sourced at the hestiallhearth. 
75 It is worth reminding ourselves of Baeumler's view of H61derlin as 
essentially political, in that Hblderlin's sleeping youth was a model 
for the potential for Germanic re-emergence through the waking of 
youthful enthusiasm (and therefore, race distinction). 
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advent of a 'new' god. To commodify humanity as one 
indistinguishable resource amongst a plethora of other 
resources is perhaps too much of a generality of what 
might seem to be Heidegger's high-minded attitude towards 
the baseness of such valuation, and as such and requires 
further clarification. 
Michael E. Zimmerman, in his text Heidegger's 
Confrontation with Modernity, cites H61derlin's view of the 
tragic as a way of understanding Heidegger's attitude 
towards his stand on archaic valuation in a way that 
maintains a significant connection with the Greek culture 
that he so admired and also a notion of completion that 
recognises both finitude and possibility. The arrogant pride 
(hubris) of the Greek tragic hero (and here we may 
alternate the archaic Greek figure with the modern 
German), in defying the divine, creates a caesura (a cleft), 
where the god reveals itself as an abyss which can either 
signal the possibility of a new beginning or the end of all 
historical possibilities. The two laws of such a tragic vision 
require the caesura to be understood as a characteristic of 
finite existence, and secondly that the tragic hero in 
recognising and facing the absence of god, must finally 
submit to his own mortality and finitude. The important 
factors that we might glean from H61derlin's view of the 
tragic (essentially a Greek view) in relation to Heidegger 
is, that the attitude of the Greek/German hero (hubris) is 
perceived as an excessive pride that may be directed 
towards or, in defiance of the divine. 
The potential for the heroic hubris to follow either 
path (or interpret the caesura/abyss as either the 
possibility of the end of all possibility) invites the 
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suggestion of what might be described as a cleansing 
punishment. 76 One might reflect here a moment on the 
essentially German/Greek aspect to this view, which is 
noted by Lacoue-Labarthe, who states: 
German has never ceased aspiring on pretence of its strange 
similarity to Greek (the 'language of origin'), to the unique 
relation it has believed it could establish to everything most 
77 
authentically Greek about Greece . 
For Zimmerman, the extremity of the National Socialist 
technological 'will to will' that found its most pronounced 
expression in the final solution as symbolised by 
Auschwitz, was the consummation of technological 
domination (machination) and the reduction of humans to 
mere industrial waste. Heidegger saw the German's blinded 
by the 'death of god', making a valiant effort to prepare the 
way for the advent of a new divine, but perverted from this 
course and led astray by the continuing power and drive of 
the technological will. 
When seen in the light of this view of the tragic, the 
notion of a cleansing punishment can be seen historically, 
in two ways; firstly (and this may well be Heidegger's 
preferred view, given his own treatment at the hands of the 
cle-nazification committee in Freiburg), in the restitution 
and 'tributes' demanded by the victorious allies, and 
secondly, in the purgation and cleansing of Germany by the 
German people themselves through racial exclusion and 
extermination. 
76 The suggestion has been made that Heidegger's lack of courage was 
that which made him look to pre-1933 Germany as the HdIderlinian 
caesura, rather than the Holocaust/Shoah itself. 
77 'Two Poems by Paul Celan', p. 7. 
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Lacoue-Labarthe's view is that the German people 
themselves were never the scapegoat' and to direct one's 
attention towards the plight of a nation that seemingly so 
embraced National Socialist doctrine is entirely misplaced 
(the argument being that Heidegger seemed to be 
incapable of distinguishing between the losses to the 
German Army on the Eastern Front and the extermination 
of the Jews). The suggestion is made that Heidegger's lack 
of courage at the moment when the courage to admit his 
grave error was perhaps all he had left, forced him to 
reconfigure the conception of the caesura as the radical 
break in history, not in the extremity of the Holocaust, but 
further back in the period that preceded Hitler's rise to 
power in 1933. 
Lyotard complicates this view of the tragic break 
further in his commentary Heidegger and the 'jews , 
78 by 
suggesting that the meaning of the mass extermination of 
the Jews is not in the caesura of the Holocaust/Shoah, 
because in his view, nothing has changed since the war. 
The technological imperative remains undiminished, so 
even the extremity of such a racial cleansing had not 
halted its continuing drive towards domination. In this 
sense, Lyotard is in some accord with Heidegger's post-war 
views on the technological (an agreement about the 
continuing drive of the technological), but where they differ 
in the most significant way is in addressing the meaning of 
Auschwitz. 
78 Jean Frangois Lyotard, Heidegger and the 'jews' (trans Andreas 
Michel and mark Roberts; pub. University of Minnesota Press 1990). 
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Lyotard interprets the Holocaust/Shoah as a genocide 
borne out of resentment. He perceives the Jews as a 
reminder of the impotence of all the West's projects to 
make everything representable, present and thus 
controllable. The Jews represent the experience of being 
uprooted (nomadic! ) and hostage to the unnameable divine 
(Jehovah) and, as such, represent the memory of an 
unconquerable obstacle to understanding and the truth. As 
bearers of the memory of human finitude and dependence, 
it was necessary to exclude them, and their extermination 
was the most extreme attempt to erase their unwanted 
memory. 
The secre CY79 under which this action took place 
further sought to obliterate, so the very memory of the 
obliteration of memory might be forgotten in a kind of 
double erasure. For Lyotard, Heidegger's post-war silence 
was a refusal to deconstruct his most basic assumption 
that the history of the West is identical to the history of 
Being initiated by the Greeks. 
As the bearded patriarchs sought to continually 
remind the Children of Israel of their unnameable origin 
(the divine), so Heidegger, as the prophet of Being, 
involved himself in the reactivating of pre-Socratic 
79 With a view to secrecy, I refer Martin Gilbert's text, The Holocaust: 
The Jewish Tragedy. He comments: 'Throughout Eastern Europe, 
rumours abounded as to some sinister fate for the growing number 
of Jews being deported to the east. But the exact nature of that 
fate was still unknown. Also unknown was the reason: the final 
solution, worked out administratively at Wannsee, remained attight 
secret. 'p. 313. This refers to the Wannsee Conference of 20 
" 
January 1942 at which it was reported were discussed 'the various 
types of solution possibilities. ' However, as Gilbert points out, what 
'these possibilities were, the notes of the Conference do not 
record. ' Ibid., p. 283 
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memory . 
80 The Jews testify to another dimension of 
faithfulness to a divine law that is certainly comparable 
with the history of Being, but remains unacceptable to the 
purity of Being in the Greek sense and therefore as 
Heidegger understood it. 
In the Preview to his text, Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enowning), Heidegger comments: 
At this point to ask the question 'who are we? ' is indeed more 
dangerous than any other opposition we face on the level of 
certainty about man (the final form of Marxism, which 
essentially has nothing to do with Judaism or with Russia; if 
anywhere a spiritualism still lies dormant an unevolved, then, 
then in the Russian people; Bolshevism is originally Western, 
a European possibility: the emergence of the masses, 
industry, technicity, the dying off of Christianity; but insofar 
as dominance of reason as equalization of all people is merely 
the consequence of Christianity and Christianity is 
fundamentally of Jewish origins - cf. Nietzsche's thought on 
slave-rebellion in morality - Bolshevism is actually Jewish; but 
then Christianity is fundamentally Bolshevist! And then what 
decisions become necessary from this point on? ) . 
As Lyotard states, they represent the flaw of a humanity 
trapped in an essentially negating relationship with the 
divine that undermines the supremacy of possibility. The 
contention as to where historically the radical break of the 
caesura might be situated has some bearing on the 
longevity of Heidegger's silence. 
I propose that there is a strong argument to suggest 
that Heidegger's conviction about a period of 
80 Bearded Patriarch is a reference to Celan's poem 'TObingen, 
January'. 
81 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), p. 38. 
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consummation preceding such a break remained intact, 
although its place in history is altered seemingly by history 
itself (or arguably, Heidegger's interpretation of history). 82 
As with Lyotard, Heidegger continued to consider the 
domination of the technological as ongoing after Auschwitz 
and therefore its potential significance as the event of 
caesura was diminished. 83 The question we may need to 
consider in light of this, is whether the radicality of such a 
break is contingent with history itself (is built into it's 
matrixical/sequential 'order') or that such an event, if can 
be considered with the specificity of a term like 'event', is 
perhaps much more ambiguous and not party to the 
constraints of a sequential temporal order? 
I would suggest here that the historical event that we 
refer to as the Holocaust/Shoah is/was/will be resistant to 
the constraints of a completion that culminated in the 
liberation of the camps in 1945. Further, it could be argued 
that the beginning (if such a term can be used) can never a 
singular point of origin that does not take account of the 
contingent historical or social implications that not only 
feed into its phenomenal substance, but also feed out into 
all repercussive activities that follow on from it as a 
historical/meridial moment. 
In this sense, the poem is contingent on the same 
meridial force and this is perhaps most evident in Celan's 
82 1 refer here to key post-war texts such as 'The Question Concerning 
Technology' and 'On the Question of Being'. 
83 Heidegger's 'On the Question of Being', a commentary directed 
towards Ernst JOnger, suggested that the post-war era was entering 
the 'zone of the consummation of nihilism' and was yet to 'cross the 
line'. Heidegger also refers to this line in a quote from JOnger as 
the 'zero meridian'. Published in Pathmarks (ed. W. McNeill; pub. 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 291-322). 
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consideration of the significance of dating the poem and 
the date as a signifier or sign. 
For Lacoue-Labarthe, Celan the poet, as both Jew 
and survivor, was confronted by the 'most brutal question 
possible': 'How was (he) able to situate not himself, but us 
ViS ;ý _C _ViS it?, 
84 
(The 'it' here refers to 'impossible 
possibility' of the mass extermination/holocaust - 'the 
intolerable banality of our time. ') He also states: 
We are at the endpoint of what Nous, ratio, and Logos still 
today (heute) the framework for what we are, what we cannot 
have failed to show: that murder is the first thing to count on, 
and elimination the surest means of identification. 85 
It is perhaps, only provisionally sufficient to retain the term 
end for the time being, for the benefit of some comments 
on completion. In Lacoue-Labarthe's text, 'Two Poems by 
Paul Celan', he indicates that for Celan, both Heidegger 
(through the poem, 'Todtnauberg') and H61derlin (through 
the poem 'TObingen, January') 'give voice to what is at 
stake in our era'. This vocalising of the particularity of 
what might be considered our temporal predicament is 
understood by Lacoue-Labarthe, via Celan, Heidegger and 
H61derlin, as the 'closing of a circle' -a completion of the 
'age of knowledge'. 
For Heidegger, the Greek term techn6 ushers in this 
era, but its significance is directed by the particular 
definition that is preferred in post-Socratic thought. In 
84 Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Two Poems by Paul Celan' (from the collection 
Poetry as Experience), p. 9. 
85 Added emphasis. Ibid., p. 8. 
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favouring its epistemological context (remember here that 
epist6m6 and techn6 in Greek are both words that mean a 
kind of knowing, and as such, a knowing that is also a 
revealing), we understand it as the pursuit of knowledge as 
pure presence. 
This is where the development of philosophical 
thought from the Socratic era is made manifest in a 
metaphysics that shackles thought via knowledge to a drive 
towards a technological understanding of the world - as 
such, the a priori of presence over absence. It is evident 
that in the Greek word techn6 we already hear the modern 
term technology, and for Heidegger, the essence of such 
technology drives forward through constraint, limitation and 
manipulation. 
What is referred to as enframing (it is important to 
remember here that man is not the force that fuels such a 
posturing of technology; as perhaps the dextrous arch- 
manipulator, but is challenged by and, as such, as much at 
its mercy as any of the things that it orders). What 
Heidegger pursues rigorously in his essay 'The Question 
Concerning Technology', is what is forgotten in the word 
techn6 - that for the Greeks it also meant a revealing in 
the sense of the artistic and poetic. He states: 
There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore 
the name techn6. Once that revealing that brings forth truth 
into the splendour of radiant appearing also was called 
techn6. 
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Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true 
into the beautiful was called techn6. And the poi6sis of the 
fine arts also was called techn 6.86 
For Heidegger, what is lost in the later metaphysical 
incarnation of techn6 - the route defined by epist6m6 
towards the prioritising of knowledge via technology - is 
the poetic/artistic (poi6sis) conception also found in 
techn6. This form of revealing (al6theia) is perhaps more 
appropriately conceived by Heidegger as a kind of 
unconcealment that is not directed by the enframing mode 
of the technological, but by an occasioning that 
appropriates mode S87 without favouring any individual mode 
within the event of occasioning . 
88 As such, he declines to 
dismiss this reign of enframing as only an exercise in the 
restrictive practices of the essence of technology, and 
completely without merit. What is heard in techn6 is both 
the revealing of the challenging forth of technology's 
essence, and also (and most importantly for Heidegger's 
project) the unconcealment of the artistic and the poetic. 
86 Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 34. 
87 This references Heidegger's definition of the 'four modes of 
occasioning' in 'The Question Concerning Technology', pp. 7-8. 
88 This is distinguished from Aristotle's version of instrumentality and 
causality and the four causes: causa materialis, causa formalis, 
causa finalis and causa efficiens - causa efficiens (the maker) 
being prioritised. 
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He quotes H61clerlin in the latter part of the essay 'The 
Question Concerning Technology': 
But where the danger is, grows 
89 
The saving power also . 
In the midst of the technological drive towards reducing all 
to 'standing-reserve', there is heard a revealing that can 
be referred to as unconcealment (al6theia). It is an 
opening that is created (artistically or poetically) to allow 
the presencing of things in themselves without the 
constraint of enframing through the technological (techn6 
as both poison and cure! )90 -a rift. 
This brief diversion is intended to provisionally 
contextualise the particularity of a conception of a world 
age (Heidegger's world picture)91 as essentially formed by 
the understanding of the essence of truth' through 
knowledge and valuation via the mechanisms of 
technological enframing. 
89 Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 34. Otto 
P6ggeler, in his text The Paths to Heidegger's Life and Thought 
(Chapter 3, 'Art-Myth-Language') argues that Heidegger 
misunderstands H61derlin here by suggesting that this phrase 'does 
not hold nihilism and the demise of the godly to be the greatest 
danger, but the opposite: that the breakthrough to unmediated 
proximity with God could lead to arrogance! ' p. 239. 
90 1 will briefly mention the Pharmakos as both poison and cure as 
explored by Derrida in his text Dissemination, and as something to 
which I will return later. 
91 This term is a reference Heidegger's essay, 'The Age of the World 
Picture', and found in the collection, The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays. In it he states: 'The fundamental 
event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. The 
word "picture" [Bild] now means the structured image [Gebild]* that 
is the creature of man's producing which represents and sets 
before. ' p. 134. 
It is noted in the footnote that the word Gebild is Heidegger's own 
word and taken from the noun gebilden, which means a thing 
formed, creation, structure or image and the assumption is that the 
prefix ge- connotes the force a kind of gathering to be found in the 
word. 
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(It may be worth mentioning here that Nietzsche was 
the first 'modern' thinker to question valuations - to 
attempt to scrutinise values that previous thinkers had 
92 
accepted as beyond such consideration . 
It is also worthy of note that both Nietzsche and 
H61derlin were considered outsiders and were essentially 
recuperated by radical conservative academics such as 
Heidegger and Baeumler). 
Perhaps more appropriate is to distinguish this era 
(whose closure Lacoue-Labarthe suggests, as inaugurated 
by the poetics of H61derlin and the thinking of Heidegger) 
under the historical term nihilism. 
Nihilism should be understood as the persistent 
unremitting decline towards the ultimate negation that 
constrains all possibilities via the mechanisms of valuation 
(the good and the bad, the noble and the base). It is this 
value structure (the enframing of Heidegger's essay, 'The 
Question Concerning Technology') that is the very essence 
of the metaphysical project whereby everything is coerced 
into a levelling binary of opposition where negation 
orchestrates, controls and dictates. 
92 Specifically Kant's uncritical use of the valuations of truth and 
beauty, etc., Derrida comments in The Truth in Painting that: 'Kant 
and Hegel reflect the line of cut or rather the pas crossing the line 
between finite and infinite as the proper place of the sublime and 
the interruption of symbolic beauty: it is not surprising that they 
both consider a certain Judaism as the historical figure of the 
sublime irruption, the one, Kant, from the point of view of religion 
and morals, in the ban on iconic representation (neither Bildnis nor 
Gleichnis), the other, Hegel, in Hebraic poetry considered as the 
highest negative form of the sublime. ' p. 134 (added emphasis). 
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Nietzsche stands at the perimeter (the meridian? ) of 
this completion and, for Heidegger, he personifies the last 
vestiges of all metaphysical inquiry inaugurating the era 
93 
whereby the zone of nihilism's consummation is entered . 
As the inverter of Platonism, he is located by Heidegger, in 
the zone of nihilism's consummation. His aphoristic 
attempts at revaluation are not the creation of new values 
or the destruction of all valuation but are the inversion of 
all preceding values - the Platonic valuations of ideality 
and the worldly turned on their head. As such, for 
Heidegger, Nietzsche cannot escape the age of 
metaphysical knowledge, the age of nihilism, and stands on 
one side of the perimeter as the circle closes. 94 
The task of thought, as defined by Heidegger, quoted 
by Lacoue-Labarthe in his text, and manifest in the work of 
H61clerlin and Heidegger, is to emerge from the midst of 
this completion as that which has to be deployed (what up 
to this moment, has been forgotten or rejected)95 to clear a 
path to a possible future, re-inaugurating history, re- 
opening the possibility of a world and paving the way for 
the advent of a new god. 
93 See 'On the Question of Being', published in Pathmarks, pp. 291- 
322. 
94 1 have specified Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche here in the 
context of an understanding of the completion of 
metaphysics/nihilism. What I have not touched upon is the Derrician 
and Deleuzian readings of Nietzsche, which complicate Heidegger's 
perception of Nietzsche as 'the last great metaphysician'. 
95 1 refer back to what Heidegger hears in techn6 - the unconcealment 
of the artistic and poetic. 
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This need to free grammar from logic (the is- 
predication) could not be conceived by merely improving 
upon or supplementing any existing tradition, but through 
the understanding that the a priori structure of discourse 
was essentially existential. 
If discourse is temporal, any permanence of an 
objective presence in which logic is based blocks and 
hinders any attempt to retrieve a more originary experience 
of time and therefore that from which this more originary 
understanding of Being and language might be formulated. 
For Heidegger, this linguistic praxis sets to work as a 
gathering in the German language of Greek logos as 
essentially the preservation of the origin of a temporal 
gathering through the manner of the pre-logical. 
H61derlin's late poetry identified a pre-logical lingual form 
that anticipated the drive towards nihilistic consummation 
and the rift/interval (the ructure) of 'no more' and 'not yet'. 
His encroaching inability to speak identified the possibility 
for silence as the praxis by which language might be 
predicated in the pre-logical. 
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As Heidegger stated with reference to H61derlin's 
prophetic consideration of the 'between' of this era as a 
time of distress and the world's night: 
The 'no more' of gods who have fled and the 'not yet' of the 
god to come. 96 
POISON AND CURE 
Yet Suddenly: silence. A fever's dull glow 
Sends poisonous flowers blossoming from my mouth, 
And how the dew falls, pale and shimmering the branches 
As if from a wound, and falls, and falls like blood. 97 
Is it appropriate to consider that Celan's demand of 
Heidegger was that of a patient of his doctor, and that such 
a consultation on the hillside at Todtnauberg would provide 
the curative solution to Celan's long-term illness? 
I would like to draw attention to a number of 
possibilities that Celan introduces in the poem to indicate 
the need for a cure that perhaps is both metaphorical and 
observational. As such, the insight at work in the text is 
how what is observed becomes metaphorical, but these 
96 H61clerlin's encroaching madness is identified by Celan in 'Tobingen, 
January' as the collapse of his ability to speak. He wrote: 'if he 
spoke of his time, could only babble and babble, ever-ever- 
moremore. ("Pallaksch. Pallaksch. ")'. From Selected Poems and 
Prose of Paul Celan, tran. J. Felstiner, p. 159. Lacoue-Labarthe 
notes in 'Two Poems by Paul Celan' that: 'We are told when 
H61derlin went "mad", he constantly repeated, '"Nothing is 
happening to me, nothing is happening to me. "' Poetry as 
Experience, p. 21. 
97 This second stanza is taken from Georg Trakl's poem 'Horror' - the 
translation by D. Simko and published in the collection Autumn 
Sonata, p. 29. 
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considerations are extended further through later 
translation and mistranslation, so that meaning can no 
longer be understood as complete or without further 
extension. 
It is well documented that Celan's fascination for the 
botanical and the geological informed much of his poetry 
and provided important references in the complicated 
strategies of his poetic insights. 'Todtnauberg' is no 
exception, but perhaps what appears insistently remedial 
should not be viewed as exclusively curative, and our 
seemingly clear understanding of such a cure at work in 
the poem must be revised. 98 
Pierre Joris's commentary is among many that follow 
the pattern that proposes that Celan's hope at the 
beginning is manifest in the observation of particular kinds 
of flora common to a location like Todtnauberg that were 
known for their curative properties. Both Arnica and 
Eyebright are common natural remedies, and Celan's 
insertion of them at the commencement of the poem is 
obviously intended to charge the text with a provisional 
hope for the curative - an expectation brought to the 
meeting and reflected in this initial observation of the 
surroundings. 
It is worth remembering here what drew Celan's 
attention to these particular plants in the light of such 
expectation by indicating their curative powers. Arnica is a 
98 Derrida comments in The Truth in Painting: 'As such, insofar as he 
inscribes his object in the cycle of natural finality, ascribes to it an 
objective function and end, the botanist cannot find the flower 
beautiful. At the very most he can conceive of an adherent beauty of 
the flower. If a botanist accedes to a vague beauty, it will not be 
insofar as he is a botanist. Scientific discourse will have become 
mute or impossible for him. ' p. 95. 
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perennial herb indigenous to Central Europe and found 
commonly in woods and mountain pastures. 
Its most common application is as a tincture for 
external application on sprains, bruises and wounds where 
the skin remains unbroken. For our purposes, what is vital 
is its significance as an external treatment for injuries 
close to the dermal perimeter of the corporeal, where, most 
importantly, this perimeter remains un-breached. 
To extend this reading of its properties further, it is 
seldom used internally because of its irritant effect on the 
stomach, and as an external application, if used 
repeatedly, it may produce severe inflammation to the skin 
surface, and to some particularly sensitive to the plant, it 
can be poisonous, particularly if taken internally. 99 
What is indicated here is that a cursory grasp of the 
properties of Arnica may lead us to interpret it as 
essentially curative without any provisos - an inherently 
good treatment if used appropriately. Yet even in its most 
appropriate use, it has properties that are not entirely 
without risk to the patient, and in certain circumstances, 
such properties are potentially hazardous. 
In considering the intrinsic relationship between that 
which is considered curative, and that from which one is 
cured, what is perhaps not accounted for is the 
characteristics of such a cure that are not essentially 
affirmative and unproblematic. The binary nature of the 
opposition of the injurious and the curative does not take 
99 A homeopathic tincture (X6) has also been used successfully in the 
treatment of epilepsy. This information can be found on the website 
www. botanical. com. 
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account of the complication of what might be inherently 
injurious in the curative. 
What I propose here is that Celan's use of the 
remedial as primordial to the anticipatory event of hope, 
which instigates the poetic consideration of his meeting 
with Heidegger in 1967, is not without the problematic built 
in to the essential nature of the potential remedy itself. 
Arnica is a remedial herb, but this quality is not exclusively 
an unreserved affirmation of its good qualities as is 
perhaps considered by some commentators. What is 
essential to the curative is also the possibility of the 
poisonous. 
With this in mind, a reading that suggests that 
Celan's provisional hope is manifest in the remedial/herbal 
of the indigenous flora of Heidegger's Black Forest retreat 
is complicated, and this is echoed, as Joris has suggested, 
by a less literal reading of the metaphorical at work in the 
poem. 
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Provisionally, Arnica is a treatment for injury, and if 
considered exclusively as such, its aspirational qualities of 
hope are beyond question. What is perhaps less obvious is 
the conditions by which such a remedy can act effectively 
as a cure and how it, as a remedial treatment, impacts on 
such conditions via its pharmaceutical nature. 
We must be attentive towards what must be 
considered the key quality of Arnica as a remedial herb and 
as a treatment for what ails a body. At its most effective, it 
is primarily (though not exclusively) an external tincture 
applied to bruising, chilblains and sprains, as already 
stated, where the skin remains unbroken. As an external 
application, its curative qualities act upon that which is 
internal without coming into direct contact with the internal 
injury itself. 
The body's dermal layer - the skin - becomes an 
intrinsic part of the curative process by refusing the 
penetration of the tincture across the border that separates 
internal from external. To be effective as a treatment, it 
must always remain external to the corporeal, and so its 
relationship with that which maintains it as external (the 
skin) is fundamental to its operation as remedial and 
curative while resistant to its complete absorption into the 
corporeal. 
The dermal layer conducts the remedial qualities of 
Arnica to that which is injured internally - it effectively 
'translates' what is appropriate in the qualities of the herb 
as tincture to treat the injury, while withholding that which 
might prove injurious. 
As we have stated, Arnica is not curative without 
reservation. It can be, in certain circumstances, an irritant, 
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and with repeated application it can cause inflammation 
and discomfort. Equally, when used for internal treatment 
in specific circumstances (epilepsy and travel sickness), it 
must be administered with care, particularly if the patient 
is sensitive to the plant. If this is the case, it can result in 
severe discomfort and even poisoning when taken 
internally in this way. 
Celan's use of Arnica as a metaphor for the remedial 
that he found so abundant around the Hatte was perhaps to 
identify the curative that surrounded Heidegger, firstly, in 
anticipation that a 'word' might come to cure what ailed the 
poet, and secondly, that Heidegger himself might be cured 
of past transgressions that compromised the purity of his 
thought. 
What I propose here is that the natural characteristics 
of the herb Arnica are not without risk when used to treat 
any malady and, as such, can be construed as a 
conditional manoeuvre that includes both the curative and 
the poisonous. When Joris argues for the refusal of the 
comfort and security of the definitive translation in his text 
'Celan/Heidegger: Translation at the Mountain of Death', 
he complicates the reading of 'Todtnauberg' by making it 
conditional in the same way that the application of Arnica 
as a medicinal tincture for treating injury is conditional. To 
'translate' Celan's use of Arnica as exclusively curative is 
to avoid its other natural characteristics that refuse the 
remedial and have the potential to be injurious, even 
poisonous. 
The clarity of Celan's hope manifest in the remedial 
qualities of Arnica are now complicated by the other 
qualities of the herb that are not curative and perhaps, 
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what is now most important about these characteristics is 
that it can only operate as a treatment effectively when 
applied externally, not through ingestion or absorption, 
where it has the potential to act as a poison. 100 How might 
this be understood with regard to both Celan and 
Heidegger? Arnica, as a treatment for internal injuries, can 
only effectively be administered externally and in so doing 
is reliant on the dermal layer to translate its curative 
qualities. 
If absorbed or ingested, it is risked as a poison to the 
body that would certainly be discomforting, perhaps even 
fatal. As a treatment, it is effective against what might be 
considered only minor injuries and only when administered 
externally under certain conditions. 101 How might we expect 
such a treatment to be considered curative of an injury that 
may well be more deeply set within the corporeal? 
To remain an external treatment is perhaps to limit 
the effectiveness of such a treatment with particular 
reference to the severity of the kind of injury to be treated. 
100 The beginning of hope in the poem not only commences in the 
remedial possibilities of the surrounding blooms (Arnica and 
Eyebright) but also in the image of the well-spring. The change 
occurs when the affirmation of the spring is lost with the later 
identification in the poem of moisture as dampness - we can 
interpret this as 'water without a clear source' and as such, an 
unease or anxiety is articulated. Celan's term for log as in 'half-trod 
log-paths' (the means of traversing the damp ground) is KnOppel, 
which also means bludgeon and has a strong resonance with the 
treatment of interned Jews. In the Alain Resnais film Night and Fog, 
it was noted in the commentary (for which Celan was responsible, in 
1956, for a German translation of Jean Cayrol's original, in French - 
see John Felstiner's text, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew, pp. 92- 
3), that camp prisoners were 'bludgeoned awake'. 
101 1 am mindful here of the internal application of Arnica as a 
treatment for epilepsy and travel-sickness and would like to 
consider these further in light of disfluency and displacement. 
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As such, does Celan have in mind, in this reference to the 
remedial via the use of Arnica, a general context for some 
kind of healing balm at the beginning of the poem, or is 
potential superficiality of both treatment and injury masking 
a deeper consideration of what is inherently poisonous 
within the curative? 
I am conscious here that we have yet to broach the 
second remedy cited in the preliminary lines of the poem, 
and as such, have not given it the same attention as 
Arnica. This is because Eyebright is more obviously a 
treatment for a particular condition that more clearly 
connects with what I believe to be Celan's provisional 
metaphorical indications towards a sense of hope in 
advance of the meeting. As the English translation makes 
clear, it is an optical treatment and restorative that is 
sight-based - 'a consolation of the eyes' (Augentr6st). The 
obvious association between the weakness of sight 
restored by the curative qualities of bathing the eyes in an 
infusion of Eyebright reaches beyond the mere 
improvement of 'corporeal' sight. 
For Celan, it indicates a more profound metaphorical 
realm of a treatment for the improvement of 'insight', not a 
general insight, but the particularity of an individual's 
insight towards a particular historical event or events. 
What was hoped for by the poet was that Heidegger would 
express a more insightful 'word' towards that which and 
about which he has previously remained conspicuously 
silent, and the proximity of such a restorative herbal balm 
to the philosopher's place of thought - the HOtte - is 
anticipatory of such an oral event of contrition. 
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Where Eyebright can be more literally conceived as a 
metaphor for the soothing of restricted sight (in 
Heidegger's case, possibly a kind of tunnel vision or 
myopia towards the ontological) and as such, acts as a 
102 restorative balm , Arnica's role 
in the poem is 
significantly more complex. 
If Arnica's status in the poem is one of 
'undecidability', it not only poses the problem of the 
pharmakon, 103 but also that of translation. To operate 
successfully as a cure, it must remain a tincture that 
soothes externally and its remedial role is contingent on it 
remaining exterior to any injury it is called upon to treat. 
102 Restorative implies a condition where vision once clear, becomes 
impaired and is in need of treatment to restore clarity. This process 
implies a temporal condition -a recurrence. 
103 Pharmakon should be understood from classical Greek and 
understood to mean either remedy or poison - either a cure for an 
illness, or its cause. 
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Once it traverses the barrier that indicates the 
separation between the external and the internal, its 
essential nature as a pharmakon, comes into play. 
As an internal treatment, it is not without remedial 
properties, but as undecidable (i. e. it cannot 'decide' to be 
either a remedy or a poison; this is contingent on the 
condition of the particular circumstances of its 
application), the risk is run of an adverse reaction -a 
poisoning that at the very least would cause severe 
discomfort, and at worst, may prove to be fatal. 104 
The unclecidability of the pharmakos - its drift 
between the polarities of poison and cure- has tangible 
links with not only the pharmaceutical nature of Arnica as a 
remedial treatment for the specifics of a corporeal injury 
where it is maintained (at lowest risk to the corporeal) in 
its exteriority, but also as a phenomenon associated with 
the undecidability of the pharmakos. 
The latter term is evidently derivative from (rooted in) 
the former, and essentially functions in much the same way 
- as a manifestation of undecidability. The specificity of 
the pharmakos is translated as the term scapegoat and is 
understood to mean an evil maintained with the structure of 
the polis, and which is sacrificed by the state to maintain 
its purity. 
In ancient Greece the ritual of the pharmakos, as a 
rite of civil purification, obliged the citizens of the city- 
state to maintain (at public expense) a group of individuals 
104 It is worth remembering that the two recognised ailments for which 
Arnica may be used as a remedy via ingestion, epilepsy and travel- 
sickness, might well be considered those of the outsider/other - 
Celan as both poet1seer and nomadiclalien. 
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('wild, ugly and deformed' and arguably barbaric) solely for 
the purpose of sacrifice. 105 
At times of greatest need (the onset of such natural 
phenomena as flood, famine or pestilence), an individual 
was selected to be removed from the confines of the polis, 
and was subjected to a frenzied beating that resulted in 
death. This was followed by the immolation of the remains, 
which were scattered to the four winds. 106 
105 The precedent for the scapegoat is noted in Heidegger's past 
through the figure of Heidegger's assistant at Freiburg University, 
Rudolf Stadelmann. Hugo Ott notes in his book, Martin Heidegger, A 
Political Life, that Stadelmann was dismissed from the first of 
Heidegger's camps at Todtnauberg (4-10 October 1933) to appease 
the warring factions also present from Freiburg, Heidelberg and Kiel 
Universities. The specificity of the misdemeanor remains unclear, 
but Ott records that the sacrificial lamb, Stadelmann, noted: 'I shall 
never seek to evade this discipline. And in Todtnauberg I realized 
more clearly than ever before that my place is in the camp of 
revolution, not among the ranks of the opposition or the carping 
spectators. I shall maintain discipline but had hoped for more, I had 
believed in the possibility of true allegiance. This is why I was so 
saddened and shaken by the way things turned out, ' p. 233 (added 
emphasis). Latterly when teacher and assistant where reconciled, 
Heidegger urged Stadelmann to 'learn to become hard' (p. 232). 
Even in 1933, Todtnauberg can be seen here as the site of a rift 
that required remedial treatment through the realisation of a kind of 
scapegoat to restore order. I would note here Stadelmann's 
anticipation of reconciliation with Heidegger in the context of these 
events was distinctly different f rom Celan's. 
106 The weapon most commonly used for the beating of the pharmakos 
was a bulbous plant known as a squill. It is significant that the two 
common varieties of this plant, white and red, are used alternatively 
as a diuretic, stimulant or expectorant (white), and a poison (red). 
Of coincidental note here is that the cottages converted to 
provisional gas chambers at Auschwitz, were referred to as the little 
red house and the little white house. 
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The significance of the phenomenon of the pharmakos, for 
our purposes, is firstly in its links with the root of 
pharmakon as already defined in the undecidability 
between toxicity and the curative. Arnica, as outlined, has 
the provisional condition of the curative and as such, is 
generally considered (with Eyebright) as the metaphor for 
remedial hope that inaugurates the opening stanza of 
'Todtnauberg'. 
I would like to suggest that this remedial possibility is 
incomplete without recognising that what is conceived as 
essentially curative is also essentially toxic - the spectre 
of toxicity which haunts the curative. In exploring the 
characteristics of the remedy that Celan opens the poem 
with, the condition of undecidability can be grasped in the 
low risk exteriority of Arnica as a pharmaceutical tincture. 
The key proposal of it as a treatment for any interior 
ailment is that it is not introduced to the interior and has 
no direct contact with it (except under exceptional 
circumstances of treatment for epilepsy or travel sickness 
and with acknowledgement of some risk to the corporeal). 
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The risk of its toxicity to the body is at its lowest 
when it is administered externally, and as a treatment 
under these conditions, its toxicity must be recognised and 
acknowledged - we can no longer conceive of it as 
exclusively curative without the otherness of its essential 
107 
nature being recognised in the remedial . 
Likewise, the historical figure of the pharmakos is 
essentially an undecidable, and to acknowledge its curative 
function in the purification of the polis is also to recognise 
its otherness as essential to its operation as a scapegoat. 
To function as pharmakos, it must be embraced by the 
state without undergoing any kind of absorption into it. It is 
perhaps more appropriate to consider the scapegoat in 
these circumstances, as ingested into the corporeal of the 
polis on the clear understanding that such ingestion is not 
merely absorption. 
The ingested pharmakos is held within the body of the 
state (historically maintained by the state) and as such has 
a function within its apparatus, a function that is 
fundamentally other to this structure, and one that 
operates at its most effective for the purposes of the polis, 
outside its confines (the pharmakos, when sacrificed, is 
removed from the interior of the polis and dispatched on its 
periphery). 
107 1 also reiterate here earlier comments made about the parallels 
between remedial and toxicity in the context of the use of water in 
the poem. From the hope of a well-spring to the unease of source- 
less water. Paul Virilio notes in his text, Bunker Archaeology, that 
Hitlerian ideology had just one element - the lithosphere (earth and 
blood). His fear of the hydrosphere (the 'liquid horizontality of the 
sea') led to the construction of the Atlantic Wall 'looking out over 
the void, over this moving and pernicious expanse, alive with 
menacing presences; in front of the sea Hitler rediscovered ancient 
terrors: water, a place of madness, of anarchy, of monsters', p. 30. 
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To be held within the state as essentially alien to its 
apparatus indicates not only the undecidability of such 
otherness (that it is both exclusive and inclusive), but also 
that at the heart of the structural integrity of the polis is 
the notion of difference - the pharmakos is essentially 
different from the state that maintains and sacrifices it and 
has to be so to operate as pharmakos. 108 
Arnica, then, within the confines of the poem, is 
essentially a metaphor for difference that is precluded in 
its nature and, as such, we cannot ignore its potential as a 
literary pharmakon. Most commentaries understand it as 
that which is curative prior to the meeting between Celan 
and Heidegger - an anticipatory possibility and expectation 
on behalf of the poet. Even Joris, whose critique of 
particular interpretations and translations of Celan's poem, 
provisionally informed this exploration, states: 
The poem's opening line, Celan's account of the surrounding 
botany he espies upon arriving, is however full of hope and 
healing: Arnica is a bright-yellow flower, whose mountain 
variety, A montana, is used to prepare a tincture helpful for 
healing sprains and bruises. "9 
What is seemingly ignored by Joris is the nature of Arnica 
as a remedy that must include in its remediality the 
otherness of a toxicity, which not only indicates a notion of 
difference already at work in the remedy, but, as Derrida 
might well point out, proposes a deferral whereby the 
108 1 am mindful here of Derrida's work on the pharmakonlpharmakos in 
Dissemination and also Mark Wigley's text, The Architecture of 
Deconstruction: Derrida's Haunt. 
109 Joris, 'Celan/Heidegger: Translation at the Mountain of Death', p. 3. 
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circumstances by which the pharmakon is instituted have 
some say in its meaning. 
For to mean cure, and only the possibility of a cure in 
the context of the poem, is already to exclude that which is 
the very nature of Arnica in its remedial state. As 
conditionally curative, its toxicity must be recognised and, 
as such, the clarity of the curative is complicated by the 
inclusion of that which had been largely excluded. The 
essential difference at work in the herbal/remedial of 
curative and toxicity in Arnica expands into a reading of it 
that informs an interpretation of the poem beyond the 
dimension of the exclusively remedial. It may be that 
toxicity is essentially silent - an unspoken other that is not 
an appendage to the remedial qualities of the herb, but 
that which is an integral part of the herbal. This being the 
case, it is appropriate that, given the complexity of such 
difference, such a reading might be extended into the wider 
context of the more figurative pharmakos. 
A question arises at this point regarding a context for 
the interpretation of the pharmakos in the light of the poem 
Todtnauberg. Can we specify a particular participant 
(Celan or Heidegger) in the drama of the poem that we 
might identify as exclusively the scapegoat? Initially, one 
might propose that Celan himself could occupy this 
position. Both geographically and linguistically, Celan 
remained outside - he wrote in his mother-tongue without 
being an ethnic German and the language he used was 
essentially a form of High-German that, Joris argues, was 
out of place in post-war Europe (the language of German 
Romanticism - that of the poets H61derlin and Trakl, and 
ironically that of the intellectual elite of Germany between 
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the wars, espousing the very anti-Semitism that preceded 
the Holocaust, but a language that may well find it difficult 
to describe). 
As someone already marginalised within the language 
that he chose to define his poetic vision, Celan not only 
instigated a deferral within the lingual form, but was 
himself an undecidable within that form: a Jewish poet who 
wrote in German without being a naturalised German, and 
who located himself on the periphery of the topographic 
location of a post-war, divided Germany, crossing its 
borders occasionally and with some reservation. 110 
The topography of this 'new' (post-war) Germany was 
itself a deferral (and as such, becomes a topology) of 
political responsibility that, it could be argued, in an 
attempt to provide remedial treatment to cleanse the 
National Socialist canker, found itself struggling with what 
provisionally might be conceived as the physicality of an 
oppositional binary of toxicity and curative within the 
confines of the corporeality of the state. "' 
Celan, in situating himself on the perimeter, remained 
on the periphery of the state/po/is, yet was intrinsically 
involved in its apparatus through his insistence in the use 
of its language (though significantly, in an archaic form 
110 Celan variously lived in Romania, Austria and France - creating a 
meridial sweep across central Europe that excluded the homeland of 
his mother-tongue and extended a perimeter of exclusion. 
111 Perhaps an example of such toxicity and remedy might be found in 
the post-war Democratic and Federal states of Germany each both 
curative and poisonous towards each other - hence a zone of 
exclusion was set up between them. The question of undecidability 
arises between them as to which was poison, and which cure? 
151 
rooted not only in the Germany of pre-1945, but more 
importantly, that of pre-1914). 112 
In the German Romanticism of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, the aspirations of literary 
figures, such as Goethe and H61derlin, were towards a 
stronger association between the German tradition and the 
ancient Greek world 113 that would provide a remedial edge 
and which would allow German culture to reach its full 
potential and blossom. Geographically, its location at the 
heart of Europe gave it topographical privileges of 
centrality that made the links between the culture and its 
locale significant historically. 114 
In literary terms, the seeds of the cultural shift from 
the high aspirations of Goethe and H61derlin to the darker 
visions of TrakI 115 and Celan were sown in this association 
- this special relationship between the ancient Greek and 
the modern German. The German metaphysics of 
nationality mythologised Germanic distinctiveness, through 
112 It could be argued that literary figures like Celan and Kafka were 
the products of a wider 'German-speaking Reich', rooted in the 
unification of a greater Germany in 1871 and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. As writers working in German, neither were indigenously 
German by birth (Celan, Romanian and Kafka, Czech), and both 
were Jewish. 
113 The aspiration of the German intellectuals to find the legacy of 
ancient Greek culture in 'modern' Germany began in this period and 
continued to be sought up to, and including the period of the Third 
Reich (Heidegger is an example of such an intellectual on such a 
quest). Heidegger's conviction towards an essential ontology was 
rooted in this tradition. 
114 Heidegger exploits this topographic locality in his most direct 
commentary on the Germany of the Third Reich, in An Introduction 
to Metaphysics, 'The Fundamental Question' (pp. 45-6). 
115 This 'darker vision' is discussed in more detail in the text 
Posthumous People: Vienna at the Turning Point, Chapter 17, 
'A ben la n d'. 
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the geographical location of the homeland as that of a 
central people occupying the rift between east and west. 116 
German nationalism rose when there was no nation- 
state or political order to channel and contain nationalist 
feelings, and therefore the people were forced to rely on 
literary, poetical and philosophical means to locate their 
nationhood. 117 In 'Two Poems by Paul Celan', Lacoue- 
Labarthe writes: 
German has never ceased aspiring on pretence of its strange 
similarity to Greek ('the language of origin'), to the unique 
relation it has believed it could establish to everything most 
authentically Greek about Greece. 118 
If conceived remedially, the higher considerations of 
literature and thought were certainly intended to inspire 
comparable works in German. What perhaps was less 
evident provisionally, in the strong linkage between the two 
cultures advocated by the intellectual elite, was the 
potential for a spherical toxicity expressed through the 
corruptive force of nomadic cultural influences that resist 
116 Heidegger draws this distinction in his text, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, published in the 1930s. 
117 It is noted here that Hans Sluga suggests the historical significance 
of this central role, was not essentially German. The ancient Greeks 
also placed themselves at the centre of the world and distinguished 
themselves from the barbarians by their use of language. German 
unification was only realised in 1871, so when Wihelm Wundt 
(Heidegger's contemporary) assumed that a nation was primarily 
defined by language and therefore national character would reveal 
itself most clearly in a nation's poetry and philosophy, it indicated a 
lingual locale. Heidegger's Rectoral Address was not a new 
conception of the German people's spiritual mission, but an 
insertion into an already long history of nationalistic claims (for 
example, Fichte's 1807 'Address to the German Nation', which 
attempted to define a unifying mythology around which a nation 
might grow). 
118 Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Two Poems by Paul Celan', p. 7. 
153 
the polis, not necessarily through subversive activities 
against the state, but through the distinctiveness of their 
own cultural identity. The upsurge of anti-Semitic 
behavioural patterns in nineteenth-century German cultural 
life, 119 prior to and after unification, though not without 
comparable historical precedents across Europe, was 
certainly a clear example of the Greek tradition of the 
pharmakos exceeding its temporal containment in history 
and finding a new status in a modern culture in search of 
itself. Celan's Jewishness already excluded him from such 
a culture that recognised the pha rmakos1scap e goat as a 
tradition worthy of upholding in the modern world and 
intensified the search for, and the institution of, a cultural 
purification . 
120 This colluded with his birth into a tradition 
that was not only Jewish, but also non-German (although 
post-First World War Romania had previously been 
between Tsarist Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the area around 
Celan's birthplace was a zone of contention between the 
Third Reich and Stalinist Russia; at different times, Celan 
was in the hands of both Russian and German forces), 
119 Richard Wagner, for example, and his text 'Judaism in Music' (1850) 
published in Neue Zeitschrift fir Musik under the pseudonym, K. 
Freigedank. In this essay he critiqued what he considered to be the 
prevailing forces in German cultural life (particularly the theatre 
world) as essentially Jewish and corruptive of the higher aspirations 
of a Germanic cultural imperative, which he identified in his own 
music-dramas. It is noted here that Wagner's anti-Semitism was the 
product of frustration borne out of his rejection by a society, which 
lionised the Jewish composer Meyerbeer. 
120 The Jew as an expendable scapegoat for cultural/religious 
purification is rooted in the European tradition from the Middle 
Ages. 
154 
where he was encouraged to not only speak German, but 
also to write it . 
121 
This collusion might be seen in two ways; firstly, to 
acknowledge the significance of the appropriated language 
is to give it an a priori that provisionally addresses its 
importance and distinctiveness and propagates it. 
Secondly, to undermine that language, to call into question 
its validity as culturally a priori, one is perhaps better 
placed to articulate its anomalies from within the language 
itself. For Celan, the priority (and extreme difficulty) was to 
speak the language of the culture that was responsible for 
the extremity of the Holocaust, to draw attention to these 
extremities through the tongue that articulated and 
instigated it, and proposed the Jew as a modern 
pharmakos. 
121 Both Kafka and Celan wrote/spoke in German although neither were 
citizens of that country - were they in some way contributing to a 
cultural propagation while remaining excluded from it? The 
profundity of those who were excluded speaking and writing in the 
language of inclusion should not be lost here. 
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Celan, while immersed in the lingual prosody of the 
appropriated German language, was maintained in his 
exclusion from it by his persistence in attempting to speak 
of the events that pushed it to the limits of its expression 
and meaning - how can one find the appropriate voice to 
speak of such things without diminishing their power? 122 
Derrida distinguishes between what he refers to as 
the 'silent mimesis' of painting and sculpture, and 
writing/poetry by suggesting that the latter 'imitates the 
voice by means of the voice'. 123 
The precedent of the vocal through the historical 
tradition of the logos as essentially a priori has always 
suggested that the written word is merely the diminishment 
of what precedes it, what is spoken. This is clearly seen in 
The Phaedrus where Plato argued that: 
And once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it 
may be, drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not 
only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have 
no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the right 
people, and not address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated 
and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its 
aid, being unable to defend itself of attend to its own needs. 124 
As already stated, the inscription of the written word differs 
from the representation of visual language in the fine arts 
because it does not involve itself in an act of substitution 
whereby an image replaces or represents its model. 
122 As already noted, Lacoue-Labarthe asks the most brutal question 
possible of Celan: 'was Celan able to situate not himself, but us vis 
A vis it? ' ('it' refers to the impossible possibility of the Holocaust 
and the mass extermination of the Jew - 'the intolerable banality of 
our time'). 
123 Derrida, 'Plato's Pharmacy', in Dissemination, p. 137. 
124 Plato, The Phaedrus, p. 275. 
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Derrida proposes that 'it inscribes in the space of silence 
and in the silence of space the living time of voice'. 125 
Writing is no longer conceived as mere weakened 
speech but as that which cle-composes the voice through a 
double movement of conservation and corruption 
transforming voice into the abstract spatial elements of 
stuttering and cluttering which instigate a disfluency. To 
evaluate Celan's poem 'Todtnauberg', we cannot ignore the 
significance and relevance of the plethora of translations 
that have informed its interpretation and become part of its 
life. 
The Joris translation we have chosen to highlight 
resists any attempt to provide a clear interpretation in 
favour of the more labyrinthine hermeneutical approach to 
the substance of the piece. 126 For example, Joris chooses 
to retain the German word Hijtte where other translators 
have proposed the English words chalet, cottage or hut. 127 
Joris defends this decision by suggesting that maintaining 
the German word HOtte complicates interpretation, as it 
brings with it the resonance and particularities of location 
or site -a secluded mountain hut, a locale of thought, the 
retreat Heidegger escaped to after resigning the Rectorate. 
125 Derrida, 'Plato's Pharmacy', p. 137. 
126 Stephen Pruslin comments in the liner notes to Pulse Shadows: 
'These imperatives come into sharpest focus in 'Todtnauberg'. When 
the cycle is performed in Hamburger's translation, as in the present 
recording the soprano sings this poem in German while 
simultaneously "reciting" it in English. (When the work is performed 
in Celan's original German, the position is reversed: this particular 
poem is sung in English and recited in German. ) From either 
linguistic direction, the sung version makes the poem more remote, 
while the formalized rhythmic speech brings nearer by both 
11 explaining" and commenting on it. ' p. 6. 
127 The suggestion is that HOtte allows for the spectral invocation of 
other translations (chalet, cottage, etc. ), which their specificity 
would preclude. HOtte articulates differentiation by resisting its 
mere substitution, with the possibility of deferral. 
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Perhaps more powerfully, it was recognised as the 
site of Nazi indoctrination sessions during the period of the 
Rectorate and that which prompted Celan's question: 
'Whose name did it record before mine? ) 1213 It is also the 
site of this portentous meeting between philosopher and 
poet, and of which, on Celan's part, so much was 
anticipated and hoped for in the form of an appropriate act 
of contrition. 
* 
Derrida speaks of the 'strange community' recognised 
through the genealogy of the visitor's book where Celan's 
question marks the anguish as to the name of 'the other' 
through a strange kind of fraternal affiliation with previous 
visitors/inscribers. 129 In his essay 'Language and the 
Poem', Heidegger defines site: 
Originally the word 'site' suggests a place in which everything 
comes together, is concentrated. The site gathers unto itself, 
supremely and in the extreme. In gathering power penetrates 
and pervades everything. The site, the gathering power, 
gathers in and preserves all it has gathered, not like an 
encapsulating shell but rather by penetrating with its light all 
128 Du ring the period of the Rectorate ( 1933), He idegge r made contact 
with Nazi student leaders to arrange what were referred to as 
'science camps' and to which both students and lecturers were 
invited to come together in a new form of academic/political 
collaboration. Also as a periphery note, Albert Speer noted a family 
link in his memoirs, Inside the Third Reich, with that region of South 
West Germany, in that his grandfather was 'the son of a poor 
forester in the Black Forest', p. 3. 
129 This affiliation transgresses the order of forgiveness, interrupting 
the clear designation of one who seeks forgiveness and one who 
grants it. Derrida describes this 'written' fraternity of alterity as the 
realisation of what he terms 'the abyssal countersignature', 'To 
Forgive', p. 38. 
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it has gathered, and only thus releasing it into its own 
nature. 130 
Furthermore, there is the model the Hitte symbolised - an 
idealised philosophical monastic community, which 
Heidegger had made tentative plans to transpose to the 
University of Berlin pending his appointment to the chair of 
philosophy. 
This would be the specific imposition of the 'lifestyle' 
advocated in his short essay 'Why do I Stay in the 
Provinces? ' as an ideal and appropriate relationship for the 
'new' intellectual to engage with the Volk commun it Y. 131 
As holiday home, mountain retreat, hideaway and 
indoctrination camp, the Hitte indicates the possibility of a 
location to invoke both the curative and the poisonous. It is 
not the pharmakon within the poetic structure, but it is the 
translatory indicator of the poem as pharmakos. It is the 
manifestation of the meridian of the poetic structure 
drifting on the perimeter of coherence, resisting fluency, 
cluttered, 132 an abortive narrative which is a compression of 
a temporal space. 
It is bloated with the haunting of other temporalities, 
other dates, which expose the in-articulation of disfluency, 
130 Heidegger, 'Language in the Poem', pp. 159-6 1. It is worth noting 
here that Lacoue-Labarthe refers to 'blindness' and 'blinding' as the 
empty space between words, or the 'not having words to say what it 
is' - difficulty as 'an event without answer'. 
131 This is often cited as another example of Heidegger's humanism, 
with his apparent engagement with the Volk community that 
surrounded his Black Forest mountain retreat. However, the 
community proposed for Berlin was much more exclusive and 
emphasised the isolation of the retreat rather than its integration 
with the community. The emphasis was on a rural rather than an 
urban Volk. 
132 Cluttering involves excessive breaks in the normal flow of speech 
and is a fluency disorder characterised by a rapid or irregular 
speaking rate. 
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but not cluttered in the sense of stifled by a lingual 
density, but in the sense of the compression of all possible 
resonances, all traces at its threshold. It is the moment in 
the poem where the curative and the poisonous coincide 
and resonate - the interval which is its meridial condition 
and which indicates all the dates that dissect the poem and 
haunt the HOtte. From it emanates the possible trajectories 
of how the poem might be read, how it might be spoken, 
who reads it, who speaks it and in what tongue. 
Lacoue-Labarthe concurs with Joris when he argues 
that the two poems 'TObingen, January' and 'Todtnauberg' 
are untranslatable. He writes: 'They necessarily escape 
interpretation; they forbid it. One could even say they are 
written to forbid it. 133 
This issue of encryption via what we might call the 
integrity of translation, poses the question of how a poem 
might be inscribed when its coding fails in advance all 
attempts to decipher it and how it makes itself absolutely 
singular, forswearing repetition of the disastrous and the 
'already said'. 
In a sense, Celan's determination to 'speak' a certain 
kind of German engages an alteric spectrality that 
wrenches the poem clear from the language of the age (the 
age of subjectivity and the T) and creates a kind of pure 
idiom of poetic singularity. Lacoue-Labarthe questions this 
possibility for the singular experience and how it might 
come into language, by speculating on inscription as the 
moment where singularity is lost in what is written. 
133 Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Two Poems by Paul Celan', p. 13. 
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This proposal is developed by understanding the 
singular experience as silent and untouched by language 
and therefore explores language through its capacity to 
take on the burden of the silent singular as outside 
recognised articulated discourse. 
He provides a distinction between idiom and 
encryption which understands the latter as a refusal to 
reveal a point of view and a form of encoding placed on 
language with the intention of disguising and is endemic to 
the 'modern' - 'stuttering is the only "language" of our age. 
The end of meaning - hiccupping, halting. 
134 
In his essay 'After the Disaster', Stephen Mitchelmore 
suggests that: 
Celan could not breathe in the old language. The old language 
was saturated with the conditions by which an entire culture 
was able to produce the greatest art and thought in history 
and then produce death camps with the efficiency of a 
factory. 135 
The question of idiom is one of singularity, not in the 
sense of either Sol i PSiS M 
136 
or autism 
137 but rather one of 
solitude. 
The sense by which we might understand terminology 
like stuttering, cluttering and disfluencY does not fall into 
any problem of communication identified by either the 
solipsistic or the autistic. 
134 Ibid., p. 18. 
135 Article taken from Spike Magazine, 
http: //spikemagazine. com/0900celan4. htm. 
136 Solipsism - this is the view that the self is all that exists or can be 
known. 
137 Autism - the mental condition characterised by complete self- 
absorption and a reduced ability to respond to or communicate with 
the outside world. 
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Both 'Todtnauberg' and 'TObingen, January' are not 
mere examples of an introverted self-absorption, but are 
attempts by Celan to communicate -a solicitude of being- 
with. More particularly they acknowledge experience as the 
bedazzlement of memory and identify the poem as an 
opening for experience if we grasp it, not as the specificity 
of anecdotal association with what is lived, but as the 
possibility without form, an event without closure not 
constrained by the parameters that would define and 
predict the finitude of its eventhood. 138 
The springing forth of the poem in its possibility is 
also the enigma whereby the source remains un-revealed 
because of the bedazzlement and dizziness of what is 
placed before it as the suspension of occurrence - the 
non-occurrence which maintains its inaccessibil it Y. 139 
Lacoue-Labarthe argues that there is no poetic experience 
in the sense of a lived moment, and therefore the poetic 
state can only give rise to a story, a discourse in verse or 
prose, but prose not a poem. A poem has nothing to 
138 Experience is understood here in its strictest sense, from the Latin 
ex-periri, a crossing through danger. This has a strong resonance 
with Heidegger's crossing-through of Being as the zone of nihilistic 
consummation in 'On the Question of Being' and latterly, Derridian 
sous rature. 
139 In H61clerlin's poem, 'The Rhine' (published in an English translation 
by Michael Hamburger, in Penguin's Selected Poems and Fragments, 
pp. 197-209), he writes that, 'an enigma is the pure sprung forth'. 
Lacoue-Labarthe makes the point that Hblderlin's river poems 
('Ister', 'Rhine', etc. ) bring on dizziness through the double meaning 
of water as subject and the river of eloquence of Hblderlin's verse. 
The two images of water that Celan exploits in 'Todtnauberg' follow 
this double pattern. Firstly, the spring water of the well as hopeful 
and life-giving possibility, and secondly, the swamp-like sodden 
ground of the sward where he and Heidegger latterly walked. The 
implication of the second image is of disappointment and 
foreboding. 
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recount except that from which it wrenches away - its 
source. 140 
The poetic condition articulated by Lacoue-Labarthe 
of 'wanting-to-say', in the sense of the purity of a 'not-not- 
wanting-to-say', may have some bearing on both 
Heidegger's pronounced post-war silence and Celan's 
demand for that silence to be broken. 
Is Heidegger's silence a 'pure-wanting-to-say' of 
nothing in the sense of a clearing of possibility that is both 
curative and poisonous -a true pharmakos? 141 However, 
true alterity - true nothingness - is always other and can 
never be incorporated into the potential specificity of a 
poetic wanting, and therefore remains inaccessible to it. 
This therefore poses the question of whether there can 
there be such a thing a poetic experience if experience 
merely marks the absence of what is lived. 
The particularity of the specific moment (the moment 
of the visit, for example) is not the moment of the poem's 
birth - memory cannot be mere recollection nor is it 
purposely or consciously lived by the subject, but is the 
atopia 142 of existence - what takes place, without taking 
place. Dizziness and bedazzlement cannot constitute the 
specificity of any one moment, but as Blanchot states in 
his essay, The Writing of the Disaster, there are no words 
for extremity, the excess of light which blinds; they can 
140 Lacoue-Labarthe argues that the poem's 'wanting-not to-say' does 
not want not to say. It wants to say, but is nothing but 'pure 
wanting-to-say'. 
141 When Hblderlin went mad, it was reported that he repeated the 
phrase, 'nothing is happening to me, nothing is happening to me'. 
142 Atopia - from the Greek, meaning uncommonness, from atopos, out 
of the way, uncommon. 
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only be expressed through the deficiencies of the eye - 
through myopia. 143 
H61derlin's prophetic tone found in his flood of words 
not what constitutes the immersive 'swamping of language', 
whereby the poetic is lost in the lingual deluge, but that 
which maintains a grasp of the possibility of articulation, if 
only a kind of incomprehensible stuttering of the 
incommunicable language of an idiolect or idiom - the 
wreckage of poetry. 144 
The sacred pathos of the world's nigh t 145 indicates the 
possibility of poetry as the consummation of a world of 
ecstasy and risk. The Greek phenomenon/form of tragedy 
offered the possibility of transgression in which the poetic 
risks through letting go. 146 Celan as the exiled poet was 
persecuted without the possibility of remission with what 
remained unforgettable and indelibly traced on language. 
Auschwitz, the 'purely unthinkable', had become the event 
that symbolised a collection of other atrocities which had 
ushered in 'a time of distress that no hope of a god could 
143 Myopia - shortsightedness. We may think back here to earlier 
observations on Celan's use of Eyebright in 'Todtnauberg', from 
which a tincture can be made for the treatment of eye problems. 
144 Lacoue-Labarthe states that to be engulfed in a 'flood of poetry' 
means that poetry itself sinks and drowns in eloquence (a 'saying- 
too-much') -a source submerged in the flood that it brought upon 
itseIf. 
145 For Heidegger, 'the no more of the gods who have fled and the not 
yet of the gods to come'. The significance of 'night' is steeped in 
the tradition outline by Bachofen in 'Mother Right' as the 
tellurian/matriarchal world of the pre-Hellenic era. 
146 Nietzsche's text The Birth of Tragedy explores the Dionysian as the 
Greek form of the ecstatic and draws comparisons with Wagner's 
tragic operatic music-dramas as equally momentous historical 
artistic events. Lacoue-Labarthe argues that: 'Madness is, indeed, 
the absence of artistic production. In turning away from madness, 
the Greeks lost themselves in works, in artistic virtuosity. If they 
undergo a trial of madness, Westerners or moderns risk the inability 
to accede to work, to artistic sobriety; and yet in this sobriety 
resides that which is their own. ' 'Two Poems by Paul Celan', p. 25. 
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still buttress' . This time of distress also demarcated a 
time of pain in which that pain, understood as extreme 
interior, becomes an absolute singularity where subjectivity 
is no more and becomes a 'waiting-for-an-other' as the 
possibility of a dialogue as a way out of solitude. 
For Celan the question of poetry's possibility was the 
possibility of going outside the self and the hope, which 
permeates 'Todtnauberg', was the hope for such a 
dialogue. 148 As Celan's poetry, prior to the meeting in 1967, 
had already in effect been an ongoing dialogue with 
Heidegger's thought, the demand made of the physical 
encounter had the potential of the pharmakos and ran the 
risk of being both curative and poisonous. Its effectiveness 
was complicated in the ambiguity of such an encounter as 
necessarily being just the possibility of an affirmation, a 
'word' about pain. What was equally implicit in the 
encounter's possibility was also the possibility for 
disappointment, of a prohibition and a breaking off of 
dialogue. 'Todtnauberg' no longer persists as just the 
specificity of a 'poem of disappointment', but is rather an 
articulation of the 'disappointment of poetry'. The risk 
taken by Celan in encountering Heidegger at Todtnauberg 
was that the curative hope that he had anticipated in the 
confrontation with the philosopher's thought over the 
previous decades would be confounded. 
147 Ibid., p. 31. 
148 Both Celan and H61derlin recoiled from the disappointment of the 
failed possibility of dialogue and were thrown back into inarticulate 
speech. 
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The inducement for this was the hope of finding in 
what Heidegger said and the gestures that he made at the 
meeting, a kind of completion or resolution that would 
allow Celan the opportunity to be at peace with this 
poetic/intellectual relationship via the 'cleansing 
punishment' of the encounter. However, the possibility of a 
notion of end or resolution remained at odds with his 
thoughts on poetic practice. 
For Celan, the possibility for the event of the poetry 
was not a liberation in the sense of a dismissal - the 
resolution of all quandaries and the absolution of any 
moral or ethical compromise, but rather a deliverance in 
the sense of Freisetzung -a setting free. Was Heidegger's 
silence the blossoming of poisonous flowers or does the 
absence of a word prompt the curative blossoming from the 
mouth/wound of Celan? Celan's wound was continually 
opened and re-opened as the ongoing guilt of the survivor 
festered and refused to allow it's healing. 149 
To speak was to continually re-open the wound, and 
his words would always be poisonous, their curative power 
external like Arnica, yet in some ways remaining 
'superficial' . 
150 The complication that the cure is such 
because it is also a poison means that it can never be 
exclusively curative -a healing balm that sooths all and 
placates the controversy of Heidegger's silence as well as 
149 Derrida notes in The Truth in Painting, 'there would be not merely 
finality but end, because the pure cut could be bandaged', p. 88. 
150 Joris draws attention to some translations of 'Todtnauberg' that 
indicate some kind of settlement or resolution between Heidegger 
and Celan. Also it is important to remember that Heidegger's own 
understanding of the poem was, in some ways, superficial and 
misplaced - he saw it as merely a memorial to the historic meeting 
of great thinker and great poet. To ingest it any further would be to 
be poisoned by Celan's cure. 
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condoning Celan's 'fall into silence'. For to cure Celan's 
stutter - his disfluency - would be to settle what cannot 
and should not be settled. A 'word' from Heidegger might 
have initiated a closure - the healing of the wound, but the 
maintaining of that silence holds that wound open, refusing 
healing, and in the insistence of that silence, maintains 
that about which it continues to be silent over as 
contentious. 151 
The question arises as to whether Heidegger was 
conscious of such a deliberation over the maintaining of 
his silence and if so, was it with the intention of not 
undermining its potency, or perhaps Heidegger too was 
struck with disfluency? 
Rather than speak, perhaps, like Celan, he was forced 
into silence by the inadequacy of his own speech - lacking 
the lingual tools to express what could not be expressed. 
However, it may also be pertinent to consider the 
pragmatism of political naivety and intellectual arrogance 
as the motivation, and to specify the historical events of 
the Holocaust/Shoah would have been to undermine the 
generalities of his own ontological project, putting it in the 
same context as other technological empowerments, and 
therefore signifying it as outside or other to the nihilistic 
drive. To separate an event like the Final Solution was to 
suggest that the Holocaust/Shoah was the consummation of 
nihilism and signified the end of that understanding of 
nihilism, but as Lyotard concurs with Heidegger, however 
151 In 'To Forgive', Derrida notes: 'History continues on the background 
of [sur fond de] an interruption of history, in the abyss, rather of an 
infinite wound which in its very scarring, will have to remain open 
and unsuturable wound', p. 42. 
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extreme those events, nothing has changed with regard to 
the technological drive, and there is no 'new age'. 
To heal the wound of locales like Auschwitz would be 
to cover over this most extreme event, and begs the 
question of Celan as to the appropriateness of such a 
healing to remembering, and ask whether it is rather just 
an attempt to forget to remember. 
The new language, the new poetry, would be a way of turning 
us towards that which is absent in our everyday world, that 
which 'stands apart in the world'. 152 
152 Stephen Mitchelmore, 'After the Disaster', Spike Magazine, 
http: //www. spikemagazine. com/0900celan4. htm 
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A NOTE ON FORGIVENESS 
In a certain way, it seems to us that forgiveness can 
only be asked of granted 'one to one', face to face, so 
to speak, between the one who has committed the 
irreparable or irreversible wrong and he or she who has 
suffered it and who is alone in being able to hear the 
request for forgiveness, to grant or refuse it. 153 
What Derrida describes as the 'solicitude Of tWO)154 marks 
the scene of forgiveness as that which predicates the 
formal possibilities of granting or refusal while 
simultaneously suggesting a deprivation of what he terms 
'authentic collective forgiveness'. 
153 Derrida, from 'To Forgive' and found in the collection, Questioning 
God, p. 25. 
154 In this regard, we may remind ourselves here of the specificity of 
such solicitude with regard to 'Todtnauberg' as the commemoration 
of anticipation of such a scene. We might also consider the 
precedent already set by Celan in an earlier prose work from 1959, 
entitled 'A Conversation in the Mountains' which describes a 
meeting between two Jews ('Gross' and 'Klein'). He remarked in the 
text: 'There they stand, the cousins, on the road in the mountains, 
the stick silent, the stones silent, and the silence no silence at all. 
No word has come to an end and no phrase, it is nothing but a 
pause, an empty space between the words, a blank - you see all the 
syllables stand around waiting. They are tongue and mouth as 
before, these two, and in their eyes there hangs a veil. ' Paul Celan, 
Collected Prose, p. 19. Additionally, it is worth reminding ourselves 
here of Joris's discussion in 'Celan/Heidegger: Translation at the 
Mountain of Death', of the line, 'orchis and orchis, singly' as an 
interpretation of the complexity of near-ness (their physical 
proximity at the meeting) and distance (the psychological 
discrepancies which the hope for the meeting sought to alleviate, 
but in reality merely exacerbated, between poet and thinker. The 
further use of a botanical motif is instructive here as the orchis or 
orchid is a member of the large family of monocotyledonous herbs, 
normally with red or purple flowers made up of three petals, the 
middle one of which is enlarged into a lip. * Also of interest here is 
the etymological root of orchis in the Greek word orkis -ios, 
meaning testicle and referring to the plant's tuber. Here I refer back 
to earlier remarks on the pharmakos and make particular note of the 
use of the squill as a weapon to beat the victim on and around the 
genitals. 
The suggestion of a lip and its connection with mouth should be 
noted here. 
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In this sense, the discretion of the singular event, by which 
we mean the concurrence of an intimate individuation (the 
possibility of a resolution between he/she who might seek 
forgiveness and he/she who is capable of granting it), 
locates this scene outside the ruling of any collective 
jurisprudence and in some sense might be interpreted as 
an interruption of the law itself. 
The questions arises then, firstly, of how forgiveness 
might be determined outside or perhaps more 
appropriately, as an interruption of, what Derrida terms 
'the juridical space'. And secondly, what is the relation 
between forgiveness and the disruption of the event of 
mourning through insistence of forgetting? 
It is a matter of some certainty that forgiveness in 
some ways is interpreted as a two-fold operation of 
demand or request and granting. In this way a linearity of 
retrieval lays out a template by which forgiveness might be 
conceived as an act of completion that directs the 
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operation towards the discretion of forgetting as its 
inevitable consequence. 
The conferring of such a recognition of secrecy 
articulates the conspiratorial event at work at the heart of 
such an interpretation of the sovereignty 155 0f forgiveness, 
so that consequentially the encryption of that over which 
one might seek to be forgiven is not only buried by he/she 
who is absolved, but is further assisted in that deception 
by he/she from whom absolution is requested/demanded. 
That we might speculate that Celan would seek some kind 
of moral restitution from Heidegger, his philosophical 
mentor, on that Black Forest mountainside arguably places 
the poet, if not at the centre of such a conspiracy, then as 
a proactive participant in an operation of the permanence 
of a healing process, whereby the wound is appropriately 
cauterised, sealed and eventually forgotten. 
Derrida notes that Kant argued that clemency should 
only operate between sovereign and subject when the 
misdemeanour is committed by the latter against the former 
and not where the sovereign acts as a third party mediating 
between two or more subjects: forgiveness should be 
between victim and perpetrator and as such, begs the 
question as to whether discussion of forgiveness is really 
one of the limit. (Should forgiveness be in the hands of 
man or reserved for God? ) When Celan seeks a 'word' from 
Heidegger, does that infer that once a conciliatory remark 
is made, that the process of mourning is inaugurated which 
155 Derricla notes that a precedent for interruption had already been set 
for the judicial-political system through what he argues is the 
sovereign right to pardon as above the law. He comments: 'As often 
the foundation is excluded or exempted from the very structure that 
it founds', 'To Forgive', p. 33. 
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then, in some way, proffers a limit to the status of the 
misclemeanour through the capacity to (begin to) forget? 
Derricla argues that the language of the other is 
identified here not through any ethical or moral condition, 
but is always fundamentally outside what he terms the 
'fraternal transcendence' of the signatory community 
affiliated with firstly, the visitor's book and secondly, the 
HOtte. Celan's personal affiliation is maintained through 
constancy of distress and anxiety and the ambiguity of 
forgiveness and what insists through the unforgivable. 156 
'Todtnauberg' remains thus to be read, to be received - as gift 
or forgiveness themselves, a gift and a forgiveness which are 
the poem before being, possibly, its themes or the theme of 
the poet's disappointed expectation. 157 
In the anticipation of forgiveness, whereby it may or may 
not have firstly been appropriately sought and then taken 
place on that Black Forest mountainside in 1967, the 
application of a remedial suture had first to have been 
recognised and then made possible, in the recognition of 
the roles of who administered and who required treatment, 
by the concurrence of the patient (on the understanding 
that it was clear who the 'patient' was! ). 
However, we are still confronted by the whereby the 
assimilation of the wrong inaugurated through the 
commencement of the act of mourning and sought in the 
agreement of both parties (he who might seek and he who 
might grant forgiveness), is perhaps merely a local 
156 As already noted this strange community, this conglomeration of 
alteric visitations at the HOtte, exceeds ethical and moral restitution 
through subsistence and insistence. 
157 Derrida, 'To Forgive', p. 38. 
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(mis)understanding. Derrida argues that even when 
forgiveness of the inexplicable has seemingly taken place, 
in the future it will not have taken place and therefore will 
remain merely illusory, inauthentic and illegitimate. 
The link between forgiveness and the therapy of 
forgetting becomes the crucial interpretation of the event 
of mourning as the healing of a wound. However, the 
history of forgiveness arguably stopped, and continues to 
remain stalled when confronted by the limit beyond all 
limits of what Derrida terms 'radical evil', and by which we 
can infer that he is speaking of the wholesale mechanised 
genocide of the Final Solution. The gift of the poem as the 
element of forgiveness should anticipate the dilemma of 
healing as a mechanism for not only the excavation of the 
sepulchural into which morbid matter might be placed, but 
the covering over of such a site so that the temporal event 
of forgetting could commence. 
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The questions as to whether it was appropriate for 
Celan to confer forgiveness on Heidegger, and also 
whether the philosopher first saw the need to seek such 
forgiveness, and whether he might also see the meeting at 
the Htjtte as the opportunity whereby such an event might 
take place, are still open to a scrutiny and debate. ' 5,3 
Must forgiveness pass through words or must it pass (beyond) 
words? Must it pass through word-verbs or must it pass 
(beyond) them, these word-verbs? Can one only forgive or ask 
forgiveness when speaking or sharing the language of the 
other, that is to say by already identifying sufficiently with the 
other for this, and, by identifying with the other, making 
forgiveness both possible and impossible? 159 
Everything will flower at the edge of a deconsecrated tomb 
160 
Where have the Holzwege of 'Todtnauberg' led us - these 
paths trodden by Celan and Heidegger on that day in July 
1967? The encryption of the poem has only further 
determined an indeterminate locale of poison and cure and 
reinforced the possibility and impossibility of forgiveness. 
Here Arnica, Eyebright and Orchid, bloom on the perimeter 
158 1 note here that according to Hans Sluga, Heidegger's 
contemporary, Alfred Bauemler, did, in a letter to Manfred Schr6ter 
and dated 24 March 1950, seek (unlike Heidegger) to take some 
responsibility for his affiliation with the Nazis. He spoke privately of 
his 'blindness', 'aberration' and 'political guilt' and that he had 
belonged to 'a system of aggression and force' and that genocide 
was 'repulsive and most contradicts the order of things'. He 
declared his former allegiance as 'an error and a madness' and, in 
speaking of what he had written with regard to Christianity and the 
Jews, as 'an incredible darkening' and 'an aberration of the mind', 
and finally stated that he did not wish to escape the consequences 
of his actions, 'even if it meant to be condemned to silence to the 
end of my life. ' From Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis, p. 242 (added 
emphasis). 
159 Added emphasis. Derrida, 'To Forgive', p. 47. 
160 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, pp. 81-82 
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(meridian) of the Holzwege. These paths have become the 
interruptive labyrinthine passageways of the tomb; and the 
rift, the secular place of the dead, the site of mourning and 
the visceral operation of the Unheimlich. 
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Chapter 3 
The Unheimlich' Manoeuvre 
2 
3 
The house is a memory device, but one from which 
memory has been alienated. it has to be opened up so 
that it can remember in order to set those memories 
free again. 3 
The bedrock hangs over an abyss of sheer possibilities 
of space - and space as pure possibility, indeed of the 
very possibility of pure space. No wonder, dangling thus, 
Dasein feels intensely anxious and not-at-home and 
flees into the comforting and tranquilizing embrace of 
everyday dealings and gossipy talk as well as reflective 
assurances of sheer theory. Yet what is glimpsed in the 
Unheimlich - from the German, literally translates as 'not at home'. 11 
also has a connotation of eerie or creepy and can be translated into 
English as uncanny. Sigmund Freud in his essay, 'The Uncanny' 
(published in number 14 of his collected works, and entitled Art and 
Literature), refers to the unheimlich as that which is strangely 
familiar and that that familiarity is intrinsic to its status as uncanny. 
He argues, 'the unheimlich is what was once heimisch, familiar; the 
prefix un [un-] is the token of repression' (p. 368). Freud also states 
that the word heimlich belongs to two sets of ideas, which, although 
not entirely contradictory, remain distinct from each other. On the 
one hand it means familiar and agreeable, while on the other, what is 
concealed and out of site. Anthony Vidler in his text The 
Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern UnhomelY, proposes the 
English word uncanny as the most helpful definition, as it means, 
literally, beyond ken or beyond knowledge (ken from the Anglo Saxon 
can or cann, the present indicative of cunnan: to know or be able). 
Canny means cautious, prudent, knowing or watchful but the meaning 
extends to possessed of supernatural powers or skilled in magic. 
Uncanny then means mysterious, unfamiliar, frightening and 
preternaturally strange or eerie and is affiliated to canny in the same 
that unheimlich is to heimlich. He describes the uncanny as 'an 
uncomfortable sense of haunting rather than a present apparition' 
(ibid., p. 22). 
Manoeuvre - from the Latin: manus, hand and operari, to work - 
manuoperare. The operation of the hand implies a corporeal function 
inherent in the unheimlich manoeuvre which this chapter will seek to 
exploit. I am also aware of Heidegger's determination towards such 
an operation in his early interpretation of 'worldliness' via zuhanden 
and vorhanden ('present-at-hand' and 'ready-to-hand') as particularly 
discussed in Sein und Zeit and 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. 
Added emphasis. Brouwer, 'Laying Bare', and published in the 
Serpentine Gallery catalogue on Gordon Matta-Clark from 1993, 
p. 364. 
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moment of anxiety, Dasein's abyssal unheimlichkeit 
remains 'the most primordial phenomenon'. 4 
By exploring the topological terrain of the unheimlich I hope 
to uncover some provisional insights into the structural and 
non-structural aspects of the corporeal (the body) and the 
architectural, via an exploration of the metaphysical edifice 
as not only a model of architectonics, but also as a basis 
for how we comprehend aspects of corporeality. This will 
also prove insightful for the ongoing thematic of haunting 
and the spectral as linked to the body as the site of 
mourning, and also with particular reference to the abysmal 
aesthetic experience inherent in the artwork as a ructure. 
The chapter will consider the work of the artist Gordon 
Matta-Clark and will identify an encryptive eventuation of 
mourning as a key aspect of not only the larger body of the 
artist's work but with particular reference to two works: 
Time WellICherry Tree (1971) and Descending Steps for 
Batan (1977). This will also indicate encyst-ence as the 
overarching introjective theme of this chapter. The 
motivation of this argument indicates an atopic locale, 
which identifies the slippage between the architecture of 
the body and the body of architecture as an encryptive rift 
in the words of Gordon Matta-Clark himself, a kind of 
anarchitecture. 5 
4 Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, p. 255. 
5A term coined by Gordon Matta-Clark and a group of fellow artists in 
New York in 1973 for what we might describe as their 'guerrilla 
activities'. Matta-Clark described it thus: 'The group's architectural 
aim was more elusive than doing pieces that would demonstrate an 
alternative attitude to building ... We were thinking more about 
metaphoric voids, gaps, left over spaces, places that were not 
developed ... These places are also perceptually significant 
because 
they make reference to movement space. It was about something 
other than established architectural vocabulary, without getting fixed 
into anything too formal. ' Gordon Matta-Clark interview with Liza 
Bear (Avalanche, December 1974, p. 34, added emphasis). 
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The Heimlich manoeuvre as a mechanical procedure 
for the permanent ejection of an alien object from the body 
- an act of sustaining the internal integrity of the corporeal 
through the act of expulsion - in some ways operates as an 
illustration via corporeality of what is recognised as the key 
settled binary opposition in the history of metaphysics. It 
sustains the exclusivity and predication of interiority over 
exteriority - the expelling of the alien at its most pragmatic, 
remains an event of security and maintenance of the status 
quo. 
The unheimlich manoeuvre in some way attempts to 
redress this balance, by identifying the complication of an 
imbalance (the placeless place of disorientation) and 
drawing attention to the exteriority of operations of 
rejection and expulsion as the false arbiters of a continuity 
in the face of the possibility of a more appropriate operation 
of introjection and incorporation. These are recognised as 
intrinsic to the encryptive arbitration of the manoeuvre as 
what I will now term the 'event of encyst-ence'. It must be 
made clear at this point that any act of retention alluded to 
through the terminologies of the unheimlich does not 
necessarily redress the relation between homely and 
unhomely through any capacity for either a determination 
towards subjugation or an objectification inherent its 
operation. What remains significant to any understanding of 
the activity of the unheimlich manoeuvre is that through the 
event of introjection an encryptive change occurs and the 
retention of the alien demands the recognition of this 
transformation as fundamental to the acknowledgement of 
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an operation of cryptol OgY6 at work. As will be explored, 
what is essentially encrypted does not necessarily conform 
to the 'balance' of historical subject/object relation, and 
therefore there is also a change in the appropriateness and 
particularity of a certain language. Encryption critiques the 
binary of inside and outside by complicating the terrain of 
that opposition via introjection. This undermines the 
juxtaposition of terminologies in a hierarchical confrontation 
of privilege and subjugation, and posits a variant lingual 
topology by which to articulate its diversity and variation. 
I am reminded here that both Heidegger (in 'On The 
Question of Being') and Bachofen (in 'Mother Right') 
questioned the imperative and need for kind of continuity, 
or what I will call a 'lingual stasis', by proposing a demand 
that in order to reconsider current thought, it must in some 
way be transgressive and rearticulated if there is to be any 
determination to exceed it. Heidegger, while heralding the 
recognition of a zone (a nihilistic topographical feature of 
thought, as it were), which Ernst JOnger's acknowledged in 
The Worker, critiqued the capacity to 'cross the line' of 
nihilism's consummation by suggesting that such a 
transgression must require a new language. 
6 Cryptology - the scientific study of cryptography (secret writing, the 
enciphering and deciphering of messages in secret code). I would 
like to note here that the scientific credential of -ology as a means 
of legitimating a term as worthy of study should not be lost here. See 
Chapter 1 of this text. 
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The language of metaphysics as the lingual arbiter of 
that consummation, and the navigation (the topographic) 
which must precede it, would no longer be appropriate to 
this new zone and any use of it would merely contaminate 
it. 7 Likewise Bachofen, in Mother Right, remarked that in 
order to embrace the matriarchal idea, any scholar would 
have to renounce the ideas of his own time and transfer 
him/herself 'to the midpoint of a completely different world 
of thought'. 8 
However, before we can consider the atavistic9 
possibility of speaking a different language, it is important 
to begin to negotiate the possibilities of cryptology1o 
through a recognisable lingual form. Derrida (commenting 
on Abraham and Torok's text) suggests that the Wolf Man's 
7 Heidegger's 'On the Question of Being' (published in the collection, 
Pathmarks) took the form of a letter to the writer Ernst JCinger. He 
observed that any attempt to cross the line, would be confronted by a 
peculiar difficulty: 'The reason for this difficulty lies in the fact that 
in your "crossing" over the line, i. e., in the space on this and on the 
other side of the line, you speak the same language. The position of 
nihilism is, it seems, already relinquished in a certain way by 
crossing over the line, but its language has remained' ('On the 
Question of Being', p. 298). 
8 Bachofen, 'Mother Right', p. 81. Note here quote cited at the 
beginning of Chapter 1 of this text and taken from Derrida's Spectres 
of Marx, which identifies the traditional scholar as one who cannot 
accept the virtual space of spectrality and immerses him/herself in 
all that is reasonable and logical. He also notes in The Truth in 
Painting that 'the pure philosopher, the metaphysician, will have to 
operate like a good architect, like a good tekhnitds of edification' 
(p. 40). In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze proposes: 'The philosopher is 
no longer the being of the caves, nor Plato's soul or bird, but rather 
an animal which is on a level with the surface -a tick or a louse' 
(P. 133). This aspect of the parasitic mooted by Deleuze should not 
be lost here. 
9 Atavism identifies a resemblance to one's ancestor's rather than 
one's immediate parental line - arguably a reversion to a more 
primitive type. Both Heidegger (on Being) and Bachofen (on 
matriarchy) considered the primordial experience the essential one, 
and one to which we must in some way, always return. 
10 In his introduction to Abraham and Torok's The Wolf Man's Magic 
Word, Derrida asks the question: 'What is a crypt? No crypt presents 
itself. The grounds [lieux] are so disposed as to disguise and to hide: 
something, always a body in some way. But also to disguise the act 
of hiding and to hide the disguise: the crypt hides as it holds' 
(P. xiv). 
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verbariumll is to be thought out as starting from the crypt, 
as a 'crypt effect'. He states: 
The verbarium no longer conforms to any law and order - 
certainly not to philosophical order, which thus finds itself 
moved, to the point of no return, by a psychoanalytical lever - 
but neither does it abide by the common law of 
psychoanalysis. This crypt no longer rallies the easy 
metaphors of the Unconscious (hidden, secret, underground, 
latent, other, etc. ), of the prime object, in sum, of any 
psychoanalysis. Instead using the first object as a background, 
it is a kind of 'false unconscious', an 'artificial' unconscious 
lodged like a prosthesis, a graft in the heart of an organ, 
within the divided self. A very specific and peculiar place, 
highly circumscribed, to which access can nevertheless only 
be gained by following the routes of a different topography. 12 
The crypt, then, is descriptive of an architectonic locale of 
the sepulchral as that which identifies an alteric variation 
as the de-centred possibility on which any edifice is now 
contingent. The so-called architect of reason (the 
metaphysical thinker), in search of the ultimate grund on 
which to raise a framework of metaphysical principles, is no 
longer just confronted with the possibility of the abysmal as 
its ultimate critique, but also that any descent in search of 
a bottom (bythos) to this or any abyss, must recognise that 
disorientation (the pre-sensibility of 'a without-knowing' in 
advance) is the topos by which and for which the pretext of 
11 Verbarium -a game in word making (related to logomachy -a 
dispute about words or a dispute carried on in words only, a battle of 
words). 
12 Added emphasis. Derrida, introduction to Abraham and Torok's, The 
Wolf Man's Magic Word, p. xiii. Further comment will be made on the 
divided self with particular reference to Gordon Matta-Clark and 
Freud's work on the double. The contention of this chapter will be to 
identify this 'different' topography as in fact a topology of the crypt. 
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(dis)[ocation takes place. 13 However, such a critique must 
not resort to the pure exclusivity of a language, which 
refuses to acknowledge the relevance of the fabrication of a 
certain domesticity from which and in which to commence. 
Mark Wigley argues: 
The idea of discourse can never be separated from a certain 
talk about houses, that is really to say a certain silence, not 
the absence of talk but a certain fold within the fabric of the 
discourse which hides something unspeakable. 14 
The metaphor of the heimlich manoeuvre should be 
understood provisionally as the sustaining of a secure 
interiority of unmediated presence, which through the 
mastery of an act of subordination excludes all that is 
other, to an absented ambiguity of outside. 
It represents surety and exclusion at the expense of 
introjection, whereby the denial of the incorporative event 
excludes the possibility of mourning and the restitution of 
the memorial as contingent to the status of corporeality. 
With Derrida's previously quoted comments on the 
crypt in mind, I would like to suggest here that a more 
complex reading of the clarity of what might be provisionally 
understood as the inclusive oppositional relationship of 
heimlichlunheimlich is necessary. 
13 Derrida postulates in The Truth in Painting that such a descent is 
fraught because the prehension to such a navigation already 
indicates a variant that is the errant possibility (the 'without 
knowing') that the bottom does not exist. See p. 40 of above-cited 
text. 
14 Added emphasis. Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction: 
Derrida's Haunt, p. 124. The notion of silence has already been 
addressed in Chapter 2 of this text, and the rubric of the fold will be 
considered further in this chapter and Chapter 4. 
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Any cursory reading might incline towards an understanding 
of Heimlich ('homely') as merely the inversion of 'unhomely' 
- but this strategy remains complicated by its actual 
translation. 
The German word more commonly used in this regard 
is generally gemfitlich, which translates variously as snugly, 
comfortable, or cosy as well as homelike or homely15 and, 
as such, the term heimlich already appears contentious. 
Over the issue of a common usage or a lingual currency, it 
is significant that the emphasis is on the complexity and 
slippage at work in this link as it will continue to unfold and 
re-fold as the strategy of this text. Freud, in his text The 
Uncanny, already alluded to what he referred to as 'the 
different shades of meaning' for the word heimlich, which he 
illustrated at great length with a list of derivations at the 
beginning of the essay. 16 A cryptology is already at work. 
The key statement identified that the obvious 
compulsion to consider heimlich and unheimlich as merely 
oppositional (the latter being merely, at best, an inversion 
of the former; at worst, inferior to), was complicated by the 
ambiguity of two sets of ideas at work in the non- 
contradictory, but significantly different 17 aspects of the 
word heimlich. 
15 GemOt (from which gemOtlich is derived) translates as nature, 
disposition, feelings and soul. 
16 See Freud's essay 'The Uncanny' (published in The Penguin Freud 
Library (Volume 14: Art and Literature), pp. 342-5. 
17 The significance of an understanding of difference outside a context 
of mere inversion has already been discussed at length in Chapter 1 
of this text. 
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Freud isolated two meanings from a plethora of 
possibilities, which drew heimlich and unheimlich in closer 
proximity by finding in the former not only what is familiar 
and agreeable, but also what is concealed and kept out of 
sight. "3 Freud later noted: 
Thus heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the 
direction of ambivalence until it finally coincides with its 
opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way a 
I subspecies' of heimlich. '9 
In this way, the surety of the home gives shape to what is 
distinctly not-at-home (it is also worthy of note here that the 
operation that we recognise as the Heimlich manoeuvre is 
so named not for any semantic reasons that Freud might 
have uncovered in his search for the linguistic root of the 
unheimlich, but by the accident of its inventor's surname - 
a kind of 'Derridian' play of lingual ambiguity). 20 
18 It is noted by Freud in a footnote that the Oxford English Dictionary 
attaches a similar ambiguity to the word canny (see footnote 1, this 
chapter) as not only meaning 'cosy' but also 'endowed with occult or 
magical powers'. In the main body of the text he points out Shelling's 
comment (in the earlier list of possible definitions) on the 
unheimlich, which he argues sheds new light on its meaning by 
suggesting that everything is unheimlich which ought to have 
remained secret and hidden but has come to light (p. 345). 
19 Added emphasis. Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 347. 
20 See remarks made in Chapter 1 of this text on Derrida's phonetic 
play between ontology and hauntology. I would also like to note here 
that Paul Virilio, in his text Bunker Archaeology, mentions, with 
reference to the construction of the so-called Atlantic Wall during the 
Nazi occupation of mainland Europe, the Todt Organisation. This was 
the strategic organisation of 'diverse social and ethnic groups, 
starting with German technicians - be they civil, military or deported 
- and including conscripts and volunteers' (p. 28). The reason for 
mentioning this is two-fold: firstly, Paul Celan was conscripted into 
the Todt Organisation in Nazi-occupied Romania and, secondly, the 
name Todt (the German for death as in 'Todtnauberg' - 'mountain of 
death' (note Joris's text cited in Chapter 2 of this text)) was so- 
named after Fritz Toct, the architect of Nazi mobilisation for 
strategic defence of the Reich and whose untimely death in a plane 
crash resulted in the promotion of Albert Speer, who succeeded him 
in 'all his offices' (see Speer's memoirs, Inside the Third Reich). I 
note the play at work here in comparison to what is noted about the 
surname Heimlich with regard to this chapter. 
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Having said this, this text in some ways continues Freud's 
project in The Uncanny, by uncovering yet another shade of 
meaning through this accident of titling by which the terrain 
of the unheimlich might be explored. 21 
The contingency by which this recognised directional 
supposition of set and subset interprets a hierarchy that 
locates meaning and gives value to it by predication and the 
subordination of other contingent meanings, fails to 
recognise that, as Freud indicated, there is an ambiguity 
already inherent in the term heimlich. This ambiguity 
refuses to conform to a clear interpretation of the 
terminology along metaphysical lines of binary and dialectic 
- what we might articulate as that which haunts the 
heimlich. 
However, it will be possible to exploit the essentially 
alteric proposition of the unheimlich by recognising its 
relation to a form of unmediated presence in the heimlich, 
but clearly not as merely the negation or 'not' of such 
presence. 
21 1 also note here that in so entitling the procedure, an act of 
commemoration has taken place and, as such, this operation of the 
hand is potentialised as a memorial to its inventor and therefore a 
similar possibility for the unheimlich manoeuvre will be explored in 
greater detail later in this chapter. 
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In seeking to find the unheimlich in the heimlich, 
Freud seemed to proffer yet further evidence to identify the 
former as perhaps just the diminished spectre - the shadow 
of all that predicates, and the not-at-home - on the 
understanding that to be at-home must always be the 
location of a departure. 22 But what if such directional 
determination merely hides (as Freud and Derrida have 
suggested) deeper anxieties which are no longer merely the 
not of exclusion settled by the surety of at-home, but the 
resistance to the recognition of the processes of 
introjection or incorporation as the premise by which the 
heimlich might be addressed? 
Anthony Vidler suggests that the unheimlich was, for 
the romantic era of Schelling and H61derlin, simultaneously 
a psychological condition and an aesthetic one, in that it 
had the capacity to both establish and destabilise through 
the authenticity of what he refers to as a 'first burial' that 
was given potency through a return which was potentially 
the re-visitation of a power essentially out of place and long 
since considered dead. 
He argues: 
To such a force the romantic psyche and the romantic 
aesthetic were profoundly open; at any moment what seemed 
on the surface homely and comforting, secure and clear of 
superstition, might be reappropriated by something that should 
22 Bachofen extrapolated at length in 'Mother Right' on the premise that 
matriarchy was the principle of the hearth and centred in material 
existence. The mother principle encouraged warlike bravery while 
entrusting 'the family, the cart, the hearth, the slaves ... to the 
women' (p. 152). Linked to the preservation of the home was the cult 
of the chthonic; the matriarchal encouraged heroism and chivalry and 
therefore advocated departure from the hearth and heroic death. 
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have remained secret but nevertheless, through some chink in 
23 the shutters of progress, had returned . 
He tracks a historical shift in architectonic systernisation 
which situates the corporeal relation between architecture 
and the body at the heart of this evolution and which is, 
most importantly for our purposes, integral to its eventual 
dismemberment. The projection of the idealised body onto 
the building (essentially a classical theory) identified 
architectural authority from this relation, while at the same 
time determining confirmation for the body through the 
criteria of socialisation and individuation in the world. 
This anthropomorphic proposition that an edifice had 
fundamental concomitant structural similarities to a body 
began to change in the latter part of the eighteenth century, 
as the potential for that relation to evolve, to take account 
of an emerging determination of the psychological to have 
an impact on the shape of the edifice developed. The shift 
from the arguably fixed attributes of classical proportion 
and artifice to the more conditional empathetic operation of 
the experiential, set the scene for the emergence of a 
subliminal aesthetics, which engaged with an emotional 
attribution of beauty, foregrounding psychotic notions of 
fear, terror, unease and disquiet - the sublime. 
In The Fold Leibniz and the Baroque (Chapter 8, 'The 
Two Floors'), Deleuze argues that the baroque house is 
made up of what he refers to as spiritual elevation (the 
upper area) and physical gravity (the floor below). The 
convergence of these operates on what Deleuze refers to as 
the movement along the divergent paths motivated by the 
regimes of the immanence of expression via the incorporeal 
23 Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny, p. 27. 
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and the transitive nature of impression via the corporeal. 
The former indicates actuality as the fold of verticality (the 
monadic), which is conditioned by absolute interiority, 
infinite inflection and is without coordinates and differs from 
the virtuality of materiality (material bodies) as the 
horizontal dimension of coordinated stability and vectored 
gravity. 24 The line of difference is not between any concept 
of organic or inorganic, but rather dissects both by 
distinguishing individuation from any notion of a collective 
or mass phenomena. Actuality (identified in the monad) is 
the primal force of an absolute surface that is essentially 
co-present with all modifications ('each monad expresses 
the sum of the world and a body receives the impression of 
"all" the others up to infinity'), 25 whereas virtuality 
(identified as the bends of matter) conceal something from 
the relative surface on which there are having an affect. 
In this sense, the world is understood as this 
combination of virtuality/actualisation and 
possibility/realisation 26 and, as such, is defined by the 
event. However, this reserve of events grasped as world 
(the eventum tantum) is conceived as both a pure virtuality 
and possibility, and also a pure predicate, and is essentially 
a battle with a potential that exceeds the souls that direct it 
and the bodies the execute it. 
24 In Death and the Labyrinth, Foucault describes the lingual 
construction of Roussel's Impressions d'Afrique thus: 'This technique 
of a secret verticality could lead to no possible discourse if it weren't 
balanced by another. Capable of opening a horizontal diffusion' 
(p. 35, added emphasis). 
25 Leibniz, 'Monadology', and found in Basic Writings, pp. 61-2. 
26 Note here that Deleuze proposes that realisation operates through 
resemblance - this suggests the significance of the simulacra (see 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 of this text). 
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We speak of the event only as already engaged in the soul that 
expresses it and in the body that carries it out, but we would 
be completely at a loss about how to speak of it without its 
withdrawn par t. 27 
The accord between monad (the conception of the entire 
world, independent of others and without influx) and body 
(the expression of the material universe, every body 
receiving the influx of others and expressing that totality) is 
determined as a pre-established harmony, whereby a body 
always expresses from its side and with its surroundings 
what a soul/monad expresses in its own region -a 
'between'. 28 Deleuze makes clear that the monad as simple 
substance (its first nature) is essentially irreducible, but the 
intrinsic possessions of any individual bear the marks (its 
second nature) of those foreign to it so that 'there is 
27 Added emphasis. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
p. 106. It is worth noting here Heidegger's emphasis on concealment 
as intrinsic to the materiality of the artwork in The Origin of the Work 
of Art. For Heidegger, the double operation of revealing and 
concealing was fundamental to the event of the artwork (see 
footnotes 81 and 82). 
28 Deleuze poses the question - How can we speak of the body of a 
monad? The monad is always an 'each' and 'every', whereas the body 
is always a 'one'; however, this 'one' is such through the event of a 
'belonging' to each 'every' without ever relinquishing its 'oneness'. 
This belonging is referred to as appurtenance. In The Fold: Leibniz 
and the Baroque, Deleuze states that 'pre-established harmony of the 
soul and the body rules their real distinction, while the union 
determines their inseparability' (p. 108). Deleuze makes four points 
regarding belonging, by citing the responses of both Leibniz and 
Husserl: 
" Though as self-cogito - by which he means the diversity of 
thought, changing perceptions, all individual predicates - the 
entire world as perceived. 
" The zone of the world as conveyed by the individual - its own 
'special possession'. 
" Primary matter - what an individual 'owns' as the requirement of 
'having a body'. 
" The owned body that fulfils that requirement - an organic body 
with which an individual is immediately present. 
Husserl understands the other as being the 'other-self' - an 
aperceptive transposition that begins with the individual's own body, 
whereas Leibniz determines a subdivision or clear zone, in which 
everything exceeds but within which everything is included as 'dark 
and obscure'. 
189 
nothing obscure in me that might not be pulled into clarity 
from another monad' . 
29 For Husserl, the body is the 
commencement of individuation and differs from Leibniz in 
that the latter argued for a negative image of other monads, 
which are used to form their own clear zone: 
The soul and the body can always be truly distinguished, but 
inseparability traces a coming and going between one level 
and the other. 30 
The domination of the cipher of appurtenance S31 suggests 
for Deleuze that possession or the 'domain of having' is a 
moving transient reshuffling of relations and now replaces 
being, so that 'to have or to possess is to fold'. 32 
Domination remains a vague term if we persist in the 
understanding that no monad contains any other, but 
Leibniz articulated what he referred to as a 'substantial 
vinculum' as the linkage of a complex relation in which a 
dominant monad becomes the subject of an adhesion. This 
adhesion resists the distinction between predicate and 
attribute (but maintains the relation between variables and 
constant while determining that this relation is both exterior 
to such variables and outside the constant), but articulates 
a topology of torsion and infinite folding which understands 
the vinculum as the unlocalisable primary link, bordering 
the absolute interior but as exterior to its own interiority -a 
reflecting wall. 
29 Ibid., p. 107. 
30 Ibid., p. 108. 
31 Appurtenance, meaning belonging, appendage or accessory. 
32 Deleuze, The Fold, p. 110. 
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A brief diversion (Holzweg) to consider the definition 
of a corporeal procedure in order to enlighten an 
incorporeal one may now be appropriate. 
THE BODY OF ARCHITECTURE AND ARCHITECTURE 
OF THE BODY 
1 
To perform the Helmlich manoeuvre 33 
If the victim is not getting air, and his/her throat is blocked, 
don't wait for medical help. Take first-aid steps for choking 
immediately. Stand behind your victim and wrap your arms 
around his waist. 
Place your fist with the thumb side against the victim's 
abdomen slightly above the navel and below the rib cage. 
Grasp your fist with your other hand and pull it into the 
victim's abdomen with a quick upward thrust. 
Repeat the movement several times if necessary. 
A further section entitled 'Sweep it out', reads: 
33 Abbreviated from the Indiamart Healthcare WebPages 
health. india mart. comlemerge ncies1ch oking. html. The procedure was 
developed by an American thoracic surgeon, Henry Heimlich, and 
first introduced in 1974. It is now often referred to as 'the abdominal 
thrust'. 
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Once the object has been dislodged, you can try to remove it 
manually, but first see it betore you put a tinger in the mouth, 
or you may force it even further down the throat. 
Move your index finger along the inside of the cheek to the 
base of the tongue. Using your finger as a hook, dislodge the 
object and sweep it into the mouth so that it can be removed. 34 
In contrast, to the remedial urgency of the event of 
expelation identified above in the Heimlich manoeuvre, the 
unheimlich manoeuvre calls into question, via the 
metapsychological, the topographical determination of the 
fantasy of incorporation against the process of introjection. 
'I 
A4/) 
2 
Prior to this, the terminologies of incorporation and 
introjection have been place in a proximal alliance against 
34 In the essay 'Economimesis' (Diacritics, vol XI, no. 2 [1981], pp. 3- 
25), Derrida articulates the introjectve object as 'that which cannot 
be eaten either sensibly or ideally and which ... by never letting itself 
be swallowed must therefore cause itself to be vomited' (p. 21). 
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those of absorption and ingestion to indicate that an event 
of mourning requires exclusion not through denial, but 
rather though the discretion of secrecy. 35 
The shift in concern for any analogy of the body in 
architecture in many ways highlights a radical distinction 
from the humanistic model, in that a true corporeal 
metaphor, described as that which identifies a body in 
pieces and fragmentation as that which breaks from 
humanist concerns of domestication and the surety of 
accommodation. 
Anthony Vidler points out that Le Corbusier's vision of 
modernism was no longer confined to the recognisably 
human, but embraced a plethora of biological existents that 
were as diverse as the embryonic and monstrous. 36 The 
model of unity was now usurped by the fragmentary, 
morselation and breakage and it is significant to see this 
change as not mere reversal but the demonstration of an 
anthropomorphic strategy exhibiting its functional and 
classical origins within a different sensibility. However, as 
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok point out in their essay 
'Introjection-Incorporation': 'Incorporation corresponds to 
fantasy, and introjection to a process. 37 
35 In their essay 'Introjection-Incorporation', Nicolas Abraham and 
Maria Torok argue that absorption is the rejection of mourning and its 
consequences, as it is the refusal to take into oneself the part of 
oneself that is in a sense 'contained' in what is lost. This would be 
the admission of the true meaning of that loss - the admission of a 
change in oneself. 
36 Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny, p. 70.1 would like to draw 
attention here to a parallel to the labyrinthine, firstly with regard to 
the occupation of such a structure by something embryonic and 
monstrous - in the case of antiquity/mythology, the model of the 
Minoan labyrinth occupied by an entity both embryonic and monstrous 
- the Minotaur (see Chapter 4 of this text). On a more playful note, I 
reference the title of the journal, which published Matta's essay 
(Minotaure) with regard to its obvious affiliation with the labyrinthine. 
37 Abraham and Torok, 'Introjection-Incorporation', p. 3. 
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Already we find a complication is at work whereby the 
fantasy of incorporation operates as a representation, belief 
or body-state, which works for the maintenance of what 
Abraham and Torok refer to as a topographical status quo. 
As an essentially conservative and preservative function it 
represents continuity of the subject through narcissism by 
attempting the transformation, not of the subject itself, but 
of its surrounding world. 
Abraham and Torok propose that fantasy - understood 
through incorporation is called upon to preserve the subject 
in what they refer to as an 'intrapsychic situation' and this 
is in contrast to metapsychological reality which threatens a 
topography of change through the act of incorporation. 38 
They argue that absorption is the rejection of mourning and 
its consequences because it refuses to take within the part 
of oneself contained in what is lost (this is the true meaning 
of loss). The admission of a change in oneself (a 
difference) is recognised as a refusal of introjection . 
39 The 
arguably contentious proposition that the architectural 
edifice might offer an appropriate metaphor for the 
continuing stasis of the historicity of metaphysical thought, 
demands that any such understanding is contingent on the 
pertinence of a metaphorical permanence inherent in the 
inviolate structural integrity of a certain kind of 
38 Incorporation has two interrelated procedures: 
i) Demetaphorisation - taking literally what is meant figuratively. 
ii Objectivation - what is experienced is not an injury to the 
subject, but the loss of an object. 
39 The term introjection is coined from Ferenzi and refers to an 
enlargement of the ego whose first beginnings take place in the 
experience of 'empty mouth'. The void is first experienced through 
unfulfilment - the transition from the 'breast-filled' mouth to the 
'word-filled' mouth. There is also a key maternal link here exploited 
by Abraham and Torok with the connection made between the 'filling 
of the void' with the nourishment of the maternal breast and later 
replacing that with the spoken word. 
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architectonics which emphasises what is essentially 
continuous, assured and stable. What is most significant in 
understanding this stability as a metaphor is the recognition 
of it as a kind of linearity or directional verticality from 
foundation through structure/edifice to decoration. In so 
doing, it maintains the clarity of this architectural model as 
concomitant with the development and continuity of the 
scrutiny any metaphysical enquiry. 
However, the architectural model also offers the 
opportunity to question a tradition of the perceived security 
of housing or dwelling, and by which things are safely put 
into place, as it were, by also locating the fissured porosity 
of an encrypted presence revealed through the event of 
what we might call the visceral orientation of the edifice. 40 
In her text on Gordon Matta-Clark, 'Laying Bare', 
Marianne Brouwer proposes that: 
The dark otherness, is built into architecture so that it shall 
not be victimized by it. Modernism creates its own therapeutic 
discourse on the level of a conscious language that means to 
41 incorporate the subconscious . 
This relation between a modernist discourse in architecture 
and the incorporation of a lingual subconscious is found in 
40 In his text on Walter Benjamin, The Colour of Experience, Howard 
Caygill argues that the categories of what he refers to as the 'modern 
experience' are porosity, threshold and shock. These are derived 
from what he calls the 'impure dispersal of anonymous transitivity'. 
Transitivity expresses a kind of continuity through relation and 
transition, which in Caygill's view articulates Benjamin's notion of 
mobility by replacing the traditional substance and subjective 
experience of the urban. In his text Constructions, John Rajchman 
states: 'For in contrast to Heidegger, Deleuze is a philosopher not of 
the forest and its paths but of the city and its modes of arranging or 
disposing persons and things - its agencements (assemblages). ' 
Rajchman argues that for Deleuze, architecture is first of all the arts 
-a montage, a composition. This is in contrast to Kant's view of 
architectural protocols which were, for him, debased by commerce. 
41 Brouwer, 'Laying Bare', from exhibition catalogue, Serpentine 
Gallery, London, June-August 1993, p. 364. 
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the specificity of Matta-Clark's personal history through the 
professional relationship of his father to the modernist 
architect Le Corbusier manifest in the former's critique of 
the latter in the Surrealist journal Minotaure in 1938. 
Roberto Matta (Matta-Clark's father), a Chilean painter 
who had relocated to pre-war Paris and was affiliated to the 
Surrealist movement, had provisionally been an associate of 
the architect Le Corbusier, working with him on a number of 
unrealised projects. 
Eventually, as illustrated in his article 'Mathematique 
sensible: Architecture du Temps', he rejected the latter's 
mathematique raisonable and its transcendent forces of a 
prevailing anthropomorphic geometry as merely the 
rationalisation and harmonisation of man's circumstance 
reducing him/her to a utopian subject of idealised form - 
modular man as reasoned proportional verticality; 
regularised and essentially linear. 42 
42 In 'Laying Bare', Brouwer notes: 'Because of the themes of the 
bourgeois home, of verticality and the void, this design at first reads 
like a work by Matta-Clark himself, until one realises that in fact the 
proposal in Minotaure implies the construction of a womb, or rather 
the production of the womb. The logic of the interior is dialectically 
linked to the concept of the exterior in Modernism. Matta's 
collaboration with Le Corbusier on a museum in the form of a 
labyrinth would corroborate this view. The "armature of rational 
architecture" contains the maternal image of the Womb as the Glass 
House contains the Hearth - indeed as the labyrinth contains Art; a 
usurped symbol' (p. 364, added emphasis). 
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Matta's illustration that accompanied his critique 
proposed a non-regularised space occupied by pneumatic 
furniture - 'opening upon vistas of deeply ambiguous 
space'. 43 What was visualised by Matta was essentially a 
kind of 'intra-uterine safe-haven' -a trope of the Freudian 
uncanny, as a critique of Le Corbusier's determination 
towards a prevailing transcendental geometry based on 
anthropomorphic idealism. 
It was described by Jeff Wall in his text, 'Dan 
Graham's Kammerspiel', as an 'intrauterine design for an 
apartment dedicated to the senses' and as a deliberate 
attack on the bourgeois home, as 'a space that will bring 
into consciousness human verticality'. 44 A further relation to 
43 Lee, Object to be Destroyed: The Work of Gordon Matta-Clark, p. 7. 
Matta is quoted by Lee as describing the space thus: 'We need walls 
like damp sheets which lose their shape and wed our psychological 
fears... To find for each person those umbilical cords that put us in 
communication with other suns, objects of total freedom that would 
be like psychoanalytic mirrors. ' If the womb is understood as the 
birth-site of domestic order, it is also at once the place of expelation 
into being and also the retreat to imagined death. It is also worth 
noting here Bachofen's detailed anthropological study of 'mother- 
right', specifically, his contention that matriarchy and its fundamental 
tellurian/corporeal character were essentially bound up with the 
chthonic (see Chapter 2 of this text) and that it marked a cultural 
stage which preceded the restrictions of the spiritual principle of the 
later patriarchal/Hellenic. For Bachofen the feminine sporium (womb) 
was seen as the representation of the Demetrian Mystery where 
Demeter represented the fertile and cultivated soil and was the earth 
mother who presided over the harvest and agricultural labour, and 
bound the maternal to the earth and the hearth (hestial). In The 
Uncanny, Freud argues: 'To some people the idea of being buried 
alive by mistake is the most uncanny thing of all - and yet 
psychoanalysis has taught us that this terrifying phantasy is only a 
transformation of another phantasy which had originally nothing 
terrifying about it at all, but was qualified by a certain lasciviousness 
- the phantasy, I mean of intra-uterine existence' (p. 367). 
44 Jeff Wall, 'Dan Graham's Kammerspiel' in Dan Graham (exhibition 
catalogue), The Arts Gallery of Western Australia, Perth 1985. Also 
in this text, Wall articulates a kind of vampirism at work in the double 
operation of the reversal of the perspectival image of the human body 
with its alteric reflection. This is particularly noted with regard to 
Graham's Alteration to a Suburban House where the 'vampire' as the 
'double' of power and possession comes in the night to feed on its 
prey when the 'openness' and 'transparency/reflection' of the glass 
house is no longer the 'master of that reflection' in the daylight 
hours, but vulnerable through its transparent determinacy, to the 
nocturnal illogic of the forces of nature. 
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Matta-Clark's work is through the event of encryption and 
its specific connotation with the act of mourning as a double 
operation of an act of refusal through the fantasy of 
incorporation. As will be explored further, Matta-Clark's two 
works, Time WellICherry Tree of 1971 and Descending 
Steps for Batan of 1977, were specifically involved with the 
act of inclusion as that which persisted in its exclusion and 
to all intents and purposes, introduced what might best be 
described as a phantom into the corporeal. 
What remains crucial to any further analysis of this 
contention is that one must understand incorporation not 
merely as an act of absorption where the corporeal 
assimilates that which is alien to it, but rather as an act 
where the object is retained within the body as something 
excluded. A foreign body that remains impossible to 
assimilate, must be rejected, and consequently this inability 
to expel becomes what I now term the unheimlich 
manoeuvre. 45 
In his foreword to Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok's 
The Wolf Man's Magic Word, Derrida described the crypt 
thus: 
The crypt is thus not a natural place [lieu], but the striking 
history of an artifice, an architecture, an artefact: of a place 
comprehended within another rigorously separate from it, 
45 In his forward, to The Wolf Man's Magic Word by Nicolas Abraham 
and Maria Torok, entitled 'Fors: The Anguish Words of Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok', p. xxxviii, Derrida argues that the fantasy 
is no longer the 'pure' expulsion of what is alien but 'involves eating 
the object (through the mouth or otherwise) in order not to introject 
it, in order to vomit it, in a way, into the inside, into the pocket of a 
cyst. " The definition of a cyst as a sac containing 'morbid matter', or 
a cell or cavity enclosing a parasitic organism clearly demarcates 
what is introjected as not only 'alien' but also as 'gaining nutrition 
from ' and sustained through symbiosis with the corporeal. 
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isolated from general space by partitions, an enclosure, an 
enclave. 46 
In identifying any displacements by which the disturbance of 
a construction by its so-called inherent undecidable figures 
is interrupted, we recognise such resistance to 
domestication whereby the hestial is interrupted by an 
alterity that is neither pure exteriority or its counterpart of 
interiority and which would sustain the continuation of 
binary oppositions as the standard dialectic of metaphysical 
enquiry. Mark Wigley states: 
As both the hiding of a secret and the hiding of that hiding, the 
crypt cannot simply take its place in the topography it 
preserves. The traditional demarcations between inside and 
outside, the closure established by the drawing of a line, the 
division of a space by a wall, is disturbed by the internal 
fracturing of the walls by the crypt. 
The crypt organises the space in which it can never 
47 
simply be placed, sustaining the very topography it fractures . 
It persists by virtue of its capacity to complicate any 
dialectic by exploiting an inherent characteristic, which can 
essentially be neither included nor evicted, and, as such, 
operates as a violation which undermines any notion of 
hestial assurance. 
46 lbid,. p. xiv. Where Derrida cites the partition as intrinsic to 
encryption, we may wish to consider Matta-Clark's use of such 
structural determinations to give shape to his 'interventions'. I am 
particularly reminded here of The W-Hole House: Atrium Roof project 
where the previously constructed internal partitions dividing the 
space were integral to the later 'visceral interventions'. It is also 
worth noting here that the translator's note for Derrida's introduction 
indicates that fors (translated from the French) is derived from the 
Latin foris (meaning outside, outdoors), an archaic preposition 
meaning except for, barring, save. Also fors as plural of for, meaning 
inner heart and subjective interiority, therefore fors means both 
exteriority and interiority; this is a spatial problematic that Derrida 
explores in connection with the crypt. 
47 Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida's Haunt, p. 144. 
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This figuration, articulated as essentially something that 
takes the form of an imposition by an exclusively exterior 
force, is undermined by the ambiguity of such 
characteristics, which refuse to conform to the clear and 
arguably insurmountable oppositions/dialectics of 
presencelabsence and insideloutside. The argument is 
proposed that perhaps that which insists through a 
determination to resist, can neither be relegated to a 
superior transcendent capacity, imposing itself and its 
ideality upon the domestic, nor as a mere alien appendage 
that is either organised or emerges from such 
domestication, but as that which is essentially alteric and 
therefore must remain entirely other. 
John Rajchman in his text Constructions sees Matta- 
Clark's anti-monumental incisions as a process of 
ungrounding which married to the comparative events of 
unbuilding and undoing, contrast any attempt to retrieve the 
context of the historical C it Y48 through architectural form and 
offer the possibility of another route out of such 
contextualism. He argues: 
they exposed not an architectural memory in monuments but a 
subversive memory hidden in the social and architectural 
facades with their false sense of integrity and wholeness, 
48 In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger states: 'The polis is the 
historical place [Geschichsstitte] the there in which, out of which 
and for which history happens' (p. 152). Heidegger's reading of polis 
should not be recognised as merely one 'city-state' but as the 
ahistorical place - the 'there' of historical 'being-there'. Edward S. 
Casey argues in his text The Fate of Place that: 'Within a limit 
[peras], room is made - and thus place. To lack limit is to lack 
place, and conversely; not to be in place is to be unlimited. A limit 
is a positive power within which place is made. ' p. 262. This 
interprets the limit (peras) as that which invokes of a kind of respect 
for the placial and not merely a confinement and it 'allows the most 
effective building-up of the world within the place of the polis. ' 
(added emphasis) Ibid', p. 262. 
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breaking out through the openings in the body of banal 
spaces. 49 
The shift orchestrated by Matta-Clark's interventions was in 
a sense a two-fold commentary, in that he had provisionally 
seized upon and exploited what might be conceived as the 
progressive tendencies of the hestial demands of the so- 
called bourgeois American dream. 50 
The gloss of privacy identified in the development of 
the American suburb was revealed by Matta-Clark (in a 
project such as Splitting of 1973) as a mere fagade of 
stability, which masked a deep-seated insecurity at the 
heart of the iconic suburban home. 
49 Rajchman, Constructions, p. 82. In his book De -Architecture, James 
Wines comments on Matta-Clark that: 'Structures were cut up, 
stripped, torn-apart, excavated - clematerialized in some way - to 
achieve a feeling of orchestrated apocalypse' (p. 139). 
50 It is also worth noting here that Pamela M. Lee draws attention to the 
possibility of an arguably contentious reading of Matta-Clark's 
'interventions' (specifically Splitting of 1973) as the violation of not 
only the domesticity of the suburban home but also the visceration of 
hestial/maternal order. As Lee indicates, feminist commentary 
identified this act as essentially genderised, and also linked it with a 
Freudian interpretation of the domestication of the uterine. She 
quotes Maud Lavin from her essay in Arts Magazine (January 1984, 
pp. 138-41), 'Gordon Matta-Clark and Individualism': 'Matta-Clark's 
wounding of a house can be seen as a male violation of a domestic 
realm with female associations. I am not making a case for Matta- 
Clark's work as a whole to be read as anti-female, but certainly it is 
concerned with male virility' (added emphasis). In The Interpretation 
of Dreams Freud states: 'It often happens that neurotic men declare 
that they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital 
organs. This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to the former 
heim of all human beings to the place where each one of us lived 
once upon a time and in the beginning. There is a joke saying that 
"love is home-sickness"; and whenever a man dreams of a place or 
country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: 'this place is 
familiar to me, I've been here before", we may interpret the place as 
being his mother's genitals or her body' (p. 524). 
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3 
As a cipher of the pretension of class mobility which 
inaugurated the socio-economic shifts of late capitalism in 
housing, the suburb was perhaps not, as Pamela M. Lee 
points out, merely the growth of the city as urban expanse, 
but rather the perimeter through which its peripheral status 
conditioned and preserved the city's status as centre. 51 
\4 
51 Pamela M. Lee argues that Matta Clark's two projects, A W-Hole 
House and Splitting, 'revealed ... the very emptiness at the centre of the two structures, a centreless centre, so to speak. ' She also 
questions Maud Lavin's contention that Matta-Clark's 'domestic 
projects' were misogynistic attacks against the gendered domestic 
order of the feminine by querying the coding of domesticity as 
essentially 'maternal' (Object to be Destroyed, p. 18). Marianne 
Brouwer also refutes this suggestion and comments that 'he is 
attacking a paternal image rather than a maternal one. If anything, 
Matta-Clark cuts through the fetishism of the umbilical cord that 
connects the notion of verticality and the void in his father's project 
and gives it a completely different vocabulary. A vocabulary in which 
high and low become metaphysically joined' ('Laying Bare'), p. 364. 
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The implication of the suburb as not only the vincular in the 
sense of an unlocalisable primary link that borders the 
absolute interior, but also in its algebraic sense of a 
horizontal line drawn over a group of terms to show they 
have a common relation to what follows or precedes. This 
must be understood as a relation in the monadic sense of a 
relation between what is constant and what is variable 
given that neither constancy nor variation are dependent on 
that relation and, most importantly the vinculum as relation 
is exterior to any variable and also outside any constant. 52 
These were manifest in the inexorable march of the 
modernist architectural determination of corporate and 
municipal projects as well as social housing in the post-war 
period and also in the violence and wilful destruction that 
accompanied them. In this sense Matta-Clark's 
interventions preserved through a kind of demolition and 
simultaneously through the act of the artist, shifted the 
significance of the building from the praxis of mere 
occupancy to a higher level of cultural merit. 53 
52 It is worth noting here Dan Graham's Alteration to a Suburban House. 
As a 'perversion' of the ideology of transparency concomitant with 
modernist architectural ideals, the project sought to remove the 
faqade of an ordinary suburban house and replace it with a glass 
sheet -a vinculum. A mirror would divided the interior of the building 
into two areas -a front section revealed to the public, and a rear, 
private section which would remain undisclosed. The mirror, as it 
faced the glass fagade, would not only reflect the public face of the 
interior, but also the street and the outside environment - bringing 
the outside into the house through the intervention of a vincular, 
transparency. In his short story 'Tl6n Uqbar, Orbis Tertius' (from the 
collection Labyrinths), Jorge Luis Borges states 'mirrors have 
something monstrous about them' (p. 27). 
53 James Wines, commenting on Robert Smithson's Buried Shed, argues 
that its entropic trope articulates a political commentary that was 
based on the 'unconscious relationship that exists in the popular 
mind between buildings and orderly functions - their generic state of 
use' (De-Architecture, p. 137). The question arises as to whether 
Matta-Clark's work was a continuation of Smithson's thematic of 
earth, no longer conceived of as a mere stable ground but as the 
entropic force ever undoing the information of formal structures. 
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Judith Russi Kirshner in her essay on Matta-Clark 
entitled 'Non-uments' identified the labyrinthine complexity 
of these visceral projects as essentially a contradictory 
relation between the event of dissection and its violation of 
contin U it Y. 54 She drew attention to: 
Matta-Clark's contradictory dissections, his intricate mazes 
opposing the clarity and geometry of an architectural plan, 
violated the unity and continuity associated with Modernist 
architecture, exposing relationships between forms and 
materials to make visible unexpected, multiple layers in spatial 
55 and temporal depth . 
The creative act as an interruption of the polis, if we 
understand this to mean the recognition of a political 
orientation of interiority and structure, can only proffer 
itself as such by assenting to such a placial integrity and 
which confirms exteriority status on the antithesis of the 
polis, the geopolis. I also draw attention here to earlier 
remarks made in Chapter 2 in the section Poison and Cure, 
where the placial undecidibility of the pharmak OS56 in 
ancient Greece was articulated as the maintenance by 
public donation, of an individual or group of individuals at 
54 'Matta-Clark fragments or splinters architecture, turning it into a kind 
of reverse Cubism or "anti- m on u ment", but one whose task is to 
reconstitute memory, not conventional memory as in the traditional 
monument but that subversive memory which has been hidden by 
social and architectural fagades and their false sense of "wholeness"' 
(Dan Graham, 'Gordon Matta-Clark', essay published in the 
Serpentine catalogue, p. 379). 
55 Judith Russi Kirshner, 'Non-uments', p. 367. Derrida, in his foreword 
to The Wolf Man's Magic Word, argues, 'Constructing a series of 
partitions, with their inner and outer surfaces, the cryptic enclave 
produces a cleft in space, in the assembled system of various places, 
in the architectonics of the open square within space, itself delimited 
by a generalized closure in the forum' ('Fors', p. xiv). See Gordon 
Matta-Clark's project, A W-Hole House: Atrium Roof, 1973. 
56 As previously stated, the significance of the pharmakos in the 
context of this text is as the identification of 'undecidibility' - 
literally through its root in the term pharmakon, as potentially both 
poison and cure. 
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the heart of the polis in order to insure an appropriate 
sacrifice (the scapegoat) at times of dire need. 
The often barbaric nature of these outsiders had 
strong links with the creative frenzy of a Dionysian excess, 
which if we are to follow Nietzsche's model in The Birth of 
Tragedy, conceived the Apollonian framework of the 
organised polis of the late Hellenic period as progressively 
repressing such disorder. Yet the phenomenon of the 
pharmakos insisted on the presence of the alien as the 
mechanism to in some way, restore order to the polis and 
therefore it could not and must not be merely excluded. 57 
The risk of being creative and therefore the potential 
definition of creative man, exploits the limit as that by 
which the contentious proposal that potential and possibility 
are essentially issueless and placeless. As Heidegger 
stated in An Introduction to Metaphysics: 
What thus comes up and becomes intrinsically stable 
[St. inding] encounters, freely and spontaneously, the necessity 
of its limit, peras. This limit is not something that comes to 
beings from outside. Still less is it a deficiency in the sense of 
a harmful restriction. No, the hold that governs itself from out 
of the limit, the having itself, wherein the enduring holds 
itself, is the Being of beings; it is what first makes a being into 
a being as differentiated from a non-being ... Limit and end are 
that where with a being begins to be. 58 
He also remarked in 'Building Dwelling Thinking' that: 
57 1 would also like to note here that, as mentioned in Chapter 2 of this 
text, when Adorno commented in 1955, 'After Auschwitz, to write a 
lyric poem is barbaric' (added emphasis), the implication is that 
Celan, the 'lyric poet' when involved in the realisation of his poetic 
voice, was in fact (in the eyes of Adorno) precipitating an act of 
'barbarism'. The parallels between this creative potential and its link 
to the barbaric should not be lost here (the Dionysian as the 
exteriority of barbaric ecstatic hedonism repressed by the internal 
order of the Apollonian). 
58 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 62. 
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A space is something that has been made room for, something 
that is cleared and free, namely within a boundary. A boundary 
is not that at which something stops, but as the Greeks 
recognised, the boundary is that from which something begins 
its presencing - Pera S. 
59 
From early pieces like Time WellICherry Tree, through the 
more explicit violation of the architectural educational 
establishment of Window Blow-Out (1976) where he gained 
the authorities' somewhat reluctant permission to shoot out 
windows of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies 
in New York with a borrowed revolver, the violence of the 
transgressive operation inevitably drew attention to that 
against which it was directed. As Marianne Brouwer 
describes: 'directed against the Institute as the sign of 
repression: Matta-Clark's provocative act confronts those 
secret fears that won't be sublimated into the dialectics of 
interior and exterior. )60 
59 Heidegger, 'Building Dwelling Thinking', p. 154. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze states: '"To the limit", it will be argued, still 
presupposes a limit. Here, limit (peras) no longer refers to what 
maintains the thing under a law, nor to what delimits or separates it 
f rorn other things. On the contrary, it refers to that on the basis of 
which it is deployed and deploys all its power: hubris ceases to be 
simply condemnable and the smallest becomes equivalent to the 
largest once it is not separated f rom what it can do'(p. 37). 
60 Brouwer, 'Laying Bare', p. 364. 
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Other works involved more specifically domestic (Splitting 
and Conical Intersect) and corporate spaces (Circus or 
Caribbean Orange and Office Baroque), albeit derelict and 
abandoned, and make a strong case for Matta-Clark's 
continued imperative to use his work to comment on the 
inherent injustice of formal structures . 
611 t is significant, 
however, that Splitting as both intervention/event and 
Matta-Clark's most noted (and recognised) work is grasped 
through its provisional interpretation as an enforcement of 
exterior over interior. In its aftermath, the recognition of a 
more complex encryption of exteriority is noted that is 
already implicit within domestication and identified in the 
61 John Rajchman also points out that Kant viewed architecture as the 
lowest form of the beaux arts as it was the most constrained by 
money interests and as such was 'genius fettered and unable to 
create freely and purely'. The project Time WellICherry Tree (1971) 
can be seen in the canon of Matta-Clark's work as a key punctum 
piece that engages with entropic force as a measure of 
disorganisation and degradation. The degenerative presupposition of 
the work's own destruction (already articulated in other works like 
Photo-Fry) is built into the 'removal' of historical loss -a non-ument 
which emphasises Robert Smithson's contention that the site/non-site 
'rises into ruin'. From 'A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New 
Jersey', and taken from The Writings of Robert Smithson, p. 54. 
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precise splitting of an ordinary suburban house prior to its 
demolition, at 322 Englewood Street, New Jersey, in 1973. 
6 
A central cut was augmented by the careful removal of part 
of the foundations at the rear of the building to open the 
Sp I it. 62 Also of importance is that the event of Splitting was 
not in the enforcement of the reversal of a dialectic, 
whereby exteriority sublimated interiority, which made 
manifest an inversion of the metaphysical trope of 
presence/absence, but the aftermath of an encryption of 
62 Derrida notes in The Truth in Painting, that the 'implication of size' 
(taille) is also the mark of a line or cut: 'the cutting edge of a sword, 
all the incisions which come to broach a surface or a thickness and 
open up a track, delimit a contour, a form or a quantity (a cut(ting) of 
wood or cloth' (p. 120). The 'play' that Derrida finds in the ambiguity 
of meaning and translation is also noted in his Memoirs of the Blind, 
where he notes: 'The trait is not then paralyzed in a tautology that 
folds the same onto the same' (p. 2). The translator has noted that 
they have left the word trait untranslated to preserve its range of 
meanings, from a trait or feature to a line, stroke or mark. This 
articulation of variant meaning is also operated by Pierre Joris in his 
translation of Celan's poem 'Todtnauberg', where he leaves the word 
Hijtte untranslated (see Chapter 2 of this text). 
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exteriority already implicit within the domesticated interior 
and manifested in what we might call the 'no-where' of its 
foundational integrity. 
7 
The foundations of buildings always remain absent, in the 
sense that the integrity of their structural value is rarely 
seen. If they are operating successfully, they remain 
undisclosed, their essence translated into that which they 
support. The double concealment exploited in Splitting was 
firstly, in the absented value of the foundations in the 
structural/domestic sense, and secondly, in their literal 
absence as a removal by Matta-Clark to initiate the split in 
the building. What is also of significance, and will be 
touched on later, is the intrinsic coeval relationship 
between, what I will call the 'closed domesticated/hestial 
verticality' of the split with the open 'formal/hermetic 
horizontality' of the removal to initiate the event of the 
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work. As already indicated in Matta-Clark's earlier projects, 
A W-Hole House: Atrium Roof followed a similar 
methodology that combined verticality with horizontality as 
the means by which the work was realised. 
Mark Wigley, in The Architecture of Deconstruction: 
Derrida's Haunt, suggests that what is implicit in 
architectonic figuration can be characterised as an 
essential deception which determines our perception of 
logic and reason. He states: 
The figure of architecture acts as a veil, enabling philosophy 
to disguise its active ordering of the world as the neutral 
discovery of the worlds pre-existing, as the dispassionate 
'discloser' order. 63 
Wigley's contention, that the architectural figure might 
function as an active yet deceptive organiser of the world, 
proposes what we might call an intriguing dwelling model 
for the exploration of the perceived familiarity of order and 
principle as not only the foundation for metaphysical 
63 Added emphasis. Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 66. 
Dan Graham's Alteration to a Suburban House project sought to 'lift 
the veil' via the introduction of a transparent yet reflective surface, 
replacing the usual suburban fagade and in so doing, made manifest 
the disguise of the architectural. In the short story, 'Councillor 
Krespel', E. T. A Hoffmann has the professor say of Krespel, 'There 
are people ... From whom nature, or some special fatality, has drawn 
away the veil under the concealment of which the rest of us pursue 
our follies. Their inner workings are visible. What with us remains 
thought, becomes with Krespel - deed' (p. 173, added emphasis). I 
would also note here Derrida's remarks in The Truth in Painting 
regarding parergon or the veil (the function of clothing in sculpture 
and painting and the column in architecture; both can also function 
as ornament) as a kind of framing device. He notes: 'The parergon 
inscribes something which comes as an extra, exterior to the proper 
fieId... but whose transcendent exteriority comes to play, abut onto, 
brush against, rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the 
inside only to the extent that the inside is lacking. It is lacking in 
something and it is lacking from itself' (p. 56). 
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thought, but also in an archaeological sense and illuminator 
and arbiter of pre-established orders. 64 
However, it would only require only a minor deviation 
from this recognised framework of thought to begin to find 
mechanisms by which it is possible to implicate through the 
identification and scrutinising of a form of alteric explication 
as indicated, which is at work in any domestic order. From 
this we might be able to explore this model from the inside 
as it were, through the reconsideration and reinterpretation 
of the means by which this model was first made manifest. 65 
The historical language of architecture demands a certain 
kind of structural continuity (by which we mean the already 
indicated linearity of what we might describe as the 
appropriate structure of a building), which can only function 
through the integrity of the recognised directional verticality 
of construction methods - from ground/foundation via 
edifice to decoration . 
66 A project like A W-Hole House: 
64 In The Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel states, 'God enters 
in the lighten ing-f lash of individuality, which strikes and permeates 
the inert mass, while the infinite and no longer merely symmetrical 
form belonging to mind itself concentrates and gives shape to the 
corresponding bodily existence' (p. 91). 
65 Wigley determines that the limit defined by the territorialisation of 
the house is not one of the dialectic of interiority and exteriority as 
much as that of encryption. He states: 'The line drawn by the house 
is not that between what appears as an inside and what appears as 
an outside, but the less clearly defined and much more convoluted 
one between the visible and the invisible. The security of a house is 
not its capacity to enclose or exclude, but its capacity to conceal' 
(The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 131). 
66 1 would like to note here the 'unorthodox' construction methods 
employed by the character Councillor Krespel in E. T. A Hoffman's 
short story of the same name (published in the Penguin Classics 
edition of Tales of Hoffmann): the 'planless' house (no architectural 
drawing was provided for the building), but merely Krespel shouting 
instructions during the construction process. However, as the 
storyteller describes: 'The difficulties which this peculiar mode of 
construction could not fail to produce were thus overcome, and after 
a short while a completed house stood there: from the outside it 
possessed the craziest appearance, since none of the windows, for 
instance, was of the same size or shape as any other, but once 
inside you were filled with a quite unexampled sense of wellbeing 
and comfort' (p. 161). 
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Atrium Roof realised in Genoa in Italy in 1973 complicates 
any clear distinctions between verticality and horizontality 
from which a precedent of one over the other might be 
accorded. 
Prior to Matta-Clark's intervention, what preceded it 
was an act of domestication by the previous occupants, who 
organised the interior space by progressively splitting its 
openness with stud wal IS. 67 Matta-Clark's initial reaction to 
such an act of hestial/domestication was to remove the 
centre of the pyramidal roof, exposing the labyrinthine 
interior, whereby the verticality of the removal 
simultaneously determined and critiqued domesticity. This 
was followed by further incisions which dissected the 
interior with two parallel horizontal lines (one demarcated 
three feet from the floor on the interior walls and the other 
18 inches above it) and which might be considered as an 
act of cle-centred hermetic de-territorialisation. 
The precedent of ground as the essential a priori for 
the determination of any vertiginous posture remains the 
consistent factor in the architectonics of the edifice. 68 
Equally, the proposition is made that the language of 
edifice of thought - metaphysics - demands a similar 
ordering, but as Wigley states, this figuration should 
perhaps be interpreted as merely the disguise by which 
67 The metaphor of enframing is not lost here - domestication taking the 
form of the particularity of hestial organisation that Matta-Clark's 
exploited through a vertical removal. There is also perhaps 
something about the specificity of this removal in that it identified 
the hestial/hearth by drawing attention to a historical architectural 
mechanism for ventilation (the hole in the roof). I also draw attention 
to earlier remarks made about the parergon in Derrida's The Truth in 
Pa in ting. 
68 Bachofen's 'Sanctum and Sacrum' argues: 'The traditional mind saw 
walls "rising from the earth" as offspring, issuing from the "maternal 
womb". Walls as "children" of mother earth even after birth are 
connected to the "maternal womb" by foundations' (p. 42). 
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reason and logic enforce the mechanisms of control and 
reduction of all outside the conformity of reasonableness to 
a kind of universality while couching such an enframing in 
the archaeological uncovering of what might be interpreted 
as almost the fictional re-discovery of a foundational, pre- 
existing order. 
Our predisposition to indicate a language for 
architectonics already submits it to a scrutiny that not only 
recognises its historical status but also simultaneously and 
perhaps surreptitiously argues for a rethinking of its lingual 
articulation. 
When Derrida argues that the philosophical tradition 
privileges the immediacy of speech over the mediations of 
what is written, he expresses a subordination of the spatial 
using the concept of the unmediated presence of speech as 
a sublimation of the space of inscription or the spatial 
distribution of signs. 
Metaphysics as the mechanism by which the logos 
resists the interruption of the containment of self-presence, 
takes mastery of the spatial by exclusion - by keeping it 
outside. 69 In 'On the Question of Being' Heidegger asked the 
question: 
What if the language of metaphysics and metaphysics itself, 
whether it is that of a living or a dead god, in fact constituted 
as metaphysics that limit which prevents a transition over the 
line, i. e. the overcoming of nihi I is M ? 70 
69 In metaphysics, speech 'precedes' space and therefore is able to 
'control' it. Writing, with the ambiguity of its dangerous spatiality, is 
cast out to the subordinate exterior. When Bachofen sited the form of 
letter writing at the hestial/hearth of the Asiatic queens (see Chapter 
2 of this text), he implied that the inferiority of the text was not 
merely resigned to the subordination of its exteriority but was 
fundamentally 'found' at the hearth. 
70 Heidegger, 'On the Question of Being', p. 304. 
213 
However, speech does not occupy interiority as it were, by 
merely not falling into the exteriority of space. This might 
indicate that speech operated as a negation - as merely 
what is not spatial. The privileged interiority of speech is 
contingent on an absence of space and as such, is that 
which is without space. 71 Mark Wigley proposes: 
The exclusion and subordination of space produces an orderly 
fagade, or, rather the faqade of order to mask an internal 
disorder. The traditional anxiety about space marks a 
forbidden desire that threatens to collapse the edifice of 
72 
philosophy from within . 
Space, however, is essentially not just the receptacle of 
inscriptions, as in Derridian terms writing does not have a 
site, but the specificity of sites and locales are an effect of 
what is written therefore the spatial is an effect of the event 
of ongoing inscription and is perhaps more appropriately 
defined as spacing. 
The term spacing is used by Derrida to identify the 
event of speech fissured by space and rather than instigate 
a mere reversal of an existing tradition, seeks to connote 
that tradition in some sense, while also carrying senses 
which cannot be recognised by that tradition and are 
therefore exterior to it. Wigley makes the point that space is 
not merely a negation or misfortune that befalls the purity 
of the logos (the pure voice sought by philosophy), but 
suggests that it is its very possibility. He argues: 'There 
can be no voice, let alone the philosophical desire for such 
71 In Of Grammatology, Derricla argues: 'Spacing is the impossibility for 
identity to be closed on itself, on the inside of its proper interiority, 
or on its coincidence with itself. The irreducibility of spacing is the 
irreducibility of the other' (p. 27). 
72 Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 71. 
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a voice, with out the spatiality that appears to contaminate 
it. ý 73 
Spacing, then, is conceived not as a pure presence 
but is in effect, an operation or manoeuvre - an event of 
interval which functions as a no-thing articulating the 
impossibility for an identity to be closed in on itself. It is no 
longer recognised as space but rather a becoming space of 
that which traditionally was meant to be without space 
(presence, speech, spirit, ideas, etc. ) and as such, opens 
up in the sense of fissuring an established structure by the 
division or complication of its limits, but also in the sense 
of producing space itself as an opening in the tradition. 74 
Marianne Brouwer says of Matta-Clark: 
[he] does not undo a building, he undoes the architectural 
analogy that is contained within it. In fact he describes his 
first cuts as 'extractions'. Words are removed from the edifice 
of language in a movement that works its way through the 
building as if it were carefully removing its semantic 
backbone. 75 
73 Ibid., p. 70. 
74 In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger states: 'The Greeks had 
no word for "space". This is no accident; for they experienced the 
spatial on the basis not of extension but of place (topos); they 
experienced it as ch6ra, which signifies neither place nor space but 
that which is occupied by what stands there' (p. 66). 
75 Added emphasis. Brouwer, 'Laying Bare', p. 363 
215 
Derrida argues that Heidegger, by employing the metaphors 
that surround the house (dwelling, enclosure, shelter, 
abode, lodging, proximity and neighbourhood), remains 
constrained within the metaphysical edifice, and his 
extensive use of the thematic of the house remains an 
organising principle that fails in its attempts to dismantle. 76 
His advocation of the imperative to return to a primal 
shelter (dwelling) as a means of taking refuge from the 
mode rn/tech nol ogical age of the consummation of nihilism 
and its generalised sense of homelessness, remains 
trapped in the a priori pre-fix of a site of unmediated 
presence and therefore the secure, interiority of 
logocentrism. 77 
Heidegger's determination towards authenticity 
through language is found at its most specifically 
architectural in 'Building Dwelling Thinking'. He poses two 
questions in the introduction, which remain pertinent to any 
discussion of his proposition that 'language is the house of 
Being'. His first question - What is it to dwell? - is further 
qualified by a second: how does building belong to 
dwelling? It is crucial to bear in mind here that dwelling 
remains the essential a priori term and, as such, locates it 
at the heart of Heidegger's discussion of being. However, in 
seeking to explore the fundamental relation of these terms, 
76 Heidegger's understanding of familiarity and propriety stem from the 
link/root between the Greek terms oikos (household) and oikeios 
(proper) and are bound together in a consistent thematic trajectory, 
which is linked to the concept of appropriation. Wigley argues: 
'Language is a house because it is a mode of appropriation whereby 
thought recovers presence in the face of alienating representation. It 
is a house because it appropriates making proper by excluding 
representation and establishing a proximity to presence' (p. 102). 
77 Heidegger argues in 'Building Dwelling Thinking', that: 'Man acts as 
though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact 
language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else 
man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives his nature 
into alienation' (p. 146). 
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Heidegger looked to the German word bauen (to build) to 
find what he described as a covert trace of an appropriate 
meaning for 'to dwell' and in citing such a spectrality 
focused on an intrinsic haunting of language in as far as 
something is 'not said', as a means by which one might 
explore the lingual edifice. 713 
In the activity of dwelling, Heidegger 'heard' bis (to 
be) but in so doing distinguished between the 'active' and 
'authentic' verb and the notion of dwelling as a mere 'act of 
inactivity'. Similarly, he noted the distinction between an 
understanding of 'building' as construction and also as what 
he defined as a 'not-making' and by which he meant a 
nurturing and preserving. 
In this sense house is the metaphor that precedes 
metaphor by determining the condition of what is proper and 
which remains detached from the 'inferior' metaphorical - 
the presence (interior) of the proper excluding the 
metaphorical exterior. For Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, 
anxiety was one manifestation of Dasein's concern for the 
familial while lost in the they (das Man) of inauthentic 
Being. It was also the realisation of what he referred to as 
'authentic care' (Sorge) as that which made manifest the 
uncertainty of Dasein's possibilities of 'being-in-the-world'. 
Therefore, Dasein's fall into the 'they-ness' of concernful 
78 The essence of Heidegger's argument is centred on finding in the Old 
English/High German word for building (buan) the meaning to dwell, 
to remain, to stay in a place. Although he argues that its 'true' 
meaning is now lost, a trace of it is preserved in the German word 
Nachbar - neighbour (Old English: neahgebur, meaning near- 
dweller). In Nachbar and nachgebauer Heidegger heard both near 
(nach) and bar and bauer (dweller) and the latter words stem from 
buri, buren, beuren and beuron, signifying dwelling, the abode or the 
place of dwelling. 'The old word bauen, which says that man is 
insofar as he dwells, this word bauen however also means at the 
same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, 
specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine' ('Building Dwelling 
Thinking', p. 147). 
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familiarity, was a flight from the 'authenticity of all real 
possibilities and as such cut Dasein off from an authentic 
world experience and the abyss of possibilities which 
always threatened Dasein's self-certainty. 
Edward S. Casey in The Fate of Place argues that 
later analysis of the uncanny (das Unheimlich) continues to 
explore what he refers to as the loss of 'home-world' via the 
form of Dasein's ineluctable 'not-being-at-home' (un-heim- 
lich) in the world. He goes on to propose that the 
unheimlich is not only nothing (by which he means nothing 
substantial in the Heideggarian manner of zuhanden 
(present-at-hand) or vorhanden (ready-to- hand)) but 
nowhere . 
79As such it represents what Casey defines as a 
'radical absence' without the particularity of the placial or 
regionality and invokes a sense of anxiety through atopia. 
Dasein's defensive and reactive flight from nowhere 
and nothing seems provisionally to be one towards what 
Casey understands as concern and, more importantly, 
absorption with other entities. However, in this rush to 
assimilate and, more significantly, to be assimilated, what 
arguably Dasein misses is that which grounds both anxiety 
and the unheimlich - the world - and therefore its own 
authentic 'being-in-the-world'. Dasein's (and Heidegger's) 
ontic manoeuvre was to flee into the gematlich 80 of what 
might be described as a familial practicality (zuhanden and 
vorhanden) and demands a question of Heidegger as to 
whether he persistently held back from a confrontation with 
the abysmal in favour of absorption in the familial. 
79 In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche states: 'Man would sooner 
have the void for his purpose than be void of purpose. ' 
80 As previously mentioned, this translates from German as snugly, 
comfortable, cosy, homelike or homely. 
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Dwelling, for Heidegger, remained the most proximal 
essence of man; as he stated in 'Building Dwelling 
Thinking': 'building is not merely a means and a way toward 
dwelling - to build is in itself already to dwell'. 81 
In Sein und Zeit, he attempted to tackle the 
oppositional difficulty of the metaphysical strategy of 
interior/exterior by working on the density of the placial and 
its relationship with the more overtly shapelessness of 
regionality, while attempting to avoid falling into the trap of 
understanding the spatial as pure homogeneous exteriority. 
In the sense of spatium and extensio, 82 specific places 
became the foci or indicators of wider, shared parts of an 
environing world understood as a pre-given, public 
regionality so that what we might call regional emplacement 
proposed an unmetric and temporal involvement between 
closeness and distance. 
Deleuze indicates that such points of view do not 
contradict any notion of the continuous but argues that 
Leibniz defined extensio as continuous repelation of situs 
or position (understood as 'point of view') bearing in mind 
that extensio was an attribute of that point of view but one 
of spatium, an order of distances between points of view 
makes repetition possible. 83 
In 'Building Dwelling Thinking' Heidegger cited the 
precedent of spatium as an 'an intervening space or 
interval' whereby such an interval and its dimensional 
81 Heidegger, 'Building Dwelling Thinking', p. 146. 
82 We may wish to consider the parallels between spatium and extensio 
and place and region in Heideggerian thought; particularly with 
regard to what has already been discussed in Chapter 1 of this text. 
83 'When inclusion is accomplished, it is done so continuously, or 
includes the sense of a finished act that is neither the site, the place 
or the point of view, but remains in point of view, what occupies point 
of view and without which point of view would not be' (Deleuze, The 
Fold, p. 22). 
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characteristics (which were no longer distinguishable 
through what Heidegger termed nearness and dis-tance) 
reduced spatial interventions to measurable distances - 
what he referred to as mere position and which meant that 
as such, were potentially replaceable by any other mere 
marker. This reduction to dimensionality allowed for the 
abstraction of 'interval' into the manifold dimensions of 
height, breadth and depth and which determined the 
expression of the spatial as no longer through the provision 
of proximity (nearness and dis-stance), but through the 
evolution of extensio. This is further abstracted into what 
he terms 'analytic-algebraic relations', which made room for 
the manifold of mathematical constructions based on 
arbitrary dimensions and which could be understood as one 
space but without the specificity of a location. 84 
Heidegger indicated that such locations while 
providing the space for spatium and extensio maintained the 
predilection that as essentially universal and therefore 
transcendent, in that they were arbitrary and therefore 
applicable to anything, they could not be the ground for the 
specifics of the proximal density of a particular location. 
Like Heidegger, Deleuze understood spatium as the 
primal groundless space from which issued all dimensional 
and representable space (extensio) with its identifiable 
coordinates of height, width and depth. However, in 
Difference and Repetition he distinguished spatium as 
essentially an implicate space in that it traits common to a 
metastable substance. If we recall from Chapter 1 of this 
84 In Bunker Archaeology, Paul Virilio notes: 'Historically, if the 
reduction of obstacles and distances has always been the central 
problem of military space, we have reached today the rupture point: 
the distinction between vehicle and projectile has ceased' (p. 18, 
added emphasis). 
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text, a metastable substance has enfolded (implicated) into 
itself its capacity for difference in itself and from which is 
unfolded (explicated) in extensio the specificity of 
individuation. 
He argued that the space we perceive is that of 
extension in that as the faculties fall under the regulation of 
common sense, a passive synthesis of the spatium is 
performed and whose existence can only be revealed 
through the transcendental analysis of the ground - an 
ungrund. 
The categorisation we perceive in the specific 
examples of matter and form, individual and environment, 
species and individual are essentially products of 
individuation and, as such, are the masks in which pre- 
individuation, articulated by Deleuze as the metastable 
differences appear to us. 
The ground [fond] as it appears in a homogeneous extensity is 
notably a projection of something 'deeper' (profound): only the 
85 
latter may be called ungrund or groundless . 
The passage from metastable (spatium) to stable (extensio) 
is made manifest in the implicate difference as energised 
intensity and which is explicated in the specificity of 
qualities and quantities. 
85 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 229. 
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However, this resists any determination to indicate such 
intensity as a mere physical force but as a dimension of the 
idea 136 in that (within the idea) it causes virtuality to pass 
into actuality. Deleuze made clear that this causal change 
of the virtual into the actual must not be confused with the 
application of a scientific concept, as it remains essentially 
a transcendental principle that enfolds from the implicate 
energy of the spatium and not in the explication of the 
extensio - whereas the scientific principle as empirical 
energy resides only in the 'commonsense' of explicated 
extensio. 
Heidegger, in 'On the Question of Being', quoted 
Nietzsche from his posthumously published notes, The Will 
to Power, in describing nihilism as 'this most uncanny of all 
guests' because when manifest as 'unconditional will to 
will', it 'willed' homelessness; was not in itself 'diseased' 
but as what he described 'corporeally', as a 'cancer-causing 
agent', made 'visible through its agency'. 87 For Derrida, the 
outside of the house continues to be organised by the 
house's logic and so therefore remains in some way inside. 
In this sense the other, in being placed outside, is 
domesticated and therefore kept 'inside'. 
86 Deleuze argues that the idea (of which intensity is a dimension) has 
three dimensions: 
i) Singular points embodied in quantities/parts. 
ii Relations between singular points embodied in qualities/species 
characteristics. 
iii) Intensities which effect the spatio-temporal actuahsation of 
singular points and their relations. 
Intensity is that which the faculty of sensibility (the five senses) can 
alone experience and although the 'idea' is not associated with any 
particular faculty, it provokes each into what Deleuze describes as 
'disjunctive functioning', which communicates a kind of violence from 
faculty to faculty. Intensity is identified by Deleuze as the 
simulacrum (the true character or form of that which is), which, 
possessing no identity of its own appears by disguising itself. 
87 Heidegger, 'On the Question of Being', p. 292. 
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In Margins of Philosophy, Derrida provides a warning 
against the appropriation of shelter and the hestial as the 
foundation of any notion of spatiality: 
To attempt an exit and a deconstruction without changing the 
terrain, by repeating what is implicit in the founding concepts 
and the original problematic, by using against the edifice the 
instruments or stones available in the house, that is, equally, 
in language. Here one risks ceaselessly confirming, 
consolidating, relifting [relever], at an always more certain 
depth, that which one allegedly deconstructs. The continuous 
process of making explicit, moving toward an opening, risks 
sinking into the autism of the closure. 88 
The subversion of the a priori of interior/presence over 
exterior/representation does not take place by the 
usurpation of one over the other but by the implication that 
exteriority as representation structures the interior as an 
effect of that representation. In a sense, the house is the 
metaphor that precedes metaphor by determining the 
condition of the proper, which remains detached from the 
inferior metaphorical. This is interpreted as the interior 
presence of the proper operating as that, which excludes 
and negates the metaphorical exterior. Such would be this 
condition of violence that is implicated in the positing of the 
architectural edifice as not only the figuration of a 
mechanism of control but also the conditional arbiter of how 
order might be determined. 
88 Added emphasis. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy ('The Ends of Man'), 
p. 130. Wigley argues in The Architecture of Deconstruction that, 
'language is a house because it is a mode of appropriation whereby 
thought recovers presence in the face of alienating representation. It 
is a house because it appropriates, making proper by excluding 
representation and establishing a "proximity" to presence' (p. 102). 1 
am also reminded here of what has been earlier remarked about a 
'change in terrain' requiring a 'new language'. See earlier references 
to Heidegger, JOnger and Bachofen. 
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It sets a tone for the interpretation of the metaphysical 
edifice in thought which, having been built on violence of 
repression, can only be indicative of another kind of 
violence through the posture of a visceral intervention as 
the means by which the structure can be undermined and 
reconfigured. 
When Derrida, in 'Violence and Metaphysics', 
questions the continuity of the thinking of Heideggarian 
being and Husserlian phenomenality, he does so via the 
process of dismantling and dispossession that he indicates 
is proffered by the work of Levinas . 
89 Derrida argues that 
what he defines as Levinas's eschatology is never literal, 
but is: 
a question of designating a space or hollow within naked 
experience where this eschatology can be understood and 
resonate. This hollow space is not an opening among others. It 
is opening itself, the opening of opening, that which can be 
enclosed within no category or totality that is everything within 
experience which can no longer be described by traditional 
concepts and which resists every philosopheme. 90 
89 Derrida also suggests in 'Violence and Metaphysics' that the security 
of the Greco-European tradition is a knowledge that is neither 
'habitual or comfortable but permits us to experience torment or 
distress in general' (p. 82). 
90 Ibid., p. 83. Eschatology is defined as the doctrine of death, 
judgement or heaven and hell. A philosopheme is a philosophical 
proposition, doctrine or principle of reasoning. 
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The method and process by which a building/edifice is 
provisionally realised is generally understood through the 
preliminary organisation of an architectural plan which 
ordinarily takes the form of a drawing or sketch. 91 
The word sketch can be translated into German as 
either Riss or Grundriss, but it remains pertinent to 
consider that the dictionary definition of both these nouns 
not only means a sketch, ground plan or design, but also a 
tear, laceration, gap or outline. 
Heidegger in his text of 1936, 'The Origin of the Work 
of Art', exploited this double connotation of Grundriss as 
both plan or design and crack or tear to define the 
difference he believed inherent in the art work, between the 
revealing of world and the concealing of earth. For him, 
truth establishes itself in the work of art as the strife 
between what he referred to as 'clearing' and 'concealing' - 
the opposition of world and earth, but significantly indicated 
that: 'This rift does not let opponents break apart; it brings 
what opposes measure and boundary in its common outline. ' 
Later in the same text, he stated: 'The rift must set itself 
back into the gravity of stone, the mute hardness of wood, 
the dark glow of colours. ý 92 
91 The significance of drawing as a means of remembering should not 
be lost here. Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind reminds us that the 
origin of graphic representation was supposedly inaugurated in 
antiquity by a young Corinthian woman, Butacles, who, faced with 
long-term separation from her lover, notices on the wall his shadow 
thrown by the lamplight and, inspired by love and a fear of his 
withdrawal from her sight, traces the outline. Derrida notes, 'the 
narrative relates the origin of graphic representation to the absence 
or invisibility of the model. Butades does not see her lover either 
because she turns her back on him ... or because he turns his back to her... it is as if seeing were forbidden in order to draw, as if one 
drew only on the condition of not seeing', p. 49. 
92 Both quotes from Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art' 
(published in Basic Writings), pp. 139-212. Heidegger later states: 
'This rift does not let opponents break-apart, it brings what opposes 
measure and boundary into its common ground' (p. 188). 
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The work of art is disclosed, for Heidegger, in the 
necessary two-fold (double) operation/manoeuvre of world 
revealing and earth concealment and is not a cleft ripped 
open, but a carrying of opponents into unity by virtue of 
their common ground. What is integral to this mapping (here 
I use the term advisedly and with reference to what has 
already been said about the sketch as both plan/map or 
tear/gap), is that the rift of locale not only operates as that 
which separates world and earth, but also that which holds 
them together while maintaining their distinctiveness - the 
orientation of their essential difference. For Heidegger, the 
revelation of worldliness can only take place in the work of 
art if the materiality (its thingliness) of the work is 
maintained in its obscurity, its resistance to the pervasive 
realisation or grasp of it as mere material and therefore the 
understanding of the imperative of that resistance, is the 
essential role of the artist in the realisation of any art work. 
Any attempt to qualify or quantify materiality by 
scientific means continually founders in materiality's 
resistance to be understood in those terms - it reveals 
nothing of its essential nature if, as Heidegger argued, its 
essential nature is to obfuscate. However, there remains in 
Heidegger's interpretation of the relation between 
worldliness and materiality in the artwork, a very specific 
directionality which continued to conform to the already 
indicated arbitration of order found in the architectural 
model. Essentially, earth imposes itself upon world, and 
this verticality can only move in one direction. 
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There is no mechanism in Heidegger's thinking 
whereby the inversion of such an operation; where 
worldliness might impose itself on materiality and with this 
in mind, the parallels with the already identified hierarchy 
of metaphysical order are self evident. 93 The essential 
double operation at work in any true art work was, for 
Heidegger, the reconfiguration of the previously stable 
dialectic of pure presence over its negation as pure 
absence, which also introduced a further complication that 
was made manifest in the inherent phonetic concealment 
implicit in material i ty. 94 The ability of the true artist was not 
only to recognise this resistance as essential to how 
materiality must operate in the realisation of the artwork, 
but in making a virtue of such stubbornness, identify 
worldliness as the model for articulating the appropriate 
circumstances (the spacing) whereby it must be allowed to 
'be itself'. 
93 Heidegger argues that the Greek temple as an architectural edifice 
made visible the ground on which it stood and, as such, 'produced' 
the site through the constitution of a 'ground' by what appeared to be 
added to it. He states: 'To locate the ground is therefore to construct 
an edifice' ('The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 61). His appropriation 
of the temple was significant for two reasons; firstly as a historical 
precedent which cited the particularity of its Greek context as 
fundamental to any understanding of Grund ('ground') and Abgrund 
('abyss'), and secondly, as an attempt to reconfigure the metaphor of 
the implicit verticality of the edifice as a metaphysical framing 
device. Edward S. Casey determines from Heidegger's use of the 
temple metaphor that it encloses and conceals the figure of the god 
and as such, makes the god present. It also gathers to it the unity of 
paths shaping the destiny of the human being (by this he means the 
paths of birth, death, disaster and blessing, disgrace and 
endurance). The 'building's rest' draws up the obscurity of the bulky 
spontaneous support of the rock on which it rests, and therefore 
illuminates and draws attention to its surroundings in which, for 
Heidegger, man bases his dwelling. 
94 As already indicated, Heidegger used a phonetic term to describe the 
appropriate resistance of materiality in the artwork by describing the 
'mute hardness of wood'. This has a strong resonance with what has 
been already articulated regarding silence and the poetic in the 
previous chapter and may enlighten further Heidegger's 
determination and insistence towards silence. 
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Heidegger also argued: 'The founding of truth by art, 
which is exemplified by a building, becomes the 
establishment of the unfamiliar rather than the familiar. Y 95 
The Freudian trope of the uncanny/unheimlich 
articulates this doubling through interval and as pointed out 
by Pamela M. Lee in Object to be Destroyed: The Work of 
Gordon Matta-Clark: 
The sensation of unease founded upon the doubled, shifting 
implications of the German heimlich and unheimlich - at once 
native, belonging to the home and shaded by an almost 
palpable feeling of dread - the uncanny is freighted with both 
architectural and spatial implications. 96 
The contention that the unheimlich functions as the interval 
that distinguishes 'at-home' from 'not-at-home', draws 
attention to the possibility of familiarity effacing the 
possibilities of what is essentially unfamiliar. Freud, in his 
essay 'The Uncanny', also drew attention to this as a 
potential for spatiality. The unheimlichluncanny can be 
identified by its capacity for dislocation motivated by an 
inherent and persistent lack of orientation at work within it. 
This capacity for disorientation may well conceal a more 
destructive repression operating within the architectural 
, model' as that which conditions through violence. 97 
95 Added emphasis. Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 65. Ir 
The Architecture of Deconstruction, Mark Wigley suggests that the 
unfamiliar, as is indicated by Heidegger in 'The Origin of the Work of 
Art', is the overflowing of the familiar. The familiar institution of 
philosophy seeks to efface any unfamiliarity and in so doing, block 
out any possibilities. 
96 Added emphasis. Lee, Object to be Destroyed, pp. 8-9. 
97 Orientation and the labyrinthine will be considered in greater depth 
in Chapter 4 of this text. 
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As already indicated, the concealment by which the 
metaphor of architectural figuration veils the characteristic 
universalising of the metaphysical project under the auspice 
of a revelation of pre-determined order, essentially 
represses through violence and deceives through 
subterfuge. Mark Wigley argues: 
The tradition of metaphysics institutes itself by concealing its 
own violence. The architectural figure of the grounded 
structure sustains this violence by affecting concealment. The 
vertical hierarchy it configures is a mechanism of control that 
dissimulates its own strategic violence. Its familiarity marks 
the extent of its control. 98 
Violence begetting violence calls into question firstly the 
integrity of that which comes first - is in a sense a priori - 
in that the repressive nature of metaphysics brings upon 
itself the visceration of discontinuity through its own 
determination to repress by subterfuge. 99 Secondly, that 
which refutes assimilation does so through the violence of a 
determined resistance and, as such, could well be placed in 
advance of any notion of the imposition of a pre-existing 
order. 
98 Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 60. In his foreword to 
The Wolf Man's Magic Word ('Fors'), Derrida determines that 'the 
crypt itself is built by violence' (p. xv). 
99 In the text 'Sanctum and Sacrum', Bachofen states: 'A guilty man's 
chains are removed after he has undergone punishment, those of a 
man whose innocence has been established are cut through with a 
file. What has been fastened by violence must be loosed by counter 
violence' (p. 42). 
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Heidegger argued in An Introduction to Metaphysics: 
We are taking the strange, the uncanny <das unheimliche>, as 
that which casts us out of the 'homely', i. e. the customary, 
familiar, secure. The unhomely <Unheimlische> prevents us 
from making ourselves at home and therein it is overpowering. 
But man is the strangest of all, not only because he passes his 
life amid the strange understood in this sense, but because he 
departs from his customary, familiar limits, because he is the 
violent one, who, tending toward the strange in the sense of 
the overpowering, surpasses the limit of the familiar <das 
Heimliche>. 100 
The ambiguity of this double invocation of over-powerment 
with particular reference to a conduct of violence inherent 
in the surpassing of any recognised limit of familiarity, 
further complicates any interpretation of violence as either 
merely the suppressing of exteriority or the eruption of an 
outside at the site of the hestial. Heidegger determined that 
the terror of such over-powerment was found in the 
compelling panic of true fear - 'a silent awe that vibrates 
with its own rhythm'. 101 Also it meant powerful in the sense 
of an individual who 'uses' power and whereby it insists 
(through the disposition of that power) through action but 
also as a condition of being-there (Dasein). 
As such, there is an implication that the unheimlich 
property of architectonics operates as consistent 
characteristic of the model, but through the alteric deviance 
100 Added emphasis. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp 150- 
1. Earlier in the text Heidegger quotes from Sophocles' Antigone 
(lines 332-75) but highlights the first two lines: 'There is much that 
is strange, but nothing that surpasses man in strangeness. ' Man, for 
Heidegger (and therefore his interpretation of Greek thinking), is 
deinotaton - the strangeness that transgresses the contending 
separation of being (by which is meant the ontological difference). 
101 Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 149. 
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of a kind of ontological subterfuge it appears to function as 
a kind of invisible topological invariant. 
If we understand topology as the branch of 
mathematical geometry generally understood to be the 
study of invariant or permanent characteristics or 'thingly' 
properties within the continuous surface of a shape or form, 
we might begin to find in a kind of spectrality that is 
contemporaneous with the scientific. These invariant 
characteristics are studied in the sense that the 
connectedness of any continuous surface allows for the 
distortion of that surface without disconnecting what is 
already connected or connecting what was previously 
unconnected. Such characteristics operate as punctum 
within the language of the event of mapping of a surface 
and through their invariant status within the continuity of 
that surface, persist and survive any distortion. 
A topology of the other may then be provisionally 
interpreted as the study of characteristics or properties of 
the architectural surface that are pertinent to, and map the 
edifice, yet remain other to it - outside of it, yet integral to 
it. In the section entitled 'Taking Shelter in the Uncanny' in 
The Architecture of Deconstruction, Mark Wigley states: 
For Derrida, the 'outside' of a house continues to be organised 
by the logic of the house and so actually remains inside it. By 
being placed outside the 'other' is placed, domesticated, kept 
102 inside . 
102 Ibid., p. 107. 
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I would like to suggest that the complication of this topology 
is that the clarity of a binary opposition of clearly defined 
metaphysical distinctions between interior (presence) and 
exterior (absence), the hestial (domestic) and the hermetic 
(nomadic), and the exclusivity or a priori of metaphysical 
presence as an a priori, is usurped and complicated by an 
alteric operation. 
THE ENCYST-ENCE OF THE NON-UMENT 103 
The fantasy involves eating the object (through the 
mouth or otherwise) in order not to introject it, in order 
to vomit it, in a way, into the inside, into the pocket of a 
cyst. 104 
In an early project like Time WellICherry Tree (1971), 105 
Matta-Clark's 'act of liberation' demonstrated a paradoxical 
approach to the buildings ostensible support through what 
the artist described as a 'permanent non-structural sub- 
basement burial'. 106 In excavating beneath the edifice, 
Matta-Clark's subtending conveyed the foundational as 
103 The term non-ument is borrowed from Judith Russi Kirshner's essay 
'Non-uments', published in the Serpentine Gallery catalogue, Gordon 
Matta-Clark, 1993, pp. 365-8. 
104 See footnote 45 of this chapter. 
105 Time Well was begun on New Years Day 1971 and was originally 
entitled Cherry Tree. The work involved the planting of a cherry tree 
sapling in a hole excavated in the floor of 112 Greene Street, New 
York. Measuring 8ft long by 4ft wide and 6ft deep, it allowed only the 
crown of the tree to remain visible, resulting in a failure to take root 
and the sapling's demise after three months in the dark, airless 
environment. It was latterly replaced by mushrooms and finally, after 
six months, its 'presence' was memorialised by Time Well, whereby a 
ceramic pipe was placed in the now vacant hole in which was housed 
a bottle in which the remains of the original tree had been placed. 
The pipe was 'crowned' by a 1ft square zinc well cover, set in 
concrete and the remaining cavity was filled, while the original cavity 
was delineated by the pouring of molten lead into the expansion joint 
of the concrete slab. 
106 Gordon Matta-Clark, notebook and cited in Serpentine catalogue, p. 
369. 
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essentially a virtual absence represented through the figure 
of the hole. 
The impossibility of such an enterprise is instructive 
because it indicated that what in a sense 'held up' 112 
Greene Street, could neither be contained or articulated by 
the integrity of architectonics but was conditioned, as 
Pamela M. Lee points out, 'by something deeply 
inaccessible, offsite even'. 107 
Matta-Clark said of the project: 
I dug a deep hole in the basement of 1 12 Greene Street. What 
I wanted to do I didn't accomplish at all, which was digging 
deep enough into the foundations so that a person could see 
the actual foundations, the 'removed' spaces under the 
foundation, and liberate the building's enormous compressive, 
confining forces simply by making a hole. 
107 Lee, Object to be Destroyed, p. 67. 
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This operation, which I now proffer as a manoeuvre of 
spacing, not only includes what is historically recognised as 
subordinate exteriority - an inferior absence encrypted in 
the ordered house of a proper unmediated metaphysical 
presence - it also maintains it in its detachment - the alien 
retained within the corporeal edifice as a kind of operation 
of parasitic introjection now interpreted as encyst-ence 
through the eventuation of symbiotic morselation. As Mark 
Wigley states in The Architecture of Deconstruction: 
Metaphysics is that which subordinates space, associating it 
with 'death', 'decay', 'degeneration', 'representation', 
'dissimulation', 'interruption', 'seduction', 'materiality', 
'sensuality', 'monstrosity' and so on. '08 
108 Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 68. 
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The project entitled Descending Steps for Batan was a work 
by Matta-Clark and realised in the Galerie Yvon Lambert, 
Paris 1977. Matta-Clark was one of twins (Matta-Clark was 
the elder by five minutes). His younger brother Sebastian 
(known as Batan), who had a history of depression, had 
apparently committed suicide by jumping from the window of 
Matta-Clark's studio in New York the previous year. Their 
mother, Anne Albert (ne6 Clark), interviewed in October 
1980 said of Batan: 
From the age of 4 he was constantly drawing. There was never 
any doubt about what he would do. Gordon would tell stories 
and make sounds and Batan would draw and illustrate them. I 
think Gordon was set back by Batan. Batan felt superior about 
his art, and Gordon had to overcome that. '09 
109 Taken from an interview conducted by Richard Armstrong and 
published in the Serpentine Gallery catalogue, p. 393. On a 
biographical note, Derrida comments in his text Memoirs of the Blind 
that he suffered from a 'wounded jealousy before an older brother 
whom I admired, as did everyone around him, for his talent as a 
draftsman ... His works, I must say in all fraternity, were merely 
copies: often portraits done in black pencil or India ink that 
reproduced family photographs ... or pictures reproduced in books. ' And later in the same text: 'I suffered seeing my brother's drawings 
on permanent display, religiously framed on the walls of every room. 
I tried my hand at imitating his copies: a pitiable awkwardness 
confirmed for me the double certainty of having been punished, 
deprived and cheated, but also, and because of this even, secretly 
chosen. ' He further remarks that: 'as if in place of drawing, which the 
blind man in me had renounce for life, I was called to another trait, 
this graphics of invisible words, this accord of time and voice that is 
called (the word) - or writing, scripture' (p. 37). 
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The twins' Father, the artist Roberto Matta, developed this 
analysis of their relationship in interviews conducted in 
January and February 1981. He said: 
Batan couldn't articulate what he had. He always would tell 
things in a complicated way, never straight, always a 
circuitous route ... with twins you must 
divide affection equally 
between both. It is very difficult. We registered them as 'A' 
and 'B', then we gave them Kachina names - 'Xibal' and 
'Numbac' or we called them the 'one' or the 'other', Batan was 
thin, very pretty, the fat one was 'Gordo'. "O 
Freud said of the phenomenon of the double, "' or the twin, 
in the essay 'The Uncanny', that it originally begins as an 
insurance against the destruction of the ego - an energetic 
denial of the power of death, but that such ideas have 
sprung from: 
[the] soil of unbounded self-love, from primary narcissism 
which dominates the mind of the child and of primitive man. 
110 Added emphasis. Roberto Matta interview published in Serpentine 
Gallery catalogue, 1993, pp. 395-6. 
ill The significance of the double or twin resonates across not only this 
text but also the following chapter. The phi-creatureslvisitors that 
appear in Tarkovsky's film (and Lem's novel) Solaris are simulacra 
drawn from the memories of the scientists on the space station 
orbiting the planet, and Mark Z. Danielewski explores the relationship 
between Will and Tom Navidson (also twins) in The Navidson Record 
strand of his novel House of Leaves. 
236 
But when this stage has been surmounted, the 'double' 
reverses its aspect. From having been an assurance of 
immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death. 112 
Pamela M. Lee in Object to be Destroyed described the 
excavation project, Descending Steps for Batan, thus: 
Through the simple ritual of digging he [Matta-Clark] collapsed 
the work of art in the present with a figure who was now part 
of the past. In a place conventionally reserved for the new, a 
memorial to his brother was staged and was subsequently 
absorbed into the gallery. 113 
Here, the assured domesticity of the ordered architectural 
place of the gallery is called upon to include the alien via 
the object (by which I mean Matta-Clark's completed activity 
- the non-ument of his excavation) of mourning through an 
act of architectural ingestion. What persists as the phantom 
part of this inclusive event is an understanding that the 
incorporation of the memorial or non-ument in the structure 
of the gallery does not connote an act of absorption. The 
architectural body of the gallery finds what is inherent in 
the exclusive otherness of death impossible to assimilate 
and, as such, foreign to its own security. Wigley indicates 
that Derrida, in 'Limited Inc., abc remarks: 
The object is appropriated to keep it as other, as foreign, as a 
foreign body within one's own body, taken into the body 
precisely to stop it from contaminating and disfiguring the body 
by keeping it withdrawn in indefinite quarantine: retaining the 
112 Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 357. 
113 Lee, Object to be Destroyed, p. 207. 
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object within itself but as something excluded, as a foreign 
body which is impossible to assimilate and must be rejected. 
114 
Coming at almost the end of Matta-Clark's working life, and 
just before his own death, Descending Steps for Batan was 
not as already indicated, an isolated event of memorial but 
had been preceded by a project with similar concerns and in 
particular, the cogency of the entropic (Time WellICherry 
Tre e) ". 
As the excavation of the gallery floor it followed the 
provisional trajectory of the earlier project, diverging only 
to reconsider the entropic integration of an entity, a 
'something' secreted in the foundations of the building, in 
order to articulate the peculiarity of the void as the 
antithesis of stability and the principality of all that is 
explainable through reasonableness. Caution is noted here 
when considering the seeming inversion of the foundational 
with the abysmal by following Derrida's precept of tracing 
which draws attention to what he describes as 'the 
bottomless pit of failed chronologies'. 
The project not only mirrors (possibly the term inverts 
is more appropriate) Matta-Clark's brother's precipitous fall 
from the studio window but in some way extends the 
trajectory of the body beyond its inevitable contact with the 
ground (the obdurate materiality of the telluric). 
114 Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 1 44, quoted from 
Derrida, 'Limited Inc., abc... '(& found in Derrida, Limited Inc, trans. S. 
Weber, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1988. p. 77). 
115 Entropy as the measurement of energy in a mechanical or chemical 
system identifies a force which is significant because it remains 
unavailable for the performance of work but exists as the internal 
motion of the molecular. It is generally interpreted as a measure of 
loss of order or decay through degradation, and understood in 
thermodynamic terms, proffers at most, a kind of stasis which may be 
perceived as in some way increasing only through a cold or lethargic 
dissipation, which is understood as a progressive disintegration of 
form that is seemingly irreversible. 
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In excavating a stairwell the artist makes provision (or 
perhaps a post-preparation) for extending Batan's 'fall' 
beyond the 'ground' through the realisation of a tangible 
mechanism by which a fall might be averted (a set of 
stairs). 116 With this in mind, we might also consider that the 
introduction of any means of traversing from one level to 
another mediates for the possibility of such a perambulation 
operating in both directions. 
Does the construction/excavation of a stairwell into 
the floor of Galerie Yvon Lambert, Paris in 1977 operate as 
116 Note here that the significance of the 'stairwell' extends into Mark Z. 
Danielewski's text House of Leaves, where it is the most significant 
element of the labyrinth which changes dimensions throughout the 
exploration. This will be considered more fully in Chapter 4 of this 
text. The form of the stair is also explored in a further project 
realised at Documenta 6 in Kassal in Germany in 1977 by Matta- 
Clark: Jacob's Ladder*. 
*Note here the fraternal rivalry and deception (of the younger brother 
at the expense of the elder) at the core of the biblical story of Jacob 
and Esau from which the story of Jacob's Ladder originates. In the 
Book of Genesis, Jacob dreams of a ladder while sleeping in the 
desert, on which angels ascend and descend* and at the apex of 
which Jehovah expounds on Jacob's future as the 'father' of Israel. It 
is noted in the monograph, Gordon Matta-Clark, that: 'He chose 
Jacob's Ladder for its title, which calls on the Old Testament for an 
analogy not only to a striving for redemption but also a disastrous 
rivalry between brothers with one failing from grace of both his father 
and his god' (p. 106). The project was originally conceived as a five- 
armed rope structure strung between three smokestacks 300 feet high 
and 460 feet apart. Supporting steel cables stretching from the base 
of one stack to the apex of another enclosed a mesh which 'hovered' 
some 15 stories from the ground. However, practicalities prevailed 
and Matta-Clark settled for a single stack with a descending mesh 
which visitors were invited to climb down. 
The section of House of Leaves where the relationship between 
Will and Tom Navidson is discussed is broken into sections (forming 
the configuration of a ladder) by the elongation of the word rzz. It is 
noted that the word rzz is etymologically rooted in the Hebrew word 
yitrozzu (meaning to tear apart and to shatter) in order to emphasise 
Jacob and Esau's struggle. Derrida comments in Memoirs of the 
Blind: 'How does one choose between two brothers? Between two 
twins, in sum, since Jacob was Esau's twin, even though he was born 
after him and his brother sold him his birthright (he "despised his 
birthright")'** (p. 23). What we might recognise as the seeming 
assurance of a stairway as a means of safely traversing a 'verticality' 
is called into question in Danielewski's House of Leaves through a 
discontinuity of dimensionality based in psychological spacing. 
Ascent and Descent will be discussed further in relation to 
Descending Steps for Batan. 
Quoted by Derrida from the Book of Genesis, 25: 34. 
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both a means of alleviating Batan's fall beyond the mere 
restrictions of corporeal contact and its inevitable 
consequences as well as offering a way out or a means by 
which he might return? 
That the excavation is not merely a hole - an abysmal 
incursion into the floor of the gallery space, but 
significantly a means by which a 'some-body' might affect a 
traversal in either direction is pertinent to the reading of the 
work and extends the interpretation of Matta-Clark's 
transgressive events of visceration beyond that of a socio- 
political act against any prevailing system. However, the 
specificity of this particular work (its location) in a gallery 
rather than in Matta-Clark's preferred locations in derelict 
buildings should not be lost here. The fact that this work 
very deliberately and very literally undermines the 
mechanism by which artworks can be exhibited (the gallery) 
already implicates the project as an act of violence against 
a system by which artists and their work are organised and 
marketed. The work itself, though poses a problem for such 
a system in that it refuses to conform to the recognised 
parameters by which the private gallery system operates 
and funds itself. 117 
117 It is noted here that Corinne Diserens, in 'The Greene Street Years' 
(published in the catalogue to the 1992-3 exhibition, Gordon Matta- 
Clark, and presented at the Serpentine Gallery), comments that: 
'Matta-Clark tried to go along two roads - ecstasy ascending or the 
mystic way, and ecstasy descending or the civic way - in order to 
create his work for the city. One might speak of a double 
transcendence' (p. 360, added emphasis). 
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Let us consider for a moment that the work as an 
event -a performance by the artist that exists for a period 
of time (the process of its making and the duration of the 
exhibiting of the work) which cannot be commodified in the 
way that directly profits the gallery itself unless it is in 
some way transposed from pure event into a documented 
resource which falls in to line with the system which might 
profit from it. 118 
Not only would this act of violence stake a claim for it 
as a critique of the gallery's status as the arbiter of and 
temple to artistic endeavour, but also introduce an alteric 
non-element - the so-called non-ument into the preserve of 
conservation and aesthetic stability. As Pamela M. Lee 
points out in Object to be Destroyed: 'In a place 
conventionally reserved for the new, a memorial to his 
brother was staged and was subsequently absorbed into the 
space of the gallery. "19 
The fact that the work existed within the specificity of 
a temporal framework should not exclude an interpretation 
which draws on further anomalies, by which its credibility as 
a memorial might be addressed outside that structure and 
118 It is noted here that all Matta-Clark's projects survive largely as 
documentation (there are some exceptions where fragments (what 
Robert Smithson would term non-sites) were retained and exhibited 
from particular interventions; sections of Splitting and Bingo (both 
1974) were later shown in galleries), and therefore the means by 
which we can even begin to discuss his work is based in the 
intangibility of this kind of recollection. I also mention here two 
comparable works by Yves Klein (1958) and Michael Archer (1974). 
The former realised a piece entitled The Void (Le Vide), which 
consisted of an empty exhibition space heralded by a private view at 
which guests imbibed blue-coloured cocktails (the result being that 
any 'evidence' of the exhibition was manifest in the colour of the 
urine of all who attended and drank and which remained blue for days 
afterwards). Archer's project involved the removal of a wall in the 
Claire Copley Gallery in Los Angeles which revealed the office space 
whereby the 'business aspect' of the gallery mechanism was exposed 
to the scrutiny of the audience. 
119 Lee, Object to be Destroyed, p. 207. 
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with which undecidibilities might inform a reading of the 
project. 
Matta-Clark's relationship with his brother must remain 
at the forefront of any interpretation of Descending Steps 
for Batan and the significance of the biological proximity of 
that relation (the knowledge that they were twins) appears 
to be crucial. As already stated, Batan was the younger of 
the two and, according to their mother, was the most 
conspicuously artistically talented as a child. A suggestion 
of sibling rivalry is perhaps not without some merit and the 
growing recognition of Matta-Clark's creative work against 
the evident historical eclipse of Batan's artistic aspirations 
may have some bearing on the latter's eventual suicide and 
his choice for the location of that successful attempt (the 
window of his brother's studio). 120 
120 The issue of sibling rivalry is brought into sharp focus in Mark Z. 
Danielewski's House of Leaves and will be considered further in 
Chapter 4 of this text. Suffice to say that Danielewski explores the 
Navidson brothers' (Tom and Will) relationship with regard to the 
evolving complexity of the house and the subsequent explorations of 
its labyrinthine hallways. Both brothers are in some way literally 
ingested or swallowed by the house but only Will is 'vomited' back 
out into the world, as it were, whereas Tom is 'vomited' into the body 
of the house and is 'retained' by it. (The word house is continually 
printed in blue (a light grey in the paperback) and this formatting is 
never clearly explained. The implication is of some kind of hyperlink 
that may refer to the text's original publication on the net, but 
perhaps more significantly, as the text unfolds, it refers to the link of 
the house with the alteric labyrinth that emerges - what we might 
refer to as a hyperlink to the unheimlich. ) 
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His early artistic precociousness identified by their mother 
was undermined by mental instability (and his elder 
brother's developing career), and therefore a literal 
interpretation of Descending Steps for Batan might infer 
some kind of fraternal exorcism on the part of the elder 
brother, while in some way simultaneously proffering a 
portal by which the spectral younger sibling might navigate 
to and from the abysmal. 121 
The particularity of Matta-Clark's entitling of the work 
Descending makes clear a directional imperative in the 
piece which does not necessarily imply some kind of 
concurrence with a decision which led towards the 
termination of life, but in its aftermath, an attempt to 
identify a conduit by which and for which that life might 
resonate. 
The precariousness of the edifice/corporeal is brought 
into sharp focus when attention is drawn by this most 
dissective scrutiny to the formulations which underpin and, 
as such, are open to such violent transgressions on the 
understanding that the begetting of any formal 
architectonics (body or otherwise) must be forged in the 
violence of a kind of repression. That Matta-Clark's 
121 1 would also like to note here a work by Matta-Clark realised in 1973 
and entitled Threshole-Bronx Floors: Double Doors. This work 
consisted of a series of removals which opened up the cubicle-like 
interiors of urban domiciles that had formerly been sequestered from 
one another (specifically in this piece, the removal of the floor on 
either side of an interior door). Matta-Clark is quoted in the recently 
published monograph of his work as saying that these transgressive 
acts were: 'Completion through removal. Abstraction of surfaces. 
Not-building, not-to-build, not-built-space' (Gordon Matta-Clark, 
p. 58). Note here earlier remarks made about sibling rivalry as 
broached by Derrida in Memoirs of the Blind. In a letter of 5 July 
1992 quoted by Corinne Diserens in her essay, 'The Greene Street 
Years', and sent to IVAM by Matta-Clark's former partner Carol 
Goodden, she comments: 'Gurdjieff was the philosopher he was 
enamored of. Duchamp was a silent force. Matta (father) was his 
psychological drive. Batan was his guilt' (p. 359, added emphasis). 
244 
subversive and almost guerrilla-like activities drew attention 
to the inconsistencies in a historical rhetoric of urban social 
architectural practice is concomitant with a wider challenge 
to the systernisation of the domicile to the advantage of 
corporative enterprise and at the expense of the 
particularity of individuation and need. 122 
Equally, a project like Descending Steps for Batan not 
only questions the status of the gallery space as an 
appropriate location for the viewing of the artwork, but also 
in some way draws attention to the social condition whereby 
mental instability might be considered and ingested (and 
not necessarily absorbed) into the social system. It also 
questions how such psychological criteria proffer a critique 
of the mechanisms for assimilation through the consistency 
of social exclusion and alienation. 123 
In interrupting the recognised order of the exhibition 
space, Matta-Clark not only addresses the issue of how that 
space functions and who it is for, but in excavating a 
memorial as an inscription of the void to commemorate the 
untimely demise of his younger brother, he also scrutinises 
the social imperative to locate mental illness. 
The particularity of his own act of mourning implies a 
wider perception of the problematic demarcation of 
interiority and exteriority by not only identifying 
122 Paul Virilio notes in Bunker Archaeology the shift in military 
architecture from the geometric organisation of the landscape to the 
construction of subterranean excavations - fortified non-uments. He 
states: 'It was no longer in distance but rather in burial that the man 
of war found the parry to the onslaught of his adversary; retreat was 
now into the very thickness of the planet and no longer along its 
surface' (p. 38). 
123 Michel Foucault in Madness and Civilisation makes the point that the 
eruption of skin diseases such as scabies, eczema or small pox ' put 
an end to a fit of madness; the corruption that left the viscera and 
the brain, to spread on the surface of the body, where it was 
released externally' (p. 164, added emphasis). 
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commemoration as the complication of the rational relation 
between presence and absence, but also through the 
conditional arbitration of mental illness as essentially 
alteric, and therefore sustained and maintained socially and 
geographically on the periphery of the organised state (the 
Polis). 
Matta-Clark's abysmal fenestrating encryption of the 
memory of his brother into the foundational determination of 
not only the literal structure of the gallery building but also 
into the metaphorical framework that the figure of the 
gallery implied (its social status as part of the wider 
organisation of the polis), introduced the commemoration of 
the crypt and its spectral articulation as an integral aspect 
of the phenomenon of architectonics. The key issues 
prevailing in much of Matta-Clark's oeuvre addressed the 
condition of a kind of wholesale social injustice which 
mediated the inherent violence complicit in the organised 
infrastructure and determination of social space by 
corporate bodies. As such, this violent repression of 
individuation in favour of the imposition of an interpretation 
of a common good through the hierarchical dispensation of 
predetermined order was ripe for critique. 
Rather than set about demolishing these values, 
Matta-Clark's interventions set about to engage in an 
almost dissective scrutiny via the operation of the hand (the 
manoeuvre) that is perhaps less of an operative procedure 
to navigate the carnality of the polis, uncover the canker 
and remove it, but more a topological determination to draw 
attention to the parasitic cystitis as concomitant to that 
order as not merely determined by it but determinant to any 
ordering (its spectrality). 
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Through the articulation of a visceral event, Matta- 
Clark did not seek to uncover what is necessarily unknown 
in the sense of a fundamentally new discovery but rather to 
illuminate through a seemingly violent act what has perhaps 
been forgotten, repressed or merely dismissed as 
irrelevant. The opening up through the revelation of the cut 
can be seen as instructive, in that it reveals the skeletal 
organisation that determines structure at its optimum as a 
structure. However, I would propose that this manoeuvre is 
perhaps more complex than the fenestration of a membrane, 
which would merely lead to the observation of what lies 
beyond that perimeter. 
A more appropriate term might perhaps draw on the 
inherent characteristics of both a rift, in the sense of a cut 
or rupture in the fabrication of an ordered edifice, a break 
in its continuity, and a fold, in the sense of a change or a 
ruck in what is continuous (an aleatory point or fraenum) 124 
that is part of any continuity without merely being an 
absorbed into it - what I will cautiously term a ructure. 
Matta-Clark's interventions do not encise to draw 
attention to an alterity that is merely transcendent in the 
124 A fraenum is a fold of mucous membrane or skin, especially under 
the tongue, checking the motion of an organ. The significance of this 
as a corporeal mechanism for articulation (speech) should not be lost 
here. I would also like to mention here the tympanum (as discussed 
in Derrida's essay 'Tympan', found in Margins of Philosophy) as the 
means by which sound resonates in the eardrum (via interaction with 
the hammer) as well as being intrinsic to balance. Its membranous 
structure functions as a kind of perimeter which allows sound to 
resonate off it so it can be heard. In a footnote in Tympan, Derrida 
states: 'The hammer, as is well known, belongs to the chain of small 
bones, along with the anvil and stirrup. It is placed on the internal 
surface of the tympanic membrane. It always has the role of 
mediation and communication: it transmits sonic vibrations to the 
chain of small bones, and then to the inner ear' (p. xiii). The paradox 
(as Derrida points out via Bichat) is that the hammer protects the 
tympanum while at the same time acting upon it - without it the 
tympanum could be damaged by the powerful vibrations set off by 
louder noises, so the hammer muffles and weakens while 
simultaneously transmitting sound. 
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sense of the revelation of what is essentially unattainable, 
but to recognise any corporeality as integral to the 
observation of what appears to be outside. This is not 
metaphysically exclusive, or understood as merely 
excluded, but inclusively exclusive understood as 
encryptive. It does not say that there is other that is always 
already other - an exclusive alterity beyond all 
predetermined remits, but that the other is always already 
'here' (not in any sense of a presence and therefore not 
occupying any locale that might be understood as 
fundamentally topographic). It is encrypted into any 
architectonics as part of its determination to function as a 
structure without conforming to any structural motifs that 
might merely restrain it from what it can do. The ructure is 
neither just a hole in the sense of a rupture or a fold in the 
sense of a ruck. 
The crypt in Derridian terms does not set about to 
bring mourning and the dead into the house, but to suggest 
that the event of mourning and the manifestation of the 
dead (the spectre) were always and already integral to the 
formation of the house and were not later appendages to be 
bolted on, as it were. As Mark Wigley states: 'The effects of 
place and taking place depend on the para SitiC125 rules of 
the crypt, by which that which is officially expelled over the 
line is secretly appropriated in order to hold the line. ý 126 
Matta-Clark's removals (the parts of his interventions 
which became 'non-sites') do not just demolish but relocate, 
125 The parasitic occupier of the cyst suggests a further reading of the 
operation of encyst-ence. It is no longer mere 'morbid matter' but has 
the appearance of something far more sinister - the double 
manoeuvre of host and parasite engaged in an 'alien symbiotic event' 
of sustenance and introjection. 
126 Added emphasis. Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction, p. 184. 
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extending the plane of immanence of each project to 
encrypt themselves in other unexplored locations that 
articulate possibilities beyond the sum of their parts. That 
Descending Steps for Batan is in one sense a literal non- 
urnent to commemorate the demise of his sibling should not 
necessarily be the exclusive interpretation of this project 
whose potential extends (as with all his projects) beyond 
the individual conglomerations of Matta-Clark's life. It not 
only says something about his memory, and is in some way 
the realisation of how that memory might function in 
corporeal terms, but demands scrutiny of a wider locale for 
the memorial -a question of where that event of 
commemoration might take place. 
This might take the form (and I use this term 
cautiously, given that what is essentially taking place here 
is without form, in any historical recognition of the word) of 
what we might refer to as an encyst-ence and which we 
might define as the event of or the spacing of the ructure. 127 
Here, the corporeality of the cyst provides a useful analogy 
with the encryptive dissection of Matta-Clark's various 
projects and interventions. 
127 Encyst is defined as the event of enclosure in a cyst. 
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The operation of spacing, as previously discussed, 
introjects a lingual reading of the artwork that significantly 
blurs any boundaries which might differentiate between a 
clear distinction of temporal and spatial Motif S. 128 
By defining Matta-Clark's operations by the terms of 
the unheimlich manoeuvre as already indicated, we 
anticipate a complication which recognises the cystic as 
128 Note here the significance of the cyst and its parallel with the 
historical alteric rhetoric of the manclorla. This is the egg- or almond- 
shaped aureole (from the Italian, mandel for almond) around the 
figure of the resurrected Christ or the Virgin at assumption, and 
portrayed in many painterly representations to indicate their 
otherness once they have transcended earthly corporeality. However, 
they maintain a connection with humanity by retaining the outward 
appearance of the body and can be recognised as such. The 
mandorla indicates difference/separateness while simultaneously 
articulating similitude. 
The significance of the almond is also found in Celan. John 
Felstiner comments in his text, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew, that: 
'the oval-eyed sweet or bitter fruit had signalled Jewishness - his 
mother's or his people's' (p. 260). The significance is clearly indicted 
in the poem 'Mandorla' (1957): 
In the almond-what stands in the almond? 
The Nothing. 
In the almond stands Nothing. 
There it stands and stands. 
In Nothing-who stands there? The King. 
There stands the King, the King. 
There he stands and stands. 
Jewish curls, no gray for you. 
And your eye-whereto stands your eye? 
Your eye stands opposite the almond. 
Your eye, the Nothing it stands opposite. 
It stands behind the King. 
So it stands and stands. 
Human curls, no gray for you 
Empty almond, royal blue. * 
Felstiner notes that what stands in the almond is not mere nothing 
(Nichts) but das Nichts - Nothingness or 'the Nothing'. What is 
heard here is the paradox of emptiness and pure Being in 
Heidegger's question in What is Metaphysics? - 'How stands it with 
the Nothing? ' He suggests that the Nothing here is the Nothing of 
God and for Celan, is transformed into an annihilated people (the 
Jews) and an unknowable God. He also notes that Celan's use of 
Menschenlocke (human curls) shifts the emphasis from specifically 
Juden (Jewish) to Menschen (human) as an attempt to work against 
the Nazis' racist split-off of the Jews from all humanity (ibid., 
pp. 180-1). We may wish to remind ourselves here of earlier 
remarks made in Chapter 2 of this text, regarding Heidegger's 
humanism and the so-called 'agricultural remark'. 
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firstly, an event linked to the metaphor of corporeality and 
therefore its association with a structural integrity 
concomitant with the architectural that it also seeks to 
critique, and secondly, an appraisal of the encryptive as 
fundamental to the realisation of any operation. The ructure 
articulates an event or operation that is essentially one of 
continuity rather than fracture, and the integrity of any 
continuous surface (whether it be architectural or 
otherwise), remains a crucial to its determination. In carnal 
terms, that which is parasitic cannot function without the 
continuation of a symbiotic relationship with the host and, 
as such, the host is similarly dependent on that equality. 
Descending Steps for Batan and Time WellICherry 
Tree offer a kind of temporal bracketing which punctuates 
Matta-Clark's artistic career and in some way locate that 
period in a larger cystic operation that encompasses the 
complete oeuvre. Matta-Clark's play with the seeming 
assurance of corporate and domestic determining is 
concomitant with our earlier definition of unheimlich, in that 
what makes the unfamiliar so strange is its very familiarity. 
The cystic relation (what I now term encyst-ence) is 
essentially parasitic and therefore symbiotic, and the 
unheimlich manoeuvre as the complication rather than the 
juxtaposition of familiarity with its other poses a series of 
questions about the nature of the ructure. In some way the 
introjection of the temporal as a guiding principle for any 
unheimlich operation would seem to be not only relevant but 
also significant. 
The entropic condition of a work like Time WellICherry 
Tree literally motivates the work as a continuous activity 
(even seemingly once entombed in the basement of Greene 
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Street). The dissipation of its provisionally heightened 
energised status at the commencement of the work (the 
operation of the artist being the most identifiable 
manifestation), does not merely reduce to mere nothing but 
follows an entropic cipher that is intrinsic to the evolution of 
the work, which understands it as not completed by a kind 
of reduction of any visual record of the piece (see 
illustration) which demeans its process to merely a kind of 
cystic entombment of morbid matter as the closure of the 
project. This morselation as in some way incomplete 
indicated a further, perhaps uncharted trajectory, which may 
have been anticipated by Matta-Clark and he may have 
engaged with its entropic force in ways that earlier works 
like Photo-fry (1969) 129 had alluded to. Descending Steps for 
Batan made the seeming endlessness of the activity of 
mourning the explicit theme of the work largely by 
undermining the redemptive overtone of the memorial 
through the abysmal burrowing to nowhere. 130 
In the way that Paul Virilio suggests that the bunkers 
of the Atlantic Wall are the monuments to the decline and 
demise of the Nazi dream, whereby the military and political 
offensives were relinquished in favour of a strategic 
defence, so the coherence of the non-ument is not founded 
in the foundational which emphasises the prerogative of the 
129 Realised in 1969 as part of the exhibition, Documentation, and 
consisting of a performance by Matta-Clark who fried Polaroid 
photographs of a Christmas tree, culminating in frying pan and 'fried' 
photos staying in the gallery for the duration of the exhibition. 
130 Jacob's Ladder's articulation of descent differed from Descending 
Steps for Batan, in that it provided a speculation on redemption 
which was questionably different from the encryptive encyst-ence of 
the latter as an alteric excavation of the gallery floor. 
253 
summit-base relationship, but in the balance of the centre 
of gravity. 131 
The function of this very special structure is to assure 
survival, to be a shelter for man in a critical period, the place 
where he buries himself to subsist. If it thus belongs to the 
crypt that prefigures resurrection, the bunker belongs too to 
the ark that saves, to the vehicle that puts one out of danger 
by crossing over mortal hazards. 132 
Throughout the years beginning with the entropic Greene 
Street projects until his untimely death in 1978, Matta-Clark 
made films and videos that highlighted what have been 
described as 'his continual investigations into and 
obsessions with window and wall space, light, trees and the 
cities underground, always thinking in three dimensions at 
once and dealing with movement from dark to light, heaven 
to hell .j 
133 Corinne Diserens comments that Matta-Clark's 
film projects drew attention to actual duration as a means of 
eliminating the illusion of another form of duration realised 
via a more traditional notion of narrative exposition: 
131 Virilio argues in Bunker Archaeology that the substitution of concrete 
for the 'discontinuous' construction methods of bricks and mortar in 
the realisation of the bunker indicates that the structure 'floats' on 
the ground. 'In concrete casting there are no intervals, joints - 
everything is compact; the uninterrupted pouring avoids to the utmost 
the repairs that would weaken the general cohesion of the work' 
(p. 45). 
132 Ibid., p. 46. 
133 Diserens, 'The Greene Street Years', p. 360. (Italicised portion of the 
text is a direct quote from another interview with Jene Highstein, a 
colleague of Matta-Clark's from the Anarchitecture group. ) 
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The process of shooting became the structure of the film, the 
use of editing or montage being minimal ... The power of real 
time becomes paradoxically disorientating and bewildering. We 
have to orientate ourselves to what we already know. 134 
The two films, Substrait (1976) and Sous-sol de Paris 
(1977), set the precedent for Matta-Clark's subterranean 
cinematic perambulations as a negotiation of both 
resistance and mourning. As transgressive events that 
resist linear focus and narrative progression, they embrace 
the stratification of historical detritus and its cyclical 
horizontality by navigating the topological characteristics of 
the urban sub-structure, anticipating the labyrinthine as an 
architectonics of encryption. 
134 Added emphasis. Ibid., p. 360. In her essay 'Laying Bare', Marianne 
Brouwer discusses Matta-Clark's films: 'In his movies of the 
underground spaces of New York and Paris, Matta-Clark explores the 
subcity's excavated tunnel spaces: aqueducts, storm sewers and 
pumping stations, the Catacombs, the tracks of Grand Central Station 
and the foundations of the cathedral of St John the Divine ... Again 
and again, there are references to the "underground" ("the city's 
sexual underground") as sexually related to the house seen as "the 
body's shell as well as a metaphor for both body and psyche"' 
(p. 364). 
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In particular, Paris as the torsion of a locale of 
revolutionary urbanisation is presented as a polis 
determined by the catacomb where the foundational topos 
are the (com)plication of the lacuna by which the leakage of 
waste matter is directed away ('swept out'), and the flexure 
of the tomb, where lie the mortified remains of the long 
dead. 135 
12 
Matta-Clark's experiments with film develop the unheimlich 
manoeuvre from the topos of a non-ument via the duration 
of the cinematic form. They refute linearity and narrative to 
explore stratification with all the implication and explication 
of temporality. Here the myriad pathways (Holzweg) of the 
labyrinthine thread their way through the tomblike 
substructure of the homely, undermining the hestial with the 
eventuation of death. The momentary aspect of Time 
135 Of historical note here, the French revolutionary leader of the 
Montagnard faction, Jean Paul Marat (1743-93) hid in the cellars and 
sewers of Paris where he contracted the horrible skin disease which 
forced him to spend a great deal of time in a warm bath to soothe the 
condition and in which he was murdered by the right-wing Girondin 
sympathiser, Charlotte Corday. The character Will Navidson in Mark 
Z. Danielewski's House of Leaves also suffers from a serious skin 
condition prior to his excursions into the house, which unaccountably 
disappears (is 'cured') after his last exploration/search for his 
missing brother Tom. 'On camera, Navidson treats what he refers to 
as "his rotten feet". As we can clearly see, the tops are puffy and in 
some places as red as clay. Furthermore, all his toe nails are 
horribly cracked, disfigured and yellow. "Perpetuated, " Navidson 
informs us, "by a nasty fungus two decades worth of doctors finally 
ended up calling S-T-R-E-S-S. " Sitting by himself on the edge of the 
tub, blood-stained socks draped over the edge, he carefully spreads 
a silky ointment around what he glibly calls his "light fantastic toe"' 
(Mark Z. Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 83). 
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WellICherry Tree and Descending Steps for Batan refute the 
closure of the monumental (the restitution of the hearth via 
the structuring of the hermetic) but persist in the 
apparitional shadow of documentation - the temporality of 
past event haunting present and future. Matta-Clark's films 
extend the trajectory of the unheimlich manoeuvre into a 
more specific interrogation of the temporality of the tomb as 
a de-centered labyrinthine complication. This poses a 
question of orientation that cannot be understood through 
machination of spatiality, but via the spectre of alterity (the 
'outside' of duration interrupting chronological linearity 
determined by the spatial). 
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Chapter 4 
The Orientation' of the Labyrinthine 
The direct time-image is the phantom which has 
always haunted the cinema, but it took modern cinema 
to give body to this phanto M. 2 
[T]he compression of space, the power of the 
imagination to decompress that space the house as a 
trope for the unlimited and the unknowable etc., etc. 
On a strictly visceral level, they provide ample shocks 
and curiosities. 3 
Man has gone out to explore other worlds and other 
civilisations without having explored his own labyrinth 
of dark passages and secret chambers, and without 
finding what lies behind doorways that he himself has 
4 sealed . 
To comprehend the labyrinthine is perhaps to 
misunderstand its true integrity as its very condition 
articulates a plurality, which aggravates sense and the 
senses to the point where any attempt at orientation falls 
into a kind of disequilibrium. 
1 Orientation - the act or process of orienting or being orientated 
via arrangement or alignment or the change of position of organs, 
organelles or organisms in response to external stimuli. Its 
etymology is found in the French word orienter - to cause to face 
or point east, specifically to build a church or temple with a 
longitudinal axis pointing eastward with the chief altar at the 
eastern end; to ascertain bearings in relation to points on a 
compass: to cause the axes of molecules to assume the same 
direction. 
2 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 41. In The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky, 
Mark Le Fanu refers to cinema (seemingly referencing Derrida) as 
the science of ghosts. 
3 Added emphasis. Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 6. It is worth 
noting here that throughout the text, the word house is continually 
printed in blue (a light grey in the paperback) and this formatting 
is never clearly explained. The implication is, however, of some 
kind of hyperlink that may refer to the text's original publication 
on the net, but perhaps more significantly, as the text unfolds it 
refers to the link of the house with the alteric labyrinth that 
emerges - what we might refer to as a hyperlink to the unheimlich. 
4 Added emphasis. Lem, Solaris, p. 164. 
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If comprehension is about a certain kind of completion 
and finitude as a means of navigation precludes 
ambiguity, then perhaps the insistence of plurality in any 
labyrinthine determination demands recognition of 
encyst-ence as its most cryptic possibility. The Labyrinth 
is also the lair of an alteric 'monster' which haunts the 
myriad of passageways and dead ends as a transgressor 
of stability -a quotient spectre interrupting ratio and 
universality. 
The form of the labyrinth first appears in antiquity 
through what we might refer to as the 'mythological 
architectonics' of what can be seen simultaneously as the 
undisturbed rest of the sepulchre or tomb 5, the secrecy of 
the maze and also the unresolved conundrum of the 
puzzle. What is consistent with all such realisations, and 
is fundamental to any interpretation of the labyrinthine, is 
the significance of the disruption of sensibility - the 
essential disequilibrium of its variant possible 
manifestations - and which indicates an alteric 
multiplicity of potential routes and passages (Holzweg) 
that initiate a topology of non-linear relations. The 
aspects of incarceration and imprisonment that are also 
concomitant with such a (dis)location should also not be 
5 Sepulchre, a place of burial or tomb, a receptacle for religious 
relics (especially an altar); Middle English, sepulchre; from old 
French/Latin, sepulcrum or sepulchrum; from sepalire, to bury and 
akin to Greek, hepein, to care for; and Sanskrit saparyati, he 
honours. The pertinence of the chthonic should not be lost here in 
the tellurian aspect of the crypt. In 'Mother Right', Bachofen 
argues, 'mourning is itself a religious cult dedicated to Mother 
Earth, practiced by barbarian peoples in subterranean, sunless 
chambers' (p. 155, added emphasis). Tomb: an excavation in 
which a corpse is buried; a place of internment; a house, chamber 
of vault for the dead; a building or structure resembling a tomb. 
Etymological root in Middle English tombe, from Anglo-French, 
tumba, meaning a sepulchral mound (from the Greek tymbos, 
which is perhaps akin to the Latin tumere, to be swollen (I note 
here the link between swollenness and the cyst; see Chapter 3 of 
this text, with particular reference to encyst-ence and the 
mandorla). 
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overlooked. 6 What is required is to exact a thread or, 
more appropriately, a plurality of threads by which to 
commence the topological operation of an ambulation of 
its myriad pathways. 
1 
6 In Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer stated that: 'Later, in my 
many years of imprisonment, I discovered what it meant to live 
under great psychological pressure. Only then did I realise that 
Hitler's life had borne a great resemblance to that of a prisoner. 
His bunker, although it did not yet have the tomblike proportions it 
was to assume in July 1944, had the thick walls and ceilings of a 
prison' (p. 302, added emphasis). 
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These, however, are never merely enunciations of the 
reliability of what might be conceived as a rational 
navigation that is reliant on the organisation of what 
would be grasped topographically as a certain kind of 
cartography: the knowledge and skill of a particular kind 
of guide. 7 As will be indicated, to negotiate the labyrinth 
is to anticipate a certain sensory disruption as part of the 
operation by which it must be, traversed. Once it has 
been (re)solved (that is, the puzzle of its complex of 
passageways and the confrontation with its 'monstrous 
occupant'), its threat is lifted and its cryptology no longer 
a precipitant risk. 
7 HeroclotuS (c. 484-43OBC) gave an account of the labyrinth in his 
second book of history: 'I saw a series of chambers myself, 
passing through, and speak from my own observation, whereas I 
learned of the underground series by report. For the Egyptian 
authorities were utterly unwilling to show them saying they 
contained burials both of the kings who had caused the labyrinth 
to be built, and of the secret crocodiles' History, Book 11,148). 
Manetho, writing in the third century BC, noted in his list of 
Egyptian kings the fourth, called Lamares, who 'built the Labyrinth 
in the Arsinoite Nome as a tomb for himself'. Nome, from the 
Greek nomos, a pasture or an administrative district (note the link 
here with nomad and therefore Deleuze's and Guattari's term 
nomadology). Pomponius Mela, writing in the first century AD, 
described the building of Psammetich (a late Egyptian king 
according to Pliny) thus: 'It has one descending way into it, and 
contains within almost innumerable paths, which have many 
convolutions twisting hither and thither. These paths, however, 
cause great perplexity both because of their continual winding and 
because of their porticoes which often reveres their direction, 
continually running through one circle after another and 
continually turning and retracing steps as far as they have gone 
forwards with the result that the Labyrinth is fraught with 
confusion by reason of its perpetual meandering' (Chorographia, 
Book 1,9,55). The significance of a guide with specialised 
knowledge of the topological potential of the labyrinth is clearly 
linked to the character of the stalker in Tarkovsky's film of the 
same name. Also, in Stalker, the room at the heart of the zone 
functions as the unnatural locale: as with the Minotaur, that which 
is encrypted in its passageways. With reference to the tomb, 
Albert Speer, in his memoirs Inside the Third Reich, referred to 
Hitler's bunker under the chancellery in Berlin thus: 'the main 
bunker, whose rebuilding had caused Hitler to be in my barracks 
that fateful day of July 20, * was completed. If ever a building can 
be considered the symbol of a situation, this bunker was it. From 
the outside it looked like an ancient Egyptian tomb' (p. 391, added 
emphasis). 
*This date refers to the attempt on Hitler's life in 1944, known as 
'the July Plot'. 
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In the case of the Minoan labyrinth, as purportedly 
designed and constructed by Daedelus, its threat was as 
the habitation (incarceration) of the unnatural Minotaur, 
and once that threat was lifted (the violent demise of the 
half-man, half-bull at the hands of the Athenian hero, 
Theseus), its potential (its force) was diminished. 
How this predicate force was realised became a 
question of the inauguration of a fear of that which was 
considered most unnatural and the maintaining of what 
was most fearful as the encrypted heart (the de-centre) 
of the labyrinthine structure. In the case of the labyrinth 
of Minos, it was constructed to house the unnatural 
offspring of an illicit encounter between the king's wife, 
Pasiphae, and a bull. The architectonics of the labyrinth 
as a structural provision of the edificial aesthetic, was 
constructed to house an unnatural alteric 'apparition' - 
that which should not exist, stalking its hallways as a 
ructure of sensibility and ratio. The minotaur is 
simultaneously neither bull nor man and yet is also both 
animal and human (diff6rance) -a spectral anomaly 
haunting the complex of matrixal order. 
Latterly, it became the site of an ordered ritualistic 
revenant sacrifice every nine years to sustain (and 
maintain) what was unnatural. 
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This was seemingly the preferred option, and that which 
superseded what might be considered the logical path of 
obliteration (annihilation) and absorption of the alien. 8 
This chapter seeks to take an errant trip through the 
variant articulations of the labyrinth in an attempt to 
comprehend it as labyrinthine. In so doing, it seeks to 
negotiate a traversal directed by a Deleuzian image of 
time as an intercise, which defies the subordination of 
temporality to movement and the spatial (what might be 
interpreted as the a priori of Kantian space). It identifies 
a plane of immanence, which will be recognised as not 
merely an indeterminate field of possibilities, but as a 
plane where the so-called genetic conditions, in which 
and by which possibilities are created, exist. John 
Flaxman, in his introduction to the collection of essays 
8 It is worthy of note here that Deleuze points out in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy that the destruction of the Minotaur at the hands of 
Theseus; the representation of the so-called higher man (the 
sublime), was a triumph of the heroic over the tellurian and 
illustrates very clearly Bachofen's historical point as extrapolated 
in 'Mother Right', that the matriarchal/tellurian world (represented 
by the Minotaur as not merely a creature of the earth confined to 
a subterranean world, but also the assertion of matriarchy as a 
sexually potent force conceived through the unnatural lust of 
Minos' wife for the bull - the Minotaur's 'father') was usurped, 
superseded and undermined by the later ideality of 
Apollonian/heroic era of Hellenic Greece (personified by the 
heroic Athenian, Theseus). The Dionysian strand linked to the 
myth via Ariadne is identified by Deleuze, via Nietzsche, to be the 
ratification of the ultimate triumph of possibility and the 
affirmation of becoming (the Dionysian) over reason and logic (the 
Apollonian). Also of mythological note here is that the sexual 
encounter between Minos' wife and the bull that resulted in the 
birth of the Minotaur was a punishment meted out to King Minos 
by the god Poseidon when the king refused to sacrifice a great 
white bull that had been sent to him. The god made Minos' wife 
Pasiphae fall in love with a bull (it is noted here that some 
sources not only cite Daedelus as the architect of the labyrinth 
but also the designer of the hollow wooden cow used by Pasiphae 
to entice the bull into a sexual encounter). The encyst-ence of the 
labyrinthine borne from an imperative for disguise in which to 
deceive, whereby Daedelus is no longer just the creator of the 
sepulchre to house the unnatural Minotaur (the shame of Minos 
and Pasiphae), but also complicit in the original deceit that 
brought that which must become a secret into being before its 
determination as a secret. The retention of the alien as alien 
through introjection has already been discussed in Chapters 2 and 
3 of this text - it suffices to reiterate here the discussion of the 
pharmakos as scapegoat, the secret of the polis in Chapter 2, and 
introjection in Chapter 3. 
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titled The Brain is the Screen, argues that cinema augers 
a path to such a plane, which supersedes the limits of 
normal perception - what he refers to as 'the 
detterritorialising of the classical coordinates of 
philosophy'. What I will seek to exploit here through 
extrapolation on Tarkovsky's films Solaris and Stalker 
and Danielewski's novel, House of Leaves, is Deleuze's 
wish to transform film theory into a philosophy whose 
rigor is in some way localised, in that it reflects the 
emergence of rules that are immanent to each given zone 
of indetermination. Such a system (if the term system can 
continue to be appropriate here) is poised between order 
and chaos in that it does not give order to or stamp an 
authority on chaos, but delicately navigates the rift 
between them. As such, cinema's power is found in this 
operation, which exiles us from the familial conceptual 
terrain leading us to the prospect of a 'becoming 
system'- an unheimlich transgression (dis)located by the 
encyst-ence of the labyrinthine. This indicates a certain 
kind of cinematic aesthetic; a certain cinematic 
requirement, whereby the systemisation through temporal 
de-coordination usurps through anomaly (a hauntological 
revenant), and where the prospect of action (no longer 
merely (re)action) of the futural is saturated by the past. 
2 
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Deleuze comments in Nietzsche and Philosophy that the 
'mystery' of Ariadne9 is uncovered in the plurality of 
senses. 10 The labyrinth is firstly interpreted as the 
unconscious (the secret of the internal self) and 
designates the continuity of eternal return; its circularity 
is not the traversal of a necessarily lost way, but a route 
that leads back to the same point and which exposes it 
as the affirmation of becoming. This understands 
becoming as that from which being comes, overturning 
the recognised doxa in such a way that objects now find 
their identity swallowed up in difference. With this in 
mind, a labyrinth is said etymologically to be a multiple 
because it contains many folds. As such a multiple, it is 
not only made up of many parts, but is also active in that 
is folded in many ways. As already indicated, it is always 
in some ways all, but simultaneously more than either a 
mere tomb, sepulchre or puzzle - the diversity of a 
resting place for the corpuscular, a location for the 
enactment of rites or a mere conundrum to be solved. It 
is an aesthetic locale -a hauntological topos. 
9 In his book, The Book of Imaginary Beings, under the section 'The 
Minotaur', Jorge Luis Borges states: 'The idea of a house built so 
that people could become lost in it is perhaps more unusual than 
that of a man with a bull's head, but both ideas go well together 
and the image of the labyrinth fits with the image of the Minotaur. 
It is equally fitting that in the centre of a monstrous house there 
be a monstrous inhabitant' (p. 100). Note here the indeterminate 
occupant of the house in House of Leaves who is only heard ('the 
growl') by the explorers and whose presence also haunts Johnny 
Truant through its transgression into the footnoted text. 
10 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 187. 
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3 
Ariadne's proximity to Theseus in the Minoan labyrinth 
maintained an interpretation of that structure as in some 
way the wrong way round, in that this view substantiates 
a moral thread, which can only lead to negation and 
ressentiment. " 
As already indicated, the contention that the Apollonian hero 
Theseus is dispatched to eradicate the tellurian Minotaur in 
Daeclelus' labyrinth, ratifies the developmental historical 
imperative of Hellenic culture which Bachofen identified as the 
precedent of ideality through the patriarchal transcendental hero 
as the suppressor of the earth-oriented matriarchal. Ariadne loved 
Theseus as he represented the sublime and higher man (but 
lacking the virtue of the bull with its capacity to throw off 
burdens), and as long as she was in love with him was fettered to 
him as merely the feminine image of man. Legends differ as to 
Ariadne's fate once Theseus escapes the labyrinth; one suggests 
that he abandons her and she hangs herself, another that he takes 
her to Naxos where she either dies or marries Dionysus. Deleuze 
argues that Dionysus (the barbaric interloper) teaches Ariadne 
that the true labyrinth is not found in negation and ressentiment, 
but in affirmation: 'The labyrinth is what leads us to being, the 
only being is that of becoming, the only being that of the labyrinth 
itself' (Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 188). 
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If we understand affirmation and negation as qualities of 
the will to power we see that they do not have a univocal 
relation. Negation is opposed to affirmation but affirmation 
differs from negation. We cannot think of affirmation as 
'being opposed' to negation: this would place the negative 
within it . 
12 
The thread allowed Theseus the opportunity to return 
from dispatching the Minotaur, and operated as a 
topographic means of escape (as against a topological 
one) in that it relied on the consistency of the labyrinth 
(a questionable assumption given all we have previously 
stated and given what will be later observed about the 
house in House of Leaves) to maintain its shape so that 
the retracing of steps was merely that and no longer the 
uncertain navigation of that which was still unknown. It 
was the strand, which stretched back like an umbilical 
cord from the pure possibility of a forward traversal, 
allowing the hero to orient himself with the benefit of a 
continual connection to what was passed through a 
tangible link with what he already knew. Here there is 
already an indication of movement as merely the sensori- 
motor schema, no longer the determining factor in any 
direct provision of the temporal via the bifurcate 
divergence of the labyrinthine. In comparison, the 
character of the Stalker in Tarkovsky's film orients 
himself in the zone by the dispersal of weighted threads, 
which he throws ahead and horizontally to ensure safe 
passage. This indicates that the pattern of potential safe 
routes by which one may navigate the zone is bifurcate, 
and therefore fundamentally inconsistent, unpredictable 
and open to constant variation. The threads are used to 
determine a safe passage (enforcing or replicating 
continuity through a straight line of causality) into and 
12 Ibid., p. 188. 
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out of the zone through the understanding that a 
traversal must always move forwards. The threads are 
retrieved only to precipitate such motion. The 
contribution of what has passed into virtuality alleviates 
not only the actuality of the moment of decision, but also 
what is immanent by recognition of its inconsistency - 
the anxiety that no expectations can be fulfilled in mere 
reflection and that certainty in the way forward cannot 
necessarily find comfort and assurance in what has gone 
before. 
In the Minoan labyrinth, the destruction of what is 
essentially at its centre (the alteric spectre of the 
unnatural Minotaur - the Derridian de-centre) offers 
Theseus in some strange way the opportunity to orient 
himself through the assurance that the demise of the 
encrypted horror marked the alteric point of focus of the 
labyrinthine (the 'room' at the heart of the 'zone' in 
Stalker fulfils a similar 'function' - 'Scientist'[the 
'Apollonian hero'], as a contemporary 'Theseus', 
journeys' to it with specific intention of destroying it). 
With its death (annihilation), it was no longer capable of 
enforcing its potency and, as such, of undermining the 
assurance of the rational through its deviant introjective 
operation. 
But it demanded the conciliation of a shift of status 
(from a tomb for the sacrificial victims proffered by the 
Athenians every nine years -a locale for their certain 
death and a remedial assurance for the Minoans) of the 
variant hallways and passages to the specificity of an 
introjective tomb for the uncanny (the unnatural). 
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It is the realisation of the emergence of the alteric, 
recognised as the figure of Minotaur itself. 13 
Any preparation that we might wish to make is 
therefore complicated and in some way disoriented by 
any suggestion that negation is merely the opposition to 
affirmation, on the understanding that such a dialectical 
opposition might compound affirmation as in some way 
post priori to negation. 
The mythological precedent of the Minoan labyrinth 
superficially compounds such an interpretation, but a 
more fundamental perception might consider how this 
urdoxa could be critiqued. 
4 
13 In Derrida's introductory essay to Margins of PhilosoPhy, entitled 
'Tympan', he comments: 'Tympanum, Dionysianism, labyrinth, 
Ariadne's thread. We are now travelling through (upright, walking, 
dancing), included and enveloped within it, never to emerge, the 
form of an ear constructed around a barrier, going round its inner 
walls, a city, therefore (labyrinth, semicircular canals - warning: 
the spiral walkways do not hold) circling around a stairway 
winding around a lock, a dike (dam) stretched out toward the sea: 
closed in on itself and open to the sea's path. Full and empty of 
its water, the anamesis of the choncha resonates alone on the 
beach' (p. xiv). The pertinence of the sonic should not be lost 
here. Firstly, in the literal form of an echo as a means of 
evaluating, physical, emotional and thematic distance (the 
distortion of such mechanisms by the divergence of the 
labyrinthine structure, through interference and confusion, 
invalidates echo as an authentic determination of such spaces). 
Secondly, echo can only be effective when confined to large (and 
consistently measurable) spaces - this is the predicament of the 
explorers of the house. However, a more effective use of sound is 
more closely linked to the tympanum as a form of resistance to 
which another agency might be applied to create sound. In House 
of Leaves, the explorers of the house draw attention to their 
presence and increasingly desperate predicament by knocking on 
the internal walls of the labyrinth in almost a reversal of the 
operation of the ear. Internal sound directed into the exterior as 
the raising of an alarm. 
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In 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences', Derrida states: 
The function of (a) centre was not only to orient, balance, 
and organise the structure - but above all to make sure that 
the organising principle of the structure would limit what we 
might call the play of the structure. By orienting and 
organising the coherence of the system, the centre of a 
structure permits the play of its elements inside the total 
form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any 
centre represents the unthinkable itself. 14 
If we take a moment to consider and distinguish between 
what we might call 'maze-treaders' and 'maze-viewers', 
we grasp that the former's vision is always impaired by 
constructed views and fragmentation, which cause 
confusion and disorientation. 15 
14 Added emphasis. Derrida, Writing and Difference, pp. 278-9. 
Derricla is one of the hidden references in House of Leaves as 
Danielewski develops a myriad of true and bogus academic 
footnotes throughout the text. With this in mind, he later quoted 
from the same source: 'This is why classical thought concerning 
structure could say that the centre is paradoxically within the 
structure and outside it. The centre is at the centre of the totality, 
and yet, since the centre does not belong to the totality (is not 
part of the totality) the totality has its centre elsewhere. The 
centre is not the centre' (also found in footnote 129, House of 
Leaves). 
15 In the introduction to House of Leaves, the fictitious narrator, 
Johnny Truant says of the writer of the main body of the text, The 
Navidson Record: 'Zampanb writes constantly about seeing. What 
we see, how we see and what in turn we can't see. Over and over 
again, in one form or another, he returns to the subject of light, 
space, shape, line, color, focus, tone, contrast, movement, 
rhythm, perspective, and composition. None of which is surprising 
considering Zampan6's piece centers on a documentary film called 
The Navidson Record. made by a Pulitzer Pr I ze-winning 
photojournalist who must somehow capture the most difficult 
subject of all: the sight of darkness itself' (p. xxi). 
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The latter see the pattern as a whole, 16 as in a diagram 
(from above) and this suggests that what is seen depends 
on position ('point of view'). A labyrinth is, in a sense, a 
singularity, 17 in that it is arguably one physical structure, 
yet also a doubling in that it incorporates order and 
disorder, clarity and confusion, unity and multiplicity, 
artistry and chaos. 18 
As noted in Chapter 3 of this text, Deleuze speaks 
of the labyrinth in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque as 
corresponding to two floors. The continuous labyrinth is 
the relation of the porous and spongy cavernous texture 
that is without emptiness, of matter (the lower floor) and 
16 It is noted in House of Leaves that Will Navidson's final journey 
into the labyrinthine hallways of house in search of his brother 
Tom, culminates in the confrontation with a window (a 
fenestration). The text comments: 'windows offer vision' and 'a 
chance to reach a place of perspective and perhaps make some 
sense of the whole'. Ultimately on climbing out onto the ledge 
beyond the fenestration, Will only 'confronts that grotesque vision 
of absence' (p. 464, added emphasis). What is useful to remember 
here is the Heideggarian notion of the rift as outlined in Chapter 1 
of this text, whereby the translation of the German word Riss has 
both the connotation of a cut or tear and also that of a ground- 
plan or drawing. The double meaning of scission and overall view 
(a perspective) identifies a difference that resonates in the 
labyrinthine singularity. 
17 In his essay 'Catastrophe' (published in Word Traces), Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe directs our attention to Celan's comment in 'The 
Meridian' speech that: 'The poem is alone. ' He argues that the 
poem is only effectively a poem insofar as it is absolutely 
singular: 'This is undoubtedly a definition of poetry's essence 
(that which, by itself, is decidedly nothing "poetic"); there is no 
poetry, poetry does not occur or take place, and is therefore not 
repeatedly questioned, except as the event of singularity' (p. 131, 
added emphasis). 
18 With reference to the navigation of the labyrinth, Diodorus Siculus 
wrote in the first century BC regarding the appointment of the king 
Mencles, that although he was responsible for no significant 
military achievements, 'he did build himself what is called the 
labyrinth as a tomb, an edifice which is wonderful not so much for 
its size as for the inimitable skill with which it was built; for once 
in, it is impossible to find one's way out again without difficulty, 
unless one lights upon a guide who is perfectly acquainted with it' 
(I am thinking here of the need for a profession of guides in 
Roadside Picnic and Stalker- the stalkers); (History, Book 1, and 
found at 
www. casa. ucl. ac. uk/diqital_eqvpt/hawara/biblioqraphv old. html). 
Pliny notes in his book on natural history that Daedalus' labyrinth, 
though modelled on the one constructed some 3,600 years prior to 
his time, only imitated a hundredth part of the original Egyptian 
project (Natural History, Book 36,13). The notion of 
'fragmentation' will be discussed further in relation to the crystal- 
image. 
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the freedom in the soul and its predicates (the upper 
floor) - the pleats of matter and the folds in the soul. It 
also designates the eternal return, in that its circularity is 
not merely a lost way but a labyrinthine perambulation of 
that which leads back to the same point/instant, which is, 
was and will be. This duality (the two floors) identifies a 
discrepancy - the difference of the vinculum in which we 
may begin to recognise a scission, which determines the 
integrity of such an architectonics of the ructure. 
In Difference and Repetition he critiques 
representation by suggesting that any interpretation that 
compounds the uniqueness of the singular perspective 
and its receding and ultimately false depth, maintains its 
condition of all-embracing mediation while actively 
mobilising nothing. He argues that: 
modern art tends to realise these conditions: in this sense it 
becomes a veritable theatre of metamorphosis and 
permutations. A theatre where nothing is fixed, a labyrinth 
without a thread (Ariadne has hung herself). The work of art 
leaves the domain of representation in order to become 
experience, transcendental empiricism or science of the 
sensible. 19 
This sense of movement implies the interruptive 
distortion of aesthetic representation through plurality, 
divergence and de-centring. It is the recognition of a 
superposition of perspectives and a tangle of viewpoints 
which, in a temporal sense, reveals a coexistence of 
moments as not only what might be conceived as the 
essence of the labyrinthine, but also an arguably 
Deleuzian interpretation of a cinematic form. This 
embraces a fractured and non-linear temporality as 
19 Added emphasis. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 56. 
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extrapolated in the crystal-image . 
20 The conflagration of 
non-linear relations, which Deleuze identifies in his 
interpretation of the crystal-image, is determined 
cinematically through the bifurcation of flashback. This 
operates outside the conventional chronology of a 
commonsense through what is tantamount to a figurative 
leap from the actuality of the present into the virtuality of 
the past. This spectral operation seeks in the past a 
virtual memory-image, which it can retrieve and bring to 
the actual present. Ronald Bogue notes in Deleuze on 
Cinema that: 
What we see in flashbacks are the residual traces of a 
branching time, the actual paths taken of a virtually forking 
labyrinth of coexisting paths. It is this bifurcating maze of 
time that gives the flashback their inner logic, their 
'necessity', their 'reason'. 21 
My intention in this chapter is to consider not only this 
theatricality of diversity and possibility as the 
determination of the labyrinthine, but also explore 
through the analysis of three specific examples 
(arguably, two cinematic examples with literary roots and 
one literary with a cinematic perspective), the emergence 
of the figure of the labyrinth as a pre-emptive condition 
of the agency of temporality through which and by which 
the encryption of the spectral might continue to be 
articulated and reconfigured aesthetically. 
20 With regard to the 'tangle of viewpoints', I note here that 
Danielewski's House of Leaves is perhaps a literary construct of 
such confusion and discontinuity whereby the house as an 
interactive locale which transgresses the bounds of orthodox 
literary organisation (literally through the use of different 
typefaces to connote different characters and source material) and 
where the events of one section of the text (the so-called 
Navidson Record) impose themselves on others. The most 
significant transgressor (perhaps the true manifestation of the 
horror of the house) is represented by the trace (scratch marks 
and wilful destruction of any means used to quantify the 
labyrinthine - markers for navigation and equipment) of violence 
and the auditory imposition of 'the growl'. 
21 Added emphasis. Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, p. 116. 
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The two cinematic works to be considered will be Andrei 
Tarkovsky's Solaris and Stalker (both loosely adapted 
from novels drawn from the genre of science-fiction: 
Stanislaw Lem's Solaris and Boris and Arkady 
Strugatsky's Roadside Picnic). 22 The literary work is the 
recently published novel by Mark Z. Danielewski, House 
of Leaves, which arguably falls into the genre of horror. I 
have already posited an interpretation of the labyrinth as 
something that not only proposes a problem of 
orientation, but also a more complex sepulchral question 
of entombment. Implicit in both interpretations is the 
already discussed notion of an active cryptology that 
articulates a propriety indicated by a cystic modality of 
mourning and loss. 
The exclusion of any detailed analysis of 
Tarkovsky's film Mirror in the discussion that follows is 
not to dismiss the import of the film which falls 
chronologically between Solaris and Stalker in 
Tarkovsky's body of cinematic work, but is a considered 
exclusion that directly engages with the specificity of the 
literary adaptation of the previously mentioned works in 
relation to House of Leaves as already stated, as a 
literary work about a film. 
Mirror's intrinsically autobiographical subject matter 
(although a strong affinity can be drawn between the 
opening and closing sequences of Solaris, in particular 
the parallels between Kelvin's relationship with his father 
22 Tarkovsky's screenplay of Stalker (from the Strugatsky brothers' 
novel Roadside Picnic) is freely adapted from only the last 25 
pages of the book. With Stanislaw Lem's novel Solaris, '[t]he 
essential point of change is that he [Tarkovsky] furnished Chris 
Kelvin with a family home, full of memories: family photographs; 
the whole physical texture of earthly life; the sound of the rain, 
the dawn chorus, the flowing of the river, the damp of the garden, 
the spreading crown of the oak, the living flame of the bonfire, the 
bent back of the father and the gingery-grey of his temples - 
everything, in short, which we normally take for granted until the 
loss of it haunts us' (Turovskaya, Tarkovsky: Cinema as Poetry, 
p. 54, added emphasis). 
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and Tarkovsky with his, as portrayed in Mirror) 
distinguishes it from the freely adapted sources of 
Solaris and Stalker. Therefore, for the benefit of this 
discussion, I will focus my attention on the alteric 
spectrality of the labyrinthine at work in the chosen films 
in relation to a comparable thematic in House of Leaves. 
* 
In Danielewski's novel, the character Zampan6 offers a 
series of brief speculations, prior to the lengthy 
description of the descent of the staircase in the 
purportedly fictitious cinematic realisation entitled 
Exploration#4 (and which make up part of the larger film 
project known as The Navidson Record), as to the 
purpose of the labyrinth. 
Is it merely an aberration of physics? Some kind of warp in 
space? Or just a topiary labyrinth on a much grander scale? 
Perhaps it serves a funeral purpose? Conceals a secret? 
Protects something? Imprisons or hides some kind of 
monster? Or for that matter, imprisons or hides an 
innocent ? 23 
23 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 111. Pliny (AD 23-79) proffered 
three possible meanings for the labyrinth in his natural history, 
Book 36,13: a palace or tomb for its constructor or perhaps most 
strangely, a temple to the sun, '[which] contains twisting paths 
and passages which advance and retreat-all impossible to 
negotiate ... frequently doors are buried in it to beguile the visitor into going forward and then force him to return to the same 
winding paths'. And later: 'Men are already weary with travelling 
when they reach the bewildering maze of paths: indeed, there are 
also lofty upper rooms reached by ramps and porticoes from which 
one descends on stairways which have 90 steps; inside are 
columns of imperial porphyry, images of the gods, statues of kings 
and representations of monsters. ' Abridged from 
www. casa. ucl. ac. uk/diqital eqVpt/hawara/bibliocirar)hy Old. html 
(added emphasis). 
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Deleuze's detailed observations on cinema, in his two 
texts Cinemas 1 and 2, proffer the temporal extrapolation 
of the crystal-image 24 as a definition of a differential unity 
which identifies the praxis of the cinematic shot as a 
fusion of the pastness of a recorded event with the 
presentness of its viewing - the conglomeration of virtual 
with the actual. It is the indivisible unity of virtual image 
and actual image, if we understand the virtual as 
subjective or in the past -a pure recollection that exists 
outside consciousness in time but somewhere in a 
temporal past, and which is, in a sense, still alive and 
ready to be recalled by the actual. What is crucial to any 
understanding of the crystal-image is the fragmentariness 
implied by its crystalline condition - whereby illumination 
as consciousness is not understood as merely an 
exteriority (a flashlight) shedding light upon a world of 
shadow, but as a constituent component of that 
luminosity. 
In short, it is not consciousness that is light, it is a set of 
images, or light that is consciousness, immanent within 
25 
matter . 
24 Donato Totaro, in 'Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project (Part 2: The 
Time-Image)', suggests Deleuze uses the crystal-image as an 
aesthetic rather than a theoretical tool, 'by ascribing stylistic 
qualities to it' 
(www. horschamp. qc. ca/9903/offscreen essavs/deleuze2. html). 
This is qualified by Ronald Bogue in his text, Deleuze on Cinema, 
where he draws attention to the four forms of the Deleuze's 
crystal-image as: 
(i) Perfect 
(ii) Cracked 
(iii) Formation or Growth 
(iv) Dissolution 
These designate four kinds of film identified by their directors; 
respectively, Ophuls, Renoir, Fellini and Visconti. 
25 Added emphasis. Deleuze, Cinema 1 (The Movement-Image), 
90: 61. In his text Deleuze and Cinema, Ronald Bogue states (in 
the last section, quoting Deleuze): 'if present images are light, 
representations are subtractions of quantities of light, or selective 
filterings of light. When we perceive objects, it is "as if we 
reflected on their surfaces the light emanates from them, light 
which would never be revealed if it passed on unopposed"' (p. 31, 
added emphasis). 
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In accounting for the past/presentness of the cinematic 
image, the crystal-image functions as a two-way mirror, 26 
which operates as a kind of fluctuation between virtual 
and actual splitting the screen into two heterogeneous 
directions - launching into the future and failing into the 
past, a confusion of mental and physical time. 27 Deleuze's 
appropriation of Bergsonian dur6e critiques the 
chronology of temporal linearity by way of memory. 
Initially, this proposes that memory is distinguished by 
two types: habitual and pure, and ratifies the former as 
stored in the brain. Habitual is the more pragmatic and 
generally dominates the latter, which resurfaces during 
moments of disinterestedness or dreaming and is stored 
in consciousness. 28 Duration was understood by Bergson 
as a dynamic movement of passing, yet continuous time, 
where the qualitative expression of our dynamic 
psychological time (of continuity of past into present and 
towards future), remained distinctive from the 
quantitative succession of discrete elements or intervals. 
26 1 am reminded here of Dan Graham's Alteration to a Suburban 
House (see Chapter 3, this text). In the novel Solaris by Stanislaw 
Lem (from which Tarkovsky adapted his screenplay), the character 
Snow, when speaking to the recently arrived Kelvin about man's 
urge for space exploration, says, 'We are seeking man. We have 
no need of other worlds. We need mirrors' (p. 75). It is worth 
noting here that Tarkovsky's follow-up to Solaris was entitled 
Mirror and that Deleuze notes that the vinculum in The Fold: 
Leibniz and the Baroque is understood as 'a reflective surface'. 
27 1 note here that Tarkovsky makes use of the particularity of this 
cinematic confusion in the film Mirror by casting the same actress 
to play both the contemporary wife and the historical mother 
throughout the production. 
28 The theory of pure perception and pure memory must take into 
account the fact that perception affected by memory remains 
dependent on the brain for material isatio n. Bergson argued that in 
dreams we have glimpses of the true nature of memory and the 
virtual past as it is when the sensori-motor system is at its most 
relaxed and therefore images from various past moments can 
coexist simultaneously in a single domain. 
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In Cinema 2, Deleuze states: 
there is no present which is not haunted by a past and a 
future, by a past which is not reducible to a former present, 
29 by af uture which does not consist of a present to come . 
Bergson proposed that the fundamental concept of durde 
expressed the dynamism of an indeterminate future as 
essentially open and unforeseeable, and therefore any 
impression of the temporal must be grasped through an 
essential difference, whereby each moment or succession 
of moments brought something that was qualitively new. 
The essential dualism of Bergsonian dur6e is found in the 
combination of duration as a dynamic continuation and 
the succession of the momentary. 30 
Deleuzian dualism designated a supposed 
opposition between ideality and sensibility but no longer 
as the historical duality of essential and accidental, but 
as a more fundamental (and more complex) distinction 
29 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 37. We may also wish to consider here 
earlier remarks made about disinterestedness in Kantian 
aesthetics in Chapter 1 of this text. Derrida notes in The Truth in 
Painting: 'Now the question of knowing whether I can say of a 
thing that it is beautiful has, according to Kant, nothing to do with 
the interest that I do or do not have in its existence. And my 
pleasure ... requires an indifference or more rigorously an 
absolute lack of interest for the existence of the thing' (p. 44, 
added emphasis). It is also noted here that Tarkovsky's Solaris 
was introjected by the familial through the sublimated desire to 
make a film about his own family. The domestic sequences in 
Solaris (the opening section at Kelvin's family home and the 
closing section where he is seemingly reunited with his father at 
that same home) predate Mirror in such a way that the familial 
terrain explored by Tarkovsky in the later film haunts the former. 
30 Ronald Bogue, in his commentary Deleuze on Cinema, suggests 
that Deleuze attempts to bring coherence to this 'dualism through 
the complexity of sensation. He develops Bergsonian analysis 
from what he refers to as illusory dualism to a clarifying dualism, 
through a higher monism to a generative dualism and pluralism. 
Bogue argues that Bergson's view of the universe is one of 
'"flows", "modifications", perturbations and "vibrations"'. This 
dynamic always entails a retention of past into present with an 
impulse towards future. The vibration is simultaneously mind and 
matter and as such presents Bergson as essentially a monist. 
However, Deleuze notes that this monism is fundamentally a kind 
of dualism, or even pluralism, as it is the realisation of a 
differentiation of speeds and degrees based on the complexity of 
the event. 
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between virtual and actual (the complexity of the 
Minotaur). 
Deleuze argued that the ontological hierarchy, 
whereby the spatiality of distribution is conceived as a 
dividing up in the d ivi ne/Apol Ionian sense, is concomitant 
to a sedentary limit that operates as either a limitation 
due to the proximity to the particularity of a principle, or 
the power of that limit as a single maximum, equalising 
all in the similitude that refuses the separation of a thing 
from what it can do. His introduction of a concept of any- 
spaces-whatever (espaces quel-conque) proffers a new 
cinematic pedagogy that disrupts any unity of space by 
drawing attention to the disparate scissions that fragment 
it, and whose character is haunted by the traumatic 
branchings of memory. 31 
Immanence as diversity proffers the single maximum 
as an immeasurable state rather than a measurable one, 
which expresses the disjunctive as the particularity 
specific to individual faculties and which it alone can 
experience. This particularity undermines the historical 
imperative of a commonsense by only revealing itself at 
what we might interpret as moments of disequilibrium and 
contradiction, where memory articulates experience 
through the enigma of a disjointure from commonsense. 
Diversity, as the fundamentally immeasurable, in a sense 
haunts the measurable as an immanence or potential. Its 
paradox is always that as an entity it has never been 
present but exists only as past -a spectre. 
31 John Flaxman notes in the introduction to The Brain is the Screen: 
'These "any-spaces-whatever" irrational, disconnected, 
aberrant, schizophrenic spaces no longer obey laws of 
traditional, commonsensical causality. At every turn, the hope for 
resolution is frustrated' (p. 5). 
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This raises the question of whether such diversity and 
variation is this concomitant with the interruptive 
Derridian spectre as a historical (both past and futural) 
non-present ? 32 
Such a d6r6glement of sensibility critiques the 
Kantian faculty as essentially passive, and therefore 
shaped by the a priori forms of space and time by 
determining a transcendental empiricism which indicated 
its objectivity as real experience but also transcendent 
because, as Deleuze stated, such empirical principles 
'leave outside themselves the elements of their own 
foundation'. 33 The opposition of consciousness, as 
conceptual representations of commonsense, and the 
subrepresentative, as essentially unconscious intensities, 
articulates the premise that ideals are no longer just 
simple essences in the Kantian sense, but what Deleuze 
defined as problems without solutions. What in a 
Bergsonian sense might be defined as an ideal limit can 
be interpreted as the most relaxed approach of 
concomitance between inert matter and extensionless 
mind. Problems are immanent within, yet irreducible to, 
their solutions and are implicit in the creation of a realm 
where a solution might take place, but remain outside 
that realm. What remains paradoxical about this capacity 
is that as virtual and therefore not actual, they occupy a 
32 We may wish to think here of the Minotaur as a present/past. In 
the context of earlier remarks regarding the tellurian nature of the 
half-man, half-bull, the myth of the labyrinth places the result of 
matriarchal transgression in a Hellenic present and which required 
a heroic personification of the then current aspiration towards 
Apollonian ideality to vanquish an unnatural past. This symbolic 
transition from matriarchal to patriarchal is complicated further 
when the Dionysian affirmation enters the mythology when Ariadne 
is abandoned on Naxos by Theseus and in one strand of the myth, 
rescued and married by Dionysus. The labyrinthine is no longer 
confined to the physical architectonics of Daedelus' structure, but 
transgresses the temporal bounds of future and past as the 
indiscernible link of what can never be merely assigned in a 
relation. 
33 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 328. 
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place that is neither existence nor non-existence -a 
spectral locale. 
The problem for Deleuze is concomitant with an 
understanding of genetic structure, in that it bears no 
resemblance to that structure of actual embodiment but is 
also not just an amorphous undifferentiated mass. As a 
distribution, it is without identity, function or location, but 
should rather be seen as a differential relation, which, 
with other singularities, is realised as a potential for 
various forms of embodiment. Conceived as a domain or 
plain of scattered points around which a nebulous vortex 
of possible actualisations are continually forming and un- 
forming, this location of the problem can only be realised 
through the conglomeration of possible actualisations and 
embodiments. 
The passage from virtual to actual is affected by 
what Deleuze terms an 'intensity', which we understand 
to be the essential activity of energising individuation. 34 
Metastability and intensity are states of what we might 
term pre-sense, in that they are essentially outside 
commonsense and cognitive understanding. As such, they 
can only be experienced in the disjunctive use of the 
faculties and distortion of the senses in moments of 
disequilibriurn and vertigo. 
As already indicated in Chapter 1, an a-dimensional 
depth of depths, implicit in the constitution of the 
34 1 refer here back to Chapter 1 of this text, and the discussion on 
crystalline structure, the metastable and pre-individuation. We 
might also note here the comparison of the nebular and 
metastable with the ocean, which makes up the surface of Solaris. 
Bogue notes: 'Deleuze speaks of the crystal-image rather than a 
simple mirror image' because 'the crystal-image serves two 
additional purposes. The surface of the crystal may be reflective, 
yet they may also be glasslike and transparent; they may refract 
light and reflect it, filter, tint, cloud or block it. The crystal's 
facets thus may be said to possess varying degrees of limpidity or 
opacity, the state of a give facet varying with its surrounding 
conditions (such as temperature), becoming transparent one 
moment and opaque the next' (Deleuze on Cinema, p. 12). 
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recognised dimensionality of the spatial, reveals the 
existence of a primal groundless space (spatium). This 
is articulated through explication from which the 
dimensionality of a re-presentable space and the 
energised intensity of individuation is manifest in the 
traversal from metastable to stable. Ronald Bogue argues 
in Deleuze on Cinema: 
Our inherent tendency is to use visual spatial imagery to 
speak about time, and hence to think of bodies as entities 
distinct from their movements. But movement is inseparable 
from that which moves and as soon as we speak of a thing 
distinct from its action we reinstate a division between 
movement and the moving ent it Y. 35 
This indicates that the idea becomes a provocation of the 
faculties into disjunctive functioning via the intensity of 
sense experience and from this disruption of sensibility, 
other faculties are likewise, disturbed. 36 The concept of 
cinema becomes no longer what might be defined as 'an 
undertaking of recognition', but 'a science of visual 
impressions, forcing us to forger our own logic and 
retinal habits'. 37 
For Deleuze, thought begins with a contradictory 
experience - an encounter with a simulacrum. Given that 
the simulacrum has no identity, it is the manifestation of 
difference in itself and can only appear in disguise as 
distinct categories of individuation, which mask pre- 
individual, metastable differences. 38 
35 Ibid., p. 19. 
36 In the novel Solaris, the character of Rheya describes herself and 
the other visitors/phi-creatures as 'passive instruments of torture'. 
37 Deleuze, Cinema 2, pp. 18-19. 
38 In Solaris, Kelvin admits to Rheya that they are not alike - and 
after her attempt to take her life by ingesting liquid oxygen, 
suggests that it is the difference between them that saved her life. 
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The specifics of a cinematic and literary illustration of 
such a proposition might be found in Andrei Tarkovsky's 
cinematic adaptation of Stanislaw Lem's science-fiction 
novel, Solaris. In both film and book, the visitors/phi- 
creature S39 are simulacra formed from the 
subconscious/memories of the surviving crewmembers of 
a space station orbiting the planet Solaris. 40 
This proximity to the planet (the forces of which 
seem to exist as a vast imaginative resource) and its 
ocean plays a significant part in the manifestation of 
these visitors, and links the specificity of individual 
memory to the realisation of an influential pre-individual 
condition manifest in the planet itse If. 4' Are these 
creatures understood as simulacra in the sense of 
disguised distinct categories of individuation 
disguising/masking the pre-individual, metastable state of 
the planet Solaris and its ocean ? 42 
39 Phi-creature: phi, from the Greek philia, meaning brotherhood. 
This notion of brotherly affiliation will be taken up further when 
looking at Will Navidson's relationship with his brother Tom in 
House of Leaves. I also note here the significance of the fraternal 
relation in the work of Gordon Matta-Clark and already considered 
in Chapter 3 of this text. 
40 In his essay 'The Film History of Thought' (published in The Brain 
is the Screen), Andras BAlint Kovacs remarks: 'According to 
Deleuze, modern cinema means, on the one hand, the different 
variations of composition of abstract time (in this respect he is in 
complete agreement with Tarkovsky who calls film "sculpting in 
time"); on the other hand, it means a variable formation of images 
of subjectivity' (p. 161). 
41 Gibarian's visitor temporarily survives his death - in Tarkovsky's film she is encountered by Kelvin in the corridor of the space 
station and entering the cold store where Gibarian's body is 
stored, and is the first evidence of the extraordinary events 
unfolding on the space station. In Lem's novel Kelvin is horrified 
by this encounter -a horror that is compounded when he 
examines Gibarian's body in the cold store and finds the visitor 
apparently sleeping next to the corpse, seemingly unaware of 
Gibarian's demise. It is worth noting here that in Lem's novel, this 
visitor is a black woman in a grass skirt. Tarkovsky, however, 
presents the visitor as a red-haired girl. 
42 In the Strugatsky brothers' novel, Roadside Picnic (on which 
Tarkovsky based his screenplay for Stalker), a group of creatures 
are also said to inhabit the zone and are referred to as 'zombies' 
or 'moulages' - re-constructions on the skeletons, dummies. The 
scientist Pilman states: 'We can't imagine anything scarier than a 
ghost. But the violation of the law of causality is much more 
terrifying than the stampede of ghosts' (p. 109). 
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In the novel, Lem catalogues in some detail the 
different kinds of phenomena experienced by the earliest 
Solarists (the name given to the scientific community who 
expressly concern themselves with the study of the 
planet - the implication being that the study of the planet 
has become a branch of science in its own right). The 
psychologist Kelvin spends time in the station's library, 
and looks in detail at these phenomena and the attempts 
made by previous Solarists to explain them scientifically, 
only to be confronted by realisation that it is evident they 
defy scientific I og i C. 43 
The description of Solaris's ocean in Lem's novel 
might indicate an almost Leibnizian/baroque implication 
and explication of folding, unfolding and refolding. The 
topological singularities of the ocean as part of its 
continuity/multiplicity that the scientific manuals, found in 
the space station's library, try to explain through the 
logic of scientific reason. 
43 For example, mimoids are understood as simulacra in that they 
copy inanimate man-made objects. The mimoid structure is 
described as a labyrinth requiring specialist equipment to explore, 
and the scientific evidence housed in the space station library 
proposes that they have 'off days' and 'gala days'. On gala days 
the mimoid 'can produce "primitive" simplifications, but is just as 
likely to indulge in "baroque" deviations, paroxysms of 
extravagant brilliance' (Lem, Solaris, p. 121). 
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These individuated beings (given names: mimoids, 
extensors, symmetriads and asymmetriads) are identified 
as scientific phenomena and their differences are 
understood as primordially different in the same way that 
the phi-creatures/visitors are differentiated from firstly, 
the residents of the space station and secondly, from the 
ideals from which they are simulated. 44 Bogue comments 
that in developing the triad of crystalline motifs 
(actual/virtual, limpid/opaque and seed/milieu), Deleuze 
does not intend to isolate specific shots or sequences but 
to indicate entire films as essentially crystalline. 
Each film, we might say is like an astronaut crew's 
exploration of a multifaceted, gemlike planet. The 
crewmembers orbit the planet, taking various shots of its 
surface. They land, traverse different planes, then 
penetrate the planet's outer surfaces and film shimmering 
and prismatic reflections from within the planet, the facets 
of changing tints, growing foggy, opalescent, silvery, or 
transparent. They follow the process of crystallization as a 
seed crystal spreads into a milieu; they record the 
shattering of a facet, the powdery disintegration of another, 
45 the liquid dissolution of a third . 
Kelvin's dilemma is brought in sharper focus when he can 
no longer distinguish between the simulacra and the 
44 As Ronald Bogue quotes Deleuze on Cinema, Deleuze 
characterises what he refers to as Bergson's primal cosmos as a 
gaseous state, (a) world of universal variation, universal 
undulation, universal rippling: there are neither axes nor center, 
neither right nor left, high or low', Cinema 1, p. 58. This 
combination of image-movement and matter-flow, Deleuze 
suggests, constitutes the 'plane of immanence'. I also note that in 
'Mother Right', Bachofen proposed an intermediary between the 
extremities of what he refers to as 'pure tellurian' and 'pure 
uranian luminaries': 'Between the two extremes, the earth and the 
sun, the moon takes the middle position which the ancients 
designate as the borderland between two worlds. The purest of 
tellurian bodies and the impurest of uranian luminaries. It 
becomes the image of maternity which attains its highest 
purification in the Demetrian principle; as a heavenly earth it 
contrasts with the chthonian earth, just as the Demetrian matron 
contrasts with the hetaeric woman' (p. 115). Bachofen identified 
the lunar celestial body (the Moon) as the intermediary between 
the tellurian and the uranian. 
45 Added emphasis. Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, p. 124. 
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real/historical (present-ness and past) Rheya/Hari. There 
is perhaps an issue between the real Rheya/Hari and the 
facsimile that begs the question, is the phi- 
creature/visitor in fact the real Rheya/Hari absolved of 
responsibility and reasoning for her suicide ? 46 
5 
46 In Tarkovsky: Cinema as Poetry, Maya Turovskaya comments: 'The 
main thing for him [Tarkovsky], however, was something else; the 
way in which Hari, finding herself at the centre of the clashes of 
personality and point of view on the station, having started as a 
ghost, gradually becomes a human being' (p. 56, added 
emphasis). 
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The planet as an intermediary can only communicate with 
the scientists through the various initial somnambular 47 
visitations of the simulacra. Kelvin's visitor (a simulation 
of his wife at the time of her suicide 10 years earlier )48 is 
a manifestation of an intensity of his memory and, as is 
made clear, has no identity of her own. She is unable to 
exist without remaining in relative proximity to him - 
relying on him to form her identity. Kelvin's 
commonsense tells him that this phenomena is not his 
wife and crucially, also not a spectre. He takes a blood 
sample, which provisionally shows him what he would 
expect to see - red corpuscles. However on closer 
scrutiny under the microscope, and looking further into 
the depths where he anticipates a view of the atomic 
structure at the limit of his exploration, he finds nothing 
but a dazzling white light. He asks the question, is this 
frail yet seemingly indestructible body 'actually made of 
nothing? 949 
47 Somnambulism - sleepwalking. Kelvin's visitor appears after he 
has slept and itself appears in a dream state, as yet without a 
rounded character of Rheya/Hari. Kelvin refers to the female 
visitors as 'succubi' and which are recognised as a kind of 
mythological female demon who attempts to have intercourse with 
sleeping men. Hoffmann's use of the metaphor of sleep in his 
short story 'The Sandman' should be noted here, particularly with 
reference to the inarticulate automaton Olympia. Nathaniel 
justifies her lack of communication by saying, 'What are words? 
The glance of her heavenly eyes says more than any speech on 
earth. Can a child of heaven accommodate itself to the narrow 
circle drawn by the wretched circumstances of earth? ' (p. 1 18). 
She appears in the latter part of the story and with whom 
character Nathaniel falls in love and is eventually driven to 
madness over: 'Then madness gripped him with hot glowing claws, 
tore its way into him and blasted his mind. "Ha, ha, ha! Circle of 
fire, circle of fire! Spin, spin, circle of fire! Merrily, merrily! 
Puppet, ha! Lovely puppet, spin, spin! "' (Tales of Hoffmann, 
p. 120). 
48 In the novel, the ghost of Gibarian (a father-figure to the younger 
psychologist Kelvin) visits Kelvin in a dream to warn him of Snow 
and Sartorious's intentions to build a magnetic field disruptor and 
bombard Solaris with radiation. The ghost also informs Kelvin that 
Rheya, his wife/visitor, will always remain at the age she died -a disruption of temporal linearity. It is important here to note the 
distinction between ghost and simulacra. In Tarkovsky's film 
version, the ghost of Gibarian appears as a recorded message left 
for Kelvin to view. 
49 Lem, Solaris, p. 103. 
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Everything looks normal, but it's a camouflage. A cover in a 
way, it's a super-copy, a reproduction which is superior to 
the original ... there exists, in man, an absolute limit -a 
term to structural divisibility - whereas here, the frontiers 
have been pushed back. 50 
Snow and Sartorious attempt to explain her in scientific 
terms as something beyond atomic structure and the 
corporeal - the realm of the neutrino, constituted of sub- 
atomic material and its capability for endless 
rejuvenation . 
5' That realisation that the phi- 
creature/visitor is more than just a spectre makes its 
manifestation all the more fearful. 
When it arrives, the visitor is almost blank - only a ghost 
made up of memories and vague images dredged out of its 
... source. 
The longer it stays with you, the more human it 
becomes. It also becomes more independent, up to a certain 
52 point . 
50 Ibid., p. 105. In Tarkovsky: Cinema as Poetry, Maya Turovskaya 
states: 'It is she [Hari] who strives to understand her earthly 
experience by understanding man with the aid of an external point 
of view - the viewpoint of space' (p. 55). 
51 Kelvin argues: 'the cell and the nucleus of the cell are nothing but 
camouflage. The real structure, which determines the functions of 
the visitor, remains concealed' (Lem, Solaris, p. 106). In House of 
Leaves, Billy Reston, one of the investigators brought in by Will 
Navidson to explore the house, comments on the accuracy of 
scientific equipment to solve the dimensional discrepancies of the 
house: 'That should put the ghost in the grave fast' (p. 38). In 
Deleuze on Cinema, Ronald Bogue notes that the implication of 
consciousness as dynamism can even be interpreted at a 
subatomic level through differentiation of velocity and degrees 
(the size of interval) and based in the complexity of any event. 
52 Added emphasis. Lem, Solaris, p. 157. In Death and the Labyrinth, 
Michel Foucault states: 'From the hollow opening inside words are 
fashioned beings endowed with strange characteristics, which 
seem to have been part of them since the beginning of time and 
forever inscribed in their destiny, yet are nothing more than the 
wake of the motion of words' (p. 36, added emphasis). 
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In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze analysed meaning as the 
contradictory simulacra within language that jolts thought 
into a transcendental speculation on grounding as the 
condition on which language rests -a loquendum. 53 
Latterly in Cinema 2, he argued that a clich6 was a 
sensory-motor image of a thing, which, according to his 
reading of Bergson, is based in our perception of things 
through the particularity of interest. We do not perceive a 
thing in its entirety, but always less of it. 
[W]e perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or 
rather what it is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our 
economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological 
54 demands 
. 
When the sensory-motor schemata is disrupted or 
interrupted, we are confronted by another kind of image - 
that of the optical-sound, which Deleuze argues is 
without metaphor and is unjustifiable. 55 
Narration is never a given of images but a 
consequence of the visibility of images, and Deleuze 
cites the difficulty rooted in what he refers to as the 
'assimilation of the cinematographic image to utterance', 
where a false appearance is given through the 
precedence of utterance over image and any 
authentically visible characteristic - movement - is taken 
from it. 
53 From the Latin loquendi, meaning a rage for speaking. Deleuze 
understands this as the contradictory simulacrum within language 
jolting thought into a transcendental analysis of the ground on 
which language rests. 
54 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 20. 
55 In Cinema 2, Deleuze argues: 'Sometimes it is necessary to 
restore the lost parts, to rediscover everything that cannot be 
seen in the image, everything that has been removed to make it 
"interesting". But sometimes, on the contrary, it is necessary to 
make holes to introduce voids and white spaces, to rarefy the 
image, by suppressing many things that have been added to make 
us believe that we were seeing everything. It is necessary to make 
a division or make emptiness in order to find the whole again' 
(p. 21 ). 
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He proposes that 'it is necessary to move towards a limit, 
to make the limit of before the film and after it pass into 
thefiI Mi. 56 The direct time-image is virtual as opposed to 
the actuality of the movement-image, but it is important 
to remember here that virtuality in opposition to actuality 
does not infer, for Deleuze, any opposition to reality. 
Danielewski has the character Zampan6 state in 
House of Leaves: 'Strangely then, the best argument for 
fact is the absolute unaffordability of fiction. Thus it 
would appear the ghost haunting The Navidson Record 
continually bashing against the door, is none other than 
the recurring threat of its own reality. 757 In The Logic of 
Sense Deleuze considers meaning by exploring the 
stoical terms 'bodies' and 'incorporeal' rather than 
'actual' and 'virtual', but he made the point that bodies, 
as a realm of causes and effects, exist as subsistence, 
and that insistence exists as incorporeality. They are the 
result of causes and therefore have a minimum of being 
and no true existence. This understands meaning as an 
ephemeral attribute or event rather than a state of things 
-a way of being rather than a state of being. 
If we consider the phi-creatures/visitors in Solaris 
with reference to this interpretation of meaning, we could 
argue that firstly they are bodies, in that they assume a 
bodily form and in so doing disguise their difference 
through corporeality. Secondly, they exist as a surface to 
the bodies of the scientists on the space station -a 
temporal/ephemeral attribute of the infinite . 
58 The phi- 
creature/visitor might then be interpreted as the surface 
meaning of incorporeal on the corporeal. 
56 Ibid., p. 38. 
57 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 149. 
58 In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze interprets the Stoical view of time 
as incorporeal on two levels: 
(i) The finite present 
(ii) The infinite past and future. 
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Kelvin's visitor/wife could be conceived as the 
realisation of an incorporeal event from his past - she 
has the mark of the fatal injection on her arm (a key 
moment in the narrative of both novel and film is Kelvin's 
recognition of Rheya/Har i 59 via the tear (a scission) in her 
dress and the puncture wound of the hypodermic needle - 
visceration as the event of acknowledgement). Later 
when Rheya/Hari voluntarily submits herself to 
annihilation, she arguably, through such a sacrifice, 
achieves a kind of human stature. 
It is significant that both Tarkovsky and Soderbergh 60 
portray the phi-creature's/visitor's need for proximity to 
the corporeal body (the scientist's). Rheya/Hari injures 
and then reconstitutes herself in an attempt to maintain 
proximity to Kelvin when he attempts to leave her to 
consult with Snow and Sartorious. Are Tarkovsky and 
Lem indicating that Rheya/Hari is the meaning of Kelvin's 
existence, or is she the problem/result/after-effect? 
As Deleuze comments, Stoic philosophy gives a 
priori to corporeal cause over incorporeal effect, and a 
reading of the relationship between Kelvin and 
Rheya/Hari might indicate that Kelvin, the corporeal 
cause, is the instigator of Rheya/Hari as incorporeal 
effect. Where Deleuzian interpretation of the Stoical 
concepts of cause and effect may prove a useful tool 
here is in the shift from a reading that emphasises the 
theological content (the a priori of body over effect) to 
consider the incorporeal/effect as essentially 
transcendental. 
59 In the novel Kelvin's visitor is known as Rheya; in Tarkovsky's 
film she is referred to as Hari. 
60 Stephen Soderbergh remade Solaris in 2003 with George Clooney 
taking the role of Kelvin. Soderbergh's film makes a radical shift 
at the end of the film by suggesting (unlike both book and film) 
that Kelvin remains with the visitor/phi-creature Rheya/Hari in 
'virtual' proximity to the planet. 
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Rhey/Hari is not only a product of Solaris, but is 
also an effect of Kelvin's proximity/interaction with the 
planet. For Rheya/Hari to exist, Kelvin as a body (a 
corporeal event) needs to be close to Solaris, and 
therefore Solaris could be conceived as a transcendental 
pre-sense that precedes the corporeal Kelvin and the 
incorporeal Rheya/Hari. 
When Kelvin attempts to instigate good sense as 
that which underlines truth via scientific means, that truth 
being that Rheya/Hari cannot exist as she has previously 
died, her presence on the space station is not a 
corporeal present of finitude, but an incorporeal 
infinitude of how she is/was as recollected by Kelvin. 
Rheya/Hari is a simulacra of the historical Rheya/Hari 
projected by Solaris via the particularity and specificity 
of Kelvin's recollection -a fragmentary, proximal 
facsimile capable of a kind of evolution base in Kelvin's 
memory. 
She is an infinite possibility that is no longer fixed 
in a finite present, yet she is fixed to a combined 
proximal location of Kelvin as the specific source of the 
manifestation of the event of simulation and Solaris as 
the transcendental pre-sense instigating an involuntary 
memory. This might indicate that Kelvin is in fact the 
screen onto which and also from which the projection of 
Rheya/Hari is realised. 
The complication made manifest in the realisation of 
the phi-creature/visitor is that the recognition of the 
duality of interior/exterior is undermined in that absolute 
interiority (the monadic condition) is at work. The visitor 
determines the differentiation that refuses to maintain 
any clear duality, in that its realisation is the interaction 
of a multiplicity whereby it can no longer be interpreted 
as the action of the subjective upon the objective. 
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The parameters by which such directional 
substantiation might take place are significantly 
undermined by the complication of recognition as to what 
might be essentially subjective, and likewise what might 
be essentially objective in the relation. 
One might argue that precedent of Kelvin's 
proximity to the planet determines his subjective priority 
in the relation, and that the appearance of Rheya/Hari as 
a specific historical manifestation substantiates such an 
interpretation. However, Solaris can also be seen as that 
which articulates this event and from which the 
realisation of the visitor takes place. 
We should also note here that in House of Leaves 
the evolutionary deployment of the labyrinthine 
capaciousness of the house is in some way a response to 
the proximity of the Navidson family and their associates. 
In this way the peculiarity of individual interaction with 
the unknown of house, planet (in Solaris) and zone (in 
61 Stalker) are essential characteristics of their operation. 
Deleuze interprets the subjectivity of the 
fragmentary vision (the crystal-image) that he argues is 
synonymous with European post-war cinema as inherent 
in particular characteristics that are manifest in 'the 
62 disturbances of memory and the failure of recognition' . 
The character Zampanb postulates on the possibility of 
realising a ground-plan of the house based on the 
footage of The Navidson Record, only to come to the 
conclusion that it would be impossible due to the 
constant wall-shifts and the film's 'constant destruction 
of continuity, frequent jump cuts prohibiting any sort of 
61 Derrida comments in The Truth in Painting: 'A piece of waste land 
[terrain vague] has no fixed limit. Without edge, without any 
border marking property, without any nondecomposable frame that 
would not bear partition' (p. 93). 
62 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 55. 
293 
accurate mapmaking' . 
63 it is also clear that Kelvin 
recognises the phi-creature/visitor as a facsimile of his 
wife, but the disruption of his memory is heightened by 
her provisional blankness. As their relationship evolves, 
her memories are filled in by persistent exposure to 
Kelvin, but the most significant one (her suicide) remains 
disturbing (a disturbance of memory) and elusive until the 
phi-creature/visitor Rheya/Hari seemingly re-enacts that 
attempt on her life. Each time she is rejuvenated, her 
memory/recollections of the real Rheya/Hari 
improve/expand so that although the seemingly infinite 
capacity of the phi-creature/visitor to regenerate itself 
indicates a kind of corporeal stasis (an eternal return of 
the body), the temporally linked aspect of memory is 
continually changing and in flUX. 64 
What is provisionally conceived in the first visitation 
as almost a barely evolved fragment of recollection 
develops through the cipher of proximity and nearness. 
63 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 109. The interpretation of the 
schematic of the house is schismatic in that in that it renders the 
architectural spatiality (the empty rooms, long hallways and dead 
ends) as 'perpetually promising, but forever eluding the finality of 
immutable layout' (ibid., p. 109). 
64 It is worthy of note here that Kelvin's first attempt to deal with the 
visitor is not to explain it scientifically but to make it invisible by 
launching it into orbit - to dispose of it: 'I felt I was justified in 
thinking that I had defeated the "simulacra", and that behind the 
illusion, contrary to all expectation, I had found the real Rheya 
again - the Rheya of my memories, whom the hypothesis of 
madness would have destroyed' (Lem, Solaris, p. 68). 
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As already noted, this is most clearly identified when the 
phi-creature/visitor repeats the real Rheya/Hari's attempt 
65 
at suicide through the ingestion of liquid oxygen This 
seemingly happens as the phi-creature/visitor 
accumulates more and more memory data through 
proximity to Kelvin, and therefore becomes familiar with 
the psychological trauma from Kelvin's past, which drove 
the real Rheya/Hari to end her life. 
What is also significant here is that such 
recollection is indiscriminate, in that the facsimile of 
Rheya/Hari cannot choose which memories inform her 
development in Kelvin's presence, and equally the 
planet's involvement cannot differentiate good memory 
from bad (this raises the question; is Rheya/Hari a 'good' 
of a 'bad' copy -a phantasme? ). 
It could be argued that the capacity for the planet to 
read and interpret memory does not include an ability to 
differentiate between what might be considered a 'good' 
or a 'bad' recollection for the one who is visited, and that 
therefore this increases the possibility of a kind of 
repetition. 
The repetition would be steeped in the potential 
trauma of the original relationship. In the novel, Snow 
interprets the process by which the planet manifests the 
65 Rodowick notes in Deleuze's Time-Machine that Walter Benjamin 
focused on the problem of time in his essay, 'A Short History of 
Photography'. Rodowick comments that Benjamin's fascination 
with the transition of the interval of time marked by exposure from 
requirements of several hours to latterly, mere fractions of a 
second. Benjamin's concept of aura is entirely dependent on the 
longevity of exposure: 'the longer the interval of exposure, the 
greater the chance that the aura of an environment-the complex 
temporal relations woven through its represented figures-would 
seep into the image', p. 8. Rheya/Hari develops her aura through 
prolonged contact/exposure to Kelvin - expanding her memory 
capacity/recollection from her first appearance as a snapshot from 
Kelvin's memory. The affiliation to a pharmacology interpretation 
should also not be lost here. Sense is called into question and 
complicated here when Rheya/Hari chooses to terminate her 
existence with liquid oxygen, which in another corporeal/material 
manifestation (its gaseous state) is life giving. 
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phenomena of the visitors as one that 'probed our brains 
and penetrated to some kind of psychic tumor'. 66 Later in 
the same passage he states that it: 
isolated psychic processes, enclosed, stifled, encysted - 
foci smouldering under the ashes of memory. It deciphered 
them and made use of them, in the same way one uses a 
recipe or blueprin t. 67 
This amoral condition of an outside agency is something 
Tarkovsky explores again in Stalker. During the traversal 
of the zone, the three travellers discuss the demise of 
another stalker named Porcupine who entered 'the room' 
and was seemingly granted his wish. 
On his return from the zone he suddenly became 
very wealthy but within a week he had committed suicide. 
The implication is that the room does not read and act 
upon the superficiality of any surface desire but rather 
delves deeper and interprets darker subconscious 
wishes. 
66 Lem, Solaris, p. 77. The interruptive aspect of undifferentiated 
amorality has a strong parallel in Stalker. The reading of Kelvin's 
memory by the ocean to facilitate Rheya/Hari does not distinguish 
between good and bad memory in the same way that the wishing 
room in Stalker does not fulfil merely conscious desire but grants 
and interprets the unconscious wish regardless of the 
repercussions to the wisher maker. 
67 Added emphasis. Ibid., p. ýý7. It may be worth reiterating here 
Danielewski's use of a blue typeface for the word house 
throughout House of Leaves and the suggestion that it indicates 
an alteric hyperlink to the unheimlich. I draw attention here to the 
use of the word encysted explored in Chapter 3 of this text as the 
event of the ructure. The term blueprint also has architectonic 
connotations that also link to earlier remarks about the rift in its 
German translation indicating both cut or tear and ground plan. 
The correlation to the abysmal is also pertinent here. 
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What is important to glean from this apparent 
dilemma is that which is essentially and fundamentally 
alteric though the nature of its alterity cannot be 
expected or anticipated to conform to any prescription of 
regulation imposed upon it. It is not merely amoral, but 
by its very definition outside the conceptual framework by 
which and for which morality can stake a claim. The 
stalker identifies the risk of the wish-fulfilment aspect of 
the room, not through the consciousness of such wishing 
but through the unconscious desire of the visitor - hence 
the cautionary tale of Porcupine. What is intolerable 
about the room is that it represents unbearable 
possibility - hence the scientist's desire to destroy it with 
an explosive device. However, the stalker might also be 
seen as a grail knight -a visionary not caught up in the 
status of his role, and who continually underplays his 
worthiness, yet it is he who is seemingly granted his 
unconscious wish as he is uncontaminated by a corrupted 
desire (unlike 'Writer' and particularly 'Scientist', whose 
intent is to destroy the room with an explosive device so 
as to extinguish false hope in others). 
Rheya/Hari is no longer fixed in a finite present but 
is the manifestation of an infinite possibility (this is 
evident in her capacity to continually rejuvenate herself), 
and is Kelvin's memory of his wife interpreted by Solaris 
and projected from Kelvin's past. 68 
68 Ronald Bogue, in Deleuze on Cinema, argues: 'The present image 
becomes representation when it is isolated from other images, not 
by more light being cast on it, but by the diminution of light, a 
darkening of its contours. Hence if present images are light, 
representations are subtractions of quantities of light, or selective 
filterings of light' (p. 31). 
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The Solaris effect (the incorporeal infinitude), 
69 
understood as a kind of thaumaturgy , precedes and 
anticipates interaction with a cause (a corporal finitude) 
in the personages of Kelvin, Snow and Sartorious. But 
they do not act as merely the source of the simulacra but 
rather also as the 'point of view' from which the 
simulacra might be viewed - the screen. 70 
The effect of the simulacra as arguably a spectral 
manifestation of memory would suggest that in a way 
Rheya/Hari is already immanent as a problem within 
Kelvin in two aspects; firstly, as a transcendental ground 
of possible actualisations, and secondly, as a secondary 
effect or simulacra. In the sense of the first view, 
Rheya/Hari could be conceived as a point of immanence 
specified by the proximity of the corporeal Kelvin and, 
most importantly, his memory of his wife at the time of 
her death, to the pre-individuation manifest in Solaris as 
a kind of transcendental ground. 
69 Thaurnaturgy - the act of performing miracles (a combination of 
the scientific with a magical outlook). From the Greek 
thaumatourgor, thaumamatos - marvel, and egos - working. This 
concept is discussed in by Frances A. Yates in Theatre of the 
World in relation to what is termed a thaumaturgike, which is 
understood to be either a mechanical toy or a strange theatrical 
effect. She quotes Dr John Dee, one of two of the great magical 
scientists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (the other 
being Robert Fludd), when describing the thaumaturgike as: 'that 
Art Mathematicall which giveth certaine order to make straunge 
workes of the sense to be perceived, and of men greatly to be 
wondered at' (p. 30). Derrida, in The Truth in Painting, quotes 
Kant in discussion of the parergon (the supplement outside the 
work of art) when he states that because reason is 'conscious of 
its impotence to satisfy its moral need', it has recourse to the 
supplementary work of the parergon. The fourth parergon 
(illumination) has a correspondent danger or detriment cited as 
thaumaturgy (The Truth in Painting, p. 56). 1 also refer again here 
to E. T. A Hoffmann's short story 'The Sandman', where the leading 
character Nathaniel falls in love with the automaton, Olympia and, 
as a result of which, is driven mad and finally to suicide. 
70 Bogue argues in Deleuze on Cinema: 'an object (a merely present 
image) emits light and that some rays of light pass through 
unnoticed, while others are reflected back onto the object. Our 
representation of the object consists of rays of light we reflect, 
that is, the object's total number of rays minus the rays we ignore 
or do not reflect. An organ of perception functions as the mirror 
that reflects the rays that interest us and that serve our future 
actions' (p. 31). 
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The ability of the planet to continually replicate 
Rheya/Hari illustrates and articulates the notion that at 
the heart of infinity is repetition. Each 'new' Rheya/Hari 
is physically the same as the previous one (a simulation 
of Kelvin's recollection of her at the time of her physical 
death), and clearly that sameness is based in Kelvin's 
memory as interpreted by Solaris. 
Yet that sameness is inherently different from the 
source Rheya/Hari, in that Solaris creates this particular 
phi-creature/visitor not from a first-hand or ideal person, 
but from the memory of another (Kelvin) whose 
recollective idiosyncrasies must inform the simulation. 
The implication here is that repetition is not grounded in 
similitude as a replication understood through mere 
sameness, but that it is contingent on an essential 
difference. 71 
71 In both the film and the novel when Rheya/Hari first appears, 
Kelvin notices, in attempting to remove her dress (he asks her to 
don a spacesuit seemingly to go on a reconnaissance mission but 
in reality it is his first attempt to rid himself of the phi- 
creature/visitor) that there are no fastenings. This implies that 
Solaris, in reading his memory, has been selective (the phi- 
creature/visitor Rheya/Hari is not a complete facsimile). In the 
novel, on Rheya/Hari's return when she undresses again, Kelvin 
notes: 'The sight of the two identical dresses filled me with horror 
which exceeded anything I had felt hitherto. Rheya was busy 
tidying up the medicine chest. I turned my back and bit my 
knuckles. Unable to take my eyes of the two dresses - or rather 
the original dress and its double' (pp. 78-9, added emphasis). 
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We understand meaning as an incorporeal attribute 
to words (it is also produced through language and 
therefore a mere after-effect of the lingual) and yet 
presupposed in every statement as an antecedent 
condition. 72 The paradox of meaning for Deleuze is both 
in after-effect and something that is always already there 
but which is also a transcendental condition of possible 
meanings and becomings that have an infinite number of 
embodiments. In linguistic terms, the ideal matter of 
words is essentially not linguistic and the singular point 
of things is not essentially physical, but implicates 
centres of virtual difference before being explicated or 
actualised in specific forms. This indicates what we 
might term a 'transcendental field' of both meaning and 
events, which might proffer a metaphysical surface that is 
manifest in paradox and simulacra. 73 
Generally, the rational meaning of logical 
propositions is referred to as common or good sense and 
this infers that nonsense is therefore paradoxical and 
contradictory to the rational. Deleuze argues that, in this 
way, nonsense gives a full and unrestricted dimension of 
sense, which is both corporeal and incorporeal. 
72 In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze indicated four categories of 
incorporeals: 
(i) Time (aion and chronos) 
(ii) Place 
(iii) Void 
(iv) Expressible - Lekton 
For the Stoics, one and four were the most important - Lekton, as 
what is expressible operates as a 'between' (what Deleuze refers 
to as extra-being) which is neither subjective nor empirical. Time 
is understood as the variable present of bodies (chronos) and the 
unlimited time of past and future, which has no real existence 
(aion). 
73 It is important to remember here that Deleuze's conception of the 
transcendental is in a sense metaphysical without falling into the 
trope of the transcendental as either an abyss without differences 
or possibilities or a sovereignly individuated being. 
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Words as bodies (physical sounds devoid of meaning) are 
non-sense but have an important psychological function. 74 
Incorporeal nonsense is an ever-elusive paradoxical 
entity that traverses the metaphysical surface of meaning 
and establishes what Deleuze describes as a structure of 
singular points. The psychological model is a primal 
experience of a corporeal plenum of non-individuated 
bodies from where emerge the agencies of ego and 
superego, fantasy and thought - corporeal 
nonsense/words as bodies. 
Schizophren i CS75 confuse words and things (similarly 
to writers like Lewis Carrol 1)76 but the latter's wordplay 
involves the incorporeal surface, whereas the formers' 
verbal constructions are embedded in the 'corporeal 
depths of bodies without surfaces'. 77 
74 In 'The Transcendence of Words', Levinas wrote: 'Non-sense is 
the most evenly distributed thing in the world' (The Levinas 
Reader, p. 145). In House of Leaves, Danielewski comments: 
'Strangely then, the best argument for fact is the absolute 
unaffordability of fiction. Thus it would appear the ghost haunting 
The Navidson Record continually bashing against the door, is 
none other than the recurring threat of its own reality' (p. 149). 
75 The 'idiot' is understood as a conceptual persona who departs 
from any scholastic definition of man as rational animal, 
dramatises the unlearned and untutored in thinking. 
76 The concept of 'non-sense', as illustrated by Lewis Carroll in Alice 
in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, is integral to 
Deleuze's The Logic of Sense. I draw attention to Deleuze's 
remarks on the object in the Sheep's Shop in Through the 
Looking-Glass (Chapter V, pp. 170-80) later in this chapter. 
77 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 74. 
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Deleuze argues that schizophrenics experience words as 
'devouring, lacerating or jubilant physical entities' but 
also as a collection of dissociated 'body parts, 
dismembered, interpenetrating and mutually devouring' 
and as what he terms 'a body without organs'. 78 
The transgressive movement of a kind of bifurcation 
of the lingual operates, for the schizophrenic, as either 
the dismembered body entered by exploding words, 
wounding and rending phonetic elements devoid of 
meaning or issuing forth from that body without organs as 
'glorious unarticulated sonic blocks'. 79 
In the endnotes to Chapter Six of House of Leaves, 
the character Johnny Truant comments on entering 
Zampanb's apartment and discovering his writings and 
some unaccountable marks on the floor: 
for I saw the impossible marks near the trunk, touched 
them, even caught some splinters in my fingertips, some of 
their unexpected sadness and mourning which though dug 
out later with a safety pin, I swear still fester beneath my 
skin, reminding me ... just like other splinters, 
I still carry, 
though these much deeper, having never been worked out 
by the body but quite the contrary worked into the body, by 
78 Foucault argued that, historically, madness was reduced by the 
age of reason to the status of a mere disease and was no longer 
dignified as meaningful unreason. The consideration that such 
non-sense was in fact the mind having wings was undermined (the 
wings were clipped) by the disposition of reason as an educational 
programme of psychiatric discourse which put the patient on trial 
as it were, and from which the only respite would be sincere 
remorse. I draw attention here to what has already been remarked 
on the phi-creatures/visitors in Solaris. Under microscopic 
scrutiny, Kelvin discovers that Rheya/Hari is not constituted of 
recognisable body parts, but nutrinos and when he has focused 
the microscope to its optimum setting, discovers not an atomic 
structure but pure white light. 
79 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 75. Earlier in the text he argues 
that: 'Sense is never only one of the two terms of the duality 
which contrasts things with propositions, substantives and verbs, 
clenotations and expressions; it is also the frontier, the cutting 
edge, or the articulation of the difference between the two terms, 
since it has at its disposal an impenetrability which is its own and 
within which it is reflected. For these reasons, sense must be 
developed for its own sake in a new series of paradoxes, which 
are now internal' (ibid., p. 28). 
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now long since buried, calcified and fused to my very 
80 bones . 
As stated in Chapter 1 of this text, incorporeal non-sense 
functions for Deleuze as the structuring force of the 
transcendental field of singular points and is a stable 
intrinsic meaning that can never be found in mere 
deferral. Here he differs from and critiques Derrida by 
suggesting that deferral, understood as a perpetual 
regress of one word defined by yet another prevents the 
discovery of a linguistic ground; as a paradoxical 
element, it is never where it is sought and always where 
it cannot be found. In Stalker, the character of the stalker 
is blessed with the idiocy of a kind of schizophrenia, in 
that he negotiates the zone by finding paths with a zonal 
topological pre-sense founded in the adaptability of his 
experience and intuition, and takes charge of the rational 
and scholastic (identified in his fellow travellers, 'Writer' 
and 'Scientist'). 81 
80 Added emphasis. Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 78. 
81 Tarkovsky's representation of the zone in Stalker indicates the 
remnants of the Great Patriotic War (the Soviet Union's fight 
against Nazi Germany, 1941-5) with the inclusion of derelict 
tanks, concrete bunkers etc. This suggests that the zone had 
already been a locale fraught with potential dangers prior to the 
alien visitation. It implies a layering of temporal events whose 
connection is the risk and danger inferred by their demarcation. 
Paul Virilio, in Bunker Archaeology, states: 'The art of warfare 
aims at the constitution of an unhealthy, improper place for men 
just where he used to dwell' (p. 37). 
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Mark Le Fanu proposes that Tarkovsky presents the 
stalker as a holy fool and this is done through gesture. 
For Tarkovsky, cinema had become a quasi-silent medium 
and the stalker's vulnerability resists being pinned down 
- 'he is muscular but at the same time "neurotic": 
masculine but with feminine characteristics. 
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In sum, he is opaque and ungraspable - an apparition. 
82 
In Madness and Civilization, Foucault argued that: 
The madman's voyage is at once a rigorous division and an 
absolute Passage. In one sense, it simply develops, across 
a half-real, half-imaginary geography, the madman's liminal 
position on the horizon of medieval concern -a position 
symbolised and made real at the same time by the 
madman's privilege of being confined within the city gates: 
his exclusion must enclose him; if he cannot and must not 
have another prison than the threshold itself, he is kept at 
the point of passage. He is put in the interior of the 
exterior, and inverse I Y. 83 
82 Added emphasis. Mark Le Fanu, The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky, 
p. 98. Deleuze indicated a new kind of character that inhabits 
'new' cinema: 'It is because what happens to them does not 
belong to them and only half concerns them, because they know 
how to extract from the event the part that cannot be reduced to 
what happens: that part of inexhaustible possibility that 
constitutes the unbearable, the intolerable, the visionary's part' 
(Cinema 2, pp. 19-20). The confusion and ambiguity of gender is 
perhaps concomitant with what has been previously stated with 
regard to Ariadne's relationship with Theseus (the feminine image 
of man) as noted by Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy. Also 
note here Tarkovsky's extended scrutiny of the physical profile of 
the stalker once he has guided Scientist and Writer over the 
border and into the zone. Le Fanu argues that this extended shot 
resists the portentousness of the anticipation of a profound 
oration in favour of a study of vulnerability, which, rather than 
resort to mere pathos, emphasises the afore mentioned 
opaqueness of the fictional protagonist. This differs from the 
original conception of the character in the Strugatsky brothers' 
novel as a tough, streetwise character. In this sense, the 
anticipation of possible readings of the character mirrors the 
navigation of the zone (a reading on the stalker's face of the 
uncertainty of the possible directions that might be taken). I also 
mention here Deleuze's cinematic reading of the close-up as part 
of his work on the affection-image, of the framed head as the 
cleterritorialisation of the face in Cinema 1 (as noted in a film like 
Carl Dreyer's The Passion of Joan of Arc -a silent film where the 
film is made up extended close-ups). The separation is from what 
he argues are the three conventional functions of the face: 
Individuation - the distinguishing of characteristics of each 
character 
Socialisation - the relation of the social role through character 
interaction 
Communication - interaction, not only between two persons but 
also what he calls the internal accord between character and 
one's role. 
83 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p. 11. 
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Foucault pointed out that with the withdrawal of lepro SY84 
from the Western world at the end of the Middle Ages, 
the figure of the leper (and the communal sites they 
occupied outside urban centres and on the margins of the 
community) was reassigned so that the values and 
images previously attached gave meaning to a more 
general kind of social exclusion. 85 
In particular this meant that the fearful figure of the 
madman was not merely driven off as an act of total 
exclusion, but inscribed with a peripheral role and, in 
that sense, kept at a sacred distance. 136 
John Rajchman, in The Deleuze Connections, 
argues that noo-ology, as the image of thought, proposes 
an undogmatic way of approaching philosophy, which is 
not to be confused with what he terms a pre- 
comprehension of being (in the Heideggarian sense) or in 
a gestalt as a sphere of spirit (in the Hegelian sense), 
but is fundamentally against any intrinsic narrative, 
84 It is worth reiterating here that in House of Leaves, Will Navidson 
suffers from an indeterminate skin disorder (see footnote in 
Chapter 3 of this text), which is miraculously cured after his final 
excursion into the house. However, it might be argued that there 
was a physical cost for such a cure: 'Navidson began to recover, 
but the price he paid for living was not cheap. Frostbite claimed 
his right hand and clipped the top portion of one ear. Patches of 
skin on his face were also removed as well as his left eye. 
Furthermore his hip had inexplicably shattered and had to be 
replaced. Doctors said he would need a crutch for the rest of his 
life' (p. 523). 
85 In the Strugatsky brothers' novel, Roadside Picnic, they not only 
identify the zone as an area of exclusion, but also a plague 
quarter also contaminated in the aftermath of the visitation which 
created the zone: 'Almost everyone who lived in the neighborhood 
was hit, that's why we call it the Plague Quarter. Some died, 
mostly old people, and not too many of them. 1, for one, think they 
died from fright and not the plague. It was terrifying. Everyone 
who lived there got sick. And people in three neighborhoods went 
blind 
... 
They didn't go completely blind, but got a sort of night 
blindness' (p. 19). This blindness was apparently not caused by a 
bright light but a loud noise. 
86 'In the margins of the community, at the gates of cities, there 
stretched wastelands, which sickness ceased to haunt but had left 
sterile and long inhabitable. From the 14th to the 17th century 
they would wait, soliciting with strange incantations, a new 
incarnation of disease another grimace of terror, renewed rites of 
purification and exclusion. ' Foucault, Madness and Civilsation, 
p. 3. 
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historicism and sequentialism. This philosophical theatre 
argues for the precedent of juxtaposition, layering and 
stratigraphic montage, no longer tied to the hermeneutic 
universality of historical linearity, and where links are 
made across strata; where newness and the untimely 
transgress established stratifications in shifts which open 
up new fault lines and possibilities through the continual 
event of mutation. The cinematic resonance of this 
conception of temporality and montage should not be lost 
here, and the pertinence of complication as the 
overarching thematic at work here is further articulated 
by the reconsideration of sense and event as the 
motivation of thought, rather than the historical 
imperatives of truth and proposition. 
As Deleuze states: 
The cinematographic image is always dividual. This is 
because, in the final analysis, the screen, as the frame of 
frames, gives a common standard of measurement to things 
which do not have one - long shots of countryside and 
close-ups of the face, an astronomical system and a single 
drop of water - parts which do not have the same 
denominator of distance, relief or light. In all these senses 
the frame ensures a deterritorialisation of the image. 87 
The freeing of the time of philosophy from any epochal 
temporality (in the sense of a self -real isation of spirit or 
a destining of the West) also insists that thought should 
have no intrinsic home - no homeland or civilisation. 
Deleuze proposes a geophilosophy that rethinks 
borders based on odd potentials, different circumstances 
and contingencies rather than origins -a 
deterritorialisation, a nowhere not covered or 
compensated by an imagined community, nation or 
utopian condition where there is no imperium of truth, no 
87 Deleuze, Cinema 1, pp. 14-15. 
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transcendent law or Apollonian ideal C it y. 88 What matters 
is not a single unchanging relation to truth but the 
differences of orientation that suggest the image of 
thought (Deleuzian noo-ology) operates as an orientation 
tool in that it is prior to argument (for example, 
Descartes would argue differently from Plato) and 
selection is made through relation to a negative that is no 
longer meant in the sense of something to be corrected 
or overcome, an error, but rather a stupidity to be 
exposed and attacked. 
This notion of stupidity suggests any philosophical 
conflict is no longer based in a propositional error of 
ideality, but in taking on the intractable, not as irrational, 
but as involving the thinker in a relation with something 
inhuman and intolerable - the 'bestiality of thinking'. 89 
Problematisation pushes outside without any assurance 
of a superior first knowledge, which has a consensual 
agreement and engages with the shock of working with 
something for which there is no prior learning method. 
We are no longer in the realms of mere correction of 
error through the beatification of a higher science, but 
extrapolate beyond the natural light of good will and 
knowing to make visible new forces through experimental 
activity. 90 
88 Deleuze proposes a 'Spinozian city' that allows for the movement 
of free thought and social diversity. This movement always has an 
outside for which the private thinker refuses to place him/herself 
prior to truth. Deleuze and Guattari argue that 'the relation to 
truth in philosophy is neither stable nor constant, which is why it 
cannot be defined by it' (What is Philosophy?, p. 54). 
89 1 would like to make a link here between the 'bestiality of thinking' 
and the 'barbarism' of post- Holocaust/Shoah writing of lyric poetry 
as indicated by Adorno in relation to Celan (see Chapter 2 of this 
text). In the novel Solaris, Snow comments to Kelvin with 
reference to man's first contact with the planet: 'contact with 
another civilization. Now we've got it! And we can observe through 
the microscope as it were our own monstrous ugliness, our folly, 
our shame! ' (p. 76). 
90 Deleuze proposes a worldly thinking against the urdoxa of 
transcendent ideality. 
308 
Deleuze proposes an amorphous unformed space as 
shown through the anexact diagrams of pre-geometric 
figures, critiquing Husserl's The Origin of Geometry by 
suggesting that Husserl, in not extending his 
phenomenality to include the affirmation of such spaces, 
undermines their significance in favour of good geometric 
figures. 
Intensive space is not grounded in good form or the 
synthesis of a manifold, and departs significantly from 
the recognised constitution of objects -with -p rope rties and 
a divisible space of mere extension. Deleuze argued that 
the perambulation of space refuses any concept of 
mapping and rather posits a condition of filling out, which 
refutes any determination towards unrestrained 
organisation while also indicating the inseparability of 
space and movement. 
David Gross, however, points out a third type of 
memory that is hinted at by Bergson (but not significantly 
expanded upon), which he understands to be involuntary 
memory and by which it is understood that memories are 
unsolicited or disengaged from immediate action or 
perception and become an overwhelming flood of images 
which hinder any ability to cope with reality. In historical 
terms, these 'disturbances of memory and (the) failures 
of recognition'91 not only draw parallels between 
Bergson's involuntary memory and Deleuze's time-image, 
but also articulate what we have already defined as a 
fragmentary vision, which became synonymous with a 
perception of European cinema where subjectivity 
resisted the domination of an objective vision 
91 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 55. 
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concomitant with what Deleuze describes as the action or 
movement-image of American cinema. 92 
In classical cinema, the laws of motion function 
independently of time and, as such, the dynamics of such 
a form subordinate the temporal to movement. Modern 
cinema pulverises chronology so that the temporal is no 
longer subordinate to the integrity of movement as mere 
physical actions, but remains fragmented like the parts of 
a broken crystal. 
The distinction made by Deleuze is that between the 
frame as a provisionally closed and artificial set, and the 
shot as open and essentially variable. In Gilles Deleuze's 
Time Machine, D. N. Rodowick argues that the former 
'detaches objects from pro-filmic space, grouping 
actions, gesture, bodies and decors in a motivated 
ensemble' . 
93 If this is correct, the parallel is perhaps 
between the habitual memory of pure recollection, 
arguably concomitant with the realism of the movement- 
image, and the involuntary memory of the modernist art 
film and the time-image. 
Deleuze argued that the significant difference 
between the classical cinema of the movement-image and 
the modern cinema of the time-image is the non-rational 
or irrational link and cut. 
The so-called classical cinema works above all through the 
linkage of images, and subordinates cuts to this linkage. On 
the mathematical analogy, the cuts which divide up two 
series of images are rational, in the sense that they 
constitute either the final image of the first series or the 
first image of the second ... rational cuts always determine 
92 It is argued by Deleuze that the cinema of the time-image 
promoted an empiricist conversion in the era of post-war trauma. 
This refers to a belief or trust in the world that is prior to any 
divine calculation and judgement and interpreting the world as 
ever still making itself and never formulated mere goodness and 
truth -a belief in future as future (an aesthesis). 
93 Rodowick, Deleuze's Time Machine, p. 1 1. 
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commensurable relations between a series of images and 
thereby constitute the whole rhythmic system and harmony 
of classical cinema ... Time here, is therefore, essentially 
the object of an indirect representation, according to the 
commensurable relations and rational cuts which organise 
the sequence or linkage of movement-images ... modern 
cinema can communicate with the old, and the distinction 
between the two can be very relative. However, it will be 
defined ideally by a reversal where the image is unlinked 
and the cut begins to have an importance in itself. The cut, 
or interstice between two series of images no longer forms 
part of either of the two series; it is the equivalent of an 
irrational cut, which determines the non-com mensu rable 
94 
relations between images . 
Modern cinema then (by which Deleuze specifically refers 
to the European films of the post-war era) proffers the 
discontinuity of the irrational as the means by which the 
smooth running of any variation on movement as 
essentially continuous and legible is undermined. Donato 
Totaro argues that movement-image is a form of 
spatialised cinema, whereby time is determined and 
measured by movement (characters placed in narrative 
situations, perceive, react and take action in a direct 
linear way). 
The breakdown of what Deleuze calls the sensor- 
motor system happens when direct action and reaction 
are undermined by the discontinuity of temporal shifts 
and the appearance of vacant and disconnected spaces 
(he terms these 'any-space-whatevers'), which disrupt 
continuity, pushing the characters into a more passive 
role. 
As already suggested, this pre-geometric spatiality 
is essentially transgressive, in that it escapes division 
and topographic determination to exploit an intensity 
94 Ibid., p. 213. 
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beyond the limit of the lived body of phenomenological 
properties. The shift in cinema is, for Deleuze, a 
slackening of sensory-motor connections, replacing them 
with a purely optical and sound situation that he 
identifies with the role of the child in neo-realist cinema. 
He argues: 'in the adult world, the child is affected by a 
certain motor helplessness, but one which makes him all 
the more capable of seeing and hearing'. 95 
In Tarkovsky's film Stalker, the stalker's child 
Monkey could be interpreted as an illustration of a 
pre/post sensory condition that is not only heightened by 
her motor helplessness (it is made explicit that she 
literally cannot walk) but also, as indicated at the end of 
the film, by the fact that she is telepathic - perhaps a 
gift/curs e of the zone/room. 
8 
95 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 3 
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There is an implication in both film and nove 196 that the 
stalker's forays into the zone and any resulting 
contamination 97 are responsible for Monkey's condition. 
The trip which takes place in Tarkovsky's cinematic 
adaptation, indicates that a wish is fulfilled by the room 
on the stalker's return, in that it appears that Monkey is 
now mobile. However, the shot later reveals that she is in 
fact 'walking' on her father's shoulders. 98 
Navidson's children in House of Leaves are denied 
the paradox of the closet by 'swallowing it whole'. 99 
Zampanb later comments on Daisy's demand to play a 
game that she seems to refer to as 'always' as perhaps 
just a childish neologism, yet the sinister overtone is 
maintained in the text by proposing that the title of the 
game may in fact be a mispronunciation of the word 
hallways and that the children fail to recognise the 
unheimlich potential (the non-sense) of the house in the 
same way as the adults do, preferring to interpret the 
disorienting changes taking place as part of a game. 
Navidson's wife Karen reacts differently. 
96 The novel written by the Strugatsky brothers is entitled Roadside 
Picnic and is so named to suggest the temporary incursion of 
aliens thirty years prior to the commencement of the narrative and 
who picnicked on earth and then left leaving a series of locations 
permanently contaminated by their debris. In the novel this 
residue is very real and the source of an underground economy for 
stalkers in alien contraband. In Tarkovsky's film, what is desired 
is wish fulfilment from the room. In her essay, 'Art for All 'Time'' 
(Film-Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 4, February 2000), Donato Totaro 
comments: 'Tarkovsky is not interested in external, scientific truth 
or reality, but an inner subjective truth. The room granted the 
truth of the deeper self and not the apparent reality of the surface 
self' (p. 4). 
97 In the novel, this is referred to as the 'mutagen effect': 'Everyone 
who spends time in the zone undergoes changes, both phenotype 
and genotype' (p. 109). 
98 Tarkovsky expands this idea of the miracle by suggesting at the 
end of the film that Monkey has telepathic powers. In a seemingly 
repetitive sequence which mirrors the opening shot of the film, 
objects move across a surface in the stalker's apartment as the 
result of the vibration of a passing train. In the final sequence 
Monkey appears to be watching a similar event, but it is only after 
the train has passed and the noise dies away that we are aware 
that the objects continue to move and that Monkey (evidenced by 
her facial reaction) is manipulating them. 
99 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 39. 
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Karen's project is one mechanism against the uncanny or 
that which is 'un-home-like'. She remains watchful and 
willing to let the bizarre dimensions of her house gestate 
within her. 100 
The discrepancies that unfold in the Navidson Record are 
concomitant with the Deleuzian view of the time-image. 
This is centred on the purely optical and sound image, 
which articulates more indeterminate themes of mental 
imagery and emotional and psychic breakdown -a direct 
image of time. 'O' Danielewski's account of a fictive 
documentary film entitled The Navidson Record, as 
described by the deceased Zampan6 in his surviving 
notes published as the main body of text in House of 
Leaves, states that: 
If finally catalogued as a gothic tale, contemporary urban 
folk myth, or merely a ghost story, as some have called it, 
the documentary will still, sooner or later, slip the limits of 
any one of those genres. 102 
The possibility inherent in this slippage that recognises 
the 'between' of any formal genres as integral to a new 
100 Added emphasis. Ibid., p. 37. Karen's project is putting up some 
shelves, which highlights the first noticeable discrepancies in the 
dimensions of the house. Earlier remarks indicate the ambiguity of 
the transgression of the corporeal articulated in the event of 
gestation, its temporal dimension and potential parasitic 
consequences. This presents a psychological trauma of 
simultaneously being 'in' the house while at the same time, 
recognising that the house is also 'in' the body. Gestation is an 
attribute of, amongst other life forms, the parasite. 
101 In his introduction to Foucault's text on Raymond Roussel, Death 
and the Labyrinth, John Ashbery comments that Roussel's poem 
Nouvelles Impression o"Afrique (1932) has a narrative constantly 
interrupted by parenthetic thought and where sometimes five pairs 
of parentheses 'isolate one idea buried in the surrounding 
verbiage like the central sphere of a Chinese puzzle' (p. xxv, 
added emphasis). The visual similarity between these parentheses 
and a labyrinthine structure should not be lost here. He later 
argues that the poem is pieced together by moving backwards and 
forwards through the text - to turn ahead to the last line of the 
canto in order to be able to finish the first line as a means of 
piecing the poem together. 
102 Added emphasis. Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 3. The two 
fictitious films mentioned in Five and a Half Minute Hallway and 
Exploration#4 are described by Zampan6 as structurally 'highly 
discontinuous, jarring' (p. 5). 
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understanding of how a structure might be recognised, 
identifies complication and interruption as the essential 
schematic of mutability. As stated above, Danielewski 
exploits many recognised forms, but the fundamental 
structure of the novel links main text and footnotes (via 
the disjunction of any intrinsic temporal continuity) by 
developing, provisionally at least, two narratives 
simultaneously (operating as two pasts, as it were), on 
the same page. 
The ongoing desire is to find continuity in the shift 
from what we might call the main narrative, understood 
as Zampan6's account of the Navidson Record, to the 
footnoted text of Johnny Truant's personal memoir. 
Chronology as a clear path through the text is blurred by 
the novel's structure and page layouts where the issue is 
raised that the novel is in fact not a novel at all but a 
documentary account of not only the edited notes of a 
person called Zampanb but supplemented by the diary of 
a further seemingly real character called Johnny Truant. 
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The account of Truant's life runs concomitantly with the 
first throughout the body of the text and specifically 
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indicates the progressive deterioration and disorientation 
of that life. In the introduction, the character Truant 
comments that he lost all sense of time while reading 
Zampan6's text and: 'Slowly but surely, I grew more and 
more disorientated'. 103 This indicates a direct affect by 
his involvement with Zampan6's account of yet further 
lives (the characters of the Navidson Record) and further 
temporal shifts. 
As the narrative unfolds, a group of associates 
(Holloway's exploration team) are drafted in to enforce a 
further 'scientific' diagnostic by exploring the shifting 
anomalies of the house. The exploration culminates in 
the tragic consequences of the latter part of the novel 
and which exacerbate non-linear relations, and along 
with the other concomitant narrative (Truant's 
increasingly convoluted trajectory through Zampan6's 
journal and notes) find the text becoming progressively 
more labyrinthine. It defies a clear linearity by 
preclicating disorientation with all its incumbent 
complications and uncertainty of what is virtual and what 
is actual. 
103 Danielewski, House of Leaves, introduction, p. xviii. In a later 
section of the text, Truant comments: 'No one wanted the old 
man's words -except me' (p. 20). The strong association between 
the characters of Truant and Zampan6 is almost as that between 
absent father and son (note here the affiliation between Matta- 
Clark, his brother Batan and their absent father, the Chilean 
surrealist painter Matta). This link that Danielewski makes in the 
footnoted text also brings to light a certain fraternal relation 
between Truant and Lude (comparable with the one between Will 
and Tom Navidson in the main text). This relation reaches its 
zenith when the distinction between the appearance of what we 
might deem 'reality' and 'fantasy' is blurred where Truant 
describes the demise of Lude (the diary entry at the beginning of 
Chapter 21 states: 'October 25,1998, Lude's dead. ') This is 
supposedly at the hands of 'Gdansk man' as the first reprisal for 
Truant's affair with Kyrie (one of Zampan6's 'readers'). Also note 
here that Danielewski's sister (stage name, Poe) released an 
album in 2001 entitled Haunted and which particularly references 
this affair in the last track entitled 'Hey Pretty' (drive-by mix 
2001) and uses an extensive quote from the novel (pp. 88-9) and 
read by the author. Other tracks made reference to the novel 
('Exploration B', '5 & 1/2 Minute Hallway', 'Dear Johnny' and 'House 
of Leaves') but the predominant theme of the recording is a 
daughter's relationship with her recently deceased father. 
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Danielewski's own account of the novel and the 
theatricality of its construction began through the 
coalescence of a series of essays on how text could be 
explored in more cinematic ways. In an interview with 
Brian Logan, he stated: 
I've always had a fondness for the way the page, when 
wrapped in footnotes and marginalia seemed to come to life. 
It was like some strange two-dimensional stage. Our words 
and phrases have all been influenced by the writers that 
come before us. I thought this was a more honest way of 
104 
relating how stories are told . 
In Sculpting in Time, Tarkovsky argued that the 
adaptation of Bogomolov's novel into his first major 
feature film as a director (Ivan's Childhood) released the 
hidden cinematic potential of the novel. 
It opened up possibilities for recreating in a new way the 
true atmosphere of war, with its hyper-tense nervous 
concentration, invisible on the surface of events but making 
itself felt like a rumbling beneath the ground. 105 
For him the poetic links found in the logic of poetry in 
cinema were 'extraordinarily pleasing', 106 and in this 
sense he argued that he found himself to be more at 
home in the poetic than in the traditional theatrical 
writing linking images through the linearity of a rigidly 
logical development of plot. 
Some works have a wholeness and are endowed with a 
precise and original literary image; characters are drawn in 
unfathomable depths; the composition has an extraordinary 
capacity for enchantment, and the book is indivisible: 
through the pages comes the astonishing, unique 
personality of the author: books like that are masterpieces, 
104 Danielewski, interviewed by Brian Logan for the Guardian, 13 July 
2000. 
105 Added emphasis. Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 17. 
106 Ibid., p. 18. 
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and only someone who is actually indifferent both to fine 
prose and to the cinema can conceive the urge to screen 
them. It is all the more important to emphasise this point 
now, when the time has come for literature to be separated, 
107 
once and for all from cinema . 
Deleuze suggested that Tarkovsky's interpretation of time 
and how it flows through the shot was essentially through 
tension and rarefaction - the pressure of time in the shot. 
He argued that Tarkovsky denied the notion of a 
language of cinema working with units - the distinction 
between 'shot' as a framing device for the temporal, and 
'montage', which articulates and expresses the pressure 
of time to exceed the limits of any shot. 
The movement-image can be perfect, but it remains 
amorphous, indifferent and static if is not already deeply 
affected by injections of time which put montage into it, and 
alter movement. 108 
107 Ibid., p. 15. 
108 Deleuze, Cinema 2, pp. 42-3. 
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In Danielewski's introduction to House of Leaves, the 
character Johnny Truant's discussion of the task 
confronting him when dealing with Zampan6's papers 
about The Navidson Record is a montage of recollections 
that press the boundaries of legibility and demand of any 
editing process a decernability of appropriateness. 109 
Truant/Danielewski includes a number of Zampan6's 
notes, which are essentially illegible (the text is literally 
obliterated), as part of the montage of the text as a 
mechanism of disruption that does not follow a clear 
imperative towards mere exclusion, but in some ways 
articulates the continuity of limit by consistently 
exceeding it. 
109 1 note here the publication at the end of The Navidson Record an 
array of appendices (pertinent to both Zampanb and Johnny 
Truant) that include visual material (Exhibits One to Six) and 
various information the author deemed relevant as evidence of the 
events at Ash Tree Lane. Note here the choice of Ash Tree Lane 
as the address of the house. Danielewski indicates (noted at the 
close of the novel), a reference to the Nordic mythological tree, 
the ash-tree Yggdrasil, which was believed to support the universe 
while maintaining its roots in all worlds. The Nordic tradition 
depicted the entire world as a tree of prodigious proportions and 
whose foliage was always verdant. It was rooted firstly in the 
subterranean kingdom of the underworld (Niflhal) and where its 
root penetrated, the fountain Huergelmer rose. The second was 
rooted in the land of the giants and from which the fountain Mimir 
spouted (the water of which was where all wisdom dwelt and cost 
the god Odin an eye for the privilege of drinking there). The last 
root ascended to the heavens and from which the fountain of the 
wisest Norn, Urd, rose. This was the source of water, which kept 
the tree from withering through the daily attention of Norns. 
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The varying scale of these omissions reflects the 
dimensional discrepancies at work in the house and add 
to the mystery and ambiguity of any definitive reading of 
the events of The Navidson Record. 110 
110 It is worth noting here that all the detailed notes (and footnotes) 
made by Zampanb and corresponding to the mythology of the 
Labyrinth and the Minotaur are conspicuously and consistently 
obliterated. Mythology encrypted into the text, pp. 109-1 1. The 
presence of a monster/Minotaur is strongly alluded to by 
Danielewski (via the sonic presence indicated by individuals 
hearing various animalistic sounds inside the labyrinth) and also 
noted inside the hallways by physical manifestation; the 
destruction of markers and equipment left by the exploration team 
- the ambiguity of these actions remains unresolved as there is 
further indication that it is not necessarily the act of an individual 
entity but the entropic condition of the labyrinth itself. The 
transgressive nature of these acts is not confined merely to the 
narrative of The Navidson Record, but crosses into the footnoted 
text where Johnny Truant also finds himself haunted as he 
negotiates Zampan6's labyrinthine notes. This is first indicated 
when Johnny and Lude first enter the old man's apartment and 
note the four gouge marks near where the body was found: "'Right 
next to the body, " Lude continued, "I found these gouges in the 
hardwood floor, a good six or seven inches long. Very weird. But 
since the old man showed no sign of physical trauma, the cops let 
it go"' (p. xv). 'Sure enough, just as my friend had described, on 
the floor, in fact practically dead center, were four marks, all of 
them longer than one hand, jagged bits of wood clawed up by 
something neither one of us cared to imagine' (p. xvii, added 
emphasis). 
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The literal interpretation of the house as a 
mythological metaphor is conspicuously undermined by 
this unexplained obfuscation, yet in a similar way to 
Heidegger in 'On The Question of Being' and Derrida in 
Of Grammatology, plays with sous rature as a mechanism 
for identifying a discrepancy whereby any literal 
interpretation of what has been erased accepts the need, 
in the act of erasure, to identify what has been removed 
in such a way that its spectral trace remains as part of 
the event of erasure. Truant's introduction contextualises 
this inclusion by listing the variety, breadth and condition 
of Zampan6's notes and therefore expressing the scale of 
his task as editor: 
As I discovered, there were reams and reams of it. Endless 
snarls of words, sometimes twisting into meaning, 
sometimes into nothing at all, frequently breaking apart, 
always branching off into other pieces I'd come across later 
- on old napkins, the tattered edges of an envelope, once 
even on the back of a postage stamp; everything and 
anything but empty; each fragment completely covered with 
the creep of years and years of ink pronouncements; 
layered, crossed out, amended: handwritten, typed; legible, 
illegible; impenetrable, lucid; torn, stained, scotch taped; 
some bits crisp and clean, others faded, burnt or folded and 
refolded so many times the creases have obliterated whole 
passages of god knows what-sense? Truth? Deceit? a 
legacy of prophecy or lunacy or nothing of the kind?, and in 
the end achieving, designating, describing, recreating - find 
your own words; I have no more; or plenty more but why? 
And all to tell - what? 
"' 
Danielewski, House of Leaves, introduction p. xvii. I draw 
attention to the specific act of folding, unfolding and refolding 
that Truant identifies as 'an act of obliteration'. In The Fold: 
Lebniz and the Baroque, Deleuze states: 'Thus a continuous 
labyrinth is not a line dissolving into independent points, as 
flowing sand might dissolve into grains, but resembles a sheet of 
paper divided into infinite folds or separated into bending 
movements, each one determined by the consistent or conspiring 
surroundings' (p. 6, added emphasis). 
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For Deleuze, cinema is not strictly speaking a language, 
but rather a semiotic in the sense of a semiology steeped 
in the structuralism of a system of signs that exist as a 
universal and unchanging linguistic structure. However, 
his development of such a structural determination is 
through the reintroduction of the notion of a signic 
temporality in relation to thought. 112 
Deleuze does not dispute the narrational, historical 
possibilities of the cinematic, but prefers to consider 
mobility of the materiality of the image through the 
relation of immanence as the motivation for any definition 
of image and narration. The unchanging ahistorical 
narrative function conceived by the structuralist model 
imposes a grammar or language that determines via 
externality and therefore proposes (and imposes) any 
analysis in such a way that takes no regard of the 
specificity of the medium in which it is realised. This 
linguistic origin merely compounds the problem by in one 
way insisting that filmic signification is essentially non- 
verbal and operates outside and independently of any 
fixed language, yet insists on expounding cinematic 
signification via a linguistic model. 
Deleuze argues that a structuralist approach cannot 
avoid basing the theory of signification on a verbal model 
112 A brief diversion is appropriate here. Deleuze critiques the film 
theorist Christian Metz's structuralist approach in two ways; firstly 
by observing Metz's contention that cinema has 'no language' in 
the sense of a determinate structure, but is codified by narrative 
form and the adoption of novelistic practices (I draw attention to 
earlier remarks made with regard to Tarkovsky's 'free' adaptation' 
of literary material releasing its 'hidden cinematic power'). 
Secondly, Metz argued that cinematic shot has a relation to 
linguistic analysis, in that it cannot be conceived as merely an 
arbitrary sign since there is what he calls a motivated relation 
between an image and what it signifies and therefore 'shot' cannot 
be characterised by this 'double' operation. However, it does 
have some unity that is comparable with linguistic notions of 
'utterance', but which cannot be further divided by morphernic or 
phonemic analysis. Metz argued that film must be conceived as 
an organisation made up of distinct narrative segments that were 
linked and had spatiotemporal characteristics, which could be 
analysed as a distinct and discrete set of codes. 
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and therefore a structure, which is seemingly both inside 
and outside of the image. This form of semiology remains 
essentially reductionist in that it indicates filmic image 
and narrative are modelled on external forms, which are 
not fundamental to the materiality of the image. The 
camera might be conceived in sculptural terms in that it 
carves out via the frame a portion of space-time but such 
a framing device is usurped by a further event by which 
that which is framed by the mechanism of the camera is 
further required to be projected onto a screen of specific 
dimensions as the frame of frames (note here the title of 
Tarkovsky's text, Sculpting in Time). In Deleuze's words, 
it provides 'a common measure for that which has 
non e'. 113 Danielewski draws attention to what we might 
term, the parergonal sublimity of the events at Ash Tree 
Lane through the complication of scale that is 
concomitant with the paradoxical transition of a kind of 
depth of field. 
113 Deleuze, Cinema 1,27: 14. 
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In other words, the immen[ ]ity of Navidson's house eludes 
the frame. It exists only in Holloway's face, fear etc [I 
deeper and deeper into his features, the cost of dying paid 
out with p[ Jun[ ]s of flesh and e[ ]ch s[ ]allow breath. It is 
painful[ ] obvious the creature Holloway hunts has already 
begun to feed on him. 114 
However, this common measure rather than provide 
continuity and stability, tends towards disorientation 
rather than unification forcing together what Ronald 
Bogue refers to as 'qualitatively different views of things 
within an arbitrarily delineated surface area'. From 
camera to screen there is a destabilisation of the image - 
a deterritorialisation. 
Sometimes it is necessary to restore the lost parts, to 
rediscover everything that cannot be seen in the image, 
everything that has been removed to make it 'interesting'. 
But sometimes, on the contrary, it is necessary to make 
holes to introduce voids and white spaces, to rarefy the 
image, by suppressing things that have been added to make 
us believe that we were seeing everything. It is necessary 
to make a division or make emptiness in order to find the 
whole again. "5 
114 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 334. Note that the physical 
breaks in the text (the parentheses) indicated by the brackets not 
only emphasise the disorder and disorientation experienced inside 
the labyrinth of the house but also imply through the absence of 
specific letters and word fragments the possibility of: 
eAn(other) text to be read in absentia. 
*The literal consumption of the text by the creature Holloway is 
hunting. 
I draw attention here to the description of 'close-up' with regard 
to what has previously been remarked on via Deleuze and 
Tarkovsky (see footnote 82). Richard Polt in his essay, 'The Event 
of Enthinking the Event' (published in Companion to Heidegger's 
Contributions to Philosophy), identifies Heidegger's description of 
the work as essentially preparatory or transitional: 'Contributions 
claims to fall short of the status of work: they are merely a 
premonition of a phantom text that would be titled Das Ereignis, a 
text that exists only as a possibility opened by this one' (p. 96, 
added emphasis). I also comment here on the description of 
Holloway as a literary 'close-up', which has parallels with earlier 
remarks made about the close-up of the stalker in Tarkovsky's 
film. 
115 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 21. 
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In classical film the laws of motion function 
independently of time in a Newtonian sense, so that the 
dynamics of such cinema subordinate the temporal to 
movement. Modern cinema is distinctive because it 
essentially pulverises chronology so that the temporal is 
no longer subordinate to movements or linked to physical 
actions but is fragmented - like a broken crystal. 'Shot' 
defines, for Deleuze, a relatively open and variable space 
and is distinct from frame, which D. N. Rodowick 
describes as a provisionally closed and artificial set: 'it 
detaches objects from "pro-filmic space", grouping 
actions, gestures, bodies and decors in a motivated 
ensemble. 016 
When Bergson indicated that the idea of the image 
was already in the very interior of things, it was an 
attempt to overcome the dualism of realism and 
idealism, 117 object and subject, etc. Since the eighteenth 
century image was considered a representation of matter: 
an internal and more importantly secondary rendering or 
supplement of what exists outside of consciousness. 
Both realism and idealism require through the 
speculative interest of pure knowledge, a divorcing of the 
mind from both matter and spirit on the understanding 
that the latter exists outside both matter and time. 
Bergson proposed to re-establish a kind of continuity 
between consciousness, matter and time. This would 
rethink the notion of human contemplation that divorced 
mind from reality to proffer a perception of image and 
matter that was essentially identical. 
If matter were already image in the sense of a 
fundamental appearing, it becomes luminous in that all 
116 Rodowick, Deleuze's Time Machine, p. 11. 
117 In realism, one represents to oneself what actually is according to 
the presumed laws of nature. In idealism, one represents to 
oneself what is according to the presumed laws of thought. 
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that could be perceived would be already inherent as the 
replete state of the image. Deleuze referred to this 
condition as the 'plane of immanence' and this is 
essentially virtual to the extent that the requirements of 
the corporeal (the body) demand that limits are put in 
place on what can actually be apprehended in matter. 
Matter and image are continuous with yet distinctive 
from human perception on the understanding that the 
picturing of matter limits via its human/corporeal role and 
acts as a filter which relays specific information on 
specific wavelengths. This indicates two systems of 
images: one that is universal and immanent and the 
other, which is bodily and filtered by the physiological 
limits and human requirements. 
In Bergsonl . sm, Deleuze distinguishes between 
discovery and invention by articulating that the former is 
the uncovering of what already exists, whereas the latter 
gives being to what may not exist and may never happen. 
Donato Totaro argues that Deleuze's introduction of the 
crystal-image as the indivisible unity of the virtual and 
the actual maintains the virtual-image as essentially 
subjective and in the past -a pure recollection that 
exists outside of consciousness but alive in the temporal 
past and always ready (immanent) to be recollected by an 
actual-image. If memory is commonly conceived as a 
quantitatively or qualitatively impoverished version of the 
actuality of a present sense experience -a mere failed 
perception: it demands the question as to where memory 
is formed? As Bogue points out in Deleuze on Cinema, 
Bergson does not conceive memory as inside the 
individual mind and therefore determined by such 
individuation, but suggests a complication that usurps 
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any subject/object, interior/exterior relation by 
suggesting that each mind is in fact inside memory. 118 
There must, then be, a 'memory of the present', a virtual 
memory image that coexists with each perception image in 
the present, a virtual double that is like a reflection in a 
mirror. '19 
The metaphor of the trinity plays a significant role in 
Tarkovsky's interpretation of time and, with particular 
reference to Solaris and Stalker, transgresses even the 
tangible finitude of the cinematic composition. At the end 
of Tarkovsky's previous film, Andrei Rublev, the director 
creates a montage of Rublev's surviving icons (the only 
sequence of the film shot in colour), 120 one of which is 
perhaps his most famous and enduring image - The 
Trinity. 121 
A facsimile 122 of this painting appears briefly in shot 
on the space station in Solaris -a temporal shift from 
fifteenth-century icon painting to modern space station 
which begs the questions of firstly, whether this is merely 
a discrete allusion to his previous work, or does it have 
118 'Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority 
in which we are, in which we move, live and change. ' (Deleuze, 
Cinema 2, p. 82). 
119 Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, p. 118. 
120 It is worth noting here that in Stalker, Tarkovsky introduces colour 
only in the sequences inside the zone; the sequences that 
parenthesise the trip into the zone are shot in a sepia-tone which 
appears almost black and white. 
121 1 note here the significance of the concept of trinity as a thematic 
across all the discussed works. In House of Leaves there are 
variant possibilities - the relationship between Will, Karen and 
Tom; Johnny Truant, Lude and Zampan6; the three explorers, 
Holloway, Wax and Jed: the rescuers, Will, Reston and Tom. 
There is an obvious trinity in Stalker: that of the stalker, Scientist 
and Writer as well as the stalker, his wife and Monkey. In Solaris 
we have the three scientists on the space station and the 
relationship between Kelvin, Rheya/Hari and Kelvin's father. In 
her text, Tarkovsky: Cinema as Poetry, Maya Turovskaya draws 
attention to the trinity as an artistic three-in-one', in relation to 
the distinctive characters of three monks/icon painters in Andrei 
Rublev - Rublev, his mentor DaniiI Chorny and his rival Kirill. 
122 The significance of the appearance of a facsimile of the Rublev 
icon should be noted here as almost a precursor to events on the 
station (the appearance of the phi-creature Rheya/Hari) and 
latterly, Kelvin's apparent reunion with his father. 
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far reaching implications for the forthcoming climax of 
this film (already alluded to in the opening sequences of 
Tarkovsky's opus but entirely absent from the novel)? 
Secondly, is Tarkovsky identifying the trinity of Kelvin, 
Hari and Kelvin's father as the psychological thread 
drawing the viewer through the narrative in a way that 
places Kelvin as the foci for the unfolding of events (the 
'point of view') where the arrival of the visitor/phi- 
creature Hari forces Kelvin to reappraise his past and his 
future? 123 
11 
Kelvin's eventual redemption with his father at the end of 
the film (an almost biblical image of the return of the 
prodigal son) is undermined by the final moments of the 
film where the camera pulls back to reveal that this 
moment of reconciliation is actually taking place on an 
island set in the ocean of the planet and not back on 
Earth. With reference to time he states: 
123 Tarkovsky also uses Bruegel's Hunt in Winter as a mechanism by 
which he can explore Kelvin's past and introduce the ambiguous 
relationship between mother and wife which he develops further in 
Mirror. 
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Our awareness of that time is totally different from that of 
the people who lived them. But nor do we thinks of Rublev's 
'Trinity' in the same way as his contemporaries, and yet the 
'Trinity' has gone on living through the centuries; it was 
alive then, and is so now, and it is a link between the 
people of that century and this. 124 
The complexity of time which defies orthodox linearity is 
equally prescient in House of Leaves with particular 
reference to the disorientation of the labyrinthine through 
the progressive explorations from the arrival of Holloway 
Roberts and his team to the final excursion of Navidson 
himself. 125 
As is noted, the impact of sound in the form of echo 
might serve as an effective way of evaluating the 
spatiality of physical, emotional and thematic distance, 
but as Danielewski speculates, this is generally confined 
to the definition of large spaces. 126 
The distortion of distance through what we might 
see as the complex ideation of convolution, interference 
and confusion is the fundamental condition of the 
labyrinth and poses the possibility of de-centring in the 
Derridian sense already outlined earlier in this chapter as 
124 Added emphasis. Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 79. 
125 1 am reminded here that Danielewski exploits the condition of 
maze-treaders and maze viewers in a temporal sense in the text 
by following both Karen and Will's activities during Navidson's 
final visit to the house. Sequentially the growing anxiety of 
Karen's despair at Navidson's disappearance is not relieved until 
the following narrative of Navidson's journey into the labyrinth, 
which we accept as events, which are running concurrently with 
the previous narrative concludes with Karen and Navidson 
reunited at the entrance to the hallway. Here Danielewski exploits 
the concept of 'point of view' as outlined previously in this 
chapter. 
126 1 note here what has been mentioned earlier with regard to the so- 
called body without organs -a cavity of sorts. The echo of the 
labyrinthine cavity in some way might define its spaciousness but 
is continually undermined by the continual renegotiation of the 
labyrinth's dimensions to the point where dimensionality is 
refused by the alterity of the hallways. Also the sound of the 
occupant of the labyrinth conforms to 'glorious unarticulated sonic 
blocks which haunt the hallways and transgress into the footnoted 
text. 
329 
not only an essentially spatial commodity, but also a 
temporal one. 
The mechanism by which an ech 0127 might define a 
spatial entity can only do so with the inclusion of a 
temporal element in that sound can define scale through 
temporal measurement. 
By the same token, the variant capaciousness of the 
labyrinthine house persists in the determination of a 
notion of the de-centred as the overarching thematic 
through the continuous variation of scale and proximity 
that navigation appears to initiate. As Danielewski has 
the character Zampan6 comment, postulating on the 
possibility of transcribing a ground plan based on the film 
footage: 
the schematic then, is a schismatic rendering of empty 
rooms, long hallways and dead ends ... perpetually 
promising, but forever eluding the finality of immutable 
128 layout . 
Navidson's navigation of the labyrinth in the final section 
of the novel is provisionally preoccupied with 
instrumentation by which and for which he believes he 
can describe the scale of the underground passages by 
measurement of distance and time. 
127 Echo was a Greek nymph (technically known as an Oread -a 
nymph of the mountains and grottoes) who followed Hera but 
distracted her whenever Zeus paid court to a nymph with constant 
chattering and singing. On discovering this, Hera deprived her of 
the ability to speak and condemned her to be only able to repeat 
the last syllable spoken in her presence. When she fell in love 
with Narcissus, she was unable to declare her love and was 
rejected, dying of a broken heart in solitary caverns where she 
went to grieve. Her bones turned to stone and all that remained of 
her was the echo of her disembodied voice. 
128 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 109. He emphasises this 
impossibility by drawing attention to the fictitious film's 'constant 
destruction of continuity, frequent jump cuts prohibiting any sort 
of accurate mapmaking' (p. 109). 
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However, it becomes clear that such attention to rigorous 
scientific methodology cannot give shape to the topology 
as through the process of navigation the variant capacity 
of the labyrinth takes affect and changes begin to take 
place. It is possible to suggest that these changes only 
take place as it were with the inclusion of a human 
presence or presences within the hallways and 
Danielewski intimates that the psychological dimension 
(the labyrinth as a manifestation of Navidson's state of 
mind - think back here to the labyrinth as a manifestation 
of the unconscious as indicated by Deleuze in Nietzsche 
and Philosophy) is not without some credibility. It was 
noted earlier in the chapter that the horrors encountered 
by him at Ash Tree Lane are the manifestation of his own 
troubled psyche and the physical incarnation of 
psychological pain. 129 
The unevenness that constitutes the spatio-temporal 
relation in the house suggests a composite which 
articulates a combination allowing the spatial to introduce 
its forms of what Deleuze would term, extrinsic 
distinctions of sectional homogeneous discontinuity, 
while duration contributes a kind of internal succession 
that is both heterogeneous and contin UOUS. 130 Deleuze 
states in The Logic of Sense that there is no stranger 
element than a double-headed entity with two unequal or 
uneven halves, where perpetual displacement and empty 
place combine through the experiential to transcend lived 
129 The variant possibilities for Navidson's psychological problems 
are identified by Danielweski as, for example, that of the strained 
relationship between him and his partner Karen, the problematic 
fraternal relation between Will and Tom, and the more elusive one 
on which Navidson made his name, which is manifest in the 
Pulitzer Prize winning photograph of 'Delial'. What is of interest 
here is that the former is the only relationship that survives - Tom 
is ingested by the house and 'Delial', although recorded in the 
photo, could not be saved by Navidson at the time the shot was 
taken, and dies. 
130 This composite, which associates duration with immediate datum, 
is concomitant with the 'right' or the 'good' side. 
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experience through a process of 'going beyond', which 
not only suggests an enlargement of that experience, but 
proposes that such expansion is always and already a 
condition of that experience. 
12 
As he observed in the nonsensical world that Lewis 
Carroll created in Alice in Wonderland and Through the 
Looking Glass: 
'The most provoking of all' (oddest: the most incomplete, 
the most disjoined) was that 'whenever Alice looked hard at 
any shelf, to make out exactly what it had on it, that 
particular shelf was always quite empty, though the others 
round it were crowded as full as they could hold. ' How 
things disappear here, says she finally in a plaintive tone, 
after having spent about a minute in a vain pursuit of a 
large bright thing that looked sometimes like a doll and 
sometimes like a work-box and was always on the shelf next 
above the one she was looking at ... 
I'll follow it up to the 
very top shelf of all. It'll puzzle it to go through the ceiling, 
I expect! But even this plan failed: the thing went through 
the ceiling as quietly as possible, as if it were quite used to 
it 131 
131 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 41. Extract taken from Through 
the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll, p. 171. Note here that the 
Navidsons first become aware of the shifting anomalies of the 
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The puzzlement experienced by Alice in the Sheep's 
Shop is not only identified in the objects resistance to 
the stability of a specific location concomitant with other 
surrounding locations similar in form, but also that it 
transgresses those other locations (the other shelves) by 
its very continual nature of refusal to conform to a placial 
integrity of thereness based in presence. This 
discontinuity of recognition through familiarity identifies 
the rigour of logic and sense as in some way integral to 
that discontinuity in that they proffer parenthetical 
conditions by which and from which the elusiveness of 
non-sense can emerge. 132 That the object itself is in no 
way clear to Alice (her indecision as to what she 
recognises the object to be), suggests that such 
disintegration of the language of logic by which she might 
express the clarity of the object, already dislocates it 
from a reality of logical preposition. The process by 
which the object might assert itself as an object through 
house when Karen's homely project of putting up shelves alerts 
them to the evolving dimensional discrepancies (Karen latterly 
learns more of the history of the house prior to her final visit in 
search of Navidson, when visiting the estate agent Alicia 
Rosenbaum, who originally assisted her in putting up the shelves). 
The suggestion that an act of homeliness should draw attention to 
the realisation of un-home-like variants as they emerge implies, 
as indicated in Chapter 3, that familiarity is presupposed by the 
unfamiliar and that as such, the more one suppresses the 
unheimlich with the heimlich, the more the former emerges and is 
maintained as unheimlich. Danielewski quotes Heidegger in Seln 
und Zeit when describing the first sense of intrusion in the house 
by indicating that what had taken place 'amounts to a strange 
spatial violation' (House of Leaves, p. 24). 'In anxiety one feels 
uncanny. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that, which Dasein 
finds itself alongside anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the 
"nothing and nowhere". But here "uncanniness" also means "not- 
being-at-home"' (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 233). Equally, Will 
Navidson's attempts to finally map the house result in the 
realisation of an abysmal anomaly which refuses both spatial and 
temporal alignment. This is mirrored in the footnoted text initially 
by the discovery (by Truant and Lude) of measuring tapes 
bisecting Zampan6's apartment; and later in the text, Truant's own 
growing obsession with scale resulting in similar behaviour. 
132 In the introduction to Foucault's Death and the Labyrinth, John 
Ashbery comments that Max MOller's theory of myths was that they 
were borne out of what he describes as a sort of 'disease of 
language' (p. xxiv). We may note here a comparison with what has 
been earlier discussed with regard to language in Chapter 2 of 
this text. 
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unmediated presence is rejected (perhaps more 
appropriately disrupted) in favour of the ongoing potential 
and discontinuity of its elusive becoming (it is there in 
that Alice recognises it to be an object of some kind, but 
it is also 'not', in that it refuses the sensibility of being 
continuous as a certain kind of specific object). While 
this operates within the confines of subjective familiarity 
(the heimlich; the operation takes place within the 
recognisable environ of a shop - albeit a shop with a 
sheep as its proprietor) '133 it is not restricted by such 
specific parameters of expectation (and anticipation) 
based in the understanding of the shop as a place of 
commerce and therefore likely to be stocked with 
recognisable objects for purchase. 
The object's ability to escape not only the confines 
of the shop by transgressing the architectonic (literally, 
to go through the ceiling 'as if it were quite use to it') but 
also Alice's expectations that in the world of the Looking 
Glass, any exterior rule of logic might be applied or 
imposed, argues for the law of alteric de-territorialisation 
where objectivity defies objectification and the spectrality 
of the unheimlich interrupts the organisation and 
restriction of continuity. The shop understood as ordered 
commercial edifice transgressed by the extraordinariness 
of its proprietor and the elusiveness of particular stock 
items. 
Similarly, in House of Leaves the unnamed and 
undefined monster that haunts the house cannot be 
expected or anticipated to restrict itself to the 
labyrinthine containment of The Navidson Record section 
133 See illustration number 12 of this chapter. Maya Turovskaya 
notes, regarding the final scene in Solaris in Tarkovsky: Cinema 
as Poetry: 'It is the image of a familiar yet strange looking-glass 
world called into being out of nothingness by the living and 
mysterious Ocean of Solaris' (p. 57, added emphasis). 
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of the text (the traditional form of the body of the text). 
By escaping and transgressing into the footnoted 
passages, a further undermining of the familiarity of 
lingual order takes place. This distinguishes itself from a 
perceived hierarchy of the precedent of the body of the 
text from the footnote though the radicality of an alteric 
de-territorialisation. Likewise, the room at the centre of 
the zone in Stalker permeates the consciousness of not 
only all who seek it, but all who are aware of its 
mythology - all who aspire to visit it but are fearful of its 
power and the risks involved in taking on such a 
journey. "' 
[A]s if to imply in a larger way that there are some places in 
this world which no one will ever possess or inhabit. 135 
The seeming restrictions of the labyrinthine house cannot 
contain the possibility for the horror of that which it 
imprisons from escaping confinement through the 
fundamental disruption of the order by which that 
restriction is imposed. 
The mere determination and imposition of a science 
of geography and topography (what we might refer to 
collectively as a certain kind of cartographic ratio) can no 
longer proffer the mechanisms by which one might not 
only navigate its locale but also escape its unrestrained 
imposition as it can no longer be confined to the 
rudiments of the architectonics of pure containment. 136 
134 Its possibility, in that it offers the risk of possibility, encourages 
'scientist' to seek its destruction by taking an explosive device 
into the zone to annihilate it. The parallels with Theseus and the 
Minoan labyrinth should be considered here. 
135 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 414. 
136 As they become more involved in the study of The Navidson 
Record, both Truant and Zampan6 resort to attempting to stabilise 
their immediate environments by imposing mechanisms of 
measurement (tape measures tacked to wall and floor). This is 
paralleled in The Navidson Record itself as the explorers attempt 
to define and describe the house (impose their laws upon it) 
through measurement of both time and space. 
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Where such devices fail to reconcile such reasonable 
markers 137 with that which refuses to be identified in such 
a manner, then perhaps the only means available lie in 
the topology of a kind of metastability of the event of 
haunting where the spectral destabilises and the 
enforcement of determined orientation crumbles in the 
face of disequilibrium. 138 
In the case of fraternal continuity in which hope 
might be found in the familial of the family, the 
unheimlich imposes its most rigorous demands. 
Danielewski, via Truant's hastily reconstituted text of 
Zampan6's, considers the question of birthright and 
sibling rivalry in the complex relationship between Will 
and his brother Tom. 
As has already been discussed in Chapter 3, the 
biblical narrative of Jacob and Esau 139 takes on a specific 
discursive posture with regard to the relation between 
Will and Tom and in forming the basis for this series of 
speculations. This might equally and, with the same 
credulity, be applied to the already noted similarity in 
what I will term 'fraternal complexities' between Gordon 
137 The markers laid by the explorers to find their way back, when 
found, have either been violently damaged or have been gripped 
by some kind of entropic dissipation within the confines of the 
house. 
138 Danielewski notes: 'of course real horror does not depend upon 
the melodrama of shadows or even the conspiracies of night' 
(ibid., p. 415). 
139 As is noted in House of Leaves, the names Jacob and Esau derive 
from two pertinent roots. The former comes from Ya'abov (Jacob) 
the root of which is akav - to delay or restrain; and the latter is 
from ash - to hurry (I also note the connection here with the 
address of the house: Ash Tree Lane). It is also noted here that 
Esau also means hairy and Jacob heel holder or supplanter. We 
might draw attention here to a potential link between the 
characters of both sets of brothers and what has been remarked 
earlier about Bachofen's concepts of matriarchy and patriarchy in 
Mother Right. The theory of the telluric usurped by ideality (the 
Hellenic determination of the Apollonic) could equally be applied 
to the story of Jacob and Esau (the telluric Esau cheated out of 
his inheritance by the 'restraining' and 'luminosity' of the 
'spiritual' Jacob) - the immortality of the Uranian Solar hero 
(Jacob) against the materiality of the chthonic and telluric figure 
(Esau). 
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Matta-Clark and his brother Batan (Sebastian) in Chapter 
3 of this text as an en-cystic interruption of the familial. 
In both cases the loss of one of the siblings is arguably 
consequential of the actions of the other or perhaps, 
questionably a (re)action to introjective events. 
In House of Leaves, Tom, as the reluctant rescuer 
mans the base-camp at the top the staircase while his 
brother Will and his disabled companion Reston go in 
search of Holloway 140 and his team after they fail to 
return from Exploration#4. 
He is the locale (an intermediary link), which 
connects the thread by which and for which Will and 
Reston can not only traverse the hallways with some 
confidence (in the sense of moving forward), but also 
retrace their steps once they have achieved their aim of 
retrieval and rescue of Holloway and his compatriots. 
By his own admission, Tom is nothing like his brother. He 
has neither the fierce ambition nor the compulsion for risk 
taking. If both brothers paid the price for their parents' 
140 It is noted in the afore-mentioned biblical/fraternal relation that 
Tom could be seen as Esau to Will's Jacob, however, a 
complication is introduced which suggests that in fact the explorer 
Holloway appears to be a more appropriate Esau (his physicality 
as literally 'more hairy' (see footnote 120) and the fact that at the 
commencement of Exploration#4 he arms himself like a hunter 
(with fatal consequences for his companions)) and arguably 
reflects a more dynamic, tellurian character against the text's 
descriptions of a largely passive Tom. This suggests that the real 
fraternal conflict is between the tellurian Holloway and the 
transcendent Will. It is also noted at the end of Chapter XIII 
(subtitled The h4inetau-r+* that even though Holloway is armed and 
hunting the creature: 'It seems erroneous to assert, like Pitch, 
that this creat[ ]e had actual teeth and claws of b[ ]e (which myth 
for some reason[ ] requires). [ ]t df ]d have claws, they were made 
of shadow and if it did have te[ ]th, they were made of darkness. 
Yet even as such the [] still stalked Holl[ ]way at every corner 
until at last it did strike, devouring him, even roaring, the last 
thing heard, the sound [ jf Holloway ripped out of existence' 
(p. 338). 
*Note here earlier remarks about the use of striking out in the text 
of The Navidson Record, apparently by Zampan6 and with regard 
to all references to the myth of the labyrinth of Minos. In so 
doing, the myth is no longer merely obliterated but is retained via 
such exclusion - held in absentia within the body of the text as 
both trace and spectre (like the creature resident in the house). 
337 
narcissism, 141 Will relied on aggression to anchor the world 
while Tom passively accepted whatever the world would 
give or take away. 142 
To be exiled from the familiar terrain of fraternal support 
- orphaned at the age of forty, 143 both in the ordinary 
circumstances of the familial and in the extraordinary 
circumstances of the house, results, ultimately, in Tom's 
demise, whereby he is swallowed as the edifice 
collapses. This is described in the chapter 'Escape', and 
could be interpreted in two ways; firstly, as a tellurian 
return to the matriarchal womb for the orphaned Tom, 
and secondly, as the entombment of an untimely burial 
for the unhappy twin. Will's (ultimately unsuccessful) 
search for him in the final part of the book shifts the 
emphasis of the earlier explorations from, firstly the 
determination to impose a mapping on the house to 
secondly, Holloway's hunt for its elusive alteric occupant 
which results in the death of Holloway and (at Holloway's 
own hand) of one of his own team. 
In Will's last exploration (which is both a search for 
the ingested Tom and an ultimate attempt via various 
technological means to finally describe, transcribe and 
ultimately, control the house) he appears as 
Apollonian/Uranian hero attempting, via all technological 
means at his disposal, to restrain the labyrinthine with 
ratio. The house defies such conflation of its properties 
by reducing its continual refutation of the frameworks of 
recognised spatiality and temporality to a 'grotesque 
vision of absence. 9 144 This final confrontation of man and 
141 See earlier remarks on the Greek myth of Echo and her abortive 
relationship with Narcissus. 
142 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 246. 
143 It is commented in the text that Tom's relationship with Will and 
Karen is almost that of a child with its parents. Tom's fortieth year 
is also the year of the birth of Navidson's son, Chad, hence his 
'being orphaned'. 
144 Danielewski, House of Leaves, p. 464. 
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house is reduced, through the edificial collapse (already 
premeditated as a possibility in the earlier chapter 
'Escape' ), 14 5 as Navidson continues to traverse its 
passageways and halls shedding the vast array of 
technological paraphernalia he entered with, as it ceases 
to function and becomes detritus, progressively hindering 
his passage and becoming useless to him. 
Very soon he will vanish completely in the wings of his own 
wordless stanza. 146 
* 
Escape appears to be the final operation of those who 
transgress the labyrinthine. Any attempts to transcribe 
its circuitous passages and tame its alteric (de)centre, 
are hopeless and are bound to fail in the futility of the 
attempt to enforce rationality where ratio can never hold 
sway. Theseus returns, having vanquished the Minotaur, 
to a temporary (a moment) of harmony with Ariadne, 
which is a mere respite before he descends into further 
mythological trauma that may or may not result, for 
example, in Ariadne's death. 
Likewise, Rheya/Hari's sacrifice (her achievement 
of human stature) allows Kelvin what appears to be an 
opportunity to resolve his problematic relationship with 
his father, only for a change of perspective on the part of 
the viewer (a development of shot - an overview) to 
realise that Kelvin has been unable (or unwilling) to 
escape Solaris. 147 The trinity of stalker, scientist and 
writer return from the zone unscathed, and false hope is 
145 Ibid., pages 339-46. 
146 Ibid., p. 484. The structure of the text parallels the reduction and 
compression of the house in the final pages describing Navidson's 
journey and giving a strong sense of physical conflation. This also 
bears comparison with earlier remarks in Chapter 2 of this text on 
disfluency and Celan and the seemingly inevitable reductive 
process towards silence. 
147 In Soderbergh's version, Kelvin and Rheya/Hari are reunited on 
Solaris. 
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raised that a reward has been bestowed when it appears 
that the stalker's child is now able to walk. However, as 
in Solaris, as our perspective changes (again the camera 
pulls back to open up the shot) and we are able to survey 
the whole terrain, it is not as it first appeared and the 
child is not walking unaided but is being carried on her 
father's shoulders. Will Navidson's escape is ultimately 
without his brother or Holloway, who cannot be found: but 
at what cost is his escape? Danielewski indicates a 
number of possible end scenarios (Karen and Will both 
reunited and not - although Chapter XXII, the final 
chapter, ends with an apparent interview with Karen 
where she describes the house dissolving after she has 
pulled Will free), which link to similar possibilities in the 
footnoted text (appearing in the form of a diary) on 
Johnny Truant as he appears to travel east from 
California in a vain search for Navidson, his family and 
the inexplicable house at Ash Tree Lane, only for the 
reader to be confounded at the end of Chapter XXI with 
the realisation that Truant's apparent recuperation and 
reintroduction into the world is a fantasy and that for him 
too there is no solution, no happy ending, no conclusion. 
The text spirals on into appendices and the images of 
what are titled exhibits that are presented as evidence or 
proof (a 'final' proof? ) of what we have read. 
What remains is possibility (the possibility of 
impossibility in the abysmal) - the thread that is 
predisposed to navigation without itself condoning the 
transcription of what appears to be navigable or 
seemingly requiring navigation. 
Orientation presents the quandary in which the 
combination of compression and release in the crystal- 
image are found. The turn of breath of the labyrinthine - 
its continuous discontinuity - determines a ructure that 
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encysts, always encrypting through a combination of 
disclosure and undisclosure which, though marked by, 
and defining illumination and shadow, remains other to 
both and therefore spectral. Its bestial heart refutes 
through introjections - vomiting inward and outward - at 
once the uncanny operation of both expelation and 
implication. Orientation of the labyrinthine is always and 
already disoriented and interred in the rules of navigation 
as its secret arbiter. It is the apparitional operation with 
which the aesthetic of the cinematic escapes the spatial 
and the confinement of its sequential spatiality through 
the temporal deterritorialisation of discontinuous 
fragmentation and as yet unknowable and unforeseen 
combinations. 
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Conclusion 
When John Rajchman draws attention to the figure of the 
'experimenter' in The Deleuze Connections (2000) as the 
perpetrator of the shift of the work of art from the realm 
of representation to that of experience, he notes that 
aesthetics ceases to be judged in the Kantian sense, but 
becomes a matter of experimentation -a 'science of the 
sensible'. ' In the preceding chapters, I have speculated 
on the aesthetic forms of poetry, the artwork, film and the 
novel, to extract a notion of sensation from a tradition of 
representation and subordination to the prior discourse of 
conceptual enframing through the uncovering of the 
spectral. These holzweg are linked across the terrain of 
the text via what I term the operation of the apparition or 
the event of the spectre through the strangeness of what 
is essentially continuous about discontinuity. However, 
the operation, to conclude indicates a procedure, which 
culminates in a certain kind of finitude - the 'completion' 
of an interrogation, which connotes the possibility or 
more appropriately, the probability of a certain kind of 
resolution. In commencing such a traversal, we place 
such conclusivity of information as in some way 
encrypted into its predication. However, what I have 
sought to question is not what we already 'know' in the 
sense of either a confirmation or a denial but rather to 
thread a way between what might be considered 
'indicative to' yet 'exclusive of' mere affirmation or 
I Rajchman comments in The Deleuze Connections that: 'Artworks are 
composed of sensations, prelinguistic and presubjective, brought 
together in an expressive material, through an anorganised plan, with 
which we have peculiar relations. They are not to save us (or to damn or 
corrupt us), but rather to complicate things, to create more complex 
nervous systems no longer subservient to the debilitating effects of 
cliches, to show and release possibilities of a life. ' P. 138. 
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negation - the conception of the spectral through 
hauntology. To negotiate such an ambulatory operation 
demands that movement is no longer predicated in the 
'purely' spatial as a calculation or machination but is 
'appropriated' by a spectral determination (if this is not a 
contradiction) that is (dis)located in temporality. Here a 
'locale' is found where chronology is no longer the 
mechanism by which and for which the (non)sensibility of 
time can continue to be articulated. It is an anomaly of 
simultaneity which is 'at once' both and neither purely 
spatial nor temporal - the interruptive spectral 
'operation' of the apparition; the science of the spectre; 
hauntology. I have proposed that this tracing (the 
Derridian trait) is no longer merely outside (as an 
exteriority -a lingual 'scrawl' on a surface which bounds 
and keeps safe an interior through exclusivity) and so 
determined by subordination to what demands 
incorporation 'into' the inside, but proposes a more 
complex and 'insidious operation' of encyst-ence of which 
the operation of introjection is now the active functor. 
If all terminologies must be considered provisional, 
any topographic realisation shifts through a twist of 
surface (a 'fold') into the recognition of the fraenum as 
no longer the 'locale' with which the substantiation of the 
intransitive determines navigation, but indicates a 
conflagration of variation and experimentation through 
'active' perspectival junctures (topos or Wegmarken) 
which resist the enforcing of the mechanistic tropes of 
the cartographic and introduce the ructure as the 
Holzweg. This realisation of a 'new' language of 
cryptology is not at the expense of predicated lingual 
continuity (in the sense of a usurpation of one system by 
another) or the enforced repression of its determining 
agencies (a 'violent' infraction of 'historical' trajectories), 
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but the recognition of a (dis)ordered intervention that is 
not the product of either the exterior enacting upon an 
interior or vice versa, but through the cystic symbiotic 
'relation' of a kind of parasitic morselation. Here the term 
Holzweg allows for the variant trajectories, which 
determine the labyrinthine and its tomblike encryption 
and which refutes the imposition of order or ratio on the 
risk of its myriad of possible pathways, escape routes 
and dead ends. 
In making the selection of areas of study 
undertaken in this text, an aesthetic approach was 
determined via the particularities of poetry, artwork, 
novel and film. This also formed the thread by which such 
a trajectory was possible and again indicated the 
variation and discontinuity and labyrinthine possibilities 
of the Holzweg. It began with a specifically un- 
chronological confrontation of aesthetics and hauntology 
via diffdrance as a philosophical mechanism for 
uncovering the rift. This led to a discourse on the 
specificity of the poem 'Todtnauberg' as the variant 
(dis)location of haunting through the silence of insatiated 
anticipation and as a topos of poison and cure. From 
here were considered the encryptive operations of 
introjection and encyst-ence as the realisation of the 
unheimlich manoeuvre as simultaneously the creation of 
a work of art and the event of mourning (the realisation 
of an absence) in the artistic practice of Gordon Matta- 
Clark. Finally the labyrinthine as both the locale within 
which a secret is kept and the eventuality (haunting) of 
the maintenance of that secret as secret. 
In uncovering a discourse which articulates the 
spectre as not merely the realisation or manifestation of 
difference, but as that which haunts a locale (the rift) 
that is no longer outside an inside, but in some way 
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inside an inside while still remaining essentially outside, 
'pure' spatiality is interrupted by alterity. As neither 
'transcendent' spirit (the 'infinite') nor mere 'facsimile' of 
the corporeal or 'morbid matter' (the 'finite'), the ghost 
finds its peras 'in' the abysmal - the alteric no-where of 
a no-thing. This is the determining agency that refutes 
mere negation as the subordinate 'inversion' of 
'affirmation' by excavating possibility and variation from 
the obdurate universality of metaphysical systernisation. 
Such an insinuation ('the operation of the apparition') has 
been the overarching thematic of this text and in 
recognising the import of the rift in the articulation of this 
discussion we have not merely exploited the 'condition' of 
absence so determined by the a priori of a presence, but 
uncovered the complication of the rift as immediately, a 
'relation' through diff6rance and as indicative of the trait 
in the Derridian sense. 
As has been noted, the term rift ('borrowed' from 
the Heideggerian treatise on aesthetics, 'The Origin of 
the Work of Art') does not merely operate as a 'gap' in 
the sense of a straightforward caesura distinguishing 
between identities without questioning the principles of 
identity (but remains what is not and cannot be identified 
through the mere scrutiny of what is merely identifiable). 
It exploits the variant meaning in the term (in translation, 
as Heidegger notes the German word riss meaning both 
tear or break and ground plan or drawing) as the 
methodology for a discussion, which places variation and 
the topological as the 'new' pedagogy and aesthetics as 
the terrain through which such a study could take place. 
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Commencing from the outline of the rift ('the plan') 
in chapter one through the specificity of the exemplars of 
the poetic, the work of art, cinema and the novel, it is 
evident that the traversal undertaken does not lead to 
conclusivity (a solution to a puzzle) but finds itself 
literally lost in the labyrinthine and confronted by yet 
further possible holzweg. Here the real possibility is 
continuing to fall, like Alice into an indeterminable abyss 
for which there is no preparation; no map, except to 
recognise what it means 'to fall', and how to do so 
appropriately. 
That into which one falls, is the risk of variation and the 
ghost, which haunts such a topos, is not a reminder of 
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termination but the affirmation of possible beginnings. 
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